Lion of Jordan (100 page)

One of the chief plotters against Hassan was General Samih Batikhi, the head of the General Intelligence Department, the Mukhabarat. Batikhi was widely rumoured to be using his position to line his own pockets, and five years later he was in fact charged with corruption and put in prison. He also had ideas above his station. The head of the Jordanian secret service is meant to be a soldier, not a politician, but Batikhi persistently dabbled in politics and accumulated in his own hands considerable power and influence. Not content with this, he aspired to become a king-maker, perhaps in order to preserve his power and ill-gotten wealth. It was clear that if Hassan became king, this would not be possible. Hassan's zealous campaign against corruption had won him few friends in high places. There was a strong anti-Hassan lobby in Amman, and Batikhi was at its head. Unlike Hassan, Batikhi knew the real state of the king's health, and, also unlike Hassan, he had regular access to the king. There is an old saying that ‘Near and sly beats fair and square who isn't there', and Batikhi was near and sly. Hussein's main source of information on the affairs of his kingdom was none other than General Batikhi. Batikhi used to fly to the Mayo at regular intervals and hold long sessions in private with Hussein. It is a fair guess that Batikhi made the most of this opportunity to drip poison in the king's ear about the regent. If Hussein's entourage began to resemble a Byzantine court, Batikhi was chiefly responsible for the transformation.

As his health began to fail, Hussein became more and more obsessed with the responsibilities of his Hashemite heritage inherited from his great-grandfather and grandfather, which he had tried to discharge throughout his life.
⁶
Now he was determined to secure the line of succession. Batikhi was aware of Hussein's anxieties and exploited them to further his own ends. Having discredited Hassan and planted doubts in the king's mind about his suitability for kingship, Batikhi began to promote his alternative candidate for the succession: Prince Abdullah, the king's eldest son. Batikhi told Hussein that Abdullah was a good soldier, that he was widely respected, and that he had the strong support of the army behind him. The message was clear, and it did not have to be stated in so many words: the house of Hashem would be safer in the hands of the soldier-prince than in the hands of the would-be philosopher-king.

Prince Abdullah was largely an unknown quantity. Within the army he was reputed to be a tough, capable and courageous soldier. Outside the army little was known about him. He was the eldest son of the king by his English wife, Princess Muna, and he had followed the family tradition by going to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst before joining the Jordanian Army. Having an English mother was not an advantage because, although she converted to Islam, her son was not considered to be a pure Arab. Moreover, because Abdullah spoke English at home and had received his training in Britain and America, his command of classical Arabic was less than perfect. On the other hand, a number of things worked in Abdullah's favour. First, he was a handsome young man and very like his father in many ways. Second, he fitted neatly into the Hashemite line of succession because he bore the name Abdullah and his first-born son was called Hussein. Third, Abdullah was not a complete stranger to the title of crown prince. He had been named as crown prince three days after his birth on 30 January 1962 in accordance with the 1952 constitution. But it was a turbulent era, with frequent assassination attempts against the king, and to have an infant crown prince would have been risky for the Hashemite dynasty in the event of regicide. Therefore, in 1965, when Hassan reached the age of eighteen, the constitution was amended to make it possible for any brother of the king to be a crown prince, and Hassan was appointed because he was considered a safer bet than the mentally unstable middle brother, Muhammad bin Talal. So the appointment of Abdullah as crown prince could be seen as simply the restoration of his birthright. Fourth, Abdullah's beautiful wife, Rania, was a Palestinian with the potential to draw the support of the Palestinian segment of the population. Last but not least, as an officer in the army, Abdullah had a natural avenue to the tribes and hence the potential to build a strong power base in the rural parts of the country.

Abdullah had not been groomed to be king and his father had not spoken about him as a possible successor, but from early 1998 he was accorded a steadily higher public profile. He was given an office in the royal court, and he was seen more often at his father's side. In March, Abdullah accompanied his father on a visit to the United States and took part in some of his meetings. In May, on the forty-fifth anniversary of Hussein's ascent to the throne, Abdullah, who was the officer commanding the Special Forces, was promoted from the rank of colonel to that
of major-general. His promotion combined with his popularity, not to mention his pedigree, made him a credible candidate for the post of deputy chief of staff and eventually chief of staff.
⁷

Hussein's own attitude towards the Hashemite succession was constantly evolving and essentially equivocal. For Hussein, thoughts about changing the succession were nothing new. After his first brush with cancer in 1992, he had begun to think aloud about the subject in the presence of his close aides. Adnan Abu-Odeh recalls a flight to Brunei with the king and his favourite nephew, Prince Talal bin Muhammad. The king sought Abu-Odeh's reaction to some new ideas about the future of the family (Talal was not sitting with them during this conversation). He was vague but did say the following: ‘My brother Muhammad, because of his illness, was excluded and I chose my younger brother. Who is to come after my brother?' The king was not talking about replacing Prince Hassan but wondering who should come after him. He wanted to see justice achieved in the family after Hassan. The king had expressed his love, affection and respect for Talal on many occasions. He now asked Abu-Odeh to educate him in the affairs of state. The king thought highly of Talal but the context was one of being fair, of not excluding his other brother, Prince Muhammad, from being a successor to King Abdullah I through his children.
⁸

Hussein's chequered private life complicated the question of the succession. He had five sons: Abdullah and Faisal from his second marriage; Ali from his third marriage; Hamzah and Hashim from his fourth marriage. Hamzah was said to be his favourite son. He closely resembled his father in physical appearance and in manner; he was also brought up bilingually, with a very impressive command of classical Arabic and a knowledge of the Koran. Queen Noor, who had converted to Islam just before her marriage, brought up her eldest son to be an Arab king. She was rumoured to be lobbying her husband to replace his brother with their son as crown prince and heir-apparent. On Hamzah's eighteenth birthday Hussein sent him an open letter stating that the prince was destined for ‘great achievements' and pointing out that he himself had been eighteen when he ascended the throne. The letter indicated that Hamzah was being groomed for bigger and better things. Hussein's transparent attempt to advance his favourite son's fortunes seemed both to reveal his true wishes and to reflect Queen Noor's growing influence behind the scenes.
⁹

Marwan Kasim, as chief of the royal court in 1995–6, also heard the king talk about the young generation of Hashemite princes, with particular reference to Hamzah. Before Hamzah could become heir to the throne, a constitutional amendment would be necessary, as the constitution stipulated that the crown prince could be only one of the king's brothers or his eldest son. On one occasion the king told Kasim that he wanted to introduce the following article into the constitution: ‘The crown prince of my crown prince will be Hamzah bin Hussein.' Kasim took legal advice, which confirmed that such a change would be possible; but he feared that it would be fraught with political risks, so he told the king that this was a matter between himself and his brother.
¹⁰
Hussein also periodically raised the idea of a Hashemite family council, whose main task would be to choose a successor to Hassan from the pool of young princes. As his sister Basma understood it at the time, he was looking for ways and means of modernizing and invigorating the monarchy by drawing on the talents of its younger members.
¹¹

Speculation about Hassan's future refused to die down. At first Hussein tried to scotch it. In mid August he dismissed rumours concerning the succession to the throne as ‘nonsensical': he stressed that the succession was firmly in the hands of HRH Crown Prince El Hassan, and that speculation to the contrary was ‘out of line'. When an Israeli paper reported American doubts about Hassan, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Hassan and assured him that the report was untrue. Hussein subsequently reiterated his ‘unwavering' confidence in his brother, ‘who has shouldered his responsibilities and performed his duties fully. As for what may transpire after that in the future… there is no justification at all for raising the subject now.'
¹²

One of the most difficult duties that Hassan had to perform as regent was to stand in for his brother as a facilitator in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations on final status. Yet he discharged this role with distinction. Jordan was not a participant in the final-status talks, but it expected to play a pivotal role. As Prince Hassan put it, Jordan ‘would endeavour to be a centre of gravity'. Jordan had a vital interest in these negotiations: it could not afford to shoulder the political costs of a collapsing peace process. The person chiefly responsible for the impasse was, predictably, the Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu. To break the impasse President Clinton convened a summit meeting at the Wye Plantation
with Netanyahu and Arafat. Wye is a conference centre on the Chesapeake about an hour and a half's drive from Washington, DC. The Wye summit opened on 17 October 1998 and lasted five days. Deadlock was reached after a few days of bad-tempered talks, and Netanyahu threatened to pack his bags and leave. Clinton called Hussein at the Mayo Clinic, where preparations were being made for his upcoming bone-marrow transplant, and asked for his advice on the stalled peace talks. Hussein immediately offered to go to the Plantation to help, no matter what the doctors said. Clinton accepted the offer.

By this time Netanyahu had become just about everybody's pet hate at the Mayo. The doctors and nurses shared the joke that their royal patient was afflicted by the Bibi bug. Few people, however, realized how seriously ill Hussein was when he again volunteered his services as a peacemaker. He was feeling frail and physically exhausted. Queen Noor accompanied him to Wye almost literally in a nursing capacity. They went to River House, their home on the Potomac, for a rest and the next day travelled on to Wye Mills on the president's helicopter, Marine 1. On landing, they were taken to Houghton House, a lovely private home in the grounds overlooking the Wye River. First the American negotiators and then the Palestinians arrived to brief the visitor. ‘Clinton looks totally exhausted and fed up,' Noor noted in her journal. ‘The Palestinians are shocked, some to tears, by their first sight of Hussein since his illness began.'
¹³
Dennis Ross, the chief peace processor, detailed the preparations for Hussein's arrival as well as his contribution to the proceedings:

The King's lymphoma was advanced and he was highly susceptible to infection; the Secretary announced to all of us that we needed to rub a special disinfectant soap on our hands shortly before greeting him. The State Department's Chief of Protocol walked around the table squeezing the soap from a bottle onto the hands of President Clinton, Arafat, Netanyahu, and the rest of us. This act and the gravity of the King's physical appearance – bald, gaunt, and gray – made the moment extremely poignant.

After the King greeted everyone, the President summarized where we were, going over each of the issues… When the President finished, the King spoke movingly of his being with us, the importance of the progress that was now being made, his expectation that we would finish this evening, and the need to put the remaining differences in perspective: ‘These differences pale in comparison to
what is at stake. After agreement both sides will look back and not even recall these issues. It is now time to finish, bearing in mind the responsibility that both leaders have to their people and especially the children.'

When he concluded, he again walked slowly around the table shaking hands. Arafat refrained from giving him his customary kiss on both cheeks, instead kissing his shoulder in order to avoid making contact with his skin.

The King's appearance and words moved us all. A pall hung over the table, and for ten minutes or so Bibi and Arafat spoke about the King's humanity and dedication and commitment to peace.
¹⁴

Hussein's emotional appeal to the parties to rise above politics and work towards a better future for their children changed the tone of the talks but not for long. Hussein and his wife left Wye that evening to go home to River House so he could sleep in his own bed. When the negotiators resumed work on the specific issues at hand, Netanyahu dug in his heels again, citing domestic politics as his excuse. Even on a minor issue, the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released by Israel, his behaviour was erratic and baffling. Clinton was irate; he paced back and forth and told his aides: ‘That SOB doesn't want a deal. He is trying to humiliate Arafat and me in the process. What the hell does he expect Arafat to do in that situation?'
¹⁵

Late that night Clinton called Hussein at River House and told him that they had again reached a dead end and that Netanyahu's plane was being readied for departure. Hussein convinced Clinton to hold firm and not to give in to Netanyahu's demands. If Netanyahu carried out his threat to leave, Hussein suggested that he and Clinton should hold a press conference to tell the world what had happened and to pin the responsibility for failure on Netanyahu. Hussein went to bed that night not knowing what the morning would bring, but Netanyahu turned out to be bluffing. In the morning the Israeli was still around, and the rollercoaster continued. Clinton asked Hussein to return to Wye for last-minute trouble-shooting, and back he went. ‘You cannot afford to fail,' Hussein told the two Middle Eastern leaders and their aides. ‘You owe this to your people, to your children, to future generations.' The two sides kept working all that day and all that night, until, at dawn, they had a deal. It was a modest one but better than failure. Israel agreed to return in stages 13 per cent of the West Bank to the Palestinians and to release some Palestinian prisoners. The peace process was still alive,
and Clinton invited the king and the queen to participate in the signing ceremony at the White House on 23 October.
¹⁶