Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (52 page)

5. Article I, Section 8 grants the legislative branch authority over “letters of marque,” the principal means by which private individuals could wage war with the patina of respectability afforded by this form of governmental authorization.

6. An outstanding survey of Confederate naval operations may be found in William M. Fowler, Jr.,
REBELS UNDER SAIL
(New York: Scribner, 1976).

7. Spector,
EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN
, 130.

8. The travails of the Mark-14 torpedo are best documented in Clay Blair,
SILENT VICTORY: THE U.S. SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), 249–54.

9. See Thomas C. Hart,
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, ASIATIC FLEET, LEADING UP TO WAR AND FROM 3 DECEMBER 1941 TO 15 FEBRUARY 1942
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 68.

10. Samuel Eliot Morison,
THE TWO-OCEAN WAR: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 493–94. See also Spector,
EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN
, 487.

11. Winston S. Churchill,
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
, vol. 4,
THE HINGE OF FATE
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 125.

12. Lockwood describes the use of “pack tactics” in his
HELLCATS OF THE SEA
(New York: Greenburg, 1955). A more recent analysis of Operation Barney may be found in Steven Smith,
WOLF PACK
(Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2003).

13. On the impact of code-breaking, see David Kahn,
SEIZING THE ENIGMA: THE RACE TO BREAK THE GERMAN U-BOAT CODES
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). A remarkably detailed account of the direction finding and other technologies—as well as tactics and doctrines—that beat the U-boats may be found in Michael Gannon,
BLACK MAY
(New York: HarperCollins, 1998).

14. On this issue, see John Prados,
COMBINED FLEET DECODED: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND THE JAPANESE NAVY IN WORLD WAR II
(New York: Random House, 1995).

15. Morison,
TWO-OCEAN WAR
, 505.

16. Lockwood’s account of this remarkable—yet not atypical—action may be found in his
SINK ’EM ALL: SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC
(New York: Dutton, 1951), 231–36. O’Kane’s memoir of these events is in his
CLEAR THE BRIDGE! THE WAR PATROLS OF THE U.S.S.
Tang (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977).

17. Spector,
EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN
, 487.

18. Morison,
TWO-OCEAN WAR
, 511.

19. Cited in William D. Leahy,
I WAS THERE
(New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 441.

20. Lockwood,
SINK ’EM ALL
, 383.

21. I exclude the spectacular Indian aircraft carrier raid on Karachi in 1971, as that Indo-Pakistani conflict was exceptionally one-sided at sea.

22. John Keegan,
THE PRICE OF ADMIRALTY
(New York: Viking, 1989), 274.

15. PARTISAN: JOSIP BROZ, “TITO”

1. See E. H. Cookridge,
SET EUROPE ABLAZE
(New York: Crowell, 1967).

2. John Keegan,
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(New York: Viking, 1989), 483–84. A more recent but similar assessment, and one that offers a sharp critique of Churchill’s strategy of sabotage and subversion, may be found in Max Hastings,
FINEST YEARS: CHURCHILL AS WARLORD
(New York: HarperCollins, 2009).

3. Winston S. Churchill,
CLOSING THE RING: THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1951), 461.

4. The number grows to over 350,000 when Serb, Bulgar, and Croat fighters are included. See Fitzroy Maclean,
DISPUTED BARRICADE
(London: J. Cape, 1957), 248.

5. Walter Laqueur,
GUERRILLA: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 217.

6. Robert Kennedy,
GERMAN ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1941–1944
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1954), United States Army Pamphlet, 29–243.

7. These methods are assessed in detail in Otto Heilbrunn,
PARTISAN WARFARE
(New York: Praeger, 1962), 108–10.

8. Heilbrunn,
PARTISAN WAREFARE
, 167.

9. Walter Roberts,
TITO, MIHAILOVIC, AND THE ALLIES, 1941–1945
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 228. Laqueur,
GUERRILLA
, 217, puts partisan losses in this action at more than six thousand.

10. Maclean,
DISPUTED BARRICADE
, 255.

11. Laqueur,
GUERRILLA
, 219.

12. Reported in Vladimir Dedijer,
TITO SPEAKS: HIS SELF-PORTRAIT AND STRUGGLE WITH STALIN
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), xiii–xv, and Richard West,
TITO
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 1994), 239.

13. This is not to suggest that Tito abstained from extramarital affairs thereafter. But his marriage to Jovanka was the most stable relationship of his life.

14. West,
TITO
, 258.

15. Cited in Jasper Ridley,
TITO
(London: Constable, 1994), 323.

16. Misha Glenny,
THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA
(London: Penguin, 1992), 31.

16. COUNTERINSURGENT: FRANK KITSON

1. Robert Taber,
THE WAR OF THE FLEA
(New York: L. Stuart, 1970).

2. See Brian Lapping,
END OF EMPIRE
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), xv.

3. The insurgents’ own name for themselves was the Land and Freedom Army. The term Mau Mau used to describe them likely came from the shortening and repetition of
MUMA WA UIGUANO
, the oath of unity that all took.

4. Anthony Clayton,
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN KENYA
(Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1976), 7.

5. John Newsinger,
BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), 70.

6. Sir Michael Blundell,
SO ROUGH A WIND
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1960), 170–71.

7. Frank Kitson,
LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS
(London: Faber, 1971), 65.

8. On the British cover-up, see Caroline Elkins,
IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN’S GULAG IN KENYA
(New York: Holt, 2005). For the anecdote about the Churchill letter, see p. 53.

9. These initiatives are described in detail in Otto Skorzeny’s memoir,
SKORZENY’S SPECIAL MISSIONS
(London: R. Hale, 1957), 120–25, 167–74.

10. Frank Kitson,
GANGS AND COUNTERGANGS
(London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), 74.

11. Newsinger,
BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY
, 74.

12. Robert B. Asprey,
WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY
(New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 640.

13. On this point, see J. M. Woodhouse, “Some Personal Observations on the Employment of Special Forces in Malaya,”
ARMY QUARTERLY
, April 1955.

14. See Lawrence M. Greenberg,
THE HUKBALAHAP INSURRECTION
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995), especially 118–19; and Lawrence E. Cline,
PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 1–2.

15. A good military overview of this conflict may be found in Stephen Cheney,
THE INSURGENCY IN OMAN, 1962–1976
(Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984).

16. J. Bowyer Bell,
THE IRISH TROUBLES
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 112.

17. Newsinger,
BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY
, 167.

18. Newsinger,
BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY
, 169.

19. See Robin Evelegh,
PEACE KEEPING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(London: C. Hurst, 1978), 29–31; and Newsinger,
BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY
, 169.

20. Charles Townshend,
BRITAIN’S CIVIL WARS
(London: Faber and Faber, 1986), especially the discussion on pp. 32–33.

21. On this point, see Martin Dillon,
THE ENEMY WITHIN
(London: Doubleday, 1971), 120.

22. Kitson,
LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS
, 29.

23. Lucian W. Pye,
GUERRILLA COMMUNISM AND MALAYA
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 95.

17. PEOPLE’S WARRIOR: VO NGUYEN GIAP

1. Cecil B. Currey,
VICTORY AT ANY COST: THE GENIUS OF VIETNAM’S GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 21.

2. The French claimed that she committed suicide, but American intelligence reports support the conclusion that she was beaten to death. See Philip Davidson,
VIETNAM AT WAR: THE HISTORY, 1946–1975
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1988), 7. Their daughter, Vo Hang Anh, survived and was later reunited with Giap.

3. This name was, as Giap put it, an “easier to remember” abbreviation of
VIETNAM DOC LOP DONG MINH HOI
(Vietnam Independence League). See Vo Nguyen Giap,
THE MILITARY ART OF PEOPLE’S WAR
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 50.

4. See the discussion of how Giap drew insights from Napoleon as much as Mao in Currey,
VICTORY AT ANY COST
, 53.