Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (28 page)

The campaign’s second day was much the same, von Manstein facing little organized opposition and Reinhardt coming up against significant resistance. In Tauroggen, site of the famous Prussian–Russian neutrality pact of 30 December 1812 and the 1st Panzer Division’s first Knights Cross of Barbarossa, every building could be considered a small fort. In his diary, von Leeb noted ‘heavy tank movement’ toward Rossieni from the north. This turned out to be a 100-tank counterattack against the 6th Panzer Division, to the right of 1st Panzer. These were lead elements of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, the super-heavy KV 1s that presently demolished the 6th Panzer’s motorcycle infantry battalion in about 20 minutes. The 1st Panzer Division halted and its 1st Brigade turned east to attack into 6th Panzer’s tormentors, beginning a three-day armored battle there. The sand and moor slowed movement. Due to superior Soviet equipment, panzers had to close to within 30–60m of a tank or else shoot it from behind if the Germans hoped to win. Artillery and 88mm guns took a heavy toll on the Soviet monsters. Logistics still posed a problem, and by the 23rd, Luftwaffe bombers had to fly supplies to panzer units, a terrible misuse of that asset. On the other hand, German aerial reconnaissance could not locate any Red Army units in front of LVI Panzer, and even the official Soviet history admits that von Manstein caught Stavka flat-footed.
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Regardless of the fact that Reinhardt had originally been Hoepner’s Schwerpunkt, blitzkrieg tactics demanded he switch his emphasis to reinforce von Manstein’s more successful drive. There was no end to the interference from higher headquarters: Hitler, Halder, Keitel, von Leeb and others all had good ideas about where Hoepner’s panzers should go next.

Soviet counterattacks around Rossieni continued on 24 June. The Germans, despite being surprised by the attacks from such unexpected directions, managed every crisis. The 6th Panzer (surrounded for two nights and a day) tangled with the 2nd Tank Division (which also became trapped) and the
battlefield was strewn with smashed vehicles and mutilated bodies. As the division’s operations officer commented that day:

Before our own attack began the enemy attacked with strong tanks and infantry forces from his bridgehead over the Dubyussa in the direction of Rossieni. Despite the surprise, his infantry did not succeed in a breakthrough, even though he renewed the attack many times. Suddenly the day led to a crisis of massive proportions. That came from the appearance of numerous completely unknown super heavy tanks, the so–called 52-tonners.
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Although the Germans had been aware of the T-34 since at least December 1940, these encounters represented their first exposure to the even heavier KV 1 and 2 tanks. Although the troops on the ground would not have agreed, higher headquarters welcomed the counterattacks as signs that the Soviets were not withdrawing into the interior of the country. If the Army Group had been stronger and if Hoepner had had more to work with, perhaps he could have sprung his own Kessel on the Northwestern Front. This was not the case, however, although by the 25th the battle around Rossieni had definitely gone the Germans’ way. By then, Reinhardt had also committed both the 36th Motorized and the 269th Infantry to the fighting. The 12th Mechanized was on its way to losing 90 percent of its tank strength in one week, half those losses to maintenance, fuel, ammunition and communications problems. To the east, von Manstein’s men lived a relatively charmed life, reaching Ukmerge on the 24th. The LVI Panzer exploited the huge hole created when the 8th Army fell back towards Riga and the 11th Army drifted southeast behind Vilnius.
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Essentially, no defenses worthy of the name barred von Manstein’s advance.

Hoepner’s men pulled off the first of many coups on their way to Leningrad on the morning of 26 June. Led by members of the 8th Company of the Brandenburg Regiment dressed in Red Army uniforms and riding in captured Soviet trucks, the 8th Panzer captured the Dünaburg crossings. Behind the commandos came 3rd Company, 59th Engineers and a combined arms Kampfgruppe under the 29th Panzergrenadier Regiment’s commander. In the early dawn they raced past Soviet units that had no clue the Germans could possibly be so deep in the Northwestern Front’s hinterland. Shortly after 0600 hours, the Germans had the main road bridge in the suburb of Griva. Demolitions experts disarmed explosive charges while firefighters put out flames started by Soviet guards. At the site of the railroad bridge a smaller assault group had a more difficult time. The guards there managed to set off their explosives, but the slight damage caused surprised both sides and left the bridge perfectly serviceable. Within half an hour the battlegroup’s main combat units arrived
and established an all-round defense in order to secure the hard-won bridges from Red Army counterattacks which now began in earnest. By noon, more 8th Panzer elements showed up, followed by those of the 3rd Motorized. Soviet counterattacks came from forces on both sides of the Dvina, including 27th Army units moving down from the north on their way to the front and the 21st Mechanized Corps, falling back after encountering von Leeb.
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The Germans had scored a massive success reminiscent of that at Sedan thirteen months earlier.

What remained to be seen was whether the Wehrmacht could translate this operational-level achievement into strategic victory as in the earlier war with France; tragically for them they would not. Hitler immediately saw the bridgehead’s larger potential, and von Manstein agreed. As the Führer told Keitel at Rastenburg, ‘Concentrate Hoepner’s panzers at Dünaburg, open Jekabpils from the east and drive through Ostrov.’
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It was imperative to get past the town, the gateway to Leningrad south of Lake Peipus, before Stavka could adequately defend it. Cautiously, von Brauchitsch and von Leeb demurred and so it was: von Manstein sat at Dünaburg until the Sixteenth Army marched up. The same day LVI Panzer took that city, Reinhardt was finishing up around Rossieni and resuming his movement towards Jekabpils, which he reached on the 28th. He too wasted time holding a bridgehead while waiting for the infantry. This conservatism was completely antithetical to the blitzkrieg doctrine and, as will be demonstrated, hamstrung the push on Leningrad just as it would have wrecked the drive across northern France. Army Chief of Staff Halder rationalized the crippling loss of initiative this way: the panzer army would be ‘in danger of being encircled and destroyed in the vast forests in front of Leningrad, unless it has the support of closely following infantry divisions’.
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While von Leeb dawdled thus, Stavka ordered Colonel General FI Kuznetsov to attempt to reestablish a viable defense further east.
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Supreme headquarters wanted him to hold the Velikaya River Line south of Pskov, since, as any soldier who could read a map knew, this would be Hoepner’s next objective. Fortunately for the USSR, the Northwestern Front faced von Leeb and only one panzer army, otherwise its northern flank would be staring at disastrous collapse rather than merely a poorly executed attack and an even more incompetent defense.

While Hoepner waited for permission to continue, the Soviets launched numerous counterattacks on the ground, supported by Red Army Air Force planes above: none enjoyed any success (the future German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was a lieutenant in the flak battalion of the 1st Panzer Division here). The panzer army expanded some bridgeheads, created others – such as the one won by Brandenburgers and 1st Panzer at Lievenhof, and conducted aggressive
patrols to the east. Kuznetsov had a big counterattack planned against Dünaburg for the 29th, but von Manstein got the jump on him by attacking first, at 0500. Fighting around the bridgeheads continued unabated, with von Leeb’s men taking advantage of masses of supplies captured at Dünaburg and elsewhere. The SS Motorized Division Totenkopf, late to reinforce Dünaburg, took particularly heavy losses. Also on the 29th, von Leeb published his order to continue operations toward Opotshka and Ostrov. Two days later he paid a visit to Hoepner’s command post, where Barbarossa’s Achilles heel again came to the fore: the inability of commanders to agree on objectives. Whereas von Leeb spoke of the upcoming assault as part of an ‘attack east of Lake Il’men’, Hoepner, and most others, thought only in terms of Leningrad.
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Not to worry, the renewed offensive would begin again soon enough and these matters would take care of themselves.

After Kuznetsov’s relief on the last day of June, Marshal Timoshenko temporarily led the Northwestern Front’s defensive efforts until the 4 July arrival of the new front commander, Lieutenant General PP Sobeninikov, formerly of 8th Army. Early on 2 July, Fourth Panzer moved out along a string of old forts built by the Teutonic Knights, but now roles were reversed for the two panzer corps: von Manstein’s ran into stout resistance and terrible terrain along the road to Rezekne, while Reinhardt’s had a relatively easy go of it and covered over 100km that first day. The 6th Panzer described the enemy’s morale as ‘very high’, and with LVI Panzer bogged down, Hoepner reinforced success by transferring the 3rd Motorized Division from von Manstein to Reinhardt. Nevertheless, the Soviets’ new defensive structure collapsed after barely 24 hours as Hoepner split the old 8th and new 27th Armies. The Soviet plan called for the 27th to retreat promptly back to the Velikaya River and take up new positions, but the Germans moved faster and got there first. Two days after leaving the Dvina behind, XLI Panzer reached Ostrov and made contact with the 24th Rifle Corps defensive position along the Velikaya.
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Hoepner’s panzers, with the remainder of Army Group North close behind, stood ready to defeat the Stalin Line and enter Russia proper.

For Reinhardt’s men this took one day: on 4 July the 1st Panzer entered, occupied and prepared to defend Ostrov, its two bridges and masses of captured supplies. About 30km to the south, KG Raus of the 6th Panzer did basically the same, meaning that XLI Panzer Corps now had a two-division lodgment in the Stalin Line. Overhead, Ju-88s of Kampfgeschwader 1, 76 and 77 provided CAS. On land and in the air, the Soviets launched fierce counterattacks and the city was in flames. With their PAKs nearly useless against the KV tanks of the 27th Army, the Germans withdrew to the burning town but still managed to hold. On the panzer army’s right, however, von Manstein’s men struggled
mightily, mainly against the upper Velikaya’s marshes. The OKH, proving it too could send panzers on missions and into terrain they had no business going, ordered von Manstein to take the ‘high ground’ near Opotshka by the most direct route. The entire region was barely serviced by any roads worthy of the name. Von Leeb did not dispute the poorly conceived maneuver and evidently, neither did Hoepner. The LVI Panzer Corps literally chopped and sawed its way through thick wilderness on its way to nowhere. Its advance averaged about 10km per day, causing even Hoepner to doubt the wisdom of the advance on Lake Il’men.
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Once out of this abysmal landscape, von Manstein, discovered, to his dismay, that his next objective was not the cradle of Bolshevism, but more terrain completely unsuited to armored warfare far to the south and southeast of Leningrad.

Between the time Hoepner punctured the Divna and Velikaya Lines, Stavka decided Leningrad would need another defensive position. Therefore, Northern Front deputy commander Lieutenant General KP Pyadychev received the mission to survey a more close-in line for his new command, the Luga Operational Group (LOG). In the first half of July he decided on the Narva–Luga River system, anchored on one end by the Gulf of Finland and at the other by Lake Il’men, with the position’s keystone being the actual town of Luga. By 8 July, Reinhardt was ready to move again and on the next day, echoing his rallying cry ‘Open the gates to Leningrad!’, XLI Panzer had taken Pskov. On the 10th, Hoepner had met what he believed to be all the preconditions for the final thrust to Leningrad. He would send Reinhardt up the middle on the road through Luga, while von Manstein made a wide eastern enveloping move via Novgorod and Chudovo. Assuming little resistance and good conditions, Fourth Panzer thought it could cover the last 300km in four days.
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Perhaps if the entire panzer army had followed Reinhardt’s advise and lead, it could have.

As it was, that proved to be a completely unfounded assumption, especially for LVI Panzer Corps. Reinhardt at least had some reasonable terrain in front of him. But Luftwaffe reconnaissance had missed the Soviet build-up representing the Luga Line. On the other hand, von Manstein only ran into more marshes in addition to Red Army defenders. The men of LVI Panzer encountered increasing resistance well short of Luga so Hoepner had them turn 90 degrees northwest at Zapole. This meant that instead of the two panzer corps travelling roughly parallel courses where they could offer mutual assistance if necessary, they were instead sent on divergent axes with hundreds of kilometers of wilderness separating them. Already, the tailing infantry armies were nearly 100km distant to the rear. To Hitler, Hoepner’s actions constituted an ‘undesirable maneuver’. The panzer army’s Schwerpunkt, Reinhardt as usual,
planned to move toward the eastern shore of Lake Peipus until reaching the dry ridge south of Kingisepp where he would turn towards Leningrad. The XLI Panzer’s right-angle turn back at Zapole also meant 6th Panzer had leapfrogged in front of 1st Panzer to become Reinhardt’s vanguard. With Colonel Erhard Raus again leading the Kampfgruppe that bore his name, the 6th worked its way through the unmapped, medieval, swampy world toward the Luga. He was so far ahead of Reinhardt’s main body that he had to send a radio truck back 60km in order to regain communications with corps headquarters. At 2100 hours on the 13th, the division commander told Raus, ‘The Luga bridge must be taken tonight.’ By 0400 the morning of 14 July, with the help of some Brandenburgers, Raus’ small command (5,000 men in 7 infantry companies, 2 machine-gun companies and 1 pioneer company, about 60 panzers, a battery of howitzers and various other units) had established a perimeter around the 2 200m bridges at Porechye – one of which was not even on the Germans’ maps. Further south, at Sabsk, 1st Panzer also achieved a bridgehead and 36th Motorized occupied the gap between them. All supplies for Raus had to be air dropped, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the farther the Germans advanced, the closer they got to Leningrad and its excellent airport facilities. A 1st Panzer Division wit composed a poem to show the frustration with his own flyboys: