Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (92 page)

The German counterattack forced the Norwegians off the hill but eventually both sides abandoned the area around the border marker as Swedish troops appeared and hoisted the Swedish flag. In his description of the heavy fighting for Hills 620 and 698, Buchner notes that after long having neglected the deep and open German flank, the Norwegians were forced into frontal attacks against well-prepared defensive positions.

The German supply situation was becoming desperate, as was their lack of reinforcements. The bad weather during this period, with heavy fog, rain, snow, and sleet, prevented aerial resupply. Troops on both sides suffered severely and were completely exhausted. They had difficulties in moving around and fell asleep, even while under attack. While these conditions plagued both sides, Group Windisch had reached such a state of exhaustion that a total collapse was imminent.

The 3rd Division journal mentions on June 2 that there had been no resupply of ammunition for six days and that they managed only because there were no enemy attacks on the Narvik Peninsula. The journal also notes that one reason they were able to hold the front was because the Norwegians did not launch simultaneous attacks against more than one objective and this enabled the Germans to bring forward badly needed supplies to the threatened areas. It also allowed the Germans to reinforce the threatened areas in a timely manner with forces from Group Windisch’s left flank and from the units facing the Poles and French.

It is ironic and tragic that the Norwegians and Allies failed to coordinate their efforts. The Norwegians remained virtually idle in the days prior to the Narvik landings and during most of the period when the French and Poles were attacking towards Sildvik. Because of the lack of activity on the northern front, Dietl was able to commit all incoming reinforcements and some units from Group Windisch to counter the Allied drive. When the Norwegians began their offensive, the Poles and French remained inactive, and this allowed Dietl again to switch units to the threatened sector. It is very doubtful that the Germans in the Bjørnefjell area would have survived if these attacks had been coordinated in such a way as to keep maximum pressure on both fronts.

The loss of Hill 620, the threatened loss of Hill 698, and the attacks against Holmevann were direct threats against the German base at Bjørnefjell. Late on May 31, Dietl had already decided that he needed to withdraw his forces to a shorter line in order to make reserves available. On the northern front, the Germans withdrew their left flank to the western slopes of Rauberg. The front on the Narvik Peninsula was also pulled back about two kilometers. These withdrawals allowed the Germans to form a company-size reserve in each battalion.

The Norwegians were within seven kilometers of the Bjørnefjell Railroad Station and the logical next objective of the attack was Rundfjell if the German resistance on Hill 698 and north of Holmevann was overcome. With Rundfjell in Norwegian hands, the forces confronting the French and Poles would be in an untenable position and forced to withdraw. The hope was that the capture of Rundfjell would force Dietl to surrender or withdraw into Sweden.
¹⁶
The date for the final attack was set for June 8.

E
VACUATION
, A
RMISTICE, AND
D
ISASTER

“You may think we are running away from the enemy, we are not, our chummy ship has sunk, the
Glorious
is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all.”

A
NNOUNCEMENT BY
L
IEUTENANT
C
OMMANDER
G
LASFURD TO THE CREW BEFORE TURNING HIS DESTROYER AROUND IN A DESPERATE ATTACK ON THE
G
ERMAN BATTLESHIPS, AS RECALLED BY THE DESTROYER CREW’S LONE SURVIVOR.

Evacuation Plans

Foreign Minister Koht and Defense Minister Ljungberg were in London when the Germans attacked in the west on May 10. Lord Halifax asked to see them and they met in the afternoon of May 10. Ljungberg asked the British Foreign Secretary if the events in Holland, Belgium, and France would cause any changes in the help promised Norway in the form of troops and materiel. Halifax assured his visitors that a cabinet meeting earlier in the day had decided there would be no changes.

There is no reason to question Halifax’s sincerity. In fact, two days later Churchill, who had become Prime Minister on May 10, offered Admiral Cork the 2nd French Light Division, located in Scotland. The return of this unit to France was delayed for three days pending a reply. Cork answered that, for administrative reasons, he could not receive the French troops before May 30. In a message to Cork on May 14, Churchill sounded even more positive by expressing the hope that Cork would clear out Narvik as soon as possible and thereafter work himself southward in increasing strength.
¹

Even as late as May 19, there were no hints that Churchill was thinking about a possible withdrawal. He was adamantly opposed to the Mowinkel Plan (discussed later in this chapter), which called for the neutralization of North Norway. “The main remaining value of our forces in Norway is to entice and retain largely superior German forces in that area away from the main decision. Norway is paying a good dividend now and must be held down to the job.”
²

Churchill’s tone changed the following day, May 20, after a report by the Inter-Service Planning Staff to the Chiefs of Staff. The consequences of a defeat in France and the loss or withdrawal of the British forces from that country were beginning to set in. It was emphasized that every ship, aircraft, and anti-aircraft gun was needed at home. That night, Churchill informed the new defense committee that since the Germans were now in a position of strength where they could demand troop transit through Sweden, the Allies would no longer be able to advance from Narvik to the iron ore fields and that Narvik had no significant importance as a naval base.
³
He concluded that holding Narvik drained British resources, a stark reversal of the position he had expressed the day before. However, as late as May 23, Churchill considered leaving the evacuation in a planning stage.

The situation appeared more distressing the next day as the noose around the British, Belgian, and French forces began to tighten. The Chiefs of Staff, in an appreciation of the military implications of a withdrawal from Norway, provided the necessary impetus for an evacuation order and spelled the end to any hopes the Norwegians might have had of carrying on the struggle with Allied air and logistic support. The Chiefs estimated that it would take 28 days from the time the order was given to bring the forces in Norway back to Great Britain in an operational condition. A telegram ordering the evacuation was sent to Cork that evening (May 24) and the War Cabinet approved the order on May 25, followed by the Supreme Allied War Council on May 31. While the evacuation decision proved final, there were misgivings within the War Cabinet and even Churchill toyed with the idea of leaving a garrison in Narvik.

The British also decided to proceed with the attack on Narvik. The reasons given for proceeding were to ensure that the harbor facilities were destroyed and to cover the evacuation, which are difficult to square with the actual situation. In anticipation of losing the city, the Germans had carried out a thorough and systematic destruction of the harbor facilities, starting on April 22. The German troops were in no position to interfere seriously with an Allied evacuation. In fact, it is arguable that it would have been simpler to evacuate from the positions occupied by the Allies prior to Narvik’s capture than it was after they had advanced into the interior. However, operations in the final days of May and early June diverted German attention away from any thoughts that the Allies were about to depart. They were completely unaware of the evacuation since they considered that the Norwegians and Allies were in ideal positions to undertake a final push that they felt incapable of containing.

The real reasons for capturing Narvik before the evacuation were probably due to pride and prestige or, as argued by General Béthouart in retrospect, because a victory was needed for Allied morale. In the process, several hundred Allied and Norwegian soldiers and sailors gave their lives without any major benefits. The delay, although impossible to foresee by the planners and decision-makers, meant that it took place at the same time as the German fleet made a sortie that brought a calamity to the British Navy.

The British government had instructed Cork and Auchinleck to keep the evacuation a close secret, with knowledge limited to senior British and French officers. The need for secrecy is understandable. Allied mistrust of Norwegians continued and any leakage of information would jeopardize the evacuation.

The Allied commanders had a distasteful task. Not only were they required to abandon a campaign when final victory was within reach, but they were required to keep that knowledge from the Norwegians and they no doubt felt that they were again abandoning their comrades on the field of battle. General Béthouart said as much, “I am operating with Norwegian troops whom for reasons of national honor, I will not abandon in difficulties on the battlefield.”
⁴
Auchinleck’s feelings are summed up in a hand-written letter he sent to General Dill on May 30, one day after Churchill decided that the Norwegians still could not be told about the evacuation. “The worst of it all is the need for lying to all and sundry in order to preserve secrecy. The situation vis-à-vis the Norwegians is particularly difficult and one feels a most despicable creature in pretending that we are going on fighting, when we are going to quit at once.”
⁵

The Norwegians reacted very angrily to the British evacuation of Bodø, leading the British to believe that they were discussing an armistice with the Germans. While there was no serious consideration on the part of the Norwegians to negotiate with the Germans, the meeting between Ambassador Dormer and the Norwegians on May 30 was very heated. Mr. Hambro told Dormer that Norwegians could no longer trust the British and he complained about the apparent lack of cooperation between the British Navy and the British Army. This elicited a sharp reply from Dormer that Hambro was in no position to pass judgment on such matters, and cooperation was in fact excellent. Hambro replied that if this was true, the situation was even worse than he had thought.

In view of these strong statements about the Bodø evacuation, the Allies could not be sure what the reaction would be to far worse news. The carefully worked out deception plan for the evacuation was as much directed at misleading the Norwegians as it was to conceal the operation from the Germans. There were those in Allied headquarters who felt that telling the Norwegians was tantamount to informing the Germans. The movement order, codenamed
Alphabet
, had an appendix, which informed people privy to the evacuation how to answer questions from individuals who were not in on the evacuation plans. There were three main points: 1) The capture of Narvik allowed forces to be redeployed to better advantage for future operations; 2) A planned move of the Allied base of operations from Harstad to Tromsø to minimize German air threats; and 3) The need to prepared to move forces to the Finnmark Province in case of German or Soviet threats in that area.

Despite concerns by Cork and Auchinleck about worsened relations with the Norwegian as result of not telling them about the impending evacuation, Churchill decided on May 29 that there should still be a few days delay in informing the Norwegians. To soften the blow of the eventual disclosure of the evacuation to the Norwegians, he told Admiral Cork to offer them “the alternatives of evacuation or being left in positions capable of further defence.”
⁶

By the end of the month, it became obvious that the Norwegians had to be informed since it would be next to impossible to disengage French and Polish forces without their knowledge and acquiescence. It was also impossible to conceal all evacuation operations since some of the supplies and heavy equipment were shipped out before the end of May.

Admiral Cork sent a message to London on May 31, stressing the necessity to inform the Norwegians about the evacuation and received the necessary authority to do so that same day.

It fell to Ambassador Dormer to fly to Tromsø to carry out this distasteful task. Dormer gave the bad news to the Norwegians on June 1. Auchinleck’s biographer writes, “…when the truth was told them, the Norwegians reacted with generosity and courage. It is arguable that, even at some risk of security, it would have been wiser, as well as more friendly, to have taken them into confidence earlier.” Admiral Cork wrote that the Norwegians “… after a very natural display of great disappointment continued to co-operate loyally to the end, although they might, with some justification, have decided to lay down their arms at once and so gravely prejudice our withdrawal.”
⁷

The Mowinkel Plan

The message to Admiral Cork from the Foreign Office on May 31 also gave the green light for the Norwegians to explore the so-called Mowinkel Plan. This plan had surfaced earlier but rejected by both the British and Norwegians. The plan originated with the Swedes and it was designed to keep the war in Scandinavia from dragging out with the distinct possibility that Sweden might become involved. At the same time, the plan also protected Swedish commercial interests. It called for the neutralization of North Norway, with both the Germans and Allies withdrawing. Swedish troops would occupy Narvik and the Norwegian King and Government would continue to function in the pacified area. If the belligerents accepted the plan, it would reduce the chance of Sweden becoming involved in a protracted conflict and would protect their export of iron ore to both sides. According to Sandvik, the first approach to the Germans came in early May in conversations that a private Swede Dahlerus had with Göring.