Mayflower (52 page)

Concerning Church’s sprint from Taunton to Swansea, Douglas Leach writes in
Flintlock and Tomahawk,
“Perhaps Church would not have thought himself so clever if the enemy had laid an ambush between him and the main force which he was supposed to be shielding,” p. 38. Saltonstall in
OIC
describes Samuel Moseley as “an old privateer at Jamaica, an excellent soldier, and an undaunted spirit,” pp. 127–28. George Bodge in
Soldiers in King Philip’s War
provides a detailed description of Moseley’s activities before and during the war and how he put together his company of volunteers, pp. 59–78. Concerning the relationship between Moseley and Church, Bodge writes, “Moseley was the most popular officer of the army, and undoubtedly excited Church’s anger and perhaps jealousy by ignoring and opposing him,” p. 73. For an example of a buff coat, once owned by Massachusetts governor Leverett, see
New England Begins,
edited by Jonathan Fairbanks and Robert Trent, vol.1, p. 56. Increase Mather in
HKPW
tells of the “many profane oaths of…those privateers” and how they prompted a soldier to lose control of himself and proclaim that “God was against the English,” p. 58.

On European military tactics in the seventeenth century and how they were adapted to the unique conditions of an Indian war, see Patrick Malone’s
The Skulking Way of War,
especially chapter 4, “Proficiency with Firearms: A Cultural Comparison,” pp. 52–66; George Bodge in
Soldiers in King Philip’s War
writes of how matchlocks quickly gave way to flintlocks in the early days of the war, pp. 45–46. Daniel Gookin in
Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians
mentions the belief prior to the war that “one Englishman was sufficient to chase ten Indians,” p. 438. Hubbard in
HIWNE
speaks of how Moseley and his men “ran violently down” on the Indians and of the wounding of Perez Savage, p. 70, as well as of the torn Bible pages, p. 76. Saltonstall in
OIC
writes of Cornelius the Dutchman’s arrival at Philip’s newly abandoned village, and how he placed the sachem’s hat upon his head, p. 130; Hubbard in
HIWNE
tells of the many masterless Indian dogs and the fields of corn, p. 72. In a July 6, 1675, letter to Sir John Allin, Benjamin Batten writes of the English taking a horse on Mount Hope “which by the furniture they suppose to be King Philip’s,” Gay Transcripts, Plymouth Papers, MHS. Roger Williams refers to the Narragansetts’ query as to why the other colonies did not leave Plymouth and Philip “to fight it out” in a June 25, 1675, letter to John Winthrop Jr., in
Correspondence,
vol. 2, p. 694.

Hubbard describes the Indians of New England as being “in a kind of maze” in
HIWNE,
p. 59. John Easton tells of Weetamoo’s unsuccessful attempts to surrender herself to authorities on Aquidneck Island in “A Relation of the Indian War” in
Narratives of the Indian Wars,
edited by Charles Lincoln, pp. 12–13; he also speaks of the promise made to neutral Indians that “if they kept by the waterside and did not meddle…the English would do them no harm,” pp. 15–16. Saltonstall describes the assault of Cornelius the Dutchman on the Indians attempting to land their canoes on Mount Hope, p. 130. Easton tells of Philip’s statement that “fighting was the worst way,” p. 9. On the enslaving of the Indians from Dartmouth and Plymouth, see Almon Lauber’s
Indian Slavery in Colonial Times,
pp. 146–47. Lauber also writes of Indian slavery in the Pequot War, pp. 123–24, while James Muldoon in “The Indian as Irishman” in
Essex Institute Historical Collections,
October 1975, discusses how English policies in the colonization of Ireland anticipated much of what happened in America, pp. 267–89. On Church’s efforts to ensure that the Indians of Sakonnet were treated fairly after the war, see Alan and Mary Simpson’s introduction to their edition of Church’s narrative, p. 39; they also cite his inventory at his death, which includes a “Negro couple” valued at £100, p. 41. William Bradford Jr. writes of the battle in the Pocasset cedar swamp in a July 21, 1675, letter to John Cotton reprinted by the Society of Colonial Wars in 1914. Hubbard in
HIWNE
describes in detail how bewildered the English soldiers were in the swamp, pp. 84–87. Saltonstall in
OIC
relates how the Indians would run over the mucky surface of the swamp “holding their guns across their arms (and if occasion be) discharge in that posture,” p. 134. James Cudworth also writes of the engagement and outlines his plan for building a fort at Pocasset and creating a small “flying army” in a July 20, 1675, letter to Josiah Winslow, MHS Collections, 1st ser., vol. 6, pp. 84–85.

Hubbard in
HIWNE
tells of Philip and Weetamoo’s escape across the Taunton River and of the hundred women and children left behind at Pocasset; he also details the encounter at Nipsachuck and Philip’s eventual escape to Nipmuck country, pp. 87–93; see also Increase Mather’s
HKPW,
p. 65. The best source on the encounter at Nipsachuck is Nathaniel Thomas’s August 10, 1675, letter reprinted in the appendix of
HKPW,
pp. 227–33. In a July 3, 1675, letter Tobias Sanders informed Major Fitz-John Winthrop that Mohegan sachem Uncas had been “in counsel with Philip’s messengers three days together in the woods privately and received of them peag [wampum] and coats,” MHS Collections, 5th ser., vol. 1, p. 427. The Praying Indian George Memicho recounts the condition of Philip and his people when they arrived at Menameset on August 5, 1675, in testimony reprinted in Temple’s
History of North Brookfield;
Memicho reports “that Philip said, if the English had charged upon him and his people at the swamp in his own country one or two days more they had been all taken, for their powder was almost spent; he also said that if the English had pursued him closely [at Nipsachuck], as he traveled up to them, he must needs have been taken,” pp. 100–101; Memicho also tells of how the Nipmuck sachems accepted Philip’s wampum. Saltonstall in
OIC
speaks of Philip’s coat of wampum, p. 154. Hubbard writes of how Philip succeeded in “kindling the flame of war” in
HIWNE,
p. 91.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN-
The God of Armies

On the attack at Brookfield, see Hubbard in
HIWNE,
pp. 98–104; Increase Mather in
HKPW,
pp. 76–70; and Thomas Wheeler’s
Narrative
of the attack in
So Dreadfull a Judgment,
edited by Richard Slotkin and James Folsom, pp. 243–57. Hubbard in
HIWNE
tells of the battle of South Deerfield, pp. 109–110. Saltonstall in
OIC
tells of the powwows’ prediction after the hurricane on August 29, 1675, p. 158. A letter quoted in Increase Mather’s
HKPW
describes the sins ( “intolerable pride in clothes and hair,” etc.) of which New England was guilty, p. 83; Hubbard speaks of the “most fatal day” at Bloody Brook in
HIWNE,
pp. 113–17; he also describes Moseley’s subsequent battle with the Indians, pp. 117–19. Daniel Gookin was particularly outspoken concerning the outrages Moseley committed against the Indians in
Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,
pp. 455, 464; George Bodge reprints the October 16, 1675, letter in which Moseley adds the postscript: “This aforesaid Indian was ordered to be torn in pieces by dogs” in
Soldiers in King Philip’s War,
p. 69. John Pynchon’s October 5, 1675, letter describing the attack on Springfield appears in the appendix of
HKPW,
pp. 244–45. Hubbard describes the Indians as “children of the devil” in
HIWNE,
p. 123. Gookin tells how “submissively and Christianly and affectionately” the Praying Indians conducted themselves as they were transported to Deer Island on October 20, 1675, in
Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,
p. 474.

The proposal to build a defensive wall around the core settlements of Massachusetts is mentioned by Douglas Leach in
Flintlock and Tomahawk,
pp. 165–66. Ellis and Morris in
King Philip’s War
write of the traditions that sprang up in the Connecticut River valley concerning Philip’s activities during the fall of 1675 and add, “but his hand is hard to trace in the warfare of the valley,” p. 96. J. R. Temple in the
History of North Brookfield
insists that the Nipmucks were the dominant Native force throughout the war: “There is more reason for calling the conflict of 1675–6 a Quabaug and Nashaway War, than King Philip’s War. Philip’s power was broken at the outset. The Wampanoags, his own tribe, deserted him…. The
Quabaug Alliance
heartily espoused, and never deserted thecause, till it became hopeless,” p. 99. James Quanapohit provides the best information we have concerning Philip’s activities in the fall and winter of 1675–76; according to James, “a chief captain of [the] Hadley and Northampton Indians who was a valiant man…had attempted to kill Philip and intended to do it; alleging that Philip had begun a war with the English that had brought great trouble upon them,” reprinted in Temple’s
History of North Brookfield,
pp. 114–15. Mary Pray’s October 20, 1675, letter to Massachusetts authorities urging that action be taken against the Narragansetts is in MHS Collections, 5th ser., vol. 1, pp. 105–8. Increase Mather in
HKPW
writes of the “sword having marched eastward and westward and northward, now beginneth to face toward the south again,” p. 102. William Harris claims that if a pan-Indian force had struck a coordinated blow against the English in the beginning “in an hour or two the Indians might have slain five thousand souls, small and great. And before the English could have been in any good capacity to defend themselves, and begun to fight, the enemy regrettably might have killed another five thousands souls, so uncertain is our safety here,”
A Rhode Islander Reports,
edited by Douglas Leach, p. 65.

In my account of the Great Swamp Fight and the Hungry March, I have relied primarily on Benjamin Church’s
EPRPW,
pp. 48–64; Hubbard in
HIWNE,
pp. 137–65; Increase Mather in
HKPW,
pp. 102–17; Saltonstall in
OIC,
pp. 178–98; Welcome Green’s “The Great Battle of the Narragansetts,”
Narragansett Historical Register,
December 1887, pp. 331–43, and George Bodge in
Soldiers in King Philip’s War,
pp. 179–205. Increase Mather speaks of “the God of armies” in
HKPW,
p. 104. Hubbard credits Moseley with capturing thirty-six Indians on December 12, p. 139; however, Church claims to have brought in eighteen that same night, indicating that Hubbard’s number probably included the Indians brought in by both Moseley and Church. James Oliver’s December 26, 1675, letter describing the night spent sleeping “in the open field” the night before the attack on the Narragansetts is in Bodge, pp. 174–75. Hubbard refers to the companies of Johnson and Davenport charging “without staying for word of command,” in
HIWNE,
p. 144; Hubbard claims that God “who as he led Israel sometime by the pillar of fire…through the wilderness; so did he now direct our forces upon that side of the fort where they might only enter,” p. 145. Eric Schultz and Michael Tougias argue that what the Puritans took to be an unfinished feature of the fort “was intentionally planned by the Narragansett…to ensure that the English would attack at a well-defended point…. Had the Narragansett not run out of gunpowder during the fight…this contrived entrance might have been viewed not as a weakness but as a brilliant military tactic…in a smashing Narragansett victory,” p. 260. In a note to his edition of Hubbard’s
HIWNE,
Samuel Drake writes of Captain Davenport: “Being dressed in a full buff suit, it was supposed the Indians took him for the commander-in-chief, many aiming at him at once,” p. 146. Hubbard in
HIWNE
claims that “the soldiers were rather enraged than discouraged by the loss of their commanders,” p. 148. Benjamin Church does not mention Samuel Moseley by name, but as several commentators have noted, there is no mistaking the identity of the Massachusetts captain who arrogantly refused to allow General Winslow to enter the Narragansett fort. Concerning the decision to burn the fort and march that night to Wickford, Hubbard writes in
HIWNE,
“[M]any of our wounded men perished, which might otherwise have been preserved, if they had not been forced to march so many miles in a cold and snowy night, before they could be dressed,” p. 151. Bodge, on the other hand, feels that “from the standpoint of military strategy, the immediate retreat to Wickford was best,” p. 189. My thanks to Michael Hill for providing me with the comparative casualty rates at D-day and Antietam. Hubbard writes of the supply vessels frozen in at Cape Cod,
HIWNE,
p. 154. Saltonstall in
OIC
talks of the mounting fears back in Boston when it took five days for word of the fighting to reach the settlement: “[M]any fears arose amongst us that our men were lost either by the enemy or the snow, which made many a heartache among us,” p. 185. Bodge’s reference to the Great Swamp Fight as a “glorious victory” is from
Soldiers of King Philip’s War,
p. 189. Hubbard in
HIWNE
tells of how the English soldiers found the treaty in a wigwam of the fort and how it proved that the Indians “could not be ignorant of the articles of agreement,” p. 160. Most of what we know about Joshua Tefft comes from a January 14, 1676, letter from Roger Williams to Massachusetts governor John Leverett, in which Williams recounts in great detail Tefft’s testimony,
Correspondence,
vol. 2, pp. 711–17. See also Colin Calloway’s “Rhode Island Renegade: The Enigma of Joshua Tift,”
Rhode Island History,
vol. 43, 1984, pp. 137–45, and Jill Lepore’s
The Name of War,
pp. 131–36. Hubbard expresses his disdain for Tefft in
HIWNE,
p. 162. James Quanapohit reported that the first Narragansetts who approached the Nipmucks with two English scalps were “shot at” and told that “they were Englishmen’s friends all last summer and would not credit the first messengers; afterward came other messengers from Narragansetts and brought more heads…and then these Indians believed the Narragansetts and received the scalps…and now they believed that the Narragansetts and English are at war, of which they are glad,” in Temple’s
History of North Brookfield,
p. 116.