Using the above example, China could hold out for 219 days by drawing from its SPR to make good the 20% loss of Saudi oil. The United States could do so for 162 days. If the percentage of oil taken off the market climbed to 30%, the days remaining for the United States and China would be 108 and 146 days respectively until the full economic impact of the embargo was felt. On the surface, China has a slight edge in staying power, but the United States has far more fat to trim and could outlast China by instituting aggressive austerity and conservation programs and ramping up liquefaction and bio-mass fuel production efforts.
Bottom Line:
Depending on the level of oil supply reductions, neither country has more than 5-7 months to resolve the crisis or face catastrophic economic consequences. Given other variables that could divert SPR reserves from direct injection into the domestic economy, such as military operations, oil support shipments to allies, additional OPEC holdbacks, etc., the Saudi oil crisis has to be resolved within five months—by March 2018—to avert a complete global economic meltdown.
Geopolitical Scenarios and Options:
King Mustafa holds the upper hand for the moment. He has the oil and is immune from attack by virtue of his dirty bombs. The Saudi economy could be sustained indefinitely by selling a mere 2-3 MB/D of oil at outrageously high prices. It seems likely Mustafa will use the threat of attacks by cruise missiles armed with dirty bombs to coerce oil reductions from Gulf countries bordering Saudi Arabia. They include the following countries with daily production levels shown in parenthesis: Kuwait (2.4 MB/D), Qatar (1.0 MB/D), and UAE (3.0 MB/D). Loss of any or all of the collective 6.4 MB/D of oil produced by these countries will greatly magnify the crisis. It remains to be seen how other OPEC nations will respond, but Iraq (6.0 MB/D) and Iran (4.2 MB/D) are not expected to play ball with Mustafa.
Planning Considerations:
A. King Mustafa is likely to attempt the following within the next thirty days:
B. Four distinct challenges and/or operational risks attendant to any allied response:
Options and Possibilities:
The purview of this Executive Summary is not to suggest a specific plan of action, but rather to provide a continuum of options ranging from full military responses to collaborative, asymmetric solutions. The options are compartmentalized into three generic approaches—each of which can be blended or tweaked to meet desired objectives. A detailed description of each option follows this Executive Summary. The three approaches are as follows:
1 Collaborative and Asymmetric Approach:
The asymmetric approach would create a united front difficult for the Saudis to oppose. It would feature a war of attrition with an endgame strategy of causing regime change in Saudi Arabia through domestic insurrection. It would require a global coalition united against Mustafa and willing to take collective measures—including rationing, resource-sharing, and collaborative strategic planning—to achieve common objectives. It would be critically important to engage China and major nations in this coalition. The downside of this approach is the time, patience, and collaboration required to develop and sustain the coalition.
2 Go-It-Alone Approach:
This approach would enable the United States to act quickly and aggressively to protect its own best interests with respect to securing oil supply. It would be easier to implement with immediate gains, and it represents the ultimate zero-sum game. It would rely almost exclusively on the military and economic power of the United States to achieve desired results for its own purposes. The downside is it would fragment the global community and create an “every nation for itself” mentality that would preclude the possibility of global leverage being used against King Mustafa.
3 Military Solutions:
This approach calls for an aggressive military response that could include the use of nuclear weapons. It would also require a full-scale mobilization of forces. It could be conducted as a standalone operation or in collaboration with others. It could include occupying chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, interdicting OPEC ships, commando raids on Saudi territory, and a host of other military actions. The downside is the possibility that Mustafa will detonate dirty bombs that permanently deprive the world of Saudi oil.
Conclusions:
We may expect a global economic meltdown of catastrophic proportions to occur within the next 5-6 months unless a solution is found for the Saudi oil embargo. Until then, conditions will worsen with each passing day, and with them the danger of conflicts on a local, regional, and international scale will increase. Once the SPR reserves of major powers are used up and the full economic brunt of the embargo felt, the possibility of an international conflagration will increase exponentially.
A detailed summary of the continuum of approaches follows the Executive Summary. All options carry a set of advantages and disadvantages that policymakers must weigh. In doing so, one fundamental question arises that will undoubtedly impact the option and direction selected:
Can the two world superpowers, China and the United States, faced with a threat exceeding their capacity to resolve unilaterally, set aside their differences and work collaboratively to defeat a common enemy?
End of Executive Summary
Clayton set aside the remainder of the report. As far as he was concerned, the entire meeting here at Camp David revolved around the closing question in the CIA report—a question that he had asked them to insert. Without advocating an approach, the CIA report made a compelling case for collaboration; one of the reasons he was anxious to send a copy to Lin Cheng and Wang Peng.
How would they interpret the report?
he wondered. The idea of pitching new austerity measures to an already pinched America was also troubling. Few people had any idea of the magnitude of the problem about to broadside the country—and he was going to be at the helm when it hit. He turned as he heard a knocking on the door.
“Yes?” he said. The door opened.
“Hey Clayton, it’s Jack. Their helicopter just arrived, and we should be ready to crank up the meeting in about a half hour.”
K
ing Mustafa’s euphoria was tinged with anxiety as he awaited his new high command in his temporary headquarters in the royal palace. He looked around at the bullet holes pocking the walls and felt eager to get the reconstruction work underway. For many reasons, he thought it important to maintain residence here as a sign of continuity in the new regime.
He greeted each person politely as they arrived and opened their 10:00 a.m. meeting by praising Allah, giving thanks for the successful coup and the greater global jihad that would soon commence.
“My brothers,” Mustafa said with pride, “I congratulate you on your heroic efforts. In three days you have restored our country to one that honors Allah and His teachings. Within days you will further cleanse it of all infidels that have corrupted it in the past.”
“Allahu Akbar!” said Mullah Mohammed al-Hazari, “and thanks to you, King Mustafa, for your leadership in this most holy effort.” The others, not wanting to be upstaged, quickly joined in their effusive praise.
The coup is over; it is now time to jockey for position,
Mustafa thought, amused by the new power paradigm unfolding before him.
“We have much to discuss, my brothers, and I would like to start now,” said King Mustafa. This time no one interrupted him—not even Ali Bawarzi, who had a knack for incessant and inane questions.
“The good news first,” Mustafa continued. “We were successful—almost beyond belief—in completing our glorious mission ahead of schedule. Through your planning and courage we were able to take out the corrupt royal government and their infidel lackeys before our twenty-four-hour timetable had passed. Our broadcasts to the world were successful; the Five Demands were issued and our demonstration atomic bomb was detonated—thanks to the superb efforts of General Ali Jabar and his Royal Air Force scientists.” The general practically glowed at this praise.
“On the other hand,” Mustafa continued, “there were things that could have gone better. I was deeply disappointed to learn that Prince Khalid ibn Saud left the country with his family and entourage shortly before our campaign. He is a powerful man with close ties to the West, and he could be a formidable force should he choose to set up a government in exile supported by the West.”
Prince Hahad ibn Saud winced noticeably at Mustafa’s disappointment. It had been his job to take out the royal family. Unfortunately, Prince Khalid and his entourage left for an OPEC meeting and vacation in Switzerland only hours before the coup was launched, and there was absolutely nothing he could do about it.
“I also hoped more countries would have severed their ties with Israel following my first broadcast, but the fifteen we have are at least a good start. Our operatives are working with Hamas to launch a major uprising in the West Bank, and their actions will undoubtedly unite other loyal Arab nations against the Zionist infidels. I’m sure Hezbollah will soon become active—not wanting to be upstaged by Hamas—and this is good.”
Mustafa delighted in thinking about the pincer attack against Israel from both movements, and how difficult it would be for the Zionists to defend against these multiple threats.
Serves them right, he thought.
“China and the United States have remained strangely silent,” he continued, “with the exception of the Americans’ feeble warning that we should abstain from attacking Israel. The Israeli government, of course, is engaging in their usual saber rattling by sending their fighter-bomber sorties close to our borders, but it is all show.
“If you will indulge me,” King Mustafa continued with feigned deference and unquestioned authority, “I would like to review with you what is next on our agenda: First, I will broadcast a message today to our OPEC partners and nations buying oil from them, advising them of our expectations.
“Second, I would like you, Prince Bawarzi, as commander in chief of the Army, to amass forces on the borders of Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE as quickly as possible. I want you, General Ali Jabar, to fly as many daily sorties as you can muster near these adjacent borders, and a cruise-missile demonstration would not be a bad idea. I’ll soon be talking with Kuwait, QATAR, the UAE, and even Yemen about a formal partnership, and I want them to be very aware of what could happen if they decline.
“Third, I would most respectfully ask you, Mohammed al-Hazari, to aggressively cleanse our society of its evil ways and once again restore it to a land that is pleasing to Allah.” He could see the delight in the face of al-Hazari.
“Fourth, General Ali Jabar and Prince Bawarzi, prepare your list of oil choke points and proposals to take them out by force, if need be. If memory serves, about 20 percent of the world’s daily oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz and another 15 percent or so flows by the Strait of Malacca. I’m not saying we want to attack these areas and make them inoperative, but I want it known that this is one of many trump cards we hold.
“Fifth, to the greatest possible extent, I want your staffs to finalize plans for keeping Iran and Iraq out of the act. Together, they produce almost as much oil daily as us, and I don’t want to see them act together as a counterbalancing force in OPEC. Please have the plans on my desk by next week.
“Last, we don’t know how the infidels will react to our Five Demands. I doubt we have much to fear from an outright military attack, as they know we can make the oil fields they so covet a radioactive wasteland, but we must be prepared for all contingencies. We must keep them off balance. My greatest concern is that they’ll unite against us and possibly support a government in exile under Prince Khalid. Ideally, we’ll be able to drive a wedge between China and the Western powers and reduce any chance of them rallying together against us. It is also imperative we eliminate Prince Khalid once and for all.”