Mike Guardia (11 page)

Although the Bugias barrio lieutenant indicated that Moses and Noble were headed south, Volckmann found this counterintuitive. Their only potential communication outlet lay in the
north
—at Ralph Praeger’s camp in Apayao. He was certain that this was where the colonels were really headed. After enjoying a rice and pork dinner with the Bugias locals, Volckmann hit the trail for Ifugao. According to Bruno, the quickest way to Ifugao was through the Taboy River Valley. This area was virtually unsettled and previously no white man had ever been there. Bruno, however, knew the area well.

Before stepping off, Volckmann instructed Bruno to inform the villagers that their group was headed south. Of course, Volckmann wasn’t really going south, but he had gleaned an important lesson from his early months as a guerrilla:
never tell the locals your true destination
.
¹⁷²
With informers indistinguishable from friendly civilians, the practice was wise. A grueling hike through Taboy River Valley found the area just as Bruno had described it: sparsely populated. And while trekking through the bottom layers of the jungle, Volckmann and company encountered a nuisance that they had hoped to leave behind in the Huk swamplands:
leeches
. The leeches in the Taboy River Valley were the worst that Volckmann had thus far experienced. Latching indiscriminately to arms, legs, and even their faces, the men feverishly pried leeches from their skin as they entered the outskirts of Ifugao— bleeding profusely every step of the way.
¹⁷³

The few natives that did reside in the Valley were more primitive than the ones Volckmann had encountered earlier. Their houses were fewer and farther between, not grouped into barrios as seen elsewhere. While it may have been true that no white man had explored this region, Volckmann could tell that the Japanese had recently been there—their footprints were still fresh on the ground.
¹⁷⁴

The following afternoon the group stopped at another barrio, Pitican. There, the natives welcomed them with a meal of chicken and rice. Unfortunately, Blackburn’s malaria had relapsed and his strength was collapsing. Recalling his own bout with malaria, Volckmann felt inclined to let Blackburn stay over at Pitican to get some rest.
¹⁷⁵
Bruno, however, interjected that the barrio of Nonpaling was only a day away and that the barrio lieutenant was his cousin. Normally, Volckmann would have balked at the proposal—he had to take Blackburn’s health into account—but the Japanese had already found their way into the Taboy River Valley.

Disgusted with the prospect of forcing a sick man to make a one-day hike, he nonetheless encouraged Blackburn to make the trip. It was torture for Volckmann to watch his friend hobble down the trail, barely keeping himself upright with the aid of a walking stick. When the group finally arrived at Nonpaling, Blackburn collapsed. Rushing him into the barrio lieutenant’s home, Volckmann appealed for help.
¹⁷⁶
Fortunately, Bruno’s connections to the Nonpaling leadership made their stay enjoyable. Blackburn was given quarter and plenty of rest at the lieutenant’s house, and all were given generous rations of rice and chicken. To Volckmann and his men, this was a welcomed rest. Since being flushed out of Lusod, it was the first chance any of them had to relax.

During the first day of their layover at Nonpaling, Volckmann and his friends were greeted as heroes wherever they went. This warm reception confirmed that the residents were friendly toward the American cause. Though informers could be persistent nuisances, Volckmann was glad to have the Filipinos on his side. Volckmann was amazed at the great faith they placed in Americans, and how much they preferred them to the Japanese. What impressed Volckmann even more than the Ifugao’s enthusiasm, however, was their ingenuity. The Ifugao were predominantly rice farmers, and they had built their fields into an elaborate system of terraces complete with irrigation and drainage networks. That evening, Volckmann, Blackburn, Bruno, and Emilio were the guests of Bruno’s cousins: Graciano, the barrio lieutenant, and Pedro. At Graciano’s, Volckmann met a man who he identified as Mr. Herrin, a minister at the Unitarian church in Kiangan, the capital of Ifugao. Herrin was one of the few American missionaries in the area who had continued his ministry despite the pestilence of the Japanese.
¹⁷⁷

After spending the night with Pedro, Volckmann decided to solicit help from the local missionaries. Since the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines, Christian missionaries had established permanent bases within the archipelago. According to Herrin, the nearest missionary camp lay only about an hour away and within its walls resided three American women.
¹⁷⁸
Two of them, Miss Myrtle Metzger and Miss Lottie Spessard, were missionaries that Bruno had known before the war. The third woman, Mrs. Kluege, was the wife of an American contractor employed with the local lumber industry. Volckmann had heard that her husband, Herman Kluege, was commanding a guerrilla unit somewhere north of Baguio, but had not yet seen him. Miss Spessard, as it were, was a registered nurse and gave what little medicine she had to Blackburn to treat his malaria. After a few days under her care, Blackburn seemed to have his ailment under control. For the remainder of Volckmann’s stay in Ifugao, he made it a point to send the ladies any additional food he had.
¹⁷⁹

Although the Ifugao tribesmen were friendly to Volckmann and Blackburn, the presence of two American Army officers within their community made them nervous. To help ease their discomfort, Volckmann began looking beyond Ifugao to garner support from the other tribes in Mountain Province. Across the valley, near the Ifugao capital of Kiangan, lay the Haliap tribe. According to the Ifugao, the Haliap were a throwback to the most primitive denizens of the Philippines: spear-wielding, headhunting savages. The Ifugao people were slightly apprehensive of the Haliap, but what intimidated them the most was the Haliap leader, Kamayong. The Ifugaos characterized him as a fearsome warrior and a tyrant, one who was well known throughout Mountain Province.
¹⁸⁰
Despite this intimidating portrayal of the Haliap chieftain, Volckmann had an idea: if Kamayong and his men were indeed as fearsome as the Ifugao described, then the Haliap would no doubt make effective guerrillas. Therefore, Volckmann decided that while keeping his lines of supply open in Ifugao, he would travel to the Haliap country in search of additional manpower.

Meanwhile, Herrin found a solution to Volckmann’s recurring problems of food and supply. Using some of his contacts in Kiangan, Herrin had established a line of credit with a local merchant named Formoca.
¹⁸¹
Formoca provided Volckmann and Blackburn with items such as coffee, sugar, and soap. Also, via Bruno’s family connections, Volckmann solicited help from two women in Manila who regularly sent him towels, shoes, underwear, and other hygiene products.
¹⁸²

By the one-year anniversary of Pearl Harbor, Volckmann had established a new camp outside Kiangan. This “camp” was little more than a small hut, but with some diligence and creativity, Volckmann made the abode livable. He and Blackburn even went so far as to make themselves a carpeted floor from sewn-together cogon grass.
¹⁸³

The entire month of December was fairly quiet. They received no further enemy contact and proceeded to spend most of their time regrouping from the previous month. Volckmann busied himself with some light exercise to maintain his strength and fend off the malaria. Over the next few weeks, he received various reports concerning the progress of the war. Some were believable, but others were so farfetched that they had to be untrue. One such report he received from Mr. Herrin indicated that one million U.S. troops landed in China. Another report included a statement supposedly made by President Roosevelt:
“[He] has notified the Japs that if they do not surrender the Philippines by Jan 27th, the USA will attack from North, South, East, and West. President Roosevelt has also ordered all guerrilla warfare to cease in the Philippines until the coming of American troops
.”
¹⁸⁴
In reality, no such order came from Roosevelt. In any event, Volckmann did not believe it.

As Christmas Eve approached, his thoughts once again returned to his wife and son. His wife, Nancy, and son, Russell, Jr., had been evacuated well over a year ago. In his diary entry for 24 December, he refers to them as “Nan” and “Dutch.” Although he missed them terribly, he assured himself that they were doing fine and wondered how long it would be before “Dutch,” who was then six, could swing a golf club. Volckmann himself was an avid golfer.

By late December, he still had no contact with the camp at the Lusod sawmill. Herrin’s “reports” were among the only news they had concerning the outside world. The following diary entries close out Volckmann’s first year of the war:

25 December 1942. The American ladies sent us a jar of noodles and wished us a Merry Xmas. We went over to pay them a visit and took them some sausage. Returned here about 4:00 P.M. and had our Xmas dinner—roast duck, mashed [potatoes] with giblet gravy, green beans, rice dressing, coffee, pumpkin pie. Best meal I have had since the beginning of the war [author’s note: quite impressive for a dinner behind enemy lines]. Hope Nan and Dutch have a swell Xmas.

26 December. Chopped some wood today for exercise. At the Xmas celebration in Kiangan, Jap Capt in his speech told the people there was no more war in the Orient; the Japs have superiority in the air, land, and water. Reports indicate there is guerrilla fighting in Bontoc, also five Jap trucks ambushed in Pangasian. Made a chocolate pie today, also some corn bread, turned out very good. The pie crust, which was made of Camote cahoy flour, was very good. 27 December. Nothing very unusual today. Made corn pancakes for breakfast, also a cake which turned out very good. One of our boys brought in a report that three Americans passed near here and that the Japs were tracking them.

28 December. Mr. Herrin sent us a note stating Italy has been occupied and that 250,000 American troops have arrived in China (news is supposed to be three weeks old). Reports—Japs ambushed in Natunin, also 50 trucks ambushed in Pangasian. Guerrilla fighting reported going on around Bontoc. Governor of Bontoc killed.

29 December. Nothing unusual today. Expect some news from Mr. Herrin tomorrow along with some supplies. Made good syrup out of coconut milk and sugar today. Hope to be able to arrange to get direct radio news from the priest in Kiangan.

30 December. Mr. Herrin returned from Kiangan with news that the U.S. now has a million troops in China. Hope this damn news we are getting is true. Took a hike to the top of mountain north of here. Beautiful country; hope to get some rice wine for tomorrow.

31 December. Took another hike up to the top of the mountain. Don went with me; lay out on the rocks and took a sun bath for about an hour. This past month has been a very quiet one for us. Have not accomplished a great deal in this area yet but have a good start in organizing the Scouts and Constabulary in this area. I certainly hope that before 1943 gets very far underway, they will get some U.S. troops in here. It’s going to be hard to keep the confidence of the people if they don’t get in here soon.
¹⁸⁵

Thus ended 1942.

By the dawn of 1943, Volckmann realized that his options were indeed limited. Without any clear directives from Moses or Noble, it appeared that there was little he could do to improve his situation. December had come and gone, but the Japanese and their friends in the “fifth column” still lurked behind every bend. In response to the disastrous raid on the Igoten Mines, the Japanese launched their first cohesive anti-guerrilla campaign of the war. This included manning garrisons within every city in North Luzon. From these garrisons, ten-day patrols were dispatched on a rotating basis. In addition to the military campaign, the Japanese also enacted a “Plan of Propaganda,” which called for psychological warfare.
¹⁸⁶

As with many of the Japanese techniques, their counterinsurgency employed tactics of the lowest common denominator. The Japanesecontrolled media ran looping broadcasts of the American “defeat” in the Pacific. Meanwhile, public decapitations, torture, rape, and thievery became the rule of the day as the Japanese took over the once peaceful municipalities of North Luzon. The propaganda machine also utilized local leaders and “puppet officials” to publicly denounce Americans and urge the surrender of those who would dare defy the Emperor’s forces.
¹⁸⁷
Every war produces its share of homegrown sympathizers— as well as those whose allegiances change with the tides. For Volckmann, the latter seem to cause more trouble than the former. Among the most troublesome was the mayor of Kiangan; one day he would be decidedly pro-American and the next day, decidedly pro-Japanese.
¹⁸⁸
Attitudes like his were difficult to decipher. Was it all just a ruse to get the Japanese off their backs? Or were these people merely “fence sitters,” who constantly changed their allegiance depending on which side had the upper hand at any given moment?

Shifting loyalties among the Filipinos could certainly be frustrating, but Volckmann nevertheless needed recruits for the resistance. To this end, Bruno proved to be Volckmann’s “ace in the hole.” This young Ifugao knew which of his brethren could—and could not—be trusted to help the American cause. Bruno carefully screened any potential recruit whose loyalties may have been questionable.
¹⁸⁹
It remains unclear exactly how Bruno knew which individuals could be trusted or what criteria he used in evaluating them, but it is obvious that he had an intimate knowledge of his homeland and the people with whom he shared it. The individuals that Bruno contacted included veterans of the Philippine Army, Philippine Scouts, and hunter and trappers of the more primitive tribes in the Ifugao highlands.

Contacting the local tribe leaders, Volckmann solicited their help in establishing guerrilla camps and keeping his men supplied with necessities. On 7 March 1943, Volckmann consulted with the first of these tribal heads: Tamicpao, chief of the Antipolo tribe. The old chieftain looked much younger than his 70 years suggested. Sharpfeatured with a muscular build, Tamicpao and his Antipolos had a more benign reputation than did the Haliap.
¹⁹⁰
Neither Volckmann nor Blackburn provided any great detail about their meeting with Tamicpao, but the elderly chieftain pledged his support and offered the guerrillas anything they needed. His one stipulation, however, was that Volckmann not establish any of his camps near the Antipolo’s main village.

Tamicpao’s reasoning behind this, surprisingly, stemmed from a fear of Kamayong and the Haliap. A long-standing border dispute over a rice paddy complex had put the two tribes at odds with one another. Tamicpao feared that if the Haliap discovered Americans near his village, Kamayong would report it to the Japanese simply out of spite for the Antipolo. Although the Antipolo were the second group of people to express their apprehensions about Kamayong, Volckmann decided to meet the Haliap chieftain anyway.
¹⁹¹

Despite admonitions from the other Ifugao residents, Volckmann found Kamayong to be a charming and pleasurable man. He was no doubt a strong leader, but he presented a warm and friendly side to those who earnestly sought his help. During the course of their meeting, Volckmann mentioned that Tamicpao had offered his support to the guerrillas. Volckmann also indicated that he knew of their border dispute, but he implored Kamayong to put aside his differences with the Antipolo.
¹⁹²
At present, the most beneficial thing for all parties was to fight the Japanese. According to Volckmann, the Japanese were a pestilence upon an innocent people. Prior to the war, Kamayong had little contact with civilized Filipinos and even less contact with the Americans. But Volckmann’s description of the Japanese and their brutal occupation techniques made Kamayong furious. The Antipolo may have been on the wrong side of Kamayong’s sentiments, but he would not stand by idly as his homeland was overrun by such brutality. As leader of the Haliap tribe, he assured Volckmann that his tribal land was safe for their use and that neither he nor his people would betray them to the Japanese. He also promised to restore normal relations with the Antipolo. Oddly enough, Volckmann’s stroke of diplomacy provided a lasting peace between the two native factions, for by the time Volckmann departed the Philippines, Tamicpao and Kamayong had become close friends.
¹⁹³

Contacting Kamayong proved to be one of the best decisions Volckmann made during his early days as a guerrilla. The Haliap leader kept a close eye on his people, and his influence over them was strong. Indeed, if Kamayong supported the American cause, it was unlikely that an informant would arise from the ranks of the Haliap. Also, the trails throughout the region were sparse and, often, only the Haliap knew their locations. Hence, Volckmann decided to establish his new headquarters in the Haliap lands of Ifugao.
¹⁹⁴

By and large, Volckmann found the Haliap to be a cheerful lot. Their houses and communities were built in a fashion similar to those he had seen elsewhere in Ifugao: on stilts five feet above ground with grass roofs. The only way to gain entrance into each house was by a single ladder in the front. Men were the hunters and warriors while the women tended to domestic and agricultural duties.
¹⁹⁵
Rice was their main staple, although livestock—including chicken and pork—often complimented their meals. Volckmann admittedly found many of their customs fascinating. On several occasions, Volckmann became ill and the Haliap doctors would take care of him. He never understood the significance of their healing rituals, but considering the speed with which he always recovered, he did not question their methods.
¹⁹⁶
Throughout April 1943, Volckmann continued to build his headquarters in the Haliap lands of the Ifugao sub-province. At present he had little to work with, yet he brainstormed new ideas while awaiting more updates from Moses and Noble. Volckmann maintained contact with the colonels—both of whom were currently in Apayao with Ralph Praeger—via the “bamboo telegraph.” Accordingly, Volckmann discovered that Ralph Praeger actually
did
have a radio set and had established contact with MacArthur’s Headquarters, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)!
¹⁹⁷

Although the news of Praeger’s contact with MacArthur was certainly rousing, the general’s only communiqué stated that USAFFE forces should “lay low” for the time being and avoid direct contact with the enemy.

Not very encouraging, Volckmann thought.

But what other choice did they have? USAFFE remnants in North Luzon were still heavily dispersed and maintained virtually no contact with one another. To make matters worse, the Japanese had intercepted more guerrillas, their “fifth column” continued to grow, and Moses and Noble—the presumed “leaders” of the North Luzon resistance—had not issued any orders since disappearing into Apayao the previous December. In all, the “lay low” advisory did nothing more than restate the obvious conclusions that Volckmann had made months ago.

The waiting game is perhaps what frustrated Volckmann the most. Until Moses and Noble gave him a clear picture of what was supposed to happen, he had no choice but continue waiting. Nevertheless, Volckmann used his downtime productively. The first thing he decided to do was build a communication network with other guerrilla elements in the adjacent area. There were many Filipinos who were eager to help him, but Volckmann wanted to find more of his American compatriots. For this, he sent Blackburn on a reconnaissance mission to re-establish contact with units in the Benguet area. It had been a few months since the chaos of the previous fall had forced Volckmann into Ifugao. Consequently, he wanted to see if any Americans remained in Benguet and get any updates on the Japanese activity there.
¹⁹⁸

When Blackburn began his reconnaissance mission, he departed Ifugao the same way that he and Volckmann had entered—through the treacherous Taboy River Valley. After running through the valley of leeches, Blackburn arrived in Ekip, where the same townspeople who had taken care of him only a few months ago now greeted him with a cascade of disheartening news. Apparently, enemy activity had not quieted down at all: their friend, Daisy Baison—the wife of the Filipino doctor at Oding—had been shot by the Japanese; Herb Swick, who had chosen to stay in Benguet, had been captured; Parker Calvert and Art Murphy were on the run—whereabouts unknown; Charles Cushing had deserted his camp; and Herman Kluege had also been captured. Blackburn did, however, find another American at Ekip. His name was Fish and he had been a lumberman before the war.

Fish had been conducting guerrilla warfare in Benguet for some time—although the nature and the extent of his operations were never made clear. Fish knew of some friendly elements that remained in the area despite the recent fury. Offering to take him back to Volckmann’s camp in the Haliap highlands, Blackburn told Fish of the idea for a communication network, explaining that his knowledge of the Benguet “friendlies” would certainly be helpful. Hearing this, the ex-lumberman agreed to join Blackburn on the trip back to Ifugao.
¹⁹⁹

Back at the Haliap camp, Fish brought Volckmann up to speed on the events of the past few months. The Japanese had certainly devastated the province, but there were enough friendly outposts left in Benguet to form cadres of a small guerrilla force.

4 April 1943. Took Fish over to see the ladies [Miss Spessard and Mrs. Kluege]. He gave them all the news he had.

5 April 1943. Fish was going to leave today but stayed over waiting for some supplies from Kiangan.

6 April 1943. Fish left with two of our boys [presumably Haliap] to return to his place.

Although he presumably had a hand in coordinating the guerrillas in Benguet, the role that Fish ultimately played in the conflict remains a mystery. He was captured in July 1943.
²⁰⁰

By the end of April, Volckmann had regular contact with the other USAFFE personnel in the Ifugao and Bontoc sub-provinces. His line of communication with Moses and Noble in Apayao ran through Captain Manalo’s area of operation in Kalinga, a few miles north of Ifugao. Manalo was an excellent information buffer, for he relayed messages both from other nearby units and from Moses and Noble. The system kept Volckmann up to date on enemy activity, but did nothing to inform him of the war outside North Luzon. Anxious for any news concerning the Allied situation in the Pacific, Volckmann sent a search party into Benguet to locate a radio. They returned with a radio receiver on 16 April and, although the battery died two weeks later, listening to KGEI-San Francisco provided him with the news he had been yearning for. Not all of the broadcasts were encouraging, but at least this news was reliable.
²⁰¹
Reports included the Allied advance in North Africa and the latest victories of the RAF in Europe.

The progress that Volckmann had made throughout the spring of 1943, however, was about to be reversed. Just as they had done the previous fall, the Japanese were poised to disrupt Volckmann’s operation yet again. Little by little, punitive expeditions began to flood the countryside. In early May, Captain Manalo was hit hard by a Japanese expeditionary force. Now on the run, his absence disrupted Volckmann’s line of communication. In the north, Ralph Praeger—the only man in Luzon with a functioning radio transmitter—was forced to go off the air and bury his radio.
^*
Meanwhile, Rufino Baldwin had been captured south of Baguio and Major Enriquez surrendered his elements of the14th Infantry Regiment.
²⁰²

To make matters worse, Captain Manalo’s records had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. From these documents, the enemy had supposedly learned the location of Volckmann’s headquarters. Although his Haliap hosts were visibly upset by the news, Volckmann knew the details of the records that Manalo had kept—the Japanese may have known that Volckmann was in Ifugao, but they did not have enough information from Manalo’s records to pinpoint him in the Haliap tribe lands.
²⁰³

Volckmann knew, however, that it wouldn’t stop the Japanese from combing the province. Not wanting to jeopardize his hosts, Volckmann met with Kamayong and asked him to help cache any surplus equipment and records in the event they had to move out. Kamayong instead responded with four pagan priests. This stunned Volckmann, for what he needed was an evacuation plan, not a pagan ritual. Undaunted, Kamayong let the four commissioned priests do their work. He explained to Volckmann that the priests would, after reciting a few incantations, bury a pair of chicken feet on the trails leading to the camp. If a Japanese patrol came upon the site where the feet were buried, they would suddenly become lazy and discontinue their search.
²⁰⁴