Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (12 page)

Caution was also the view of Captain Theodor Krancke, who represented the SKL at OKW on matters dealing with Norway, and was the chief of staff of the group tasked to further develop
Studie Nord
. However, despite doubts, the operational branch of the SKL agreed that it would be prudent to undertake preparations for an operation against Norway in case British actions made it necessary.

The caution that prevailed in the operational branch of the SKL was also prevalent in the German Foreign Office. This organization underlined the fact that Germany had lost much goodwill in the Scandinavian countries because of its association with the Soviet Union and the Soviet-Finnish war. However, the diplomats expressed fear that the Allies could find a justification in the occupation of points on the Norwegian coast under the guise of helping the Finns. The German Foreign Office concluded that the Norwegian government would oppose an Allied invasion with all means at its disposal, but it was less certain about the reaction of the Norwegian people. The Foreign Office based its conclusions primarily on reports received from Dr. Curt Bräuer, the German Ambassador in Oslo.

Commander Schreiber and Hans Wilhelm Scheidt, Rosenberg’s personal representative in Norway, did not share Bräuer’s views. They concluded that Norway was not enforcing its neutrality and would not oppose a British invasion. They made their views known in numerous messages and in person when they visited Berlin in January 1940. Subsequent events illustrated that the two representatives had good reasons for these claims. The
Altmark
affair, and frequent British violations of Norwegian neutrality in the aftermath of that incident, did not lead to any meaningful measures on the part of the Norwegians to enforce their neutrality.

The operational branch of the SKL had worked out an expansion of
Studie Nord
. This is contained in an SKL operational branch document titled Ü
berlegungen Studie Nord
, dated January 19, 1940 and summarized by Ziemke in the cited work. The SKL envisioned requirements for naval support for landings from Oslo to Tromsø, and considered surprise the key element in the operation. The whole fleet had to participate to carry out the navy’s part of the operation. They foresaw no difficulties on the outward journey if surprise could be achieved. The Norwegian warships were not considered a threat to even a single light naval unit, and the coastal fortifications were not viewed as serious obstacles. However, it was important to capture these fortifications intact as quickly as possible in order to use them against expected British counterattacks.

The SKL calculated that the assault force should consist of an airborne or mountain division. Transportation would be provided through the combined resources of the Luftwaffe and the navy. The problem of weather was recognized. Air force participation would be limited by the typical winter weather both in the target areas and along the routes to those areas. On the other hand, the expected weather conditions would favor the navy. The darkness, fog, and stormy weather would shield the fleet from British observation and help achieve surprise.

The SKL considered sending the troops that were not air transported by merchant ships, disguised as ore transports. This idea was rejected because a large number of ships would be required, the navy could not afford them protection, and there was a risk of discovery by Norwegian authorities. A second possibility considered was to transport the assault troops aboard fast-moving warships. The disadvantage here was that the number of troops would be severely restricted, and that there would be little room for supplies and equipment. A combination of the two proposals was deemed the most suitable. Assault elements would be carried in warships while reinforcements, supplies, and equipment were to be transported in merchant ships.

The operational staff of the SKL considered the attitudes of Denmark, Sweden, and the Soviet Union, and offered recommendations for each. The staff suggested that Germany should seize bases at the northern end of the Jutland Peninsula in Denmark as a means to dominate the Skagerrak and the southern portion of the North Sea. The Soviet Union should be assured that the occupation of bases in North Norway was only for the duration of the war. Sweden would be informed pointedly that the only way to preserve its independence was to adopt a pro-German neutrality policy.

Hitler Moves Planning to OKW

Hitler was still preoccupied with plans for the campaign in the West, but when bad weather forced a postponement of the that offensive, he turned his attention to the Scandinavian situation. On January 23, he ordered
Studie Nord
recalled and directed that all future work on this project take place at OKW under his personal guidance. Up to then, the review and planning for
Studie Nord
was carried out by the services and the OKW. Security may have been one of the major considerations in Hitler taking this unusual step. Some of the plans for the Western offensive had fallen into enemy hands when a German officer’s airplane had made a forced landing in Belgium earlier in January.

Keitel informed the service chiefs on January 27 that he would take over supervision of a working staff consisting of one officer from each of the three services experienced in operational planning and with some background in organization and supply. The group’s chief of staff, and senior member of this inter-service team, was Captain Theodor Krancke, commander of the heavy cruiser
Admiral Scheer
. The code-name
Studie Nord
was now replaced by the more secretive code-name
Weserübung
. (The Weser was a German river; “übung” means exercise or drill.) The group held its first meeting on February 5.

The close working relationship between OKW and SKL has led some writers to suggest that there existed an axis between the two organizations, or between Raeder and Jodl, on the subject of Norway.
³⁴
There is no doubt that OKW was tuned to Raeder’s ideas and supportive of his views. As opposed to General Halder, Jodl took a positive view of the feasibility of securing bases in Norway as early as October 1939, and “thought it could be easily accomplished.” The OKW had made its own study on the possibility of acquiring bases in Norway and concluded that, although it would require considerable forces, it was feasible and should be considered if other possibilities (e.g. the base on the Russian coast) proved inadequate. A copy of this report was given to Raeder.
³⁵
The views of the OKW appear to be more in tune with the views expressed by Raeder in the fall of 1939 and the early winter of 1940 than with the more cautious attitude in the SKL.

The OKW and Hitler had definitely taken a lead in the invasion plans by March 1940, and during February and March of that year, Raeder had become a cautious follower.

Centralizing the planning for the Norwegian operation in OKW made sense since it involved elements of all three services, and because there was no precedent in German military history for the type of combined arms operation envisioned. However, the action was the first of several that eroded the influence and prestige of service commanders. Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command, or OKH) still constituted the famed German General Staff and it was not to be expected that it would relish seeing its planning and operational functions taken over by what amounted to Hitler’s personal military staff. The army and air force harbored similar feelings, and it was therefore not surprising that these two organizations reacted vehemently a few weeks after Hitler had taken this action. Walter Goerlitz writes the following about Hitler charging OKW with planning the Norwegian operation and the creation of a theater command directly answerable to him and his staff:

Hitler’s unprecedented disregard for the General Staff has been explained in various ways, but there is no doubt that Goerlitz is on the mark. Halder’s diary entry on February 21 notes, “Headquarters XXI Corps is to be placed under OKW in order to avoid difficulties with the Luftwaffe.” Later events indicated that this was just an attempt by Keitel and Jodl to soothe bruised feelings at OKH. Another reason advanced for Hitler and his staff taking direct control of the planning and execution of
Weserübung
was that it would relieve OKH of some work, since that headquarters was deeply involved in preparations for the attack in the West. However, the workload of OKH was not reduced by the new procedures. The various branches of OKH were still involved in force readiness, movement, transport, and supply, and it could be argued that the new command arrangements created more work and greater stress since the various staff sections of OKH and its subordinate organizations now had to answer to two masters. The fact that these command arrangements became a prototype for similar arrangements later in the war tells us that OKH’s workload was not a prime consideration.

The Krancke Staff

The OKW work group that became known as the Krancke Staff produced the first real plan for the Norwegian operation. It used the work of the SKL as a point of departure, but its mission was nevertheless formidable. Information on Norway, its armed forces, and its facilities was limited, since it had not enjoyed a high priority within the German intelligence services. The personnel limitations dictated by secrecy were handicaps and the lack of such basic items as maps became serious problems. However, within three weeks the staff produced the first practical plan.

The plan called for the capture of seven ports simultaneously: Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. These cities constituted the population centers in Norway and contained many of the country’s industries. Furthermore, the capture of these cities would gain control of almost all Norwegian naval facilities, forts, most operational airfields, and more than half of the supply depots the Norwegian Army needed for mobilization.

The Krancke Staff increased the force level from the one division envisioned by SKL to an army corps consisting of one airborne division, one mountain division, one motorized brigade, and six reinforced infantry regiments. The Krancke Staff planned to transport the troops in three ways: by aircraft, by warships, and by merchant ships.

Eight transport groups of the 7th Air Division would bring five parachute battalions in the first wave. The rest of the assault wave would arrive on warships. The second air transport wave would bring about half of the airborne division over a period of three days, while the third and fourth echelons of the troops would arrive by sea on the fifth day. The Krancke plan envisioned that about half of the assault echelon would arrive on warships while aircraft transported the rest. The Trondheim and Narvik assault units would all arrive on warships since these cities were outside the range of transport aircraft.

The Krancke Staff concluded that the Norwegian armed forces had neither the desire nor the ability to offer any effective resistance, and that the Germans could consolidate their positions after the landings through diplomatic means. The plan urged that the Norwegians be assured of maximum independence in internal affairs, that Germans take over all forts and supply depots, that the Norwegian armed forces be reduced to a caretaker status except for the units along the Finnish border, and that no Norwegian mobilization take place without prior German approval.

With respect to Denmark, the Krancke Staff believed that airfields in northern Denmark could be acquired peacefully by threatening to take them by military force. The SKL proposed that the threat against Sweden should be dropped, and instead both the Soviet Union and Sweden were to receive assurances that the occupation would only be for the duration of the war and that Germany guaranteed Norway’s borders.

The Krancke plan was a great improvement over the more rudimentary work of the SKL. However, it contained serious flaws. The combined services operation was the first of its kind to be undertaken by Germany and the plan underestimated the potential problems posed by Norwegian and British forces. The will and fighting abilities of the opponents were minimized. The underlying assumption in the plan was that the operation would remain shrouded in complete secrecy until the actual landing of German troops on Norwegian soil. This was an unrealistic military assumption in view of the buildup requirements. Over 100,000 troops along with thousands of tons of supplies and equipment, required movement to debarkation ports, and the shipping to carry these had to be assembled in a very limited number of north German ports. There were no good reasons to believe that this would not be observed or commented on.

Hitler Expedites Planning and Appoints a Commander

Whatever the legal pros and cons of the
Altmark
incident described earlier, they mattered little to Hitler. As Churchill and his supporters may have hoped, it was the event that energized him into action. Hitler was convinced that the British government would no longer respect Norwegian neutrality—a conclusion supported by the dramatic increase in British violations over the weeks that followed—and that Norwegian territorial waters would no longer offer a safe route for the transport of iron ore. On February 19, Hitler ordered the planning for
Weserübung
expedited and forces designated for the operation.

In addition to the
Altmark
affair, Hitler had other reasons to be worried. In the middle of February, German naval intelligence succeeded in breaking British naval codes, and this gave them important and accurate information about Allied activities and intentions. The information gathered was provided to OKW. The intercepts indicated that intense Allied preparations were underway for operations against Norway under the pretext of helping Finland. This confirmed Raeder and Hitler’s conclusions about British intentions.