Hitler's Bandit Hunters (33 page)

A prime responsibility of the German military leaders was to evaculate “bandit-infected” areas and deport all men aged between sixteen and fifty-five as labor. The term used for this exercise was registration (Erfassung). In January 1943, a conference held in Berlin of senior SS bureaucrats examined the question of labor in occupied territories.
¹²²
Since January, Bach-Zelewski had regular meetings with Gauleiter Sauckel. In February, Fritz Sauckel formerly appealed to Bach-Zelewski for captives from Bandenbekämpfung to be turned over for labor. Himmler agreed in principle but allowed only civilians who had not had contact with the bands to be released. Gradually, Bandenbekämpfung came to depend on labor roundups as valuable commodities. They became less a countermeasure and more a pure realization of financial return. Bandenbekämpfung turned the business of population management into a profitable undertaking. In April 1943, Bach-Zelewski met again with Sauckel. They bartered; Sauckel promised an increased supply of armored cars in return for roundup operations (
Arbeitererfassungsaktion).
¹²³
Instructions were issued by OKW on July 8 and August 18, treating all captives from security actions as prisoners. The remaining civilians and the unsuitable for deportation were, according to a Himmler order of July 20, to be resettled and put to useful purpose locally.
¹²⁴
In September 1943, Bach-Zelewski issued instructions to all HSSPFs committed to Bandenbekämpfung regarding the importance of labor to the war effort. He ordered active and vigorous support for operations that conscripted labor. To assist in implementing these instructions, a regional labor controller was assigned to the SS staff. The plenipotentiary general for labor action (
Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz
, GBA) was expected to carry out the preparatory work. This included preparing special collection camps for the large numbers of deportees, organizing their transportation, and posting guards. Bach-Zelewski ordered that, henceforth, all Bandenbekämpfung reports were expected to reflect these new requirements. He wanted to know how prisoners were captured and transported, their numbers by sex, and counts of those over and under ten years of age. People unfit for work anywhere were literally “thrown away” (
ausgemustert
),
a death sentence, and Bach-Zelewski justified the orders by declaring, “By doing this, without deviation, the nation shall be secured.”
¹²⁵

Just how far Bandenbekämpfung dogma was assimilated into the German way of war is illustrated in the following army group order:

The hard fighting at the front demands security of supply and the necessity to secure the transport routes against bandits. All troops in the army and other organisations committed to Bandenbekämpfung are to show aggression in this fight. This battle support’s the front. In this context I especially direct Bandenbekämpfung measures for securing trains and roads, bridges and buildings.

The snowfall restricts movement and forces bandits to take shelter in villages and bunkers. Regional operations to seek out the bandit in their camps and in hiding are as important as the immediate action and counter-attack by Jagdkommando following tracks of bandits in the snow; for the destruction of bandits. All units must look for tracks and use the snow to point toward the enemy.

All forces, security services and alarm units must be concentrated to maximum of their ability in the “bandit-fight.” The organisation of the Bandit information Service in all places, the special troops and by all soldiers must be monitored and improved. It is important not to waste time. All operations cooperate with Fliegerführer 1. All troop leaders and village commanders are to be made aware of this order.
¹²⁶

The June 1943 order included Himmler’s self-appointed authority to declare a “combating-bandits area” (Bandenkampfgebiet). This authority does not seem to have been discussed during his meeting with Hitler on June 19, but the meeting almost certainly engineered it (refer to
chapter 4
). Himmler decided this would be a fitting senior command function of the Chef der Bandenbekämpfung, a post he retained until the end of the war. This instrument effectively placed Himmler in control over any or all territory experiencing intense partisan incursions or resistance activity. This control was administered either through the offices of the Chef der Bandenkampfverbände or another SS-Police office such as Karl Wolff’s in Italy (discussed in
chapter 9
). These offices would then decide upon the appropriate course of action. The Bandenkampfgebiet had wider operational implications. From the perspective of military history, it was not a major departure from the Etappengebiet introduced after 1872 and regularly utilized until the end of the First World War. During Operation “Barbarossa,” Hitler opted for four zones: the combat zone (
Gefechtsgebiet
), the immediate army area behind the front line (
Armeegebiet
), the security zone under the “army rear area” (
Heeresgebiet
), and the political zones under the
Reichskommisariate.
¹
The Bandenkampfgebiet really affected only the political zones in Russia. Ideologically, the Bandenkampfgebiet originated from Himmler’s vision for Lebensraum as depicted in the “General Plan for the East.” This envisaged a network of colonial estates governing Russia. Thus, common threads linked the Bandenkampfgebiet to both German military traditions and Nazi ideology.

The Bandenkampfgebiet became central to the Nazis’ prosecution of Bandenbekämpfung in the last years of the war. It was the Nazi counter to Stalin’s partisan challenge over the rightful ownership/control of Russian
lands or “space” (
Raum
). In 1942, Himmler proposed eradicating “banditry” through attrition rather than dominating terrain. This represented a compromise to the army’s objections over the SS control of security. By the end of 1942, just as in 1918, the devastation of the German occupation had created a wasteland that both Vejas Liulevicius and Christian Gerlach described and that Hannes Heer painted as “death zones” (
tote Zonen
).
²
The situation in the army rear areas continued to deteriorate into an existence dominated by the forces of exploitation and destruction.
³
However, as yet the Bandenkampfgebiet has avoided academic scrutiny.

In 1943, Himmler aligned Bandenbekämpfung policy to the task of dominating terrain for purposes enforcing security by exploitation; the Bandenkampfgebiet, therefore, was a manifestation of Hitler’s Fortress Europe strategy. In operational terms, the Bandenkampfgebiet was categorized into three threat levels. The highest threat level, the “bandit-diseased area” (
bandenverseuchtes Gebiet
), was an area wracked with bands or “bandits” openly supported by the indigenous population. If the area contained a military railway line or major road (
Rollbahn
) and the insurgency hindered theater military operations, then it was likely to become subject to a full-scale “cleansing action” (Säuberungsaktion). The mid-threat level, a “bandit-suspicious area” (
banden-verdächtiges Gebiet
), could expect a vigorous investigation of the local community by the SD/GFP. In addition, Jagdkommandos were likely to be dispatched to conduct patrols to gauge the level of “banditry.” The lowest threat level, the “bandit-free area” (
bandenfreies Gebiet
), was normally registered only after cleansing operations were completed and was subject to minimum-security scrutiny. In general security terms, the Bandenkampfgebiet signaled the adoption of intense preventative security measures (proposed in the 1942 Bandenbekämpfung manual), the deployment of manpower under training (Zenner’s proposal from 1942), and the fusion of both into Bandenbekämpfung operational training. In specific security terms, the difference between 1942 and 1943 was the central role of recruits and training to the prosecution of Bandenbekämpfung and in the domination of terrain.

Simple Bandenbekämpfung practice began with self-security or preventative measures. Himmler first approached this subject in his Bandenbekämpfung pamphlet (1942). The 1944 regulations continued to emphasize defense and protection. In practice, these principles encouraged a strict occupation and heightened an aggressive mood in the occupier. The Bandenkampfgebiet troops within installations, cities, and rural communities were forced into an automatic state of readiness. Regulations stipulated that prior to entering a “bandit-diseased area” the troops should be conditioned as to what awaited them and the bands’ location should be plotted on “bandit situation maps” (
Bandenlagekarte
). The advancing troops set patrols, established
a skirmish order, and swept their entry points of mines. They entered an area under the cover of machine-guns, ready for combat. When building an encampment in a “bandit-diseased area,” they incorporated houses, workshops, and farms within the defensive complex. Strongpoints were stocked with machine guns, flare pistols, and hand grenades with fighting positions (
Kampfstände
) made easily accessible. They cleared strips of forests and scrubland up to 400-meter frontages, setting clear line-of-sight and enfilading killing zones.

The first priority of preventative measures was the protection of lines of communications: railways, roads, and waterways. The civil administration and the SS determined the appropriate level of guardianship to protect the railway lines. Strongpoints were established in stations, at railway block sections or junctions, and at other important installations (bridges, water towers, pump stations, power stations, and railway work facilities). Security landscaping generated a lot of activity among competing Nazi agencies. Deciphered messages reveal that Himmler was active in landscaping: “He wants to know how quickly forestry along supply routes can be cut down as a defense measure,” recorded one British signal.
⁴
In September 1943, Himmler signaled Fegelein, “I order for the building of your defensive task intensive building of positions; you will employ every man available,” meaning from the civilian population.
⁵
After the war, one former German officer indicated that, in principle, they fortified railway installations for rapid defense.
⁶
The regulations again required a 300-meter-wide exclusion zone, or no-man’s-land, on either side of the tracks. The Technische Nothilfe received orders to clear areas up to 500 meters wide on either side of railway lines.
⁷
The long-distance telephone and signals cables were buried to protect them from attacks.
⁸
The zone was cleared and posted with warning signs in all relevant languages. The railway command decided which parts of the forests were preserved to protect against snowdrifts. State foresters organized wood removal. Railway gardeners, under guard, attended to the weeds in the zones.

The second priority involved securing the rural communities, economic installations, and important intelligence-connected facilities. Economic facilities, plants, and administration buildings that were important for the German war effort also came within the scope of preventative measures. The civilian authorities decided which buildings were protected. Strongpoint and obstacles were established around key factories. Again the question of loyalty arose in both rural and industrial communities as the Nazis expected civilians to prosecute passive Bandenbekämpfung. The attitude emphasized in the 1944 regulations was that, as a matter of duty (and proof of loyalty), natives granted survival through work should secure their places of work, even after long shifts.

The third priority involved securing agriculture and forestry. The preferred method of securing farming areas was to garrison troops and conduct patrol sweeps. Crops designated for the Germans came under the Nazi civilian
administration and its agricultural leaders. They planned and coordinated security levels with the priority of protection and collection of the harvest. Lieutenant General Schwarznecker in a post-war study implied that the SS-Police mission was limited to protecting political issues and the harvests.
⁹
Another German officer thought that crops, especially Indian corn and rye, were purposefully grown to restrict the movement of “bandits.”
¹⁰
The “harvest security action” (
Erntesicherungsaktion
) was not only an SS priority. These studies overlook the Wehrmacht and SS prioritization of agriculture as critical in their operational and strategic plans.

The troops and local populace, including those working for the Germans, came face to face in the Bandenkampfgebiet. Civilian status was made more complex than the usual bystander-collaborator-resistor construct. Collaboration was forced on civilians; for example, troops conscripted local watchmen (
Alarmein-heiten
) to raise the alarm. The watchmen’s reliability was probably suspect, as they feared the bands more than German terror.
¹¹
Highway security patrols carried out spot checks, entering villages and hamlets to conduct searches. After the war, former German soldiers claimed that many civilians were peaceable, industrious, and uninterested in the conflict. However, the average soldier treated civilians with suspicion and contempt: “Every civilian, every highway and railway worker, especially if those who directed the traffic were natives, was required to have an identification card, the form of which was changed regularly.”
¹²
The villages located in the way of death zones were evacuated and flattened. Native railway laborers (
Eisenbahnhelfer
) and other collaborators were given special consideration in locating a residence. Civilian railway workers received permit papers (
Ausweise
) from the transport duty officers in the town commander (Orts-kommandantur) or the territory commander (
Gebietskommandant
) for travel on the railways. Laborers were allowed to enter and to leave the death zones only along designated paths and under guard. Civilians were officially barred from strongpoints and encampments. The emphasis was on rigid social control irrespective of its psychological implications: “The morale of the population has been lowered a good deal by the labor allocation to Germany since the recruiting had to be carried on in most cases by imposing a forced quota on the various communities.”
¹³