Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (9 page)

South of Tarofofo there is no other harbour accessible to ships of deep draught, for the reefs which lie off Port Ajayan, the south-eastern extremity of the island, make this last-named bay a place to be avoided in any but the finest weather. Running for several miles to the westward of Ajayan is a reef which encircles Cocos Island and then turns to the north, and beyond this obstruction lies Umata Bay, two miles north of the south-western point of the island. The heavy swell which sets on the shore when the westerly winds are blowing makes this bay a perilous anchorage. There are two ruined forts here, Nuestra Señora de la Soledad at the southern entrance, and Fort San Angelo on the rocky heights at the north. In former times Umata was a fairly large town, but the greater part of it was destroyed in 1849 by an earthquake.

Eight miles to the north of Umata is Agate Bay, where ships may lie in safety except during the season of westerly winds; but here the many reefs fronting the beach render landing operations difficult. A few miles further north lies Oroté Peninsula, forming the southern side of Port Apra, the largest and best harbour in the island. It is about three and a half miles wide, and is bounded on the north by Cabras Island and Luminao reef, running more or less parallel with Oroté Peninsula. There is deep water inside, but the port is thickly studded with banks, coral reefs, and islets, which necessitate caution in entering or leaving. An old Spanish masonry citadel, Fort Santa Cruz, stands on a rock at the head of the bay, and there is a second fort, Santiago, at Oroté Point. These forts had never been repaired by the Americans, as they were considered to be too exposed to gunfire from the sea; but an earthwork battery, mounting two modern 6-inch guns, had been thrown up at Oroté Point. A second battery of the same type existed near Sumay towards the eastern end of the Peninsula, and there was a third in the hills above Atantano, overlooking the harbour. The approach to the port was thus commanded by six 6-inch guns, four of which were mounted at an elevation that enabled them to deliver a plunging fire.

Agaña Bay, on which Agaña, the capital of the island, is situated, is a long, shallow indentation eight miles to the north-east of Apra. There is practically no shelter for vessels here, as the bay is quite open and exposed to the heavy ocean swell. Its only defences were the old forts of San Rafael and San Agueda, built of stone, and armed at this time with a few light rapid-fire guns. The town of Agaña, which lies midway between the headlands of Adelup and Aperguan, had some six thousand inhabitants and three hundred buildings. Only a few of the latter, such as the Governor’s residence, the arsenal, barracks, and jail, are constructed of stone. The streets are paved, and an excellent road connects the town with Apra. From Agaña Bay to Ritidian, the most northerly point in the island, the coast is steep and forbidding, with only one inlet — Tumun Bay. This is partly reef-bound, but there are several channels through the barrier by which boats can pass to the shore, and the beach is favourable for landing. The garrison of Guam consisted of two thousand United States Marines, most of whom were stationed at Agaña. They also manned the defences at Apra. Besides the guns in the coastal batteries there were a few light field pieces and machine-guns.

CHAPTER VI

Captain Harper, Governor of Guam, receives news of fall of Manila — Two steamers arrive from United States with war material — Preparations for defence — First attack repulsed with heavy loss — Two submarines the only warships left at Guam — Second Japanese attack proves more formidable — Surrender of the island — Captain Harper’s escape

For nearly a fortnight after the bomb attack of March 4, which had destroyed the radio station at Machinao, Guam was left undisturbed. Japanese aircraft from Saipan occasionally flew over the island, but without dropping bombs. No attempt was made to engage them, for there were only eight American machines in Guam, and the Governor had determined to hold these in reserve to meet an emergency.

On the morning of March 18 the look-out station on Alutum reported smoke on the southern horizon, whereupon a plane was sent up to scout. The newcomers proved to be the destroyers
Dent
,
Lamberton
, and
Rizal
(the last-named fitted as a minelayer), which had broken out from Manila Bay before the capitulation. When still some ten miles west of Oroté Point, the flotilla was observed to be zigzagging, putting on speed, and making a smoke screen. A few minutes later the leading boat opened fire, and depth charges began to explode. It was evident to the watchers ashore that a hostile submarine was attempting to attack; but if so, it seemed to have failed, for the three boats came on at high speed. Then, just as the second boat in the line (the
Dent
) was drawing abreast of Oroté Point, a column of water shot up from her starboard side, followed by the dull boom of an explosion. A torpedo, striking amidships, had broken her back, causing her to sink quickly; while two more torpedoes from the enemy narrowly missed the
Rizal
.

When this vessel and the
Lamberton
reached their moorings off Cabras Island, their commanders at once came ashore to report to the Governor, Captain Harper. U.S.N., who now heard for the first time the tragic tidings from the Philippines. Manila was still holding out when the destroyers left, but it was known then that surrender was only a matter of days, if not hours. That Guam would be attacked in its turn at any moment was patent to all, and with such scanty means of defence as it possessed there seemed little hope of making an effective resistance. The submarines which had left Manila at the same time as the destroyers had not yet arrived, nor with their low speed were they likely to reach Apra for two or three days.

At 1 p.m. on March 18 the look-out station on Alutum again reported smoke on the horizon, this time to the westward, and again an airplane went up to reconnoitre. Two large steamers of cargo build were found to be heading for Apra, and were soon identified as the naval transports
Newport
News
and
Beaufort
, which had left San Francisco in February bound for Manila, with a consignment of artillery, mines, and other war material. As the
Beaufort’s
speed was not above eight knots and the two ships kept together, their voyage had been a long one. On March 9, when still 700 miles to the east of the Philippines, they met a German steamer, which gave them news of the destruction of the American squadron off Manila. This intelligence decided them to retrace their course, since by continuing on to the Philippines they would almost certainly fall into enemy hands. Their intention was to return to Honolulu, but coal was running short, and at dusk on the 18th they sighted what was taken to be a Japanese submarine. This they contrived to evade, but on the following day another suspicious vessel was observed hull down to eastward. It therefore looked as if the homeward route was barred.

Guam was now the only refuge within reach of the hunted ships. The
Newport
News
, which had a long-range radio installation, repeatedly called up the island without getting any response. This silence indicated that something was amiss; it might even mean that Guam was already occupied by the Japanese. Still, there was nothing for it but to take the risk of entering a trap, for the bunkers of the two ships were rapidly emptying, and in a few days’ time would be exhausted. So a course was shaped for the island, it having been decided that both ships should be scuttled at the first sign of danger. But no untoward incident occurred, and in the forenoon of March 18 the coast line of Guam was sighted. Warned by the airplane which had come out to meet them that Japanese submarines were in the neighbourhood, both ships began to zigzag and work up to their best speed. They were soon met by the destroyer
Lamberton
, which circled round them at high speed and put down a depth charge barrage. Thanks to this escort they got safely into Apra, where the work of discharging their valuable cargo was begun with feverish energy.

By sunset on the 19th there had been put ashore twelve 7-inch and eight 6-inch guns on caterpillar mounts, with their tractors; fifteen field guns, ten 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, fifty heavy and light machine-guns, and a large quantity of ammunition. Twenty motor trucks were also landed from the
Beaufort
. The 7-inch weapons were of a specially powerful type. They had been removed from old battleships during the world war and adapted for land service. Each gun had a length of twenty-five feet, and discharged a 153-pounder shell containing 24 pounds of T.N.T. From its caterpillar mount it could be fired at an elevation of 40 degrees, which gave the shell an extreme range of nearly fourteen miles. With each gun was a 120-horse-power gasoline tractor, which could take it up steep hills or over the roughest open country. By reason of their great mobility and long range these guns were ideal for coast defence against all but the heaviest war-ships. Had there been two or three batteries of them in the Philippines when the Japanese invasion took place, that operation might have ended differently, and would in any case have cost the enemy much heavier casualties.

As lecturer at the Naval War College Captain Harper, now Governor and Commandant of Guam, had gained a reputation by his ingenious if somewhat unconventional views on strategy and tactics. He was now to have an opportunity of putting certain of these theories into effect. Since being appointed to the governorship two years previously, he had devoted much thought to the problem of defending the island. Had batteries of heavy long-range guns been mounted at strategic points Guam would have been almost impregnable, for the configuration of the ground lent itself admirably to artillery defence against approaching ships, and good landing places were few in number. But the building of such batteries had been neglected prior to the Washington Conference, and after that event the erection of fortifications on the island was interdicted by treaty. Failing these, mobile guns of heavy calibre would suffice, in Captain Harper’s opinion, to keep hostile ships at a respectful distance. Nothing, therefore, could have been more timely or welcome than the arrival of the two transports with their cargo of big guns.

Captain Harper’s study of the defence problem had led him to conclude that an enemy bent on invading Guam would probably select Port Tarofofo on the east and Port Apra or Tumun Bay on the west as landing places, owing to the favourable conditions to be met with there. Alternative but less likely points of attack were Umata Bay, Agate Bay, and Agaña, all on the west coast. There were not enough heavy guns to command the approach to each of these places, but there would probably be time, after the enemy had made his intentions clear, to rush several of the 7-inch tractor guns to the danger zone. Most of the marines on the island had been trained in the use of these weapons during their service in the United States. Gun crews were hastily organised and the guns themselves formed into batteries of three pieces each, with the same number of motor trucks attached to each battery for carrying the
personnel
and ammunition. For the field pieces and the anti-aircraft guns teams of carabao were provided. The weak point in the defence, and one that could not be remedied, was the shortage of airplanes. If the invading force were strong in aircraft there would be little chance of putting up a successful resistance, for the guns and their crews would then be exposed to heavy bombing, and with only two thousand men all told there was no margin for severe casualties.

Early on March 20 a hundred mines taken out of the
Beaufort
were laid across the entrance to Port Apra by the destroyer
Rizal
. It was intended to sow other mines off Tarofofo and Tumun Bay, but before this could be done the attack had developed. It was heralded by four Japanese planes which approached from the north-west at 11 a.m. on the 20th and flew over the island at a height of 6,000 feet. Expecting a visitation of this kind, Captain Harper had camouflaged all his big guns with tarpaulins and tree branches, which made it impossible to detect them from the air. Striking the island at Urano Point in the north, the enemy planes flew southward along the coast, passing over Agaña at a very low altitude. Here they dropped several bombs, which destroyed many of the ramshackle native houses and caused some casualties among the civilian inhabitants. Unaware of the existence of anti-aircraft guns — for Japanese spies had correctly reported that no weapons of this kind were in Guam just before the war — the planes now came down as low as 2,000 feet to make a close inspection of the batteries at Apra. The chance was too good to be missed. Six of the newly-landed “sky guns” were at Apra, and at the word of command they came smartly into action. Despite the inexperience of the gunners in this sort of work, the shooting was very accurate. Two of the enemy planes were brought down almost immediately; and a third was disabled and had to descend on the sea. Only one machine escaped injury.

At 11.30 a.m. the look-out station on Alutum reported masses of smoke in the north-west. Captain Harper immediately sent up one of his few planes, as it was essential to gain intelligence of the enemy's strength and course at the earliest moment possible; but the pilot of the machine was ordered to keep out of range of attack, and not to get into a fight with hostile planes unless absolutely forced to do so. His report, which came in by radiophone, was to this effect: “Enemy fleet now steering almost due east. There are four armoured cruisers, four scouts, about sixteen destroyers, and what appears to be a plane carrier; also fifteen steamships which are probably transports. Scouts are ahead, cruisers next, and destroyers forming screen round them and transports. Am being fired at by anti-aircraft guns and chased by planes.”

The air scout was now recalled, and in a few minutes was seen making for Apra at low elevation, with four enemy planes in hot pursuit. He was obviously trying to draw them over the anti-aircraft battery, and succeeded so well that two of the pursuers were brought down before they were aware of the danger. The other two, being well in the rear, turned tail and got away before the ground gunners found their range.

At this time, 12.15 p.m., the enemy fleet was in sight from Mount Alutum. It was seen to have split into two sections, one of which was steering north-east, apparently intending to round Point Ritidian and come down the eastern side of the island, while the other was heading due south on a course that indicated some point on the west coast as its objective. There was no longer any doubt that landings were to be attempted simultaneously on both coasts, and it only remained to discover at which points.

At 1.20 p.m. two of the armoured cruisers, identified as the
Tokiwa
and
Asama
, stood in towards Apra and opened a heavy fire on the harbour and the batteries. In both these ships, as became known later, the forward 8-inch turret had been replaced by a pair of 12-inch howitzers behind armoured shields. The fire of the cruisers was controlled by Japanese spotting planes. These flew at too great a height to be effectively engaged by the American anti-aircraft guns; moreover, if the latter had revealed their position by opening fire they would at once have become the target of the heavy guns of the fleet, and must soon have been destroyed. The batteries at Oroté Point and Sumay came in for a severe shelling, but amidst a tempest of bursting projectiles the handful of marines continued to work their guns with such effect that several hits were scored on the two Japanese cruisers, and the
Tokiwa
, with her howitzers disabled by a shell bursting fairly between them, was compelled to haul out of range. In less than twenty minutes, however, both batteries were silenced; three out of the four guns had been dismounted, and the men who had fought them so gallantly lay dead or wounded. The third battery — that above Atantano — was of more recent construction, and its site was evidently not known to the enemy so precisely as the other two, for it survived the bombardment for another half-hour until a chance shell touched off some spare ammunition, causing an explosion that laid low most of the
personnel
.

All this time the marines in charge of the heavy mobile guns had been chafing to support their comrades, but Captain Harper’s orders were peremptory: not a shot was to be fired until he gave the word. At his camouflaged observation post on Mount Tinkio he received word that the second detachment of Japanese ships was steaming past Taguan Point on a course parallel with the coast. A few minutes later came news that the armoured cruisers
Kasuga
and
Nisshin
were bombarding Port Tarofofo with 10-inch and 8-inch shells. This intelligence confirmed him in his belief that the landings were timed to take place concurrently at Apra and Tarofofo. But so long as the Japanese aircraft were overhead, it was impossible to move a single gun without exposing it to almost instant destruction, either by bombs from the enemy planes or by the fire of the ships.