Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (2 page)

At the period we are now dealing with the social situation in Japan was far more acute than it had been when the above forecast was penned. Communist agitators were hard at work in all the great industrial centres; mass meetings at which sedition was preached were held without any attempt at concealment, and the police were openly defied. In November, 1930, an attempt to arrest two prominent Communists, Watanabe and Onzu, who were addressing a Labour Convention at Osaka, provoked a riot, in which several police officials and more than a score of civilians were killed. So threatening was the temper of the crowd on this occasion that troops were called out. In the following month Watanabe was arrested at Tokyo, and the authorities announced that he would be severely dealt with. Organised labour at once took up the challenge; indignation meetings were held in all parts of the country, and resolutions passed demanding the immediate release of the prisoner and the dismissal of the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Sasaki, who had ordered the arrest to be made. Failing compliance with these demands, the Labour spokesmen threatened a general strike. There were those in the Cabinet who urged upon the Premier, Prince Kawamura, the wisdom of setting Watanabe at liberty in view of the ugly temper of the populace. But the Prince refused to listen to such advice. He would countenance no parleying with the mob, he said. It was the duty of the Government to maintain law and order, and they were determined to take all necessary measures to that end.

When the Premier’s answer became known there was a violent outburst of fury among the workers. A general strike was declared on January 2, 1931, and so swift was the response that in less than twenty-four hours the industrial system of the country was all but paralysed. Riots broke out simultaneously at so many points in Tokyo and the provinces that the police were powerless to cope with them. Strong detachments of military were hurried to the chief cities, with instructions to suppress all disturbance with an iron hand. On the night of January 4 the residences of the Premier and Home Minister were attacked by a huge crowd, which broke through the cordon of troops and did a great deal of damage before it was dispersed by rifle fire. The bodies of those killed by the fusillade were then carried through the streets on litters, to the mournful strains of the “Hymn of Revolution.”

Parliament was to meet next morning, and at an early hour a throng numbering at least one hundred thousand persons gathered in the neighbourhood of the Diet buildings. Ministers and Deputies, under a strong escort of police and troops, reached their places in safety, but the noise of the vast multitude outside made it difficult to proceed with the business of the day. Replying to interpellations in both Chambers, the Government announced that the situation was well in hand, and that should the strike continue troops would be drafted to carry on essential public services; furthermore, that force would be employed without stint against those evil-minded persons who were seeking to overthrow the Constitution.

As the Premier was passing out through the lobby of the Upper Chamber a man in the uniform of an usher hurled a bomb. Although the explosion was violent, Prince Kawamura escaped serious injury, but two Deputies with him were killed outright, and there were numerous casualties among bystanders in the lobby. The assassin, on being apprehended, was found to be a young student who had gained admission to the building by donning the uniform of an usher from one of the Ministries. That same evening a conference took place at Prince Kawamura’s villa, at which, in addition to the senior members of the Cabinet, General Oka, chief of the General Staff, was present. Contradictory versions of what transpired at this momentous gathering have been circulated, but in view of subsequent events it appears certain that the Premier laid bare his drastic plan for “bringing the people to their senses” as he termed it, and there and then secured the consent of his colleagues to its immediate application. So much, indeed, is admitted by the Japanese historian, Dr. Ikeda, whose recent volume,
Political
Antecedents
of
the
American
War
, contains what purports to be an accurate summary of the proceedings at this emergency meeting of the Cabinet. The following extracts from this work, which was published at Tokyo in 1934, are illuminating:

Prince Kawamura, having received his visitors, announced that they would await the arrival of the chief of the General Staff before opening the discussion, as military questions of the highest importance were involved. The Foreign Minister, Baron Fukuhara; the Naval Minister, Admiral Oshima; the War Minister, General Ofuji, and other members of the Cabinet were already present. When General Oka arrived, the Premier at once declared the meeting in session and began an address. ‘The country stands in imminent danger,’ he said. ‘As you are aware, the revolt is spreading more rapidly than we can cope with it, and the ringleaders, conscious of their strength, are daily becoming more defiant. I have been advised from certain quarters to parley with them, but that to my mind would be a fatal course, for it would lead them to think that their tactics of intimidation had succeeded and they would be encouraged to raise all manner of impossible demands. On the other hand, to stamp out this menace we should need to employ the most ruthless measures; blood would flow in streams; and when all was over the populace, cowed though they might be for the time being, would be more than ever inclined to lend an ear to seditious teaching. Nor is that all. Before deciding to make unrestricted use of troops to crush this revolt, we must be sure that the spirit of the army is proof against the insidious propaganda of the revolutionaries, and I fear that we have no such assurance. The War Minister informs me that two battalions of the 85th infantry regiment at Nagoya refused to entrain for Tokyo, declaring that they would not fire on their own people, and although the mutineers have been severely dealt with the divisional commander reports that acts of disobedience have occurred in other regiments. Only this evening a despatch has been received from Kanazawa, reporting a mutinous outbreak among the troops of that division. We shall therefore do well not to place too great a strain on the loyalty of the army.

Now, gentlemen, it seems to me that the only alternative to civil war is a diversion abroad, which would inflame the declining patriotism of the people and provide them with something to think about in place of their imaginary grievances. There can be no doubt that at the first threat of foreign aggression all sections of the community would forget their differences and rally to the support of the Government. It has always happened before; it will surely happen again. And, as a matter of fact, such a threat already exists. The recent epidemic of militarism in China has not subsided; on the contrary it is increasing, and at any moment we may be forced to defend our vital interests in that country at the point of the sword. We have positive evidence that American money, arms, and equipment are pouring into China for the purpose of enabling her to attack us, and now comes this affair of the Sayers concession to prove, if proof were needed, that America is stealthily manoeuvring to destroy our privileged position in those lands which we have brought under our economic sway by the labour and sacrifice of years. If we elect to wait until America and her Chinese confederates are ready to strike, we may find ourselves driven out of the Continent, including Korea; and that, of course, would mean the end of Japan as a Power that counts in world affairs.

‘I therefore propose that we make clear without delay our firm resolve to tolerate no foreign interference with our rights. This will not necessarily mean war, but if war should result I think we could face it calmly. The staffs of the army and navy are in complete agreement on that point. The military position vis-à-vis China is favourable at the moment, but it will, of course, turn more and more against us as the reorganisation of the Chinese army progresses. The naval position, I am assured, is such that a conflict with America could be entered into with every prospect of a happy issue. For the rest, we have a gold reserve that experts declare to be adequate for the contingency in view; provided our communications with the Continent are kept open there will be no shortage of essential supplies, and our industry is now sufficiently organised and developed to produce all the material necessary for a campaign of some duration. Finally there is no reason to suppose that we should have to deal with any enemies other than China and America. Our relations with other Powers are on a footing that, rules out the possibility of their taking up arms against us unless their interests were directly molested, which we should be particularly careful to avoid.

‘And now let us consider the advantages we should derive from a favourable issue of this struggle in defence of our national existence. In the first place it would scotch, if not completely kill, the demon of anarchy who has been rearing his head in our country of late. Chastened in the hard school of war, our people would turn aside from the baneful doctrines which foreign agitators have been propagating, and revert to their former allegiance. For a generation at least the country would be purged of the revolutionary poison which has invaded its system. Secondly, our position in China would become impregnable, and we could henceforth continue the development of its resources without fear of interruption. Thirdly, we could set up impassable barriers against the extension of those Western influences, moral as well as material, which have wrought so much harm in the past to the peoples of Asia, and which, if allowed to spread, will end by bringing the whole Continent under the domination of the white race. Fourthly, we should obtain new territories in the Pacific which, by reason of their admirable climate, fertility, and rich resources, would offer the best possible field for settlement by our surplus population.

‘I have now placed before you quite frankly the problem with which we are confronted, and would ask you to judge which of the two alternatives it is our duty to adopt; but before coming to a decision it would be advisable to hear the reports of the Ministers of Army and Navy.’

Admiral Oshima, General Ofuji, and General Oka were then successively called upon to express their views, which generally confirmed the favourable account which the Premier had given of the outlook from the naval and military points of view. After a discussion lasting several hours all the Ministers, excepting only Mr. Sasaki (Home Affairs), agreed that a strong foreign policy offered the best means of uniting the nation and putting an end to the grave domestic troubles then in progress. Mr. Sasaki dissented, but expressed his readiness to resign if his views did not harmonise with those of the rest of the Cabinet. At this the meeting broke up, Prince Kawamura bidding his colleagues farewell with the significant words: ‘Gentlemen, the necessary steps will be taken to give effect to our common decision.’ At 6 p.m. secret orders were issued to put in force Sections 1, 2 and 4A of the War Emergency Plan.

It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that, while Dr. Ikeda has incurred some odium in Japan by reason of his liberal opinions, his general veracity as an historian has never been questioned; and we may consequently accept his account of this fateful Cabinet meeting on January 5, 1931, as being in the main accurate.

CHAPTER II

Diplomatic correspondence preceding hostilities — Radio and cable communications interrupted — Dangerous weakness of United States Asiatic Squadron — Captain Appleton, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Bureau, resigns as a protest — Japanese steamer blows up in Panama Canal, suspending communication between Atlantic and Pacific — Question of employing submarines against merchant vessels raised — Bad news of the Asiatic Squadron

EVENTS now marched swiftly to their appointed end. Rioting continued in the capital and elsewhere during the 6th and 7th, and as the troops were repeatedly compelled to use their weapons, the tale of casualties mounted steadily. With Japan, as it seemed, on the verge of revolution, her friends and enemies alike waited breathlessly for the
dénouement
. But suddenly the whole complexion of affairs underwent a marked change. Speaking in the Diet on January 10, the Foreign Minister announced in solemn tones that a critical situation had arisen in China, the gravity of which was enhanced by the unlooked-for intervention of a third Power. Baron Fukuhara then reviewed the negotiations which had taken place with regard to the Sayers concession, reminded his hearers that the Chinese Government had lately adopted a tone which was difficult to reconcile with peaceful intentions and added: “In order to make our position quite clear we have informed the United States Government that, since the question at issue concerns only ourselves and China we do not propose to make the Sayers concession a subject of diplomatic negotiation with any other Power.” Appreciating to the full the significance of these words, the deputies gave way to patriotic fervour, their cheers quite drowning for the moment the tumult of the crowd which still surged about the precincts of the Diet.

An hour or so later, when the evening papers appeared with a report of the Foreign Minister’s speech under flaring headlines, and the people read that little Japan had figuratively snapped its fingers under the nose of the American Colossus, they speedily verified the Premier’s prediction by forgetting all about those grievances which they had come out to ventilate. Serried masses of workmen still paraded the streets, but in place of the “Hymn of Revolution” many of them were now chanting the martial songs which their fathers had sung on the eve of battle, and the air was full of “Banzais.”

That night the labour chiefs held an emergency meeting, at which they decided to annul the general strike and suspend their campaign against the Government until the foreign crisis was at an end. A few of the leaders were against this course, arguing that the crisis had been deliberately manufactured to turn the thoughts of the people away from their wrongs, and that action by the workers was more necessary than ever now that the imperialists were seeking to plunge the country into war. These counsels, however, were not listened to. Not only was the strike declared at an end, but the meeting passed resolutions pledging the trade unions to support the Government in any reasonable measures it might take to safeguard the country against foreign aggression.

Prince Kawamura’s scheme had, so far, proved completely successful. Revolution had been averted for the moment, but unless the fires of patriotism were kept burning a reaction might set in and the forces of disorder again become supreme. The Press was therefore encouraged to inflame racial passion by recalling the American attitude on Japanese immigration. In a few days a violent anti-American campaign was in full blast. Fuel was added to the blaze by the receipt of a strong note from Washington, which not only upheld the validity of the Sayers concession, but declined to recognise Japan’s claims to favoured treatment in the district concerned, and expressed “profound surprise” at the tone of the Foreign Minister’s speech in the Diet.

Contrary to all diplomatic precedent, the Japanese Government at once communicated the contents of this note to the Press, which naturally hailed it as further evidence of America’s aggressive intentions. In a further note, dated February 4, the United States proposed that the dispute over the Sayers concession be submitted to arbitration, as provided for in the Nine-Power Treaty negotiated at Washington in February, 1922. Japan, however, declined the proposal on the ground that the question at issue concerned her sovereign rights, and was therefore not a fit subject for submission to an international tribunal. Undeterred by this rebuff, the United States Government was continuing its efforts to promote an amicable solution when an incident occurred which gave a fresh impetus to the war fever in Japan. On February 15 a New York paper stated, with an air of authority, that all American warships in the Atlantic had received urgent orders to pass through the Panama Canal and join up with the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii, from whence the combined force would make a cruise to the Philippines. This report was instantly contradicted by the Navy Department in an official
communiqué
. A few ships, it was stated, had certainly been ordered to the Pacific, but only in line with ordinary routine, and the report of a naval cruise to the Philippines was absolutely unfounded.

But the mischief was done. The original message had been flashed to Japan, where it caused the wildest excitement; while for some reason, never satisfactorily explained, the Navy Department’s denial was held up for several days. Before it reached Tokyo — or at any rate before its receipt was officially admitted there — the Government addressed a sharp Note to Washington, protesting against naval movements “which could only be interpreted as a menace to Japan.” The Note went on to declare that American transports were known to be under orders to proceed to the Philippines with cargoes of guns and naval mines, and added that unless these ships were immediately recalled “the Imperial Government will be forced to conclude that the intentions of the United States Government are not of a friendly character.”

It was now clear to all that Japan was bent, if not on provoking war, at least on subjecting the United States to a diplomatic humiliation that would not only reduce American prestige in the Far East to zero, but at the same time force that country to acknowledge, in so many words, Japan’s complete ascendency in China and her monopoly of Chinese resources. The gravity of the issue was fully appreciated at Washington, but the authorities were determined to prevent the catastrophe of war if this were possible without the sacrifice of national honour. In a long and courteously worded Note the Japanese Government was urged to reconsider the arbitration proposal, and assured that the United States would scrupulously refrain from taking any action, military or otherwise, that could in any way be construed as prejudicial to Japanese interests. The Sayers concession, as well as all other American undertakings in the disputed Chinese territory, would be regarded as in abeyance pending the decision of the arbitration court. The Note concluded by recalling the traditional friendship between the two nations, “which the United States Government most earnestly desires shall continue unimpaired, and which it will do its utmost to preserve.”

But forces were already at work against which all the arts of diplomacy were powerless. Japan, having definitely resolved to unsheath the sword, was in no mood to draw back at the eleventh hour. Her reply to the last American Note was curt, and while professing peaceful sentiments, reiterated the demand that no reinforcements of any kind, whether of ships, troops, or material, should be dispatched to the American stations west of Hawaii. “The Imperial Government,” added Baron Fukuhara, “assumes that the transports already
en
route
to Manila will be ordered back immediately; failing which it must reserve the right to take such measures as may be expedient in the interest of national defence.”

There were some members of the Cabinet at Washington who would have yielded to this ultimatum — for such in effect it was — rather than involve their country in war; but by this time public opinion was taking a hand in the matter. Devotion to peace is inherent in the American temperament; but so also is a passionate patriotism, which at moments of national crisis is apt to override every other consideration. If in this instance the Japanese demands had contained the smallest element of justice or equity, had they even been presented in a less bellicose manner, public opinion in the United States would have been unconquerably opposed to war, and the Government might have made almost any sacrifice of interests in the Far East without incurring the anger of its people. As it was, however, Japan’s truculence had the desired effect. The State Department’s last Note to Tokyo was condemned in nearly all quarters as being far too mildly worded, the Press with few exceptions urging the Government to inform Japan in plain terms that the limit of American patience had been reached. More than this, it demanded that all requisite steps be taken without delay to protect American interests in Asia. Special emphasis was laid on the necessity of putting the Philippines into a state of defence.

Confronted with this evidence of the nation’s resolve to defend its rights at all costs, the Government had no option but to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Japan. This it did by notifying Tokyo that the latter’s demand for the recall of the transports
en
route
to Manila could not be entertained. At this date, February 28, the ships in question,
Beaufort
and
Newport
News
, were half-way across the Pacific, and destroyers of the United States Asiatic fleet had been ordered to meet them at a point one thousand miles east of Manila, to convoy them safely over the last stage of their journey. Concurrently with this Note to Japan, Admiral Ribley, commanding the Asiatic Fleet, was instructed to assemble all units of his command at Cavite, the principal naval base in the Philippines, there to await further orders. The political situation, he was informed, was serious enough to justify the taking of special measures for the safety of his command. Not until long afterwards was it known that the issue of these orders to Admiral Ribley had occasioned a serious dispute at the Navy Department, and led to the retirement of Captain Appleton, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, an officer of brilliant attainments, whose appointment to this important post a year earlier had evoked some heart-burnings, it being usually held by a flag officer.

The Asiatic fleet was less of a fighting organisation than a squadron for “showing the flag”; excepting the destroyers and submarines it was composed of obsolete ships with limited military value. Besides the flagship
Missoula
, an armoured cruiser more than twenty years old, it comprised the
Frederick
, an older and smaller vessel of the same type; three slow and ancient light cruisers —
Galveston
,
Denver
, and
Cleveland
; the small airplane-carrier
Curtiss
; ten destroyers, three light mine-layers, twelve submarines, and various non-combatant auxiliaries. As the larger ships of this squadron could offer no serious resistance in case of attack by the Japanese fleet, and must inevitably be destroyed if they were brought to action, Captain Appleton urged their immediate recall to Hawaii. The destroyers and submarines he proposed to leave in the Western Pacific, as they were well fitted to co-operate in the defence of the Philippines. But this plan did not commend itself to Admiral Morrison, the Chief of Naval Operations, who rated the military power of the Asiatic fleet more highly than his subordinate and believed that, if concentrated, it could put up a good fight against anything short of the Japanese battle fleet.

Declining to accept responsibility for orders which he regarded as the forerunner of certain disaster, Captain Appleton resigned his post and applied for a sea command. This, however, he did not receive till some time after, when events had fully vindicated the accuracy of his judgment. His successor as Assistant Chief of Operations was Rear-Admiral Hubbard. On March 2 a message was received from Admiral Ribley acknowledging the Department’s orders, but requesting the prompt dispatch of reinforcements for his fleet, and indicating deficiencies in reserve ammunition and other warlike stores. This proved to be the last communication from him. A day later the cable ceased to work, and repeated radio messages, both direct from the high-power stations on the West coast and relayed from Samoa, failed to elicit an answer. Nor could contact be made with Guam, though in normal circumstances the radio plant at that island could send over a distance of ten thousand miles.

From the silence that now descended on the Western Pacific it was only too plain that some radio installation of maximum power was being used to jamb all signals from the American stations, nor could there be any doubt as to who was responsible for this interference. The only conclusion possible was that Japan had cast her vote for war and was already engaged in acts of hostility. This belief was universally held at Washington on the evening of March 3. But it was not until March 5 that the Japanese Ambassador, Count Sakatani, applied for his passports, and by that time things had happened which made the Japanese declaration of war a somewhat superfluous formality.

Late in February, when the gravity of the situation could no longer be ignored, the majority of the warships then in the Atlantic and Caribbean had been ordered to join the flag of the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, Admiral Robert J. Dallinger. Needless to say, these orders were not made public, but the volume of naval traffic through the Panama Canal showed clearly enough that a big concentration of strength in the Pacific was in progress. Ordinary commercial traffic still went on, however, as the United States Government, still hoping for peace, was careful to abstain from any action that might be interpreted as preparation for war. But special precautions were observed by the Canal authorities during this period of crisis, all mercantile ships, American as well as foreign, having to undergo inspection before being permitted to enter the waterway.