Read In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan Online
Authors: Seth G. Jones
24.
Gerges,
The Far Enemy,
pp. 38–40; Zahab and Roy,
Islamist Networks,
pp. 48–52.
25.
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden,” August 23, 1998. Also see, for example, U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Usama Bin Ladin: Bin Ladin Uses Recent Interviews to Assert Right to WMD, and to Threaten U.S. and U.K. Over Iraq,” December 28, 1998. Released by the National Security Archive.
26.
Laura Mansfield,
His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri
(Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2002), pp. 314–15.
27.
Gerges,
The Far Enemy.
28.
“UK’s Arabic Paper Interviews bin Laden’s Former ‘Bodyguard,’”
BBC Monitoring International Reports,
March 30, 2005. “Interview of Bin Ladin’s Former Body Guard, Abu Jandal,”
Al-Quds al-Arabi
(London), August 25, 2005.
29.
Alan Cullison stumbled upon several al Qa’ida computers in Kabul shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Alan Cullison, “Inside al-Qa’ida’s Hard Drive,”
Atlantic Monthly,
vol. 294, no. 2, September 2004, p. 67.
30.
Sayyid Qutb,
Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq [Milestones]
(Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981).
31.
The Qur’an, 5:50.
32.
On Qutb’s work, see Gilles Kepel,
The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Olivier Carré,
Mystique et politique
(Paris: Presses de la FNSP et Cerf, 1984); Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi,
Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Muslim Arab World
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996).
33.
See, for example, Qutb,
Ma’alimfi-1-Tariq,
p. 57.
34.
See, for example, Kepel,
Jihad,
pp. 25–27.
35.
Coll,
Ghost Wars,
p. 113.
36.
Qutb,
Ma’alim fi-1-Tariq.
37.
The Qur’an, 5:50.
38.
Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
translated by Laura Mansfield (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2002), p. 61.
39.
Osama Rushdi, “How Did the Ideology of the ‘Jihad Group’ Evolve?”
Al Hayat,
January 30, 2002; Gerges,
The Far Enemy,
p. 97.
40.
Gerges,
The Far Enemy,
p. i.
41.
On the establishment of a caliphate, see, for example, Abu Bakr Naji,
The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass,
translated and published by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard Universit Ma 23 2006.
42.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 201.
43.
Mansfield,
In His Own Words,
p. 47.
44.
ABC Television News interview, “Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama bin Laden,” December 22, 1998 (conducted in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai).
45.
See, for example, Wright,
The Looming Tower,
p. 48; Gerges,
The Far Enemy,
pp. 3–4.
46.
United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui,
Transcript of Jury Trial Before the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, VA, March 6, 2006.
47.
The Qur’an, 4:29–30.
48.
On paradise, see, for example, The Qur’an, 56:12–39.
49.
See, for example, Memorandum from the Rendon Group to J5 CENTCOM Strategic Effects, “Polling Results—Afghanistan Omnibus May 2007,” June 15, 2007.
50.
Mohammed el-Shafey, “Al-Zawahiri’s Secret Papers,” Part 6,
Al-Sharq al-Awsat,
December 18, 2002.
51.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 200.
52.
Sayyid Qutb, “Letter to Tewfig al-Hakeem,” in al-Khaledi,
Amrika min al-dahkhil,
p. 39.
53.
Zawahiri argued: “Jerusalem will not be liberated unless the battle for Egypt and Algeria is won and unless Egypt is liberated.” See, for example, Montasser al-Zayat,
Ayman Zawahiri as I Knew Him
(Cairo, 2002), pp. 113–36; Salah,
Narratives of the Jihad Years,
chapter 5.
54.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 199.
55.
Osama bin Laden, video clip released in September 2007.
56.
Abdullah Azzam,
Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important Personal Duty
(Amman, Jordan: Modern Mission Librar, 2005), chapter 1.
57.
Quoted in Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know,
p. 35.
58.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 128.
59.
Ibid., p. 111.
60.
Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 209–18.
61.
Ayman al-Zawahiri,
AlWalaa wa al Baraa,
obtained by
Al Hayat,
January 14, 2003.
62.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 113.
63.
Ibid., p. 111.
64.
The text is the second
fatwa
originally published on February 23, 1998, to declare a holy war, or jihad, against the West and Israel. It was signed by Osama bin Laden, head of al Qa’ida; Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of al-Jihad; Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlur Rehman, leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.
65.
See, for example, Sandia National Laboratories, U.S. Department of Energy, Dr. Gary W. Richter,
Osama bin Laden: A Case Study,
December 6, 1999. Released by the National Security Archive.
66.
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “TFXX01: Afghanistan: Reaction to U.S. Strikes Follows Predictable Lines: Taliban Angry, Their Opponents Support U.S.,” August 21, 1998.
67.
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Reported Activities of Extremist Arabs and Pakistanis Since August 20 U.S. Strike on Khost Terrorist Camps,” September 9, 1998. Released by the National Security Archive.
68.
Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban.
69.
Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2000),. 98–100.
70.
On Saudi Arabia’s historical role in Afghanistan, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), pp. 371–74.
71.
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Tensions Reportedly Mount Within Taliban as Ties With Saudi Arabia Deteriorate Over Bin Ladin,” September 28, 1998. Released by the National Security Archive.
72.
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Taliban Seem to Have Less Funds and Supplies This Year, But the Problem Does Not Appear to Be that Acute,” February 17, 1999. Released by the National Security Archive.
73.
Memorandum from Richard A. Clarke to Condoleezza Rice, Subject: Presidential Policy Initiative / Review—The Al-Qida Network, January 25, 2001. Released by the National Security Archive.
74.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
pp. 38–39.
75.
Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower
(Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001).
76.
Wright,
The Looming Tower,
p. 110. Gilles Kepel also argues that “the Arabs seem to have played only a minor part in fighting the Red Army. Their feats of arms were largely perpetrated after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 and were highly controversial.” Kepel,
Jihad,
p. 147. And Fawaz Gerges notes: “There exists no evidence pointing to any vital role played by foreign veterans in the Afghan victory over the Russians.” Gerges,
The Far Enemy,
pp. 83–84.
77.
See, for example, ABC reporter John Miller’s interview with bin Laden in May 1998, a little over two months before the U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. Part of the transcript was played at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested in August 2001, shortly before the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.
United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui,
Transcript of Jury Trial Before the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, VA, March 6, 2006.
78.
Memorandum from Richard A. Clarke to Condoleezza Rice, January 25, 2001.
Chapter Six
1.
Jon Lee Anderson, “American Viceroy: Zalmay Khalilzad’s Mission,”
The New Yorker,
December 19, 2005, p. 63.
2.
On the overthrow of the Taliban regime, see Gary Schroen,
First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); Stephen Biddle,
Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002); Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2005); Bob Woodward,
Bush at War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
3.
Author interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, August 27, 2008.
4.
Ibid.
5.
Transcript of Martin Smith interview with Richard Armitage, July 20, 2006. I received a copy of the transcript from
Frontline.
6.
Woodward,
Bush at War,
p. 47.
7.
Author interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, August 27, 2008. W
8.
Woodward,
Bush at War,
p. 59.
9.
Author interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, August 27, 2008.
10.
Ibid.
11.
Woodward,
Bush at War,
p. 51.
12.
George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 207.
13.
Douglas J. Feith,
War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism
(New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 75–76.
14.
Schroen,
First In,
p. 28.
15.
Andrew J. Birtle,
Afghan War Chronology
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information Paper, March 22, 2002), pp. 2–3.
16.
Biddle,
Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,
pp. 8–10.
17.
Michael DeLong and Noah Lukeman,
Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004), p. 46.
18.
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int.; Tape 032802p, CPT D. int. This information comes from deposits at the U.S. Army Military History Institute’s archive at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. See also Dale Andrade,
The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif, October—November 2001
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information Paper, March 1, 2002), pp. 2–3. Roadbound Taliban and al Qa’ida reserves moving from Sholgerah were decimated by American air interdiction as they moved south to reinforce the defenses of Bai Beche and Ac’capruk, then as they fled north toward Mazar after November 5. See U.S. Army Military History Institute: Memorandum for the Record, COL J. int., July 2002; Tape 032602p, CPT M. int.
19.
Biddle,
Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,
p. 10.