Mike Guardia (21 page)

The Korean War represented a unique opportunity for Volckmann. Throughout the conflict, unconventional warfare occurred in two overlapping phases. In the first phase, spanning from June 1950 until fall 1951, U.S. conventional forces conducted counterguerrilla operations against the NKPA irregulars. The second phase of unconventional warfare, from January 1951 until the cease-fire in 1953, saw the U.S. Eighth Army develop its own “special operations command” to conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The North Koreans made extensive use of guerrilla units during the first year of combat. From a military standpoint, NKPA guerillas served two functions: (1) their tactics could offset the superiority of American maneuver forces; and (2) while camouflaging themselves within the local population, NKPA partisans could work to undermine American ideology. The irony of the situation was not lost on Volckmann, for the NKPA strategy was nearly identical to the plan he had developed against the Japanese a decade ago.

As North Korean partisans wrought havoc on American assets, the newly appointed Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton “Lighting Joe” Collins, scrambled for a cohesive plan to neutralize the enemy guerrillas. Among the most significant problems caused by NKPA irregulars were their attacks against lines of communication and rear areas. The hastily devised solution from the Chief of Staff thereby included a directive to all in-theater units—as well as those tapped for deployment—to receive instruction on counterguerrilla techniques.
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When the stateside units began their predeployment training, they utilized the only literature available on counterguerrilla operations: Volckmann’s FM 31-20.

Meanwhile, General Douglas MacArthur, now the commander of UN forces, pondered his next move. He was confident in handling the conventional aspects of the war, but dealing with the NKPA partisans brought to mind an aspect of warfare that he had hoped to leave behind in the Philippines. Admittedly, he had never been a fan of irregular warfare or the “special operations” concept.
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Nonetheless, during his days at SWPA, he had feverously supported the USAFIP-NL and had even been quoted as saying that the guerrillas were indispensable to the outcome of the campaign. Whatever the genesis of MacArthur’s reservations towards unconventional warfare, he nonetheless approved of the creation of special Army units to combat enemy guerrillas.
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However, creating the framework and the operating principles for these units could not be done without the help of someone more knowledgeable in the ways of guerrilla warfare. Recalling the young officer who had radioed him from North Luzon years earlier, MacArthur gave simple instructions to his staff in Tokyo:
find Russ Volckmann and get him in here.

At the start of the Korean War, the U.S. Army had no command apparatus for special operations. In fact, the term “special operations” had yet to gain widespread acceptance throughout the military. In response to North Korean partisans, the Army simply created a series of units geared for counterguerrilla or “behind-the-lines” activities. Most of these units fell under jurisdiction of the Eighth Army G-3 Miscellaneous Group, although the Far East Command did retain its own, organic special operations unit.
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When Volckmann arrived in Tokyo to report to Eighth Army Headquarters, he met with Colonel John H. McGee,
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the hastily appointed Director of Special Operations for the Eighth Army.
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Weighing in with his assessment of the situation, Volckmann emphasized the need for small-unit tactics and mobility. The elusive nature of the guerrillas would be consistent regardless of what country or ideology to which they swore their allegiance. North Koreans, however, would be especially problematic. They were united not only by a common ideology—in this case, Communism—but an ideology that was now shared by two of America’s newest enemies: the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The ideological link could spell disaster if it translated into material support. Volckmann also knew that the biggest concern—outside of destroying the guerrilla’s combat capabilities—was to keep them away from civilians. Considering that NPKA had a better grasp on Korean culture and language, enemy partisans would undoubtedly have the upperhand in turning the population against Americans. In the early days of the conflict, when America appeared to be on the losing end of the war, a fear of the South Koreans’ receptiveness to Communist ideology was not completely without merit. A priority for all special operations, therefore, lay in building a rapport with the local civilians.

While still assigned to Eighth Army Headquarters, MacArthur appointed Volckmann the Executive Officer of the Special Activities Group (SAG)–Far East Command.
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SAG was an interesting conglomeration of U.S. Army Rangers, Marines, and other South Korean personnel commanded by Colonel Louis B. Ely, a veteran of the OSS. As Executive Officer, Volckmann’s responsibility lay in planning and conducting guerrilla activities behind NKPA lines. SAG conducted numerous patrols during the first year of the Korean War, and became especially adept at nighttime operations. “The unit screened refugees, destroyed villages and buildings that could be used by [enemy] guerrillas, and provided medical treatment to civilians. Its effectiveness was enhanced by the provision of radios down to the squad level and the establishment of an extensive intelligence network in conjunction with local authorities and Korean and American intelligence services.”
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Unfortunately, Far East Command dissolved the Special Activities Group in April 1951, concurrent with the Army’s disestablishment of Ranger companies and all “ranger-style units.” Accordingly, the Army decided “to provide Ranger training to the Army as whole, rather than by relying on special formations.”
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Still, the Army, in conjunction with the CIA, continued to organize and lead South Korean and disaffected North Korean partisans behind enemy lines. By the end of the war, these guerrillas were collectively known as the United Nations Partisan Infantry in Korea (UNPIK).
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In all, Volckmann did not approve of the methods he saw in Korea. During his time with SAG, Volckmann ran into many of the same problems he had encountered with USAFFE nearly a decade earlier: supply issues, unclear mission parameters, and indecisive leadership in the higher echelons. Also, the manner in which the military approached unconventional warfare was largely
ad hoc
—they had merely thrown together a special operations command for the occasion. Volckmann knew that “reinventing the wheel” with special operations for every war was dangerous and unproductive. What the Army needed was an unconventional force of its own.
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Although Volckmann had floated the idea as early as 1946, the only progress he made was the Army’s acceptance of FM 31-20 as a guide to train conventional forces to combat guerrillas. Relying on FM 31-20 wasn’t a bad start, but the blunders he witnessed in Korea confirmed his belief in the need for a permanent special operations command.

The Eighth Army special operations tactics were another point of contention. Statistically speaking, their operations were a success: by the end of 1951, UNPIK had confirmed 9,095 enemy KIA, captured 385 prisoners, captured or destroyed over 800 pieces of enemy equipment, and claimed the destruction of 49 bridges and 22 railroads.
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But Volckmann had noticed that UN partisan assets were not being used properly. Over half of their engagements had been in open combat against enemy forces. Conversely, only eleven percent of their activity had been dedicated to sabotage, and less than three percent directed against enemy lines of communication along the eastern coast. As Colonel Rod Paschall poignantly remarked, “the partisans had devoted most of their energy and efforts into killing the troops of an enemy that had an almost inexhaustible supply of manpower.”
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Meanwhile, the task of cultivating civilian support was left to conventional assets and third-party civil agencies, for example the UN Civil Assistance Command. While it was commendable on behalf of the guerrillas to engage the enemy in open combat, it was not the operational context to which they were best suited. According to Volckmann, guerrillas were best geared towards subversive activities (counterintelligence, sabotage, etc.) and were optimized for open combat only when directly supported by conventional forces. Certainly, UNPIK had done a fine job in meeting the latter requirement, but they had paid too little attention to the subversive activities needed to wear down the enemy’s supply and logistical apparatus.

There were several reasons why the Eighth Army employed the guerrillas in this manner. First, guerrilla operations were kept as a “staff activity.” The Eighth Army kept partisan operations under the supervision of its G-3 Miscellaneous Group. “Since the G-3 could only recommend and not command, there was actually no chain of command for partisan operations.”
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Second, because special operations remained a staff function, Eighth Army Headquarters never devised a coherent plan for the employment of guerrillas. In the early stages of the war, the existing plans executed under Colonel McGee’s leadership were often confounded by the bureaucratic friction between G-3 and the Eighth Army Command Group. Meanwhile, SAG, under the jurisdiction of Far East Command, operated within its own microcosm and often duplicated the efforts of the Eighth Army partisans. Third, guerrilla operations depended heavily on naval transport and seaborne delivery into their areas of operation. This condition not only limited the guerrillas to a “coastal tether,” it put their operations at the mercy of competing naval requirements.
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Volckmann also did not agree with the heavy emphasis on Ranger formations. Volckmann had no objections to the Ranger doctrine or their tactics, but in the realm of special operations, Ranger capabilities were only part of the equation. Covert raids, ambushes, rapid deployments, and extractions—revered tenets in the Ranger tradition—were indispensable to the special operations concept. However, the Rangers did not proscribe the training necessary to accomplish the
strategic
goals of the special forces, for example building rapport with local civilians and working to exploit local sympathies to American ideology.

Volckmann did not remain in Korea very long. After less than six months into his tour, he sustained a critical injury and was evacuated to Walter Reed Army Hospital.
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Though frustrated by his removal from Eighth Army operations, it proved to be another step that would solidify his legacy within the U.S. Army Special Forces.
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The overtures to develop a special warfare doctrine began with the dissolution of the OSS in 1946. Despite the success of Allied guerrillas in World War II, there remained a strong tide of resentment against the establishment of “guerrilla-style” forces. This bureaucratic resistance arose from the conservative-minded military officers who felt that conventional means were sufficient for combating enemy partisans. Furthermore, these conservative military minds appeared to be growing in number. Indeed, by 1947, even the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed their doubts about the feasibility of “special forces.” With FM 31-20, however, the Army seemed to have reached a solution that satisfied both sides of the special operations debate. The manual outlined methods guaranteed to dismantle guerrilla forces while still using conventional assets and not relying exclusively on special formations.

The prevailing wisdom dictated that although “the United States should provide itself with the organization and means of supporting foreign resistance movements,” a civilian agency would be sufficient to handle all aspects of the job—including the training, organization, and management of guerrilla units.
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After all, why should the Army concern itself with the “unconventional” aspects of warfare when the Army’s designated functions were conventional by nature? Thus, in 1947, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took control of all “special warfare” operations—a term it included under the umbrella of counterintelligence and espionage activities. Although the CIA never adequately defined the term “special warfare,” the agency adopted the broadest possible interpretation—deciding that their authority rested over the entire planning, organization, and training of indigenous guerrillas.
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Although the actual deployment of these guerrillas would be an Army responsibility, the CIA had effectively made guerrilla warfare a paramilitary—and therefore, ultimately a civilian—responsibility. However, the Korean War and the Army-CIA boondoggle in the special operations field sparked a renewed interest in guerrilla-style units and their tactics.

In the early days of the Cold War, however, the Army’s only study apparatus for “special operations” existed under the Office of the Chief Psychological Warfare (OCPW). A small office tucked away in the bureaucratic jungles of Washington DC, the OCPW was an autonomous study group that reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff. Psychological warfare as a military discipline, however, was woefully ill defined and OCPW’s tasks, therefore, remained ambiguous. Under orders from General J. Lawton Collins, OCPW began operations in 1950 as an outlet for ideas on the development of “psy-war” contingencies.
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As of yet, however, they had not developed an apparatus capable of delivering psychological operations to any potential enemy.

Upon his return to the United States, Volckmann completed his next intellectual achievement, FM 31-21
Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare
. Published in 1951, the manual sought to fill the doctrinal gap left by the demise of the OSS. Recommending that “wartime control of guerrilla warfare be exercised by the theater or unified commands,” 31-21 called for a Theater Special Forces Commander with “an appropriate size headquarters on the same level as the unified command’s Army, Navy, and Air Forces.”
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In total,
Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare
“was a badly needed, authoritative publication that provided well reasoned methods to organize, control, employ, and disband guerrillas.” These concepts were not lost on the Army as control of partisan forces passed from the Eighth Army to the Far East Command before the end of the Korean War.
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