Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (51 page)

10. De Wet,
THREE YEARS’ WAR
, 78.

11. Winston S. Churchill,
FRONTIERS AND WARS
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1962), 592. Churchill had gotten close enough to the action to be captured by the Boers at one point, though he soon escaped. From then on he kept close company with Field Marshal Roberts and other senior British commanders. Churchill left South Africa after the fall of Pretoria and, later in the year, won election to Parliament as the Conservative member from Oldham.

12. Farwell,
GREAT BOER WAR
, 307.

13. Actual battle deaths among the Boers were still quite small and would reach only about seven thousand by war’s end, compared to more than twenty-two thousand British soldiers killed in the war. These figures are cited in Pakenham,
BOER WAR
, 607.

14. De Wet,
THREE YEARS’ WAR
, 225.

15. See Ruth Fry,
EMILY HOBHOUSE
(London: J. Cape, 1929).

16. Alfred Thayer Mahan,
THE STORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
(London: William Clowes, 1900), 203.

17. De Wet,
THREE YEARS’ WAR
, 292.

11. BUSH FIGHTER: PAUL VON LETTOW-VORBECK

1. Thomas Pakenham,
THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 1876–1912
(New York: Random House, 1991), 613.

2. Cited in Edward Paice,
TIP AND RUN: THE UNTOLD TRAGEDY OF THE GREAT WAR IN AFRICA
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 25.

3. One of the best accounts of this German maritime strategy may be found in Edwin P. Hoyt,
KREUZERKRIEG
(Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1968).

4. Cited in Byron Farwell,
THE GREAT WAR IN AFRICA
(New York: Norton, 1986), 105.

5. Paice,
TIP AND RUN
, 153.

6. Farwell,
GREAT WAR IN AFRICA
, 293.

7. Indeed, victory was somewhat prematurely declared in the leading book about the campaign published back then, J. H. V. Crowe’s
GENERAL SMUTS’ CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA
(London: J. Murray, 1918).

8. Edwin P. Hoyt,
GUERILLA: COLONEL VON LETTOW-VORBECK AND GERMANY’S EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE
(New York: Macmillan, 1981), 162.

9. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck,
MY REMINISCENCES OF EAST AFRICA
(London: Hurst, 1925), 212.

10. Von Lettow-Vorbeck,
REMINISCENCES OF EAST AFRICA
, 229.

11. Paice,
TIP AND RUN
, 392.

12. Hoyt,
GUERILLA
, 34.

13. Farwell,
GREAT WAR IN AFRICA
, 357.

12. EMIR DYNAMITE: T. E. LAWRENCE

1. Plutarch,
THE LIVES OF NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS
, trans. John Dryden (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), 433.

2. One might argue that attack aircraft made the principal difference in this campaign, but the Northern Alliance enjoyed complete air support for a month before the Special Forces joined them—and showed little progress. Once the advisers were in place, Kabul and Kandahar fell in a few weeks. See Doug Stanton,
HORSE SOLDIERS
(New York: Scribner, 2009).

3. T. E. Lawrence,
SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM
(London: J. Cape, 1935), 192.

4. Robert Payne,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: A TRIUMPH
(New York: Pyramid Books, 1962), 105.

5. James Barr,
SETTING THE DESERT ON FIRE: T. E. LAWRENCE AND BRITAIN’S SECRET WAR IN ARABIA, 1916–1918
(London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 83, 162.

6. Cited in Jeremy Wilson,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF
T. E. LAWRENCE
(New York: Atheneum, 1990), 192.

7. Lawrence,
SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM
, 350.

8. Lawrence,
SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM
, 386.

9. Barr,
SETTING THE DESERT ON FIRE
, 201–6, offers a case against the truth of Lawrence’s story about Deraa, based mainly on lack of corroboration and later evidence of his masochistic tendencies. A more sympathetic but clinically incisive perspective may be found in Harvard psychiatrist John E. Mack’s biography of Lawrence,
A PRINCE OF OUR DISORDER
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).

10. The impact of this deception on Turkish leaders and their German advisers is nicely described in Jon Latimer,
DECEPTION IN WAR
(Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2001), 92–94.

11. Lawrence,
SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM
, 344.

12. B. H. Liddell Hart,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA
(New York: Da Capo, 1935),
384.

13. Lowell Thomas,
WITH LAWRENCE IN ARABIA
(New York: Century Co., 1924), 171. The direct share of prisoners accounted for by the Arab irregulars was about one-third. The numbers of Turks that Lawrence’s fighters killed as they tried to surrender remains lost to history.

14. Liddell Hart,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA
, 380.

15. Liddell Hart,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA
, 381, for both quotes in this paragraph.

16. See, in the first instance, Richard Aldington,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: A BIOGRAPHICAL ENQUIRY
(London: Collins, 1955) and, in the second, Suleiman Mousa,
T. E. LAWRENCE: AN ARAB VIEW
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

17. Wilson,
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA
, 1084.

18. Robert Graves,
T. E. LAWRENCE TO HIS BIOGRAPHER, ROBERT GRAVES
(New York: Doubleday, 1938), 129.

19. B. H. Liddell Hart,
T. E. LAWRENCE TO HIS BIOGRAPHER, LIDDELL HART
(New York: Doubleday, 1938), 191.

20. Cited in Barr,
SETTING THE DESERT ON FIRE,
317.

13. LONG RANGER: ORDE WINGATE

1. Walter Laqueur,
GUERRILLA: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 169.

2. Wingate would come to criticize Lawrence’s method of buying the support of Arab tribesmen, and studiously refrained from doing so when recruiting tribal levies in Abyssinia a decade later.

3. Leonard Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
(New York: Scribner, 1955), 44.

4. Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 62–63.

5. Christopher Sykes,
ORDE WINGATE
(London: Collins, 1959), 149.

6. Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 58.

7. Lewis Gann,
GUERRILLAS IN HISTORY
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 58–59.

8. Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 126–27.

9. Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 138.

10. Thesiger would later in life become famous for his classic studies
ARABIAN SANDS
and
THE MARSH ARABS
.

11. Sykes,
ORDE WINGATE
, 317.

12. Sykes,
ORDE WINGATE
, 331–32.

13. This critical view was certainly held by General (later field marshal and chief of the imperial staff) William Slim, one of the senior British commanders in India, though he only articulated it in full more than a decade later in his memoir,
DEFEAT INTO VICTORY
(London: Cassell, 1956).

14. Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 194.

15. Winston Churchill,
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
:
CLOSING THE RING
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 67.

16. Wingate’s supporters tended to come from those who served under him. See, for example, Derek Tulloch,
WINGATE IN PEACE AND WAR
(London: Macdonald, 1972). More recently, an excellent assessment that sustains the more positive view of the Chindits may be found in J. Bierman and C. Smith,
FIRE IN THE NIGHT: WINGATE OF BURMA, ETHIOPIA, AND ZION
(New York: Random House, 1999). Wingate detractors, including and beyond William Slim, were often drawn from the ranks of more conventional general officers. One of the most thoughtful critiques is Shelford Bidwell’s
THE CHINDIT WAR
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979).

17.
JAPANESE MONOGRAPH NO. 134: BURMA OPERATIONS IN IMPHAL AREA AND WITHDRAWAL TO NORTHERN BURMA
(Washington, D.C.: Distributed by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957). Cited in Bierman and Smith,
FIRE IN THE NIGHT
, 386.

18. From Mosley,
GIDEON GOES TO WAR
, 63–64. Emphasis in the original.

14. UNDERSEA WOLF: CHARLES LOCKWOOD

1. Ronald Spector,
EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN: THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN
(New York: The Free Press, 1985), 178.

2. Robert Frank,
GUADALCANAL
(New York: Random House, 1990), 601, reflects a final tally of twenty-five American surface ships lost, including two aircraft carriers, and eighteen Japanese ships, including one small carrier.

3. A. T. Mahan,
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1894), 132.

4. Cited in Carlton Savage,
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MARITIME COMMERCE ON WAR
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), 1:389.