International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (5 page)

As such, realists suggest that the perpetual problem of the security dilemma means that inter-state war remains an inherent possibility. Despite this, though, they also suggest that several mechanisms exist enabling states to limit the likelihood of war occurring in specific contexts. The first is through ensuring that the distribution of power is balanced across the international system. This can be done through creating alliances and ad hoc coalitions which balance the power of competing states and nullify the presumed benefits of military action. Second, realists suggest order can also be ensured through the emergence of a hegemonic power, a state with such a preponderance of power that it can set and police the rules of the system. In the contemporary period the United States has come closest to performing this role, although with the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (see
Box 2
) its ability to do so effectively is being undermined. A third way states may avoid war, though, is through acquiring a nuclear deterrent and threatening potential adversaries with devastation should they be foolish enough to attack. Indeed, some realists even favour the more general proliferation of nuclear weapons, believing that widespread ownership may have a stabilizing effect on international relations. For instance, some analysts suggest that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to India and Pakistan has actually moderated their relationship by raising the costs of all out war to unacceptable levels. Indeed, this prospect of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is often suggested as the primary reason for the Cold War remaining cold, with nuclear weapons therefore viewed as a fundamental source of both international stability and national security. As critics note, though, in actuality there were several occasions during the Cold War—most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)—when the world came perilously close to nuclear war. For them, relying on nuclear weapons as the foundation of international security is therefore an unacceptably risky strategy.

In contrast to realists others are more optimistic about the prospects for overcoming the problems and effects of the security dilemma. At the conservative end are those who argue that while the security dilemma remains an indisputable element of international politics its effects can be mitigated. One way of doing this is through the creation of ‘security regimes’. On many issues, states and other actors do accept, either explicitly or implicitly, certain rules and norms, perhaps also decision-making procedures, as fundamental principles guiding their behaviour. These rules, norms, and procedures are called security regimes. To the extent to which this happens relations between participants within the security regime may become increasingly cooperative and characterized by reciprocity and restraint.

Although states may initially participate in a security regime because of perceived short-term gains, over time the benefits of participation may become viewed as outweighing those of leaving. The central benefit is that security regimes establish standards and rules of behaviour against which different states can be judged and even punished. As such they stabilize expectations and reduce uncertainty between states. For liberals, by fostering confidence and trust between participants, security regimes enable states to take a longer-term view of their interests, ultimately providing them with the luxury of prioritizing the absolute gains that might be derived through cooperation over the concern with relative gains that preoccupies realists. Beyond this, more critically inclined analysts suggest that participation can also result in the moulding of state interests and identities in line with the principles and norms inherent within the security regime. The result is that states might end up participating in security regimes, not simply because participation is seen as maximizing state interests, but because conforming to the regime’s norms and rules has become consistent with the state’s own sense of identity and of what constitutes appropriate behaviour.

A good example of a security regime is the nuclear non-proliferation regime designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and which has been in development almost since their very first use (
Figure 2
). In respect of horizontal proliferation the regime has been relatively successful as at present only nine states possess nuclear weapons (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, UK, USA). At the heart of the regime is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signed in 1968 the NPT recognized the existence of five nuclear weapons states (NWS)—China, France, Russia, UK, USA. In signing, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) committed themselves not to develop nuclear weapons and to make themselves subject to various monitoring procedures. In return for such abstinence the NWS agreed to help the NNWS acquire nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes (e.g. power production). They also pledged not to use nuclear weapons to attack NNWS unless those states had attacked them while aligned to a nuclear power, and they agreed to pursue their own nuclear disarmament over the longer term.

Although some states have ignored the NPT and developed nuclear weapons capabilities regardless, this number has been small. Indicative of the emergence and value attached to the non-proliferation regime is that over time various states—including Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Sweden—abandoned their nuclear weapons programmes. This was also the case with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which on gaining independence in the 1990s became de facto nuclear powers as a result of the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons installations on their territories. The non-proliferation regime has also been enhanced with the declaration of various Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) in Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia, the South Pacific, and Antarctica, and by the active role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, in monitoring and inspecting the use nuclear facilities and verifying that states are upholding their NPT commitments.

The non-proliferation regime therefore suggests that states do not always quest after power and may see upholding the regime as operating in their longer-term collective benefit. However, aside from such rational cost–benefit calculations it may also be that NNWS have not pursued nuclear weapons because, owing to their immense and indiscriminate destructive power, their use has become viewed as morally unacceptable to large segments of the international community, except perhaps in retaliation to a first strike by another nuclear power. Acquiring nuclear weapons would therefore be incompatible with the identity many states project to themselves and the world.

In contrast, progress on vertical proliferation—the NWS’s commitment to pursue complete nuclear disarmament—has been more mixed. From the late 1960s onwards various strategic (nuclear) arms control talks were undertaken and treaties signed. These included restricting the types of nuclear weapons tests which could be undertaken and working towards reducing the overall number of nuclear weapons, although significant progress had to wait until the Cold War’s end. In signing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2010, however, the USA and Russia committed themselves to reducing the number of deployed warheads to 1,550 over seven years. Particularly significant, however, was the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972. This was a treaty specifically designed to ensure the mutual vulnerability of the Soviet Union and the United States by limiting the missile defences they could develop and therefore making them mutually vulnerable to nuclear attack. The ABM Treaty rested on the proposition that the development of effective missile defences by one side would undermine the overall balance of power and might undermine the other side’s confidence in the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent, incentivizing it to launch a first strike before it was too late. Importantly, in 2002 the USA
withdrew from the Treaty to pursue the development of its Ballistic Missile Defence system, a move which Russian President Vladimir Putin warned would only result in a future arms race as Russia tries to develop similar systems and missiles capable of nullifying US defences.

The development of security regimes therefore suggests that the fear and uncertainty inherent in the security dilemma can be moderated. A more radical position suggests it might even be possible to exclude the security dilemma, and therefore the likelihood of war, from international politics altogether. This idea has been most closely associated with the development of ‘security communities’, the argument being that while security regimes may rise and fall over time (note America’s challenge to the non-proliferation regime through its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) security communities are potentially more durable.

The concept was initially coined by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s to describe the emergence of groups of states amongst whom the sense of community and trust had developed to such a degree that members could be assured that all disputes would be resolved peacefully, without resort to physical violence. Security communities are therefore characterized by dependable expectations of peaceful change. For Deutsch, security communities develop through processes of integration and community building between states with compatible core values and identities. In particular, he argued they are more likely to form when communication levels between states and societies are high. Thus, high levels of interaction through trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, etc. can all help foster trust, predictability of behaviour, and ultimately a shared sense of community. However, if high communication levels were enough then in a globalized age we might expect to see the emergence of a global security community and the eradication of
inter-state war. Clearly this has not happened. More recently, therefore, it has been argued that security communities are also characterized by the emergence of shared (as opposed to simply compatible) identities. In other words, through participation members not only come to identify with each other, but also to view their identity in collective terms.

The quintessential example of a security community is the European Union (EU). The key point about the European integration project is that its underlying rationale has been precisely that of preventing a return to the rabid nationalism and conflicts that ravaged Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Integration has therefore developed on an incremental basis to encompass political, economic, social, and environmental sectors, and is increasingly evident in the area of security and defence. Common laws and institutions have been established and attempts to manufacture a common identity through the introduction of a European flag, anthem, and common currency have also been undertaken, as well as the establishment of a broader conception of European citizenship facilitating rights of free movement. Some of these measures have been more successful than others, but insofar as it now appears inconceivable for war to break out between member states, then it is fair to say that a security community has been created and that in the context of intra-EU relations at least, the security dilemma has lost relevance.