Hunting Down Saddam (34 page)

The Ace in the Hole

“They say you can't do it, but sometimes it doesn't always work.”

—C
ASEY
S
TENGEL

It had been two hundred and fifty-four days since Saddam Hussein was last seen. At times he seemed more a ghost, or a desert mirage, than a man.

From March 20 on, when the United States initiated the war with a strike by cruise missiles and bombs on Iraqi “leadership targets,” including Saddam, his sons, and key leaders, Saddam was a shadowy figure. His whereabouts, and even whether he was still alive, were constantly in question.

Saddam Hussein surfaced briefly on April 4 during an Iraqi television broadcast of two videotapes. Where and when they were made sparked great debate. Three days after they aired, United States forces bombed a building in the Mansour district of Baghdad, where sources had told them Saddam was gathered with his leadership. Saddam survived again and the Coalition's inability to kill or capture him hampered progress toward a new nation and government. Saddam's loyal Ba'athists continued to intimidate the population, claiming Saddam was alive and warning that he and the Ba'athists would return to power and punish all who cooperated with the new government or with the Coalition.

By the time President George W. Bush formally declared an end to the major military campaign in Iraq on May 1, Saddam and his associates were clearly on the run. Yet the United States seemed no closer to catching this man who was proving to be as elusive and difficult to find as Iraq's alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction. The month of May also brought Paul Bremer to Iraq as the U.S. civil administrator, followed by the twenty-five-member U.S.-backed Iraqi Governing Council's inaugural meeting in July, and the Interim Governing Council appointment of twenty-five ministers in September. But still no Saddam.

Saddam Hussein and the remnants of all he stood for hung like a pall over Iraq. Regardless of the brilliance of the military operations that had ousted him, and the speed and precision of Iraq's liberation, and no matter how much President Bush and his allies denied it, success in Iraq was measured by whether or not they got Saddam. The insurgency increased, and U.S. post-conflict casualties mounted, eventually eclipsing the number of lives lost during the declared conflict. Saddam seemed to remain just out of reach, yet close enough to broadcast audio messages to rally his loyalists, while taunting those who cooperated with the American-led occupation. He labeled anyone disloyal to his ousted regime a traitor, and encouraged Iraqis to murder foreign soldiers and government officials.

It began to appear that Saddam would be another Osama Bin Laden, remaining just out of grasp, the attacks on him always near misses from which he would always, almost miraculously, escape. The United States tried and failed to kill him with laser-guided two-thousand-pound bombs at the war's start. Despite the unprecedented speed with which U.S. forces swept through the country and into Baghdad, he managed to slip away and vanish. A $25-million reward produced nothing. The entire lineup of secret, twenty-first century, state-of-the-art technology the United States boasted was failing to find him. But survival was nothing new for Saddam. The man who had become known as the Enemy of the Western World had beaten the odds before, and was betting that he could do it again.

Elvis Has Left the Building

The intelligence section for the 1st Brigade Combat Team had received reports about Saddam's whereabouts from the earliest days, after their arrival in Tikrit in mid-April 2003.

While many believed Saddam was constantly on the move between about twenty “spider holes” throughout Iraq, MAJ John S. “Stan” Murphy (1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Intelligence Officer [S-2]) and his team didn't completely accept that conclusion. There was little doubt Saddam moved often, but Murphy's team felt strongly that Saddam would remain in the relative safety and protection of the Tikrit area. In addition to Saddam's age, family connections no doubt were playing a significant role in his concealment. His family, tribe, and most of his trusted aides were from the Tikrit region. Perhaps Saddam would move from one location to another in the area, but Murphy believed he would not travel far beyond that. Tikrit had protected him as a young man, so it made sense to Murphy that Saddam would do the same at this point in his life.

That didn't alter the fact that there had been a plethora of “Saddam sightings” throughout Iraq between April and December. At the 4th Infantry Division, based north of Baghdad, Saddam became known as “Elvis” because of the number of reported sightings. It became worse once the United States posted a $25-million reward. Reports flooded the division, some as bizarre as those often published in supermarket tabloids about the King of Rock and Roll. One former general in the Republican Guard, who asked not to be identified, said a friend spotted Saddam praying at his father's grave. Another Iraqi Army officer who had joined the newly reconstituted police force claimed Saddam passed through his checkpoint in Tikrit, giving him three hundred dollars.

Saddam was reported posing as a cab driver, a janitor, and in countless other disguises, frequently said to include a beard and dark glasses. Saddam was also rumored to have a number of body doubles, and to have undergone plastic surgery. None of the reports panned out, but they all consumed vital time and resources nonetheless.

Raiders, Special Operators, and a Man with a Jeep

The task force that had originally set out to find Saddam was replaced in mid-summer (the actual date is classified) by a faster, harder-hitting one with tighter OPSEC (Operational Security): Task Force 121, a joint force of the most elite of each service's Special Operations forces working in close partnership with Task Force RAIDER, the 4th Infantry Division's Brigade combat team. Prior to that, conventional forces in general, and the 4th ID in particular, rarely worked with Special Operations forces. That changed drastically as the 1st Battalion 22nd Infantry, G Troop of the 10th Cavalry regiment (the brigade's armored cavalry troop), and the scout platoon immediately began the conducting supporting and joint raids with Special Operations forces. One additional change would prove to be a deciding factor. Based in Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, the Raider Brigade, as it is called, took over the mission to find and capture, or kill, the deposed dictator. Task Force RAIDER's commander, COL James Hickey, was the perfect man for the job of hunting down Saddam.

A 1982 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), COL Jim Hickey commanded the 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade. Hickey is all Army, so much so that the Hickey family car is a World War II–era jeep.

The Chicago native, one of six children of an Irish-born plumber, wanted all through his youth to attend VMI, admiring its rich military heritage and deep traditions. Since 1839, VMI has produced nine Rhodes Scholars, thirty-eight college and university presidents, a National Football League head coach, three United States Senators, numerous U.S. Representatives, chief executive officers, explorers, authors, military leaders, actors, an Academy Award–winning producer, civil rights advocates, six Congressional Medal of Honor winners, and the only soldier in history to win the Nobel Peace Prize—General George C. Marshall. The tenacity of VMI's military leaders, such as “Stonewall” Jackson, is legendary. It was the perfect environment for Hickey, who flourished in VMI's military-style education. Hickey was welcomed into the close brotherhood of the military education environment.

Following graduation, Hickey excelled in the Army. He commanded the 2nd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Carson, Colorado, a unit whose history dates back to such heroic engagements as the Battle of Milk Creek in 1879, for which eleven Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded. In keeping with his alma mater's tradition of the fully rounded citizen-soldier, Hickey engaged in scholarly pursuits, attending Georgetown University as an Army Senior Service College Fellow just before his assignment to Iraq, where he took command of the 1st Brigade on June 13, and was promoted to colonel in one of Saddam's former palaces.

Hickey's top soldier was CSM Lawrence K. Wilson. CSM Wilson entered the Army at Aberdeen, North Carolina, in February 1977. Although he left at the end of his enlistment, the Army remained in his blood, and he reentered in June 1981. Wilson is a soldier's soldier, one who has worked his way through the ranks by taking the hard jobs and serving on the line with his fellow soldiers. Others sought out desks and staff duties, but Wilson worked his way through positions as team leader, squad leader, platoon sergeant, and operations sergeant. He had four assignments as a First Sergeant (the top noncommissioned officer in a company) and Engineer Battalion Command Sergeant Major (the top soldier slot in a battalion).

Wilson's quiet professionalism and high standards were an ideal match for Hickey's focused drive and leadership. CSM Wilson's attention to detail and high standards ensured the brigade's soldiers were always trained to a razor's edge. Hickey's quiet confidence, keen mind, and continuous encouragement toward innovation and initiative inspired those highly proficient soldiers to reach beyond themselves. Together the two men created and maintained an environment that empowered subordinates to take innovative approaches to solving the difficult problems they faced.

COL Hickey's PSG (Personal Security Guard) was SPC “Joe.” Joe's real name remains confidential, a consideration that protects his ability to use his native language to seamlessly move through the local population without the danger of being linked to the U.S. military. Joe was many other things, including COL Hickey's Arabic interpreter and aide. This daunting combination of aide, interpreter, and bodyguard to the brigade commander required a true professional. His multilevel skills and abilities were in line with the high standards and innovative, “outside the box” approach adopted by Hickey's group, which ultimately led them to success.

According to Joe, his original MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) was 19K (military jargon for a main battle tank crewman). Given his drive and dedication to quiet professionalism, he will be reenlisting for Special Forces training following his deployment with TF RAIDER, after serving under COL Hickey. Joe says that he joined the Army “to be a soldier, nothing more, nothing less.” Joe would be there at Hickey's side for everything to follow, and privy to much more than the average E-4 enlisted man.

“Outside the Box”

Task Force RAIDER, together with its Special Operations and interagency partners, shared the same frustrations as their predecessors in tracking down Saddam.

Catching a prey as crafty as Saddam, in his own environment, could not be done by the traditional ways of doing business. Compiling mountains of information, methodically sorting through it all, building the picture piece by piece until it all became clear was not an option. The cultural landscape in Iraq, with its labyrinth of customs, centuries of cultural norms, and family alliances would make such an approach virtually impossible.

Nor would a linear approach be responsive enough to support quick action against Saddam and his supporters as they moved rapidly in the shadows from place to place, narrowly avoiding death or capture. A truly innovative approach was needed, one based on doctrine and experience, but not shackled by it. It needed people who colored outside the lines drawn by the traditionally rigid analysis processes. It needed what many in the military and private sector called “thinking outside the box.” It's exactly the kind of thing Donald Rumsfeld wanted from his Department of Defense Transformation Initiative.

That approach is precisely what Rumsfeld and the United States got with Hickey and his Special Operations, conventional force and interagency team. It was particularly manifest in the unique and eclectic group that was Hickey's S-2 (intelligence) shop under supervision of Major Stan Murphy.

The Right Team at the Right Time

MAJ Stan Murphy was the son of a fighter pilot who was shot down twice during two tours in Vietnam, ultimately serving a year there as a POW after his second bailout. From childhood, Stan knew he too would serve in the military. But he repeatedly put it off, first graduating college and then kicking around in several jobs before enlisting in the Army at the age of twenty-eight. He graduated from OCS (Officer Candidate School) in 1991. An Infantry officer from the get-go, he attended airborne school, serving his first assignment in sub-zero Alaskan weather with the elite 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR). Murphy switched MOS to MI (Military Intelligence) after his promotion to Captain. He had attended many of the schools the new job slot had to offer, and knew the schoolbook version of MI front-to-back. However, Murphy had never applied this knowledge to any real-world situations.

After selection as a resident student for the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Murphy told Angela Santana, the branch manager, that after graduation he wanted her to assign him back to “the pointed end of the bayonet” with the 4th ID. She did, after Murphy graduated CGSC on June 6. Twenty-one days later he was on his way to Iraq. Murphy took charge of the brigade's eighteen-person Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE) as the 1st Brigade Intelligence Officer (S-2) on July 1, 2003. It was the first assignment in his career as a unit intelligence officer (S-2). He admits feeling in over his head when he started looking at all the information he had to know as well as he knew himself. More than once, he wondered if he could perform his job. The pressure was real and the quarry elusive. This was years more intimidating than a field exercise, and light-years away from the Command and General Staff College, from three weeks before.

First Lieutenant (1LT) Angela Ann Santana was attached to MAJ Murphy's S-2 shop from the 4th Infantry Division's 104th Military Intelligence Battalion. She worked the night shift in the Task Force RAIDER Tactical Operations Center as Special Projects Officer and Analysis Control Team Leader. In addition to being a proficient officer and skilled analyst, Santana had unique scholarly credentials for a young Army officer. She held both a bachelor of science degree in Psychology from Campbell University in North Carolina and a master's degree in Counseling from Webster University in St. Louis, Missouri.