Goebbels: A Biography (58 page)

On August 21 there was further “news from the Obersalzberg”: “Non-aggression pact with Moscow completed. Ribbentrop in Moscow
on Wednesday.” Once again the decision-making process had entirely bypassed the propaganda minister, as he was only informed post facto of highly significant developments.
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On the day Goebbels received this message, he struggled to put this “global sensation” into words: “The whole scene of power in Europe has been transformed. London and Paris bewildered. […] The Führer has pulled off a brilliant chess move.”

At Hitler’s request, he made his way early next morning to Berchtesgaden.
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During the following two weeks he was to stay in close daily contact with Hitler, and although Goebbels was not involved in the actual decision-making process that was eventually to unleash the Second World War, his diary entries for this critical period contain extremely interesting insights into the individual steps and the motives of the German leadership.

A letter from Chamberlain delivered to Hitler by Ambassador Nevile Henderson reinforced the message of Britain’s resolve in the event of an attack on Poland. Hitler replied to the letter with an equally clear counterthreat.
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As Goebbels’s notes have it, the Führer’s general assessment of the situation is as follows: The situation of Poland was “desperate. We will attack them at the first opportunity. The Polish state must be smashed, just like the Czech.” This would not be too difficult, but the question of whether the West would intervene was more complicated: It was not certain. “Italy is not enthusiastic, but will have to go along with us. It hardly has any choice.”

Hitler then informed Goebbels of the details of the way the pact with Stalin had come about and its consequences: “Eastern Europe will be divided between Berlin and Moscow.” Naturally, a surprise treaty with the Soviet arch-enemy was a risky business. But Goebbels noted: “Beggars can’t be choosers.”

Finally, at two in the morning, the long-awaited communiqué from Moscow arrived, sealing the alliance with Stalin: “Non-aggression and consultative pact for 10 years. […] A world-historical event with vast implications.”
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The treaty, and a Secret Supplementary Protocol signed at the same time, did indeed provide for the division of Poland and the Baltic states into German and Soviet spheres of influence, respectively: Hitler now had the necessary rear cover for his planned war on Poland.
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The next day Hitler and his propaganda minister left Berchtesgaden
for Berlin.
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Here preparations were begun immediately for the invasion of Poland, scheduled for the night of August 25–26. At midday on August 25, Goebbels saw Hitler, who instructed him to draw up two proclamations, one to the German people and one to the Party. “Clarification of the need for an armed conflict with Poland, adjustment of the whole nation to war, if necessary for months and years.”
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Later in the same day Hitler met the British and French ambassadors. He declared plainly to Henderson that “the German-Polish problem must be resolved and could be resolved.” If Britain declared war because of a military move by Germany against Poland, then Germany would accept this challenge.
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On the other hand, Hitler promised Britain extensive cooperation once “the resolution of this problem had been achieved.” However, this step did not seem very promising even to Goebbels: “England will no longer believe we mean it.” The encounter with the French ambassador did not offer the prospect of peace, either: Robert Coulondre assured Hitler “on his word of honor as an officer” that if Germany attacked Poland, France would be obliged to act.
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But events then took a turn that upset all of Hitler’s calculations. Early in the evening Ambassador Attolico appeared in the Reich Chancellery with a surprising message: “He delivers Mussolini’s declaration that Italy cannot participate in a war at present. Serves us right. It’s what I’ve always feared and have really known all the time since Venice: Italy won’t go along with us.” In fact, Mussolini complained to Hitler that “in their encounters […] war was envisaged for 1942,” and in accordance with this understanding he would of course be ready by that juncture “on land, at sea, and in the air,” but at the present moment he was insufficiently prepared for armed conflict with the western powers. Hitler immediately drew his conclusion: Mobilization was to continue, but the attack planned for that night was called off.
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What to do? “The Führer broods and ponders. It’s a heavy blow for him.” Goebbels was confident that Hitler would “find a way out, even from this damned situation.” But all Hitler came up with was to go to war without his assiduously cultivated ally.
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The next day Ambassador Coulondre handed over a letter from Daladier,
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the content of which, according to Goebbels’s report of
Hitler’s reaction, was of no consequence, obviously serving the purpose of avoiding “possible war-guilt.”
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Although the French were promised confidentiality, two days later the German side broadcast the letter and Hitler’s answer “in every language”; Goebbels thought this was “the best possible propaganda for us.”
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When he met Hitler the following day, August 27, the leader was “in fine form and full of confidence.” He had no intention of giving up his minimum demands regarding Danzig and Poland. That evening, Henderson brought the British note replying to Hitler’s proposals of August 25. The British government took cognizance of Hitler’s offer of extensive cooperation but stressed that the outstanding differences between Germany and Poland must be settled first—on the basis of Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag of April 28. Attention was clearly drawn once more to the existing commitments of Great Britain to Poland.
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In addition, the Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus, whom Hitler had requested a few days earlier to present his ideas about a resolution of the crisis directly to the British government, brought a message from London. Goebbels noted: “England might possibly agree to ceding of Danzig and a corridor in the Corridor. But guarantee of Polish border in return. Later also to discuss question of colonies. Long peace with England. […] Everything still hangs in the balance.”
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The German reaction the next day was to describe the prospects for any further negotiations with Poland as no longer encouraging, but nonetheless the German side was ready to receive a Polish representative in Berlin for discussions, provided he arrived by the next day, meaning August 30.
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On the morning of August 30 Goebbels summarized the thinking behind this reply: “The Führer wants a plebiscite in the Corridor under international control. That way, he still hopes to pry London loose from Warsaw and find an excuse for striking. London’s attitude is not as rigid as previously.”

It was clear that any negotiations would be a sham. The real aim was, on the one hand, to weaken the British guarantee to Warsaw and on the other to create a pretext for military action against Poland.

The extremely tight deadline set for a Polish representative to be sent to Berlin made a resumption of negotiations appear quite improbable. But if, against the odds, Beck should come to Berlin, Goebbels
was worried above all that the unexpected chance of peace could lead to an “unstoppable wave of optimism here,” which would “ruin our whole position.”
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Evidently, Goebbels was still assuming that the nation was not exactly enraptured by the prospect of war. Meanwhile, the press was instructed “to play up reports of Polish atrocities.”
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Around midnight on August 30 Ribbentrop received the British ambassador to inform him that the German side had formulated some proposals to resolve the Polish issues. These had lapsed, however, since contrary to German wishes no Polish plenipotentiary had presented himself to the Reich government. Ribbentrop went on to read out the proposals to Henderson at top speed, without handing him a copy of the document. It was quite clear that the German side no longer had any interest whatsoever in negotiating.
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At about the same time, Hitler summoned Goebbels to tell him about the details of the “negotiating proposal” and the background of this tactic: “The Führer thinks there’ll be war.” Hitler had composed a memorandum which, among other things, stipulated the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich and a plebiscite in the Corridor. Hitler proposed to “launch this document into the global public sphere at the most favorable opportunity.” He himself was making it apparent that the sixteen-point catalogue he had drawn up was never intended as the basis for negotiations but simply to demonstrate to the world the “good will” of his regime—for the time
after
the now inevitable war had begun.

“England’s reply,” added Goebbels in his account of the conversation with Hitler, “is playing for time. But also disrespectful and provocative. They think Germany is weak. They are deceiving themselves.” These words of the dictator’s to his propaganda minister were all part of the charade Hitler was acting out: Neither the Poles nor the British were going to be given any chance of reacting to the proposals.

When the Polish ambassador called on Ribbentrop the next day to present his government’s response to the British proposal that direct talks should be arranged with Germany, Ribbentrop made an excuse to cut the conversation short. Soon afterward the German Foreign Office handed the German “proposals” to the ambassadors of Britain, France, Japan, the United States, and the USSR, declaring that
the Polish side had not availed themselves of the chance to negotiate.
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This communication and the sixteen-point document were announced on German radio at around nine o’clock.
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On the German side, the decision had been made long before: At midday on August 31 Hitler had given orders for the invasion of Poland to begin that night. Hitler did not believe that Britain would intervene, but whether this prediction would turn out to be accurate, wrote Goebbels, “nobody can say at the moment.”
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Credit 19.1

The government front bench in the Kroll Opera House during Hitler’s speech after the attack on Poland, September 1, 1939. Goebbels’s reaction to the outbreak of war was far from enthusiastic.

The Nazi regime represented the opening of hostilities on September 1, 1939, as a response to alleged provocation by the Poles on the frontier. Border incidents faked by the SS, especially the alleged “raid” on the Gleiwitz radio transmitter, were to supply the pretext for the German assault. The corresponding entry in Goebbels’s diary reads: “The SS given special orders for the night,” and a few paragraphs later comes the phrase “Polish attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter.”
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For him, the carefully contrived lie had transformed itself, all unawares, into a real event. The fiction was maintained by Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag on the morning of September 1: “Fire has been returned since 5:45
A.M.!”
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—
although in fact the attack had
begun an hour earlier. Hitler also announced the ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and declared that he had no interest in changing Germany’s western borders, the perfect lifeline for London and Paris, decided Goebbels, who was present in the Reichstag for the speech.
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But these maneuvers proved futile. That very evening, September 1, the ambassadors of Britain and France called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to assure him that their countries would stand by their pledges to Poland. At the same time the two countries declared general mobilization.
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On September 3, the British ambassador handed over a last, short-term ultimatum from his government, which Hitler rejected. Whereupon Britain declared war. The French government followed suit, albeit after several hours’ delay.
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By that morning, in parallel with his rejection of the British ultimatum, Hitler had already addressed separate appeals to the people, the Party, and members of the armed forces, which Goebbels immediately had broadcast over the radio. That same evening, Hitler left Berlin on his special train, “in order,” as Goebbels dramatically phrased it, “to make his way to the Eastern Front.” In fact, during the following weeks, Hitler was to move around at a relatively safe distance from the fighting.
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Exploiting the propaganda value of the Polish “campaign,” already victorious after only five weeks, was one of the chief tasks falling to Goebbels’s propaganda machine at this time. As before, during the Sudeten crisis, and as in the days before the beginning of hostilities, Goebbels’s office made strenuous efforts to disseminate reports of alleged Polish atrocities, inflicted first and foremost on the German minority population, although in most cases these horror stories were either invented or highly exaggerated.
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In point of fact, during the course of the war, many thousands of “ethnic Germans” lost their lives, some as a result of combat action, others executed by the Polish military, or killed by civilians. The civilian attacks peaked at the beginning of September in Bromberg (in Polish: Bydgoszcz), and while it is true that some hundreds of “ethnic Germans” were killed as alleged “saboteurs,” Nazi propaganda described the “Bromberg Bloody Sunday” in terms of a massacre of thousands.
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After the Polish action, German propaganda was to assert that over fifty thousand “ethnic Germans” had fallen victim to such atrocities at this time. In
reality, the total number of people of German origin who had died was multiplied by a factor of ten.
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The Germans used this atrocity propaganda to justify “retribution.” During the Polish campaign and in the following months, German units (including task forces, police, the ethnic German self-defense force newly formed by the SS, and also regular German troops) shot tens of thousands of Polish civilians, members of the intelligentsia, the clergy, and the aristocracy and thousands of Jews.
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German actions were systematically planned from the beginning to carry forward the wishes of the political leadership. By September 7, Heydrich had already given orders at a conference of leading officials that “as much as possible the Polish elites are to be rendered harmless.”
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Action was taken accordingly.

During these weeks, while creating suitable atrocity propaganda around the mass shootings of “ethnic Germans,” Goebbels also directed propaganda efforts at the Western powers. At a meeting with Hitler on September 3, guidelines were set for wartime propaganda. The byword for the coming weeks ran: “Against Chamberlain and his associates. Divide leadership from people. Leave France unmolested for the present.”
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