Mike Guardia (18 page)

When the ground assault began, elements of the 15th Infantry occupied the area surrounding Cervantes, the westernmost apex of the Lepanto-Mankayan defense. This allowed the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry the freedom to move southeast toward Lepanto proper while 2nd secured the communication and supply routes south of Highway 4. The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, occupied their hastily constructed redoubts in the area surrounding Mt. Namandaraan. This arrangement guaranteed enclosure of the Japanese; escape would not be easy. Of course, “escape” was not what the Japanese had in mind.

As 2nd Battalion soon discovered, the Japanese were prepared to fight to the death. Several assaults launched by 2nd Battalion to destroy the garrisons immediately north of KP 90 were repelled. One such garrison, about 500 yards southwest of the Mankayan Ridge, successfully repelled nine consecutive guerrilla assaults! Aggravated, the CO of 66th called for air support. In the course of their nine disastrous attempts to unseat the Japanese garrison, 66th Infantry scouts determined that there was a nearby field gun giving fire support from a hilltop only a few hundred yards from the enemy outpost. While Allied planes and guerrilla artillery strafed the hilltop gun site, 1st Battalion moved in to catch the enemy garrison off guard. After the gun was silenced, 1st Battalion launched “a perfectly timed assault, closely supported by 60 mm mortars and knocked out the Japanese stronghold.”
³¹⁰

With this latest garrison destroyed, the entire left flank of the Japanese defenses collapsed. A few raids and skirmishes, involving small arms and light mortars, continued sporadically as the 66th Infantry pushed eastward through Lepanto proper to the Bontoc side of the Japanese defenses. Finally, on 20 July 1945, the last of the enemyguarded mines fell to the 66th Infantry, bringing the siege of LepantoMankayan to a close.
³¹¹

The 66th Infantry’s destruction of the Lepanto-Mankayan defense was important for several reasons. The Japanese had taken three years to build this compound and made it one of the most fortified positions in North Luzon. Now that the area had fallen to the guerrillas, it effectively siphoned off the largest mineral reserve in North Luzon. Consequently, Yamashita could no longer secure shipments of the precious metals to his Emperor. Also, the Lepanto-Mankayan weapon caches had been wrested from Japanese control. The U.S. military considered it bad form to use captured enemy weapons, but Volckmann and his guerrillas had no concern for such formalities. The smorgasbord of grenades, automatic rifles, and bayonets were fair game. And each battalion of the 66th Infantry enjoyed the fruits of the captured Japanese arsenal.

Farther north of the Allied landings, in the area surrounding the villages of San Fernando and Bacsil along the coast of La Union, the 121st Infantry directed their attention toward the 6,000 Japanese troops led by Colonel Hayashi. This hodgepodge force was a conglomeration of Marines and four combat regiments taken from the 19th Division.
³¹²

The Japanese 19th Division had landed at San Fernando earlier in the war. Now, in anticipation of the American landings, the Division had withdrawn the bulk of its forces to Baguio, leaving Hayashi only a few elements with which to defend his coastal areas. Unfortunately for Hayashi, the naval bombardment that screened the Allied landings on Lingayen Gulf had rendered most of the Japanese forces at Bacsil and San Fernando impotent. Consolidating what little equipment they had left, the Japanese contingent built their redoubts into a system of terraces so steep that USAFIP-NL would have found itself literally
climbing
to meet the enemy.
³¹³

At the beginning of the assault on the San Fernando area, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry deployed its guerrillas along an east-west front situated a few kilometers north of the village. The 3rd Battalion occupied key positions from the La Union coast, stretching as far east as Highway 3 and the interior barrios of the province. “The holding of this east-west line blocked all Japanese intentions and movements to push beyond the San Fernando enclosure.”
³¹⁴
Meanwhile, 2nd Battalion—in conjunction with the U.S. 123rd Infantry—laid along the rice terraces to the south of Hayashi’s main defenses. Bloody skirmishes and a fight for attrition would no doubt punctuate this battle. However, to neutralize the enemy’s well-placed redoubts, Volckmann looked to the third dimension.

Building on the
forward air controller
concept, Volckmann devised a way to overcome the heavily fortified terraces. Coordinating his efforts with the Army 308th Bomb Wing and elements of the 24th Marine Air Group, Volckmann supplied his ground liaisons with twoway radios connecting them directly to the pilots overhead. Every time the 121st Infantry called in an air strike, they would display a series of white panels visible from the air. These panels would indicate the forward edge of the battle lines as a safeguard against fratricide. Once the pilot acknowledged recognition of the white panels, Volckmann’s ground liaisons would direct the plane to its target.
³¹⁵

The flight leaders of these bombing runs, after confirming the location of their target, would make a “dry run” on the mark. After completing the initial bombing runs, the pilots would then come in on strafing runs (i.e. a low-altitude fly-by punctuated by machine gun fire on a target). On the final prearranged strafing run, the pilot would give a signal to the ground forces, like dipping his wing, as a sign for the guerrillas to rush the enemy target. Simultaneously, the bombers would come in on a fake strafing run to deceive the Japanese. With their heads to the ground in fear of another violent machine gun strafing, the Japanese could not see USAFIP-NL ground forces scaling the terraces to assault their positions.
³¹⁶

The outcome of the San Fernando-Bascil operation was important not so much for what it contributed to the Japanese defeat—although destroying this Japanese contingent was no meager accomplishment— as for what it contributed to the future of military air-ground operations. Although air-ground tactics similar to Volckmann’s had also been used in the European Theater, the modern incarnations of air support and forward air control tactics more closely resemble those employed by USAFIP-NL.

The 15th Infantry, under the command of Colonel Rob Arnold, mobilized his troops against the Japanese in Ilocos Norte at the northernmost extremities of Luzon. At first, Volckmann directed the 15th Infantry to carry out missions similar to those of the other regiments. Arnold’s men began the fight with a 100-mile demolition route along Highway 3. Special Order #129 from GHQ read:

1. Maximum demolition of bridges, culverts, and defiles between Laoag and Vigan; between Narvacan and Lagangilang;
2. Destruction of every wire communication;
3. Destruction of ammunition, fuel, and other supply dumps; 4. Destruction of planes concealed in dispersal areas;
5. Destruction of convoys and troop trains; and
6. Encouragement of patriotic people under local leadership to unleash maximum violence against the enemy.
7. Power lines, railroad tracks, and stations will only be destroyed upon order.
³¹⁷

In January 1945, Arnold was facing over 4,000 enemy troops within his district—the highest concentrations being in Cabugao, Laoag, and the Gabu Airfield. By this time, however, the main highways and service roads had been demolished—courtesy of Arnold’s men—and vehicular traffic had come to a standstill. This in turn isolated the prominent Japanese garrisons from one another.

The 15th Infantry began their initial assaults during the second week of January 1945. The ensuing campaign for Ilocos-Tangadan would last nearly five months, culminating in May of that year. The offensive in Ilocos Norte targeted three garrisons, each within the towns of Bangui, Burgos and Batac. Intelligence from GHQ indicated that the enemy’s heaviest armaments within the Ilocos provinces were in Ilocos Norte. These included some 18 anti-aircraft guns and at least one 155mm artillery piece.
³¹⁸
Since the demolition of the previous fall had rendered the highways useless, the Japanese had no choice but to flee on foot, abandoning any weapon that could not be shouldered. Because their motorized assets were no longer useful, the fleeting Imperial soldiers left behind countless heavy guns and artillery pieces—all of which fell into the hands of Volckmann’s guerrillas. The methodical destruction of the isolated Japanese garrisons led Volckmann to cast his eyes on a new target. Now, instead of strictly going after Japanese ground forces, he wanted to bring down their air forces as well.
³¹⁹

The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service operated a massive airfield out of Ilocos Norte near the town of Gabu.
³²⁰
With a regular reception and dispatch of long-range bombers and transports, Volckmann undoubtedly saw the strategic opportunity that lay before him. An Allied airfield behind enemy lines would serve two functions: it would provide a landing zone and staging area for American bombers heading to Japan, and also provide a faster means of resupply for USAFIP-NL and the Sixth Army. By 9 February 1945, this idea had become a reality as the 15th Infantry captured the airfield at Gabu and converted it into an Allied landing zone.

By the end of the initial assaults in Ilocos Norte and the capture of the Gabu Airfield, the 15th Infantry had claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 enemy soldiers. The terrified Japanese, undoubtedly aware that they were running out of time, retreated into Ilocos Sur, joining their comrades in Cabugao and Tangadan. “On their heels were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 15th Infantry.”
³²¹
These two garrisons were the southernmost enemy strongholds in the Third District. Cabugao was a relatively small outpost but Tangadan housed over 2,000 enemy troops under the command of General Araki. On 1 April, the 2nd Battalion began its assault on Cabugao. The
After-Battle Report
described the situation as a “see-saw affair,” with guerrillas cresting the garrison only to be beaten back by stubborn resistance.
³²²
However, on 7 April, Companies C and G entered the town with no enemy resistance whatsoever.
³²³

It was clear that the Japanese had used the defense of Cabugao as a stall tactic to reinforce the garrison at Tangadan. The mountainous citadel had hence become the focal point of the Japanese resistance in northwest Luzon. Tangadan lay situated along a series of hills, “bristling with guns of various calibers.”
³²⁴
The elevation gave the Japanese an excellent vantage point and their fields of fire covered any approach to the garrison. Fortunately for the guerrillas, however, a combination of dry river beds and tall grass on the hills surrounding the complex allowed safe passage for advancing troops. The mission to take Tangadan was a critical one. The Japanese could not be allowed to escape as they had in Ilocos Norte and at Cabugao. If they did so, their next rendezvous point would most likely be Cervantes, right at the edge of the Lepanto-Mankayan defenses. The 66th Infantry, which at the time was planning its initial raids on the Lepanto mine network, certainly had enough on its plate. If more enemy troops arrived to reinforce the mines at Lepanto-Mankayan, it would certainly make life more difficult for the guerrillas trying to shut down Yamashita’s mineral outlet.

Beginning around the 10th of April, the three battalions of the 15th Infantry occupied their assault positions for the final raid on Tangadan. Each battalion divided its companies into assault and reserve elements. Reserve elements ensured that no enemy would retreat beyond the perimeter established by the guerrillas. After nearly fifteen days of air strikes, artillery barrages, mortar fire, and hand-to-hand combat, Tangadan succumbed to the guerrillas of the 15th Infantry.

Meanwhile, the 14th Infantry was steadily enjoying the fruits of the I Corps’ advance in the south. The new battlefront was certainly a distraction for Yamashita’s forces but, unfortunately, the I Corps fighting did not seem to be making much headway. In fact, it looked as though the I Corps front had devolved into a relative stalemate. Although this development was hardly encouraging, it proved to be a blessing in disguise.

Yamashita apparently realized that if an entire American corps were fighting its way through the mountains, he would have to lend his heaviest firepower to the beleaguered southern perimeter. Unfortunately, the only heavy armor assets he possessed were elements of the 2nd Tank Division.
³²⁵
Releasing them to repel the I Corps assault meant that Yamashita would have to compromise the “stay-put” aspect of his defensive strategy.

As the smallest of the USAFIP-NL regiments, the 14th Infantry needed to conserve its resources. As such, Volckmann directed the 14th Infantry’s regimental commander, Major Manriquez, to limit his operations to the area surrounding Highway 4.
³²⁶
For Yamashita to get his armor moving to the beleaguered southern perimeter, he had no choice but to use the same Highway 4 that the 14th Infantry knew intimately. Thus, using the regiment’s anti-armor weapons, including mines and bazooka teams, the 14th Infantry destroyed Yamashita’s only armor asset.
³²⁷

This defeat took away the only real maneuver asset that Yamashita had left in the area south of Baguio. Judging from the USAFIP-NL situation maps, the 2nd Tank Division provided the only means of cover for the approaches into the Ifugao and Bontoc sub-provinces (Highways 4, 5, and 11). In this regard, Yamashita could deploy his fearsome Type 89 and Type 97 battle tanks to either destroy or severely delay any Americans wishing to gain access to his headquarters through Ifugao.
³²⁸
However, with his tank units destroyed by the 14th Infantry, “The Tiger of Malaya” had lost his best line of defense.

The 11th Infantry—now commanded by Don Blackburn—covered Cagayan, Apayao, and Mountain provinces, the largest operational area of any regiment within USAFIP-NL.
³²⁹
Volckmann gave Blackburn considerable leeway in managing the regiment. Volckmann’s primary directive, however, was to deny Japanese access to the Cagayan River Valley. As in Lepanto-Mankayan, the Cagayan River Valley was a “breadbasket” region whose farms had been commandeered by the Japanese.
³³⁰