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47
Taft to Yoo, Jan. 11, 2002. Addington is acknowledged to be the author of White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales's Jan. 25 memo to the president (actually written by David Addington) entitled “Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” in Greenberg and Dratel, eds.,
Torture Papers
, 118–21.
48
Jane Mayer,
The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals
(New York: Doubleday, 2008), 289.
49
Romig quoted in Lasseter, “Day 4”; author telephone interview, Thomas Romig, Oct. 10, 2010.
50
Yoo interview, Oct. 18, 2010. Despite continued objections from Secretary of State Colin Powell and his legal advisor William H. Taft, Yoo's Jan. 9 draft on Geneva was formalized by three subsequent memos. See Jay Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales and William J. Haynes II, Jan. 22, 2002, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds.,
Torture Papers
, 117; Gonzales, “Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” in Greenberg and Dratel, eds.,
Torture Papers
, 119–20; and President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Vice President et al., on “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,” February 7, 2002, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds.,
Torture Papers
, 134–35.
51
In a recent book, Karen Greenberg argues that the first one hundred days or so represented salad days at Guantánamo compared to what it would become over the next several years, before administration of the camps was transferred out of the hands of General Michael Lehnert and into the hands of Generals Michael Dunlavey and Jeffrey Miller. That may be; I suppose it is a matter of perspective. But life is not experienced from Archimedean heights, and many individual detainees and guards remember things very differently. Compare the following discussion to Greenberg,
The Least Worst Place
, 213–14 and passim.
52
Darius Rejali,
Torture and Democracy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 434. Rejali calls the informal pattern of torture proliferation as “the apprenticeship hypothesis.”
53
Rejali,
Torture and Democracy
, 580–91. Just who ordered the “habitual” torture of Filipinos in the U.S.-Philippine War, 1899–1902, is not clear, though it is clear that high government officials knew about it; see Paul Kramer, “The Water Cure,”
The New Yorker
, February 25, 2008, available at
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/25/080225fa_fact_kramer
. For more on the United States and torture, see Alfred W. McCoy,
CIA Interrogation: From the Cold War to the War on Terror
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 5–20 and passim.
54
Evidence of abuse at Bagram and Kandahar is overwhelming and undeniable. See Margulies,
Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power
, 135–37; Mayer,
The Dark Side
, 224–47. Cf. National Security Archive interviews of detainees Bisher Al-Rawi, Moazzam Begg, and Shafiq Rasul, available at
www.torturingdemocracy.org
, as well as Moazzam Begg,
Enemy Combatant: My Imprisonment in Guantánamo, Bagram, and Kandahar
(New York: New Press, 2007).
55
U.S. soldiers quoted in Rejali,
Torture and Democracy
, 433–34. As astounding as this may seem in the case of MPs, more astounding still are the statements of senior CIA officials that “case officers aren't actually trained in interrogation techniques”—that they never encountered “anyone who was a ‘professional interrogator' in the agency.” “We're not trained interrogators,” one CIA official told Rejali; “to be honest, in those situations I really had no idea what I'm doing and I'm not the only one who has had this experience.”
56
Greenberg,
The Least Worst Place
, 146–53.
57
On Dunlavey, see Sands,
Torture Team
, 37–39, 42–44; and Greenberg,
The Least Worst Place
, 164–68.
58
Greenberg, 172.
60
Sands,
Torture Team
, 43.
61
Dunlavey quoted in Sands,
Torture Team
, 44; see also 43–45.
62
Mayer,
The Dark Side
, esp. chaps. 8 and 9; Sands,
Torture Team
, 94–97, 227–29, and passim.
63
John Yoo, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Aug. 1, 2002, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, in Greenberg and Dratel, eds.,
Torture Papers
, 172–217.
64
Critics quoted in Mayer,
The Dark Side
, 152; Margulies,
Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power
, 90–91. For succinct critiques of the memo, see Margulies,
Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power
, 90–95; and David Cole,
The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable
(New York: New Press, 2009), introduction, esp. 20–25. Cf. Sands,
Torture Team
, 74–76, and Mayer,
The Dark Side
, 151–52.
65
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques, available at
www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=299242
. On the Haynes JPRA discussions initiated in the immediate wake of 9/11, see note 28 about the first Haynes-JPRA discussion known to have taken place.
66
Again, high-level Bush administration officials insist that the idea for these techniques bubbled up from below; the evidence has come back to haunt them. Sands,
Torture Team
, 75–77, 224–32; Mayer,
The Dark Side
, 220–24.
67
Al-Qahtani's interrogation log available at
ccrjustice.org/files/Al%20Qahtani%20Interrogation%20Log.pdf
.
68
Bob Woodward, “Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official,”
Washington Post
, Jan. 14, 2009, available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html?hpid=topnews
).
69
For a description of these lethal assaults, see Margulies,
Guantánamo
, 137.
70
Sands,
Torture Team
, 144–48.
71
Johnston interview, Oct. 8, 2010.
72
James Yee,
For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire
(New York: Public Affairs Press, 2005), 47–48.
73
Ibid., 51.
74
Ibid., 52.
75
Ibid., 66.
76
Ibid., 73–74.
77
Ibid., 45, 85–88.
78
Army judge advocate Thomas Romig, celebrated in liberal circles for opposing Bush administration detention and interrogation policy, shared the MPs' suspicion of the Muslim chaplain. Telephone interview, Thomas Romig, Oct. 10, 2010.
79
James Yee,
For God and Country
, 115–22.
80
Ibid., 122–23.
81
Erik Saar,
Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantánamo
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 46, 59, 71, 99.
82
Ibid., 55.
83
Ibid., 72.
84
Ibid., 73.
85
Ibid., 74–75.
86
Ibid., 65.
87
Ibid., 66–67.
88
Ibid., 90–95.
89
Ibid., 108.
90
Ibid., 151.
91
Ibid., 153.
92
I experienced this firsthand, on a tour of the prison in the autumn of 2008.
93
Romney quoted in Martha T. Moore, “Guantánamo Puzzles Candidates,”
USA Today
, June 19, 2007, available at
www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-06-18-gitmo-candidates_N.htm
. Romney's pandering pales by comparison to that of Duncan Hunter, who came back praising the “honey-baked chicken” and “lemon-glazed fish”; Otto Kreisher and Toby Eckert, “Hunter Says Menu from Guantánamo a Proof of Good Care,”
San Diego Union-Tribune
, June 14, 2005, available at
www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050614/news_1n14gitmo.html
. On a more serious note, see the Schmidt Report, a so-called investigation on allegations by the FBI of detainee abuse, available at
www.cfr.org/publication/9804/schmidt_report.html
. On the more general “pattern of deceit” at Guantánamo and elsewhere, see Margulies,
Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power
, chap. 8; and Stafford Smith,
Eight O'Clock Ferry to the Other Side
, chap. 5.
94
Saar,
Inside the Wire
, 159–63.
95
Ibid., 164–65.
96
Ibid., 166–73. Saar recounts other examples where intelligence and patience build trust, which generates information; e.g., 177–85.
97
Ibid., 220–28.
98
Eric Schmitt, “There Are Ways to Make Them Talk,”
New York Times
, June 6, 2002, C1.
99
Katharine Q. Seelye, “Guantánamo Bay Faces Sentence of Life as Permanent U.S. Prison,”
New York Times
, Sept. 16, 2002, A1.
100
Neil A. Lewis, “Detainees from the Afghan War Remain in a Legal Limbo in Cuba,”
New York Times
, March 25, 2003, A21.
101
Sands,
Torture Team
, 118.
102
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Report, May 2008, 126.
103
Sands,
Torture Team
, 121, 126–27.
104
Ibid., 118.
105
Michael Isikoff, “We Could Have Done This the Right Way,”
Newsweek
, April 29, 2009, available at
www.newsweek.com/id/195089
.
106
Testimony of Ali Soufan before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, May 13, 2009, available at
judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3842&wit_id=7906
. The contractors Soufan refers to are Jim Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the retired psychologists who imported SERE techniques into military interrogation and who shunted Soufan and McFadden aside in the questioning of Abu Zubaydah after he was picked up and taken to Thailand in March 2002. Among other treatment, Zubaydah was confined in a coffin-like box, slammed into walls, and waterboarded eighty-three times by Mitchell and Jessen, long after he had surrendered the information he had to Soufan and his associates. See Mayer,
The Dark Side
, 155–81; Shane, “Soviet-style ‘Torture' Becomes ‘Interrogation,' 3; and Scott Shane, “2 U.S. Architects of Harsh Tactics in 9/11's Wake,”
New York Times
, August 11, 2009, A1, 12.
107
See, for example, Steven Keslowitz,
The Tao of Jack Bauer
,
iUniverse.com
, 2009.

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