Losing Vietnam (7 page)

The enemy was not only expediting the infiltration of armor, it was greatly fortifying its antiaircraft capabilities. Thus, not only did the RVNAF lose the U.S. tactical air support, its effectiveness was being considerably reduced, as its planes had to fly at higher altitudes to escape lethal antiaircraft fire. Consequently, the main burden of antiarmor defense against a much improved enemy armor capability was primarily with the ARVN. If enemy armor attacks were to be stopped, infantry and armor units would have to do it.

Obviously, the South Vietnamese had the experience and capability to kill tanks. In the future, more reliance would have to be placed on the infantry for antitank kills, thus it was most important that ARVN training techniques be reviewed and assessed. With this in mind, on 24 October 1973 I visited the Quang-Trung Training Center, accompanied by the commanding general of the Central Training Command and DAO representatives. The training center ably demonstrated techniques and tactics, with an emphasis on antiarmor training. Its
techniques and tactics were developed to coincide with the reality of the battlefield. Having spent the previous two years with staff responsibility for training in U.S. training centers and schools, I was in a good position to judge the adequacy of the Vietnam training doctrine and performance. The training was excellent, and if conducted elsewhere in country at the same level of performance, from a technical point of view the situation would be satisfactory. The ARVN's problems, highlighted by the two events in MR-2, appeared operational; the infantrymen must stand fast and use their antitank weapons at close range. That required strong leadership.

Because the enemy armor threat was so serious and the antiarmor capabilities of the RVNAF so important, in late October 1973 I asked Maj. Gen. John Murray to see if an expert team from the United States could provide technical assistance to DAO Saigon on the subject of ARVN antitank capabilities. U.S. Army Pacific responded immediately, and on 12 November a team headed by Col. W. F. Ulmer Jr., the commanding officer of the 194th Armored Brigade at Fort Knox, arrived in country with three expert members, including Col. R. S. McGowan, the president of the Combat Arms Training Board at Fort Benning, Georgia, to assess the training and readiness of army units in antitank warfare. The team visited twenty-seven schools, headquarters, training centers, and combat units in MR-1, -2, and -3 and made twenty short-term and sixteen secondary or long-term recommendations.

The team provided excellent insights into antiarmor capabilities.
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There were sizable enemy armor threats in all three regions, and the corps commanders generally had no viable armor reserves to deploy against unexpected enemy actions. The M-48A3 tanks observed and inspected were in a high state of readiness and, if properly manned, could defeat enemy armor. Thorough antiarmor training was ongoing. The individual soldier was healthy and alert, with well-maintained equipment.

In a late November 1973 letter to me, Colonel McGowan provided a summary of the team's assessment: “The tanks we saw were well maintained and the soldiers appeared confident and competent. The big question—Will they stand and fight?—remains as unanswerable as it always has.”

In a conventional war, the most formidable tank-killer is the tank itself. In an aggressive combined arms assault, the tank also provides firepower, shock action, and great mobility. Although still semiconventional, the war in Vietnam was becoming more conventional, as the North Vietnamese, who had the initiative, began to attack with division-size units, using combined arms tactics. Therefore, it was important that we review the ARVN armored capabilities.
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ARVN had an armored command whose organization had an administrative chain of command that ran from the armored squadrons to the armored brigades to the armored command and the JGS. In this chain, the armored command had no direct control of operations and the JGS had only limited control, since the military region commander exercised almost all of the authority. This dual chain of command, of course, also applied to air force units. As of 26 November 1973, the combat vehicle status of the four armored brigades had 96 percent of their authorized combat vehicles assigned, and 89 percent of them were serviceable, an excellent situation.
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The units had a high assignment of authorized equipment, and the deadline rate was well within tolerance, considering the need for maintenance downtimes.

On 7 December 1973, the JGS issued a memorandum signed by General Vien, “Improvement of Capability for Countering Enemy Tanks.”
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It included many of the USARPAC team recommendations and highlighted ARVN's battle-tested experience. A JGS briefing on the subject outlined several key points, advising that the South should have confidence in its own armor and in its antitank weapons, should include practical experience in employing and laying minefields, and should develop artillery, air force, and engineer capabilities in antiarmor operations. It also counseled that only teamwork with the air force and all branches and services within the army would ensure a successful antiarmor outcome.

Thus, at the end of 1973 antiarmor capabilities had been emphasized at the highest level and training was ongoing at all levels. Commanders were cognizant of potential enemy mechanized avenues of approach and all corps had positioned their forces accordingly. However, the ARVN defensive positions generally had no great depth (a factor the North Vietnamese had commented upon), and reserve forces so essential to conduct counterattacks were limited. The ARVN and
RF/PF were greatly dispersed, to protect hamlets, villages, and towns. Notwithstanding, the situation on the eve of 1974 was satisfactory for local defense and limited enemy offensives.

The army had an artillery command that, like its armor command, was primarily administrative, since the majority of artillery battalions were assigned to the four corps. In June 1973 it had sixty-three artillery battalions: forty-four 105 mm territorial artillery, fifteen 155 mm howitzer, and four 175 mm gun. In a hurried attempt to beef up South Vietnamese firepower, the United States had delivered the self-propelled 175 mm guns under PROJECT ENHANCE toward the end of 1972. The 175 mm gun was the only artillery weapon that could outrange the communists' 122 mm and 130 mm guns. Besides the army battalions, there were 176 105 mm howitzer sections of two weapons each that supported the regional and popular forces. In all, there were 1,698 artillery tubes in South Vietnam. The RVNAF was proficient in artillery-firing techniques, and when combined with close air support the artillery weapons gave it a decided firepower advantage in 1973. However, this advantage was seriously degraded over time.

One of the most important factors in the conduct of the war in Vietnam was the support the respective allied countries provided to both sides. The United States, of course, gave South Vietnam funding.
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Between 1966 and 1974 the United States authorized $4 billion in military assistance. The FY 73 (1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973) program was $1.53 billion. However, in FY 74 support was greatly reduced, to $1.069 billion, which caused the South to initiate a conservation program, particularly in the utilization of ammunition and petroleum products. The military aid was further eroded by the greatly increased inflationary effects of the Middle East oil embargo. Consequently, the FY 74 funding was barely adequate to support the successful conduct of the war.

The large FY 74 congressional reduction in military aid and the inflationary effects of the Arab oil embargo in the post-cease-fire period
were highly destructive. The Saigon consumer price index in December 1973 indicated an annual inflation of 65 percent.
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By mid-1974 inflation had risen an additional 28.5 percent. The spectacular increase in the costs of petroleum products caused by the worldwide energy crisis was responsible for a substantial part of this price spiral. South Vietnam's determination to stem consumption by greatly increasing taxes affected the prices of imports, such as rice, cooking oil, and sugar. Fortunately, the cost of rice increased only 30 percent, the result of a bumper crop due to the great success of the pacification program.

In September 1973 and again in June 1974, noting the serious impact of the economic situation on soldiers, the government gave an across-the-board salary increase. However, it did not come close to ameliorating the inflationary gap. In 1973, military income actually fell between 25 and 40 percent in real terms, and it continued to deteriorate in 1974. Military personnel with dependents (65 percent of the total number), were the hardest hit.

The withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam had a major impact on the economic situation. Foreign exchange receipts evaporated, and the employment opportunities for military dependents as well as the soldiers' ability to moonlight at other jobs disappeared. The declining level of real U.S. economic aid did not help either. So, military families faced with reduced real income had no choice but to consume less.
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It is disturbing to note that the pay only met about 75 percent of a minimal existence level for married soldiers. Military commanders unanimously stated that no soldier or officer could adequately support his family on his pay and allowances; further, they claimed that of all the factors affecting morale in the military, the soldiers' and their families' dismal economic situation was by far the most important. Connections between the adequacy of pay and combat effectiveness are tenuous at best because of many associated variables, such as the level of hostilities, leadership, and unit pride. Nevertheless, it is clear that the less adequate the real pay, the greater the distraction of the soldier.

South Vietnam's inflation, which had increased about 100 percent since the cease-fire, greatly affected the well-being of the soldier. However, worldwide inflation also seriously reduced the amount of food, ammunition, and petroleum available to the soldier in the field, thereby
compounding the morale problem. Between FY 74 and FY 75, the cost of ammunition increased 60 percent, gasoline 150 percent, and clothing 110 percent. The overall across-the-board increase rate was 47 percent.
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The effects of inflation on the well-being of soldiers and their families with the unfortunate spillover into desertions and corruption were serious but not critical. The manpower deficiencies at year-end 1973 were manageable.

Having reviewed the communist and South Vietnamese capabilities, the question then is, “How did the RVNAF stack up against the NVA/VC?” To help answer this, in December 1973 the DAO prepared and forwarded to USSAG a study that listed those factors that favored the RVNAF. The South Vietnamese had greater firepower and tactical mobility. They had a large combat force, more weaponry, more guns and howitzers, more and better communications. They had greater tactical and strategic mobility: helicopters, trucks, armored personnel carriers, air transport (C-130s and C-7s), and naval transport (which included blue- and brown-water fleets). Additionally, they had a modern infrastructure and interior lines of communication, which provided greater staying power. Their logistical support was far more reliable and extensive than that of the communists.

Although ARVN had more combat personnel than the enemy, most of the army battalions were committed to security missions that greatly reduced force flexibility. In 1973, in addition to their troops in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese also had several divisions in Laos and several more in North Vietnam available for deployment. Therefore, the enemy could move its forces at a time and place of its choosing to obtain battlefield superiority.

The South Vietnamese Air Force had become quite expert in airlift and airdrop operations and could move regiments and division-sized units throughout the country faster than the enemy, whose mobility was limited to trucks and sampans. The country's extensive and modern
infrastructure provided great depth and flexibility, and elements of the infrastructure could be mobilized and employed for military purposes on short notice. The enemy, on the other hand, had to make do with what it had moved to the South.

Tactical air power had been decisive in the 1972 campaign. The VNAF had more than eighteen hundred aircraft of all sorts and had experienced combat pilots capable of providing close air support to embattled units. The navy also added to mobility and improvement of security. The blue-water navy could move supplies along the coast to support all four military regions. This sealift capability for shifting major forces and equipment served as a backup to the ground lines of communication and the airlift capability. The brown-water navy had successfully impeded the waterways, the enemy's main lines of communication in the delta.

Looking to the individual combatants, the ARVN had better training. Its soldiers had higher morale, which accompanied good training, greater firepower, and faith in continued U.S. economic and military aid. At this time, the North Vietnamese soldiers had low morale. They had been told that the 1972 offensive would result in the culmination of hostilities. After almost a year of protracted conflict, resulting in major casualties, the individual soldier found himself bogged down far from home with little hope of repatriation in the foreseeable future. The constant monsoonal rains considerably dampened the enemy's spirits. In an April 1974 USSAG briefing, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, the MR-1 commander, said an “important point concerning present enemy armed forces in MR-1 is their low morale … the majority of enemy do not wish to continue fighting. There has been a significant number of desertions, self-inflicted wounds, etc.”
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The United States had pulled out all the stops in supporting the Vietnamization program. We had delivered large numbers of aircraft, ships, artillery, and tanks and provided the expertise to maintain the equipment. We also agreed to replace equipment combat losses on a one-for-one basis and built up a large inventory of ammunition, which we would maintain at the cease-fire level. The DAO study concluded that the RVNAF was superior in each area, but noted that it faced security missions that tied its forces to widely scattered defensive
positions, enabling the enemy to aggregate his forces to obtain local superiority.