Harold (28 page)

With his position established, King Harold had returned from York probably accompanied by his new bride to celebrate the Easter festivities at Westminster on 16 April. This festival presented King Harold with his first major opportunity to demonstrate his new status and splendour to his subjects. As King Edward had done before him, Harold presided over a period of feasting, worship, receptions and royal business attended by many of the nobles of England, and probably wore his crown and royal robes. This would have reinforced the message that he was their king and lord, and he would have dispensed gifts and received their pledges of loyalty in return. He probably chose Westminster for this occasion because of the need to remain close to the centre of communications at London in the face of the threat of a Norman invasion.
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Shortly after, on 24 April, Halley’s Comet made its regular appearance in the skies above the earth. It came fairly close on this occasion and, from observations recorded throughout Europe and the Far East, appeared at the time to be unusually bright. This is confirmed by English records which state that it was seen all over England and describe it as a sign such as no one had ever seen before. John of Worcester speaks of it shining with ‘exceeding brightness’. The artist of the Bayeux Tapestry also shows it as large and impressive. It remained visible in England for a full week and provoked wonder and fear at what it might portend. Such heavenly apparitions commonly presaged disaster, although its connection in later sources with the fall of King Harold was, of course, a product of hindsight.
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In the short term, it was merely a prelude to the return of Harold’s exiled brother from Flanders. Tosti had been provided with a large Flemish fleet by his brother-in-law, Count Baldwin V. In May he landed in the Isle of Wight, and collected money and provisions from the inhabitants as his father had done in 1052. He may also have collected supporters from his own estates there. He then raided along the south coast until he reached Sandwich, possibly in an attempt to repeat his father’s successful campaign of 1052. However, Tosti does not seem to have encountered the welcome that Earl Godwine received then, as the damage he inflicted on his brother’s estates implies. In this connection, it should be recalled that Tosti’s lands in the south were smaller and more scattered than those of his brothers, and that he had spent some ten years ruling in the north. In the end all he achieved was the recruitment of some sailors at Sandwich, partly under the threat of force.
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King Harold was in London, possibly recovering from the celebration of the feast of the finding of the True Cross on 3 May, when news of his brother’s attacks on the south coast was received. In response he called out land and naval forces to deal with him. News that these forces, led by King Harold himself, were heading for Sandwich quickly caused Tosti to retreat. He had failed to win any significant support in the south and therefore could not hope to face the royal forces of his brother. Therefore, he turned north, hoping perhaps to rally support from his more extensive former landholdings there. Some versions of the Chronicle confuse this call-out of troops to deal with Tosti at Sandwich with Harold’s assembling of ‘a naval and a land force larger than any king had assembled before in this country’ to face the Norman threat. The reason for this is probably that the two events did indeed follow on closely. It seems though that King Harold, forewarned by Tosti’s actions that conditions were now favourable for a Channel crossing and aware of William’s intentions, and after ensuring that Tosti was no longer an immediate threat, called out more forces to deal with the likelihood of Norman invasion.
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The force gathered by King Harold to face William was clearly of extraordinary size, and this surely confirms his secure grasp on the machinery of royal government. It also reflects the unprecedented concentration of wealth in King Harold’s hands. This is sometimes overlooked, perhaps as a result of Domesday Book’s record of the situation in the time of King Edward. Domesday Book only records the lands held by Harold as Earl of Wessex and lists the royal lands under King Edward. In reality, of course, Harold now held not only all those lands listed as held by ‘Earl Harold’, but also those listed as held by ‘King Edward’. Such a concentration of lands had not fallen to an English king since at least the days of King Aethelred II, if even then. It is likely that a fleet was also collected in the Thames, which then proceeded to join Harold at Sandwich. The collection of this fleet took some time, not surprisingly when it is remembered that the last time a large fleet was summoned was in 1052 to oppose the return of Godwine. The fleet called by Harold for his campaign against Wales was probably a smaller local fleet from Bristol. At the same time, the largest land force in living memory was summoned and stationed all along the Channel coast. Such an effort speaks more than any number of lost documents about Harold’s power and control over his kingdom.
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While Harold gathered forces to repel a Norman invasion, Tosti moved northwards. He made a brief attempt to entice his brother, Earl Gyrth, to support him but this was apparently rebuffed and instead he raided near the mouth of the Burnham river in Norfolk. He entered the Humber estuary with sixty ships, and ravaged and slew many men in Lincolnshire, probably on lands now held by Morcar but formerly his own. King Harold had left the defence of the north to his new brothers-in-law, Earls Edwin and Morcar, and they undertook the task with vigour. They were no doubt fired by their previous rivalry with Tosti and mindful of their vested interest in retaining Northumbria. The two earls led a land force into Lincolnshire which expelled Tosti decisively and, deserted by his men, the latter fled with only twelve ships to the protection of his sworn brother, Malcolm King of Scots. Thereafter, Tosti remained impotently in Scotland throughout the summer. He had made his threatened move and had been dealt with decisively by King Harold and his new allies, the northern earls, and without outside help he could not return.
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King Harold had dealt with the first threat to his position and was now free to concentrate on what he undoubtedly considered a much more serious one, that from William of Normandy. He did this by basing himself and his newly recruited fleet on the Isle of Wight, ready to move against any invasion fleet which crossed the Channel. The fleet was probably commanded by Eadric the Steersman, described in Domesday Book as
rector navis
or commander of the king’s ship, and organized by Abbot Aelfwold of St Benet of Holme. Indeed, both these men would later suffer exile under William because of their role in the defence of the coast under King Harold. In case this interception plan failed, Harold had stationed land forces at vital points all along the Channel coast. It may have been at this time that Harold appropriated the estate of Steyning in Sussex from Fecamp Abbey. This estate was situated near the coast and Harold perhaps feared that it would become a landing point or centre of intelligence for the Normans. About June 1066 William confirmed that Steyning would be restored to Fecamp if he was victorious, which may reflect some truth in this story. However, other lands held by Fecamp Abbey, notably Rye, show no evidence of seizure by Harold. Harold himself sent spies across the Channel in an attempt to gather information on the extent of William’s preparations and in particular on the timing of any crossing. All these actions were sensible precautions against the anticipated Norman invasion and prove Harold’s sound judgement.
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King Harold’s spies probably brought word that across the Channel William of Normandy was indeed making his own preparations. Initially, William encountered great difficulty in persuading his nobles to participate in his plan for invading England to claim the throne. William claimed the English throne as his rightful inheritance and many of the Norman nobles had probably been present when Harold swore to support this claim. They were fully aware of his breach of fealty and of his oath before God. In spite of this, William’s barons were also aware that, with Harold securely installed as king, the only hope of William achieving his aim was to undertake a risky invasion. They knew this would involve the expensive construction of a large fleet, a risky sea crossing, and an opposed landing in a largely hostile country. A Norman diploma of the period speaks of the time when William ‘was about to cross the sea to wage war against the English’, a sign that they understood that Harold was not lacking in support. William of Poitiers reflects this opinion by portraying the English at Hastings fighting, some out of ‘love for Harold’ but ‘all out of love for their country which . . . they wished to defend against aliens’. The Norman lords were naturally concerned that such an enterprise would be hazardous in the extreme and were therefore reluctant to take part. That William nevertheless convinced many of them to participate says a great deal for his determination and strength of will, which in the end overcame their opposition. Another important factor in persuading many of them was the lure of the riches of England which, not for the first time, attracted men who were hungry for wealth to prey on her. Therefore, William was able to set about the construction of a fleet and the collection of an army as a first stage in achieving his ambition to rule England.
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In the first of a number of examples of good fortune the diplomatic situation was favourable to William’s enterprise at precisely this time. King Philip of France was a minor under the tutelage of Baldwin V of Flanders, who was not only a relation of William but had recently provided aid to Tosti in his attempt to invade England. The other principalities of northern France were either vassal states of William or, like Anjou, were absorbed in their own internal troubles. If William had faced opposition in northern France it is unlikely he could ever have undertaken his invasion at all.
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However, on the wider European scene William of Poitiers’ picture of William’s diplomatic successes seems a little unrealistic. It is highly unlikely, for example, that Swein of Denmark gave his backing to William’s enterprise. He would be more likely to welcome Harold’s accession since the latter might favour aiding his Danish cousin against his Norwegian enemies, as had his father, Earl Godwine. It should be noted here that Swein had just emerged from a long and bloody war with Norway and was fearful of further trouble. In this context, William of Poitiers contradicts himself when he later speaks of the Danes sending troops to assist Harold against the Normans. This contradiction somewhat undermines our confidence in the further claim made by Poitiers that the Emperor Henry IV provided his own endorsement for William’s claim. This seems unlikely. Henry IV or his regents, since he was still in his minority, had many other concerns and the contemporary Annals of Corvey compiled at that royal monastery in Saxony were to describe William in 1066 as removing the ‘legitimate’ King of England (Harold) and seizing his kingdom. What these diplomatic ‘successes’ described by Poitiers seem to represent is nothing more than the fact that neither Swein nor Henry IV were in a position to interfere directly in William’s plans.
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There remains one important aspect of the later Norman account of William’s diplomatic preparations which needs to be considered. William of Poitiers states that Duke William received the approval of Pope Alexander II for his invasion of England and that he was presented with a Papal banner in confirmation of this. It is usually assumed that this action on the part of the Pope was influenced by his desire to bring about the reform of the English Church and its principal archbishop in particular, and that William portrayed himself as the man who would achieve this. In addition, some have presented the influence of the Normans of southern Italy as important in convincing the Pope to support William’s plans, since they had after all brought him to power in Rome and could expect to have some influence on him. This interpretation is based solely on the evidence of Poitiers, but given his unreliability in a number of areas it is in need of reassessment.
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Such a reassessment has in fact already been undertaken by Catherine Morton and the main thrust of her arguments are as follows. In regard to the state of the English Church in terms of the existence of pluralism, concubinage, simony and worldly prelates she points out that the position of the Norman Church under William was not dissimilar. Indeed, William’s own half-brother, Odo of Bayeux, was perhaps in some ways a worse example of an unreformed prelate than Stigand. The irregular position of Archbishop Stigand was well known, but Pope Alexander II’s own legates had sat in council with him in 1062 without demur. In addition, William’s immediate actions after the Conquest cast doubt on any idea that he already had a Papal commission to depose Stigand, since he in fact maintained the archbishop in power until 1070. It is possible that William simply allowed Stigand to retain power for reasons of political expediency. However, he also permitted him to consecrate Remigius as Bishop of Dorchester in 1067, an odd action for someone holding a Papal commission to depose him. The Normans of southern Italy were in fact as much a threat to the Pope’s position as a support, and he would therefore need to be wary of any action which might increase their power. In addition, the different Norman groups were as often at each others’ throats as they were allied, and there is no evidence of any alliance between the Normans in Italy and their former duke back in France at this time. The southern Italian Normans who later joined William’s expedition were clearly individual fortune hunters. William of Poitiers’ account of the Papal banner supposedly presented to Duke William is based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of such banners at this time. They were issued only to endorse war either against Muslims or rebels against papal authority and not to endorse aggression against fellow Christians. They were also associated with the remission of sins and not with penances like those later imposed on the Normans by the Papal legate Erminfrid of Sion in 1070. Indeed, the improbability of Pope Alexander risking the enmity of the powerful and wealthy King of England in order to support the ambitious and risky plans of the Duke of Normandy needs to be considered. It is difficult to understand why the Papacy should have supported William’s plans which were directed against a kingdom which had been a major European power for over a century and a half and which provided a significant source of support for the Papacy. Particularly important in this respect was Peter’s Pence, a substantial subsidy which had been paid to the Papacy by the English kings intermittently since the time of Alfred. Indeed, the Papal desire not to offend King Edward is evident from the fact that the Papal legates, who visited England in 1062, took no action against Stigand.
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