Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (30 page)

After long road and rail movement across the northern tier of the Ostfront, the reorganized Fourth Panzer arrived in the middle of Army Group Center’s sector. Hoepner’s command would be ad hoc from the start: units thrown together on the eve of combat, some had been manning the Desna Line for nearly two months and others arriving by rail from the Leningrad front after operations had begun. Von Bock’s plan called for the usual pairing of infantry and panzer armies during the initial, breakthrough phase of a large operation. For Operation Typhoon Hoepner’s new formation would be attached to von Kluge’s Fourth Army, the Schwerpunkt, heading east on the southern highway and eventually directly into the center of Moscow’s defenses. Exhausted and attritted, at the end of a long and inadequate logistical tail, with bad weather approaching and with the Red Army surely prepared to fight hard for its
capital, only Moscow could justify the risks the Ostheer was about to take.
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Stalin had provided that prerequisite for a successful Vernichtungsschlacht: a massive defensive force tied down in front of a valuable target. Typhoon represented the penultimate battle that Halder, von Bock and many other German generals had wanted so badly for over a year. What would they do with the opportunity now that they finally had it?

For Hoepner, the final offensive against Stalin’s capital began at 0530 on 2 October, a beautiful autumn day. The XLVI Panzer Corps commander, General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Vietinghoff published this Order of the Day:

The 2nd of October is the birthday of the late General Field Marshal von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg. His was the first, the great victory over the Russians, and hindered their invasion in search of empire. On his birthday we begin the decisive crusade against the last large group of Russian forces. The passwords for the panzer corps on 2 October are: Hindenburg–Forward–Victory!
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His XL Panzer and XII Corps made short work of the defenses, augmented by the Desna River, but weakened after the Timoshenko Offensive of late summer. The Germans soon earned numerous bridgeheads, and by the end of the first night 10th Panzer occupied positions 30km deep into the Soviet lines. Fourth Panzer had managed to work the seam between the Reserve and Bryansk Fronts and within a couple of days turned the left flank of the 43rd Army. Three days into Typhoon, 10th Panzer took Yukhnov and Hoepner sent the rest of XL Panzer northwest with the ultimate goal of reaching Gzhatsk, all of which came as a surprise to the Soviets. The LVII Panzer Corps (late in returning from Velikie Luki sector) fell in behind them, ready to exploit in the direction of Moscow. (But as happened to Third Panzer Army on its left, Fourth Panzer also outran its fuel, ammunition and food supplies.) Of equal concern to Stavka, was XLVI Panzer at Spas Demyansk, turning north in concert with the Fourth Army’s VII and XX Corps, pressuring the left flank of Reserve Front forces holding the main road from Smolensk through Viazma. Field Marshal von Kluge stood at the Vishody bridgehead over the Ugra River, cheering the 5th Panzer onward. As had been the case throughout Barbarossa, Stalin’s orders to stay put played into the Germans’ hands. By the 5th, Stavka could not help but see that XL Panzer coming up from Yukhnov meant disaster to these defenders, now counting the bulk of 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies plus other formations. The Soviets intended withdrawal to subsequent positions 25km east came to naught when panzer units began to arrive in their rear. On 7 October, XL Panzer linked up with units from Hoth’s Third Panzer
Army at Viazma, closing the door on the northern portion of the massive double encirclement. On the same day, XLVI Panzer reached Nikolskoye, barely 15km south of Gzhatsk.
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The three panzer armies and their infantry consorts had ripped a giant hole in Moscow’s first line of defense and sent another two-thirds of a million frontovicki to captivity. Could even Zhukov, that master of improvisation and the new commander of the combined defenses of Moscow, save the city?

By 10 October, Hoepner’s men prepared to continue on towards the east as the winter arrived in earnest; from here on, weather would have a tremendous effect on operations. The 710 panzers he had available outnumbered those of Guderian (271) and Reinhardt (259) combined, by a wide margin, but it is difficult to see how he made full use of his advantage. The SS Reich took Gzhatsk, but because XL Panzer was still involved clearing the Viazma Kessel, it had to hold on against two Soviet armies alone. Star shells routinely illuminated the night since it was then that Red Army soldiers tried to slip the noose. Fourth Panzer advanced but slowly during the second half of October. Eventually the 2nd, 5th and 11th Panzer Divisions arrived and continued east past the Napoleonic battlefield of Borodino, capturing Mozhaisk on the 19th. The Germans did not know it at the time, but this town represented the center of Zhukov’s defensive structure for Moscow. As Soviet defenses stiffened, Hoepner skirted around to his left, searching for a weak point in Moscow’s perimeter. By 20 October, Hoepner’s line ran from 3rd Motorized near Yermolino in the south to XLVI Panzer’s outposts at Klementyevo in the north. He sent 10th Panzer over the Moscow River, which on the 25th captured the town of Ruza on the river of the same name, while 2nd Panzer neared Volokolamsk on the panzer army’s far northern flank. Like most of Army Group Center, Fourth Panzer made slow but steady progress, but not nearly enough to win Moscow or even bring Typhoon, much less Barbarossa, to a successful conclusion. As Soviet resistance and mud continued to stymie the advance, Hitler searched in vain for a decision on von Bock’s flanks, therefore resources and effort went to Guderian and Reinhardt instead of Hoepner.
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So it went through the first half of November, as well. Fresh baked bread had to be brought forward 50km on panzers or other tracked vehicles, while winter uniforms were back in Roslavl and fuel was as far away as Smolensk. Fourth Panzer pushed eastward very gradually and in his diary, von Bock scarcely mentions it or Hoepner for an entire month. When the ground finally froze solid, both army group and OKH had high hopes for Hoepner, who would attack along with the Fourth Army due east to Moscow during Typhoon’s second phase. He issued a rousing Order of the Day on the 17th: ‘The time for waiting is over. We can attack again. The last Russian defense
before Moscow is defeated. We must stop the beating of the heart of the Bolshevik movement in Europe ... The panzer group [sic] has the good fortune of leading the decisive attack!’
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Hoepner’s command was arranged north to south, V Corps (2nd Panzer, 35th and 106th Infantry Divisions), XLVI Panzer (5th and 11th Panzer), XL Panzer (10th Panzer, SS Reich), IX Corps (78th and 87th Infantry) and VII Corps (7th, 197th and 267th Infantry). With V Corps leading, they got off to a slow start, partly as a result of pre-emptive Red Army attacks and much to von Bock’s annoyance, but by 17 November he had 5th Panzer just short of Novopetrovskoye against Rokossovsky’s 16th Army. A couple of days later Hoepner’s right flank units driving for Zvenogorod gave Zhukov cause for concern. It took other elements of the panzer army five days to get close to the town of Istra, a testament to both the Germans’ fatigue and the Siberians’ determination. By the 23rd, on Hoepner’s left, the 2nd Panzer had cut the railroad from Leningrad to Moscow near Solnechnogorsk and four days later reached a point only 35km from Moscow. In the center, his Schwerpunkt of the two panzer corps astride the main Istra road made respectable progress. Die Afrikaner (The Africans) of 5th Panzer and Brigade 900 had the sensitive mission of capturing the Istra Reservoir dam before the enemy could demolish it, but the Soviets succeeded. The 10th Panzer and SS Reich, largely leading the panzer army since the beginning of Typhoon, took the town of Istra on the 26th. With Guderian clearly stalled south of the capital, the Germans switched their emphasis to the northern flank – as it turned out, one last time. With Reinhardt also advancing to his left, Hoepner urged his men to their final effort. Despite the enemy (and his scorched earth tactics), the weather, the disappearance of the Luftwaffe and the lack of supplies, the 2nd Panzer reached Krasnaye Polnaya, 22km northwest of Moscow, on the 27th. On the first day of December, Panzer Engineer Battalion 62 (directly under panzer army control) reached Chimniki, 15km from the city.
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Engineers

Engineers (often ‘pioneers’ in Europe) are frequently neglected from consideration as members of the combined arms teams of modern armies. This is a serious mistake: engineers are among the hardest working soldiers on the battlefield, often covered in dirt from before dawn until after dark, clearing or breaching minefields and other obstacles in front of the other combat troops, or continuing to improve strongpoints and other positions to the rear. During the Nazi-Soviet War, German engineers helped the blitzkrieg forward by assaulting over rivers, making, repairing and improving bridges, creating corduroy roads through marshes and performing other mobility improving tasks. During the second part of the war, when the Germans were largely on the defensive, engineers also made and improved field works, bunkers and other survivability assets for friendly troops. During the Second World War, the German Army considered engineers elite troops.

Throughout Barbarossa, the Soviets employed extensive systems of anti-tank ditches and massive numbers of mines wherever they chose to make a stand; these all had to be negated by engineers. Tactical bridging units made light (
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. 10 ton) and medium (up to 20 ton) capacity bridges. Army level bridging columns (complete with their own self-sufficient saw-mill detachments) made pontoon bridges and even heavy duty ‘permanent’ bridges of 50– to 60–ton capacity.

German engineers employed over forty types of mines during the war. Early anti-tank mines were called Tellerminen (‘plate’ mines). Later, they developed wooden mines filled with Amatol to confound mine detectors and to save metal. The Germans also used anti-personnel ‘S–mines’ filled with shrapnel and often used as booby traps. The Germans also had a few models of remote-controlled demolition vehicles, but these were used in small numbers and had a limited effect. In the Wehrmacht, engineers also had responsibility for flame throwers, both man packed and AFV mounted.

But the panzer armies could not do it alone, they needed the attack’s Schwerpunkt, von Kluge, to act. Unfortunately no power on earth could move the stodgy old Prussian. The three panzer army commanders each begged von Bock to give them command of the main effort (the Ostheer only had enough resources for one) – they and their men wanted the honor! But not even the army group commander could cause von Kluge to bestir himself. Halder wanted the increasingly ill von Brauchitsch to give the Fourth Army commander a direct order to attack. In the end, the Fourth made a half-hearted effort on either side of Naro-Fominsk during the first three days of December, which can only be charitably described as too little, too late. Zhukov’s men easily parried the attempt. Hoepner would later say that von Kluge abandoned Fourth Panzer Army.
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It was effectively the end of Typhoon and ultimately the end of Barbarossa. Since the Fourth was a latecomer to the central front, it is little wonder that its impact may be considered less than the other two panzer armies. Despite arriving late for Typhoon, it did smash the Desna River Line, did give Stavka quite a shock as it made for Yukhonov and did come closest to Moscow of any German formation. It seems that the panzer army had a difficult time escaping mopping up duty following the Viazma battle and one has to ask, with significantly more than 50 percent of the panzers participating
in Phase II of Typhoon, why did it not have a bigger influence? Surely attacking into the center of Zhukov’s shield before Moscow and being ‘unequally yoked’ to a weak leader such as von Kluge is part of the reason. Coupling of Third and Fourth Panzer Armies together immediately after the Viazma operation, and sending the combined force around Zhukov’s right is exciting to contemplate. With adequate logistical support (and Hoth still as commander?), the twin panzer armies would have been a force to reckon with. Of course, a German defeat of the USSR probably still remained outside the realm of possibility.

On 3 December, on his own initiative, Hoepner called a three-day halt to operations. The pause was much needed, and his men expected to renew their attacks on Moscow’s defenses on the 7th. That was not to be. The Soviets’ winter general counteroffensive began slowly on 5 December and began to take off the next day. It began in the north, where Third and Fourth Panzer Armies posed a greater danger to Moscow than did Guderian’s Second Panzer the south. On 7 December, von Bock noted in his diary that the enemy was especially active opposite Fourth Panzer. Hoepner and Reinhardt requested permission to withdraw, and on 7 December, not understanding the full implication of events, Hitler agreed. The two armies pulled back without allowing potentially disastrous breakthroughs. The following day, von Bock finally did what he should have done two months earlier, join the two panzer armies. Zhukov ordered the 5th, 16th and 20th Armies to encircle Third Panzer Army plus Hoepner’s adjoining XLVI Panzer Corps. Reinhardt, in the more exposed salient, began to retreat. As it did so, Fourth Panzer had to do the same so as not to offer an exposed left flank, and therefore Fourth Army had to do likewise. Only a weak performance by the Soviets in the offensive’s opening stages, as noticed at the time by Zhukov and admitted to in their official history a dozen years later, saved Army Group Center from greater calamity. Logistics, a weakness since Barbarossatag, continued to bedevil the Germans when Hoepner received a train of fuel-tank cars that were all empty. As the general feared, slow-moving artillery would be lost during any improvised movement such as an unexpected withdrawal in the worst conditions imaginable. By the end of the second week of December, a dangerous penetration in the VII Corps sector developed. On the 15th, Hitler agreed in theory to allow Fourth Panzer to return to the Ruza River Line, which in any event Hoepner doubted his men could hold for long. Already his units had begun to evacuate non-essential materiel, including, in the case of 11th Panzer Division, the markers from its field graveyard, but not the corpses under the crosses.
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