Lion of Jordan (65 page)

Following the adjournment of the Geneva conference, Kissinger embarked on what became known as his ‘shuttle diplomacy'. The first fruit of this was the military disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, which was signed on 18 January 1974. Kissinger's next target was a military disengagement between Israel and Syria but in the meantime he needed to stop in Jordan ‘to demonstrate that King Hussein, that moderate ruler and old friend, would not suffer for his refusal to pressure us'. Hussein invited Kissinger to visit him in Aqaba, Jordan's holiday resort on the Red Sea. Still a passionate pilot, Hussein would occasionally fly out to greet visitors to whom he wished to pay special respect. ‘On this occasion,' wrote Kissinger, ‘it pleased His Majesty to come out in a helicopter and perform aerobatics in the narrow space between the right wing of
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[Boeing plane] and the Saudi mountains. Had there been a Jordanian official aboard our plane, he could have easily got us to sign any document as the price of getting his monarch to return to earth.' On Saturday afternoon, 19 January, they met in Hussein's bungalow by the sea, less than a
hundred yards from the barbed-wire fence that denoted the frontier with Israel. Hussein, his brother Crown Prince Hassan, Prime Minister Zaid Rifa'i and Chief of Staff General Zaid bin Shaker received the Americans as friends. The Jordanians were warm in their praise of the disengagement agreement. Hussein described it as a tremendous achievement.

Kissinger sensed that this achievement also filled his Jordanian hosts with foreboding. They recognized that Syria had to be next, but they wanted to be sure that their turn would come soon after. In the meantime, they wanted some working-level discussions on an initial Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, emulating the procedures in the Egyptian case. ‘Jordan's nightmare was that its Arab brethren would deprive it of the right to recover the territory it had lost to Israel in 1967. Jordan, in fact, had two nightmares about the West Bank: either indefinite Israeli occupation or a PLO state whose first target would be the Hashemite Kingdom.' Kissinger claims that he was sympathetic and that he shared Hussein's strategic assessment. ‘Either it [Israel] can deal with Arafat or it can deal with Your Majesty. If I were an Israeli Prime Minister… I would rush into negotiations with Your Majesty because that is the best guarantee against Arafat.' But stating the alternatives did not advance matters, because Israel wanted neither.

So the discussions in Aqaba were a replay of what had occurred on Kissinger's previous visit in November. On that occasion he had presented to Israeli leaders Rifa'i's suggestion of a very modest ‘disengagement', involving principally withdrawal from the city of Jericho with its exclusively Arab population and its location close to the Jordan River. Jericho would have symbolized Hussein's claim to the West Bank and established him as Israel's interlocutor in West Bank negotiations. The suggestion had been rejected as inconsistent with the Allon Plan, which claimed the Jordan Valley as Israel's security border. Kissinger suggested that since Yigal Allon was in the room, there was nothing to keep the author from modifying his plan. This was treated as a joke. But when Kissinger asked whether some disengagement scheme based on the Allon Plan could be put forward, he hit an obstacle: the Allon Plan could not be the basis of disengagement on the Jordanian front because the Labour Party's coalition partner, the National Religious Party, was absolutely opposed to giving up any territory on the West Bank. ‘Thus Israel would reject a proposal inconsistent with the Allon plan but would refuse to
negotiate the Allon plan because it could not get the full cabinet behind.'
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Kissinger's analysis of the Israeli position is accurate enough. What he does not say is that he himself, for his own reasons, wanted to avoid negotiations on the West Bank. In countless private conversations Kissinger in fact encouraged Israeli intransigence by telling Allon: ‘If I were you, I wouldn't settle for less than the Allon Plan.'
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At the meeting in Aqaba, Hussein put forward another disengagement plan in which Jordan and Israel would each pull back their military forces eight kilometres from the river to the foothills of the mountain ranges that marked the Jordan Valley. Jordanian civil administration would be established in the area vacated by Israel, especially in the town of Jericho. A working group would be formed as rapidly as possible to establish Jordan's claim to represent the Palestinians. Kissinger was non-committal. He told the king that he would discuss his ideas with the Israelis in the coming weeks. Kissinger describes Hussein's approach as moderate and statesmanlike but futile while a new Israeli coalition was being formed, including a party that opposed any territorial change on the West Bank. That state of affairs, according to Kissinger, precluded even the formation of a working group.
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None the less, Hussein persevered in his efforts to engage in the diplomatic process. Kissinger's obvious reluctance to involve Jordan in his step-by-step diplomacy impelled Hussein to renew his direct contacts across the river. In the early part of 1974 he had two meetings with Meir, who was facing a storm of domestic protest for the failure to anticipate the Arab attack. With great difficulty she managed to assemble a coalition government following the election of 31 December 1973 but this government had the shortest lifespan in Israel's history. Even at the height of her power Meir was not noted for her flexibility but now she had less room for manoeuvre than ever before. Hussein had little enough himself. Rifa'i accompanied him to both meetings with Meir and her ministers. By this time Rifa'i had gained a great deal of experience in regional and international diplomacy, and had grown considerably in stature and authority. There was a division of labour between the Jordanian monarch and his prime minister in accordance with the model prescribed in the constitution: the monarch determined the broad lines of policy, while the prime minister was in charge of carrying it out. The monarch set the tone; the prime minister's role was to deal with the details, to clarify the issues and to dispel ambiguity. He also took notes
during the discussion and produced records after the meetings.
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Hussein was courteous, soft-spoken and skilful at creating a congenial atmosphere for negotiations; Rifa'i was a shrewd and hard-headed politician and a tough negotiator who robustly defended Jordanian interests. They were an impressive duo, but they had a very weak hand to play.

On 26 January 1974 Hussein and Rifa'i crossed into Israeli territory to meet with Meir, Dayan and Gazit. The meeting took place in the Araba Desert on the border between the two countries in an air-conditioned caravan. Both sides wanted to move forward towards a disengagement agreement, but they had conflicting ideas about the nature and scale of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Essentially, the Israelis thought in terms of very limited disengagement, whereas the Jordanians demanded vertical disengagement along the entire front. Meir favoured a gradual approach and offered to restore to Jordanian rule the city of Jericho and the heavily populated Arab areas at the centre of the West Bank. Although this was a modest offer, Meir emphasized that it was only a beginning and not the end of the process.
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Hussein, on the other hand, demanded that Israel vacate a strip of land along the entire length of the Jordan River, which would have entailed the dismantling of some Israeli settlements. He regarded her offer as a rehashed version of the Allon Plan, which he had repeatedly rejected as ‘totally unacceptable'. The rationale behind his demand was that even a modest Israeli retreat along the entire ceasefire line would give the Palestinians hope for the future and restore their faith in Jordan.
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The following dialogue took place:

HUSSEIN: If you agree in principle to my proposal for an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan River to a depth of fifteen kilometres, enabling me to establish a Jordanian civil administration in this strip, we can move on in stages to its implementation. It will help us distance the Palestinians from the PLO.

MEIR: It's possible to find other ways of separating [our forces] through a corridor connecting you to the Palestinian population.

HUSSEIN: We refuse to be confined to a narrow corridor to the West Bank; and there will be no progress without your withdrawal from the Jordan Valley.

DAYAN: This means that the IDF must pull back from the entire valley?

RIFA'I: Yes, definitely. But we shall not introduce a Jordanian army there.

DAYAN: And what about Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley?

RIFA'I: They must be totally removed.

DAYAN: If so, what will your final border be?

RIFA'I: Identical with the 1967 lines. We are ready to achieve this in stages.

The dialogue continued but the deadlock could not be broken. Dayan was adamant that in any accommodation, the Jewish settlements and military bases in the Jordan Valley had to stay in place. Meir added that to get agreement even to a corridor from the Knesset would be a tough struggle. Rifa'i was no less adamant that withdrawal could not begin with a corridor. ‘We need “frontage” along the entire Jordan River,' he said to the Israeli premier. ‘If the Allon Plan is Israel's goal, there's no prospect of a settlement.' So as not to end on a sour note and to keep the lines of communication open, Hussein concluded by saying, ‘Even if there's no agreement, we could continue with our good relations.'
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A second meeting with the same cast of characters took place in the same caravan on 7 March. Once again Hussein raised the demand for an Israeli withdrawal along the entire front. Meir pointed out that the disengagement with Egypt was not from the whole Suez line but only from part of it. Hussein's response betrayed his frustration: ‘Would I have had to fight you in the October War to bring you to a disengagement agreement along the whole border?' The discussion did not go anywhere:

HUSSEIN: If there is peace, we'll prevent terrorism, but as long as you reject our proposals they [the Palestinians] get stronger…

MEIR: What if the Palestinians on the West Bank want to establish an independent Palestinian state?

HUSSEIN: It will be all right. Such a state would be like a sandwich between you and us and there is nothing to fear.

DAYAN: Can strongholds and settlements remain under Israeli sovereignty?

HUSSEIN: It is difficult for us to accept that.

Dayan continued to press for an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley but Rifa'i rejected this idea much more categorically than the king. Dayan threatened to ask the Palestinian leaders on the West Bank whether they would agree to Israel's presence there in return for suitable payment. Rifa'i dismissed the threat by stating confidently that they would not agree. Dayan said, ‘We'll either strive for an agreement with the Palestinians or you agree to significant border changes.' Rifa'i retorted, ‘At the moment we are discussing the separation of forces.' Meir became agitated. The question, she said, was: did the Jordanians
accept Israel's right to be on the West Bank? She pleaded with Hussein to move forward step by step without a commitment to total Israeli retreat at the end of the road. She pointed out that the separation of forces with Egypt did not require Israel to pull out of Sharm el-Sheikh. ‘Why is what I am proposing,' she asked, ‘so unacceptable to you?' ‘The reasons', replied Hussein, ‘are psychological. You created a psychological problem with the Allon Plan.' Another point made by Hussein was that the Palestinians could be more generous in making concessions with their own territory and their own rights than he could. ‘I most certainly have no such right nor the will to exercise it on their behalf,' he added with uncharacteristic bluntness.
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The meeting ended without any agreement. As Hussein had remarked at the beginning, they were back to square one.

Mordechai Gazit was a largely silent but highly perceptive participant in these meetings. What struck him most was the complete consistency with which Hussein adhered to his basic position, namely, that the price of peace was Israel's withdrawal from all the territory it had captured in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Hussein was prepared to settle for phased withdrawal from the West Bank, provided Israel accepted at the outset the principle that it should eventually be total. At the last meeting Hussein made it crystal clear that he could make no compromises over this territory because it belonged to the Palestinians. This was not a new departure but a more forceful statement of Hussein's consistent position ever since the end of the June War. This principled position stood in marked contrast to the popular Arab view of Hussein as a traitor who was prepared to trade with the Jews on Palestinian rights. Gazit was therefore moved to tell his Palestinian interlocutors that they had no idea how loyal Hussein was to them in all his dealings with Israel or how staunch he was in defence of their interests. Meir was difficult to deal with because she tended to view Arabs as a monolithic and implacable enemy. ‘Do you know one Arab who is prepared to make peace with us?' she would ask, glowering at her advisers. ‘King Hussein!' they would reply in unison. She would concede the point about King Hussein but not about any other Arab.
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It is testimony to Hussein's skills as a diplomat that he managed to remain on good terms until the end with a leader who was unusually truculent and self-righteous, even by Israeli standards. On 10 April, Meir tendered her resignation following the publication of the Agranat Commission's report. The Labour Party
chose Itzhak Rabin to succeed her, and a long chapter in Jordanian–Israeli relations came to an end.

One trend was clear: ‘The longer the delay of negotiations to relieve Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the more inexorable the growth of the political status and weight of the PLO. Stalemate on the West Bank spelled humiliation for King Hussein; it undercut his claim that his moderate course would return Palestinian lands to Arab control.'
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Not surprisingly, Hussein was in a sombre mood when he arrived in Washington. He confided to Kissinger that the Israelis had flatly rejected his proposal for disengagement and countered with their old scheme of inviting him to take over civil administration in the West Bank while their military occupation continued. Kissinger wrote that it was ‘an amazing reflection of how little the Israelis understood Arab psychology that the proposal was continually put forward; not even the most moderate Arab head of government could accept administering the West Bank under Israeli occupation'. Hussein was depressed and seriously considered withdrawing from the negotiations altogether. This, however, would have made the PLO Israel's only valid negotiating partner, and Hussein continued to be convinced that its hostility towards him and his dynasty was implacable. Kissinger shared Hussein's frustration, and during the king's call on Nixon, on 12 March, he said, ‘Israel hasn't faced what their real alternatives are. They have to deal either with King Hussein or with Arafat. They can't deal with neither.'
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But Kissinger also had his own priorities and these did not include negotiation over the West Bank. His main aim was to exclude the Soviet Union from playing a part in Middle East diplomacy. He embarked again on his solo shuttle diplomacy, and on 31 May delivered a military disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria on the Golan front. Hussein hoped it would be his turn next. But Sadat pressed for a second agreement with Israel that would give him another slice of Sinai, and the political situation in Israel was not conducive to negotiations on the West Bank.