Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program (33 page)

If your explanations of the terms of the contract, rules of conduct, and
other important matters are ambiguous, trouble will most likely result, especially with regard to working conditions and prohibited activities.
The foreign assistants, having been raised in a contractual society, are
used to listening to such explanations, even when they are very strict.
It is necessary to refrain from ambiguous treatment and to give firm
and persistent explanations, making sure at all times that the foreign
assistants understand.14

Caricatures such as these may partially explain why Japanese prefectural
officials not only used an employment contract but embraced it with a
fervor that seems puzzling in light of their own preference for informal
modes of conflict resolution. Ironically, Sato-sensei's inclination to rely
primarily on the contract to resolve disputes earned him a reputation
among prefectural ALTs as cold and calculating. Both Lisa and Toby, for
instance, interpreted his verbatim reading from the contract as exemplifying perfectly the lack of a human touch that was the problem with
Japan's internationalization. Even Kevin, who was viewed as more of an
insider by Sato-sensei and Tanabe-san, sometimes objected to the extent
to which appeal to the contract became Japanese officials' knee-jerk response: "It seems like whenever I bring up things involving ALT requests-like someone wants extra vacation time or if they can't be at a
required meeting-it's like a wall goes up and they just say, 'No' and go
straight to the contract." Adding to the suspicion of ALTs were several
misunderstandings that resulted from discrepancies between the Japanese version of the contract and the English version that they received.
To the ALTs such discrepancies seemed irresponsible at best and downright dishonest at worst.

Cultures differ in their assumptions about motivation and human nature, as well as in their repertoires of techniques for interpersonal influence. Moreover, different historical experiences generate and perpetuate
distinctive myths about how specific groups of people behave and how they
ought to be managed.;' In this case, prefectural officials had little faith that
the ALTs would respond to appeals directed at internalized norms. The
ALTs tended to focus on particular issues and immediate circumstances, in
part because they knew that their stay in japan was limited. In addition,
Sato-sensei and Tanabe-san had to worry about precedents. The bureaucratic impulse is to standardize procedures in order to ensure smooth and
efficient operation, and they did not like exceptions or disruptions. The
failure of their preferred, symbolic means of control thus led Sato-sensei
and Tanabe-san to embrace the contract with a fervor that at times seemed
to border on desperation. But although they could certainly operate under this Weberian model in which rewards and punishments were explicitly
spelled out, I sensed that they were never entirely comfortable with it. The
clear-cut dualism of good and bad, right and wrong, that is characteristic of
the "contractual model" did not fit well with their sense of morality.

It is crucial to note, however, that the day-to-day behavior of ALTs was
never tightly supervised and controlled. Stanley Heginbotham has suggested that there are three compliance mechanisms available to maintain
indirect control over the behavior of physically inaccessible field agentsmaterial incentive control, feedback control, and preprogrammed control36-
and his model seems to apply well here. Material incentive control was
clearly evident in the arrangement of the overall employment package, for
it was in the ALTs' best interest to fulfill the requirements of the job. Preprogrammed control, which is achieved by persuading the individual
worker to accept the goals of the program, was manifest in the orientation,
midyear conferences, and newsletters organized by CLAIR, as well as in a
variety of team-teaching seminars and publications at the prefectural level.
These attempts to get ALTs to buy into the goal of team teaching were nevertheless constantly in danger of being undermined by actual conditions in
the schools.

Feedback control, which involves some monitoring of the ALTs' job and
regular reports, was rarely implemented. In fact, one of the frequent complaints from ALTs regarded the lack of feedback from their superiors (particularly ETCs) about how they were performing their jobs. This lack of
feedback is quite understandable, however, given the difficulty of objectively assessing much of the ALTs' work, the uneven nature of the ETCs'
own expertise in team teaching, and their strong preference for avoiding
confrontation with a foreigner. Feedback control would make explicit the
limitations of trust and confidence in the ALT and could easily undermine
the hosts' fragile commitment to team teaching, on which the entire program depended.

THE FRONT LINES OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

At the prefectural level, JET participants are pulled into a complex, heavily
bureaucratic institution with ongoing programs, priorities, and operating
procedures. Board of education bureaucrats must respond to a bewildering
array of objectives and pressures-from school officials and teachers, district administrators, the ALTs, and national-level ministry bureaucrats.
When the formation of coalitions at the national level is aided by leaving
policy goals somewhat ambiguous, then lower levels must take on the task-and the unpleasantness-of removing ambiguities. Sato-sensei and
Tanabe-san inherited a whole host of problems that had been left unresolved, including the pension issue, Japanese language training for ALTs,
and the relative emphasis to be given to conversational and exam English.

Numerous other small factors-conflicting commitments, dependence
on those who may not fully support the program, procedural requirements-accumulate to affect how prefectures implement the JET Program.
Other difficulties arise because the local bureaucrats charged with implementation may not have the necessary proficiency in English. Finally, as
the actors frequently change, their attention (on both sides) shifts: prefectural officials rotate every few years, and the turnover among ALTs is constant. Indeed, nearly 40 percent of ETCs report that they are working with
foreigners for the first time. Under these circumstances, it is little wonder
that Sato-sensei and Tanabe-san most frequently described their JETrelated job responsibilities to me as "burdensome" (futan).37

The teachers' consultants thus employ a variety of methods to protect
established routines and existing institutional priorities. They exhibit a
tendency toward what Harry Wolcott has referred tows "variety-reducing
behavior.""' That is, the ETCs respond to the ALTs with inherent conservatism because they are anxious to keep things manageable and to minimize the program's burden to themselves and others. Changes in policy are
avoided because new initiatives usually arouse more controversy than
leaving things as they are-even if the status quo includes contradictions
and jurisdictional overlaps. In many ways the picture that emerges confirms what is already known about Japanese strategies for resolving conflicts when making and implementing policy. It very closely approximates
what Michael Blaker has described as "coping": that is, "carefully assessing
the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to
settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about
the situation faced, and then performing the minimum adjustments
needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing situation with the fewest risks."39 While coping in foreign policy is usually seen
as spineless or immoral, it could also be viewed as a pragmatic and realistic
response.

In spite of the difficulties in conflict management and the extra work
the JET Program created for them, Sato-sensei and Tanabe-san did not
once consider forsaking their responsibilities. Eager to remain true to the
spirit of the program, and feeling very acutely the high expectations of the
superintendent and the governor that they make internationalization a "success," both of them worked mightily not only to defuse potential conflicts but also to create support and momentum for team-teaching activities. Under their guidance the prefecture sponsored a series of teamteaching workshops and seminars, and in the final year of their tenure it
published a sourcebook of ideas for the communication-oriented English
language classroom. Most ETCs strongly believe that the JET Program is
in the national interest. Prefectural officials remain receptive both to pressure from the ALTs themselves and to top-down guidance from national
ministry officials.

The ETCs did not have their hands entirely tied by environmental constraints or cultural preoccupations: like most people, they are selfinterested actors and, as we have seen, they wield considerable power in
shaping program content. Indeed, their power lies precisely in the ambiguity of their role. Bureaucrats can interpret policy directives in ways that
align their own desires and those of policymakers or they can ignore directives altogether. Each course of action has costs and tradeoffs, and the
choices are real. The prefectural board of education is thus the focus of
pressures from all sides, and the teachers' consultants are the fulcrum
around which the system moves. Influenced by outside guidance and authority, they nonetheless shape program structure and content in ways
that protect local meanings and institutions.

In the summer of 1995 I had the opportunity to revisit Sato-sensei and
Tanabe-san and to swap stories again over beer and karaoke. After four
years working for the board of education, Sato-sensei had been appointed
head of curriculum at a prestigious prefectural high school, where he was
biding his time before being appointed vice-principal. Tanabe-san first had
been sent to a district board of education, and then was promoted to assistant section chief (kacho hosa) in the personnel department of the prefectural office. He had a much more distinguished look about him, enhanced
by the addition of some gray hairs, and Sato-sensei joked at how quickly he
was ascending the prefectural career ladder. Neither had had any significant contact with subsequent administrators of the JET Program. "It would
be rude and inappropriate to offer unsolicited advice," Sato-sensei told me.

With a bit of prodding they began to reminisce about their time together in the board of education. Tanabe-san commented that he missed
those days because he now had less variety in his job. By contrast, Satosensei was much more relieved to be out of the line of fire, even though he
still taught English regularly with an ALT. "We just gave up being a base
school," he noted, "and to tell you the truth, it's a lot easier that way." But he did not regret having worked with the ALTs. "I'm thankful for taking
that position because I've learned I should just say what I think. If ALTs
can express their opinions freely, then we have to be able to do the same."
We talked late into the night, and I was particularly impressed by Tanabesan's long-term perspective on internationalization:

You know, everyone talks about kokusaika, but it's a lot harder than it
looks! It takes a lot of time, and there's a lot of disappointment along
the way. Ten years from now we'll probably be saying, "Look at that
stupid stuff we were doing back then." The first few years are the hardest part-getting everyone used to foreigners. But our sensibility is to
put up with the bad part of hosting ALTs so as to reap the benefits of
the good part. That's why we keep inviting more and more ALTs. And
this is definitely the trend. There's no turning back now.