Goebbels: A Biography (57 page)

On April 1, 1939, a department of Wehrmacht propaganda was created in the Wehrmacht High Command, concentrating military authority in this field.
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Goebbels observed these activities with deep
mistrust: “The Wehrmacht is meddling too much in my affairs. But I won’t put up with it. The Wehrmacht can do the fighting, and I’ll do the propaganda.”
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In view of the tense international situation it seemed questionable to Goebbels in spring 1939 whether he should really embark on his long-planned
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trip to Greece and Egypt, but Hitler advised him to do so: He did not think Goebbels indispensable in Berlin.
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Moreover, the fact that his propaganda minister, so prominent as a firebrand in recent weeks, was setting off on a fairly long journey would show the world how relaxed the regime was about the international protests. Goebbels on the other hand took Hitler’s approval of his trip to be a clear confirmation that the signals were set for détente on the international scene. He could not imagine that hugely significant decisions would be maturing in Berlin during his absence, and he did not grasp that his trip was a political diversionary tactic.

So it was that on the evening of March 27 Goebbels set off on a journey of almost three weeks, predominantly private in nature.
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At his first stop, Budapest, he stayed for a few days and used the opportunity to pay his respects to Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Pál Teleki.
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From there he flew—with a brief stop in Belgrade—to Athens, where he was greeted by his old acquaintance, Minister Konstantinos Kotzias. In the Greek capital, as on his last stay there in 1936, he visited Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas—now ruling with dictatorial powers—and the Greek king
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as well as taking in the Acropolis and other famous ancient sites. Reverently he marveled at “the antique cultural soil across which so much history has swept.”
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On April 1 he flew on to the island of Rhodes, occupied since 1912 by the Italians.
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There he relaxed for two weeks, enjoying the “glorious sun.”
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What he did not hear on his vacation was that on April 3, in reaction to Chamberlain’s speech, Hitler had drawn up instructions for “Case White.” The Wehrmacht should gear itself for war against Poland from September 1, 1939; he was prepared to launch this war if the Poles maintained their intransigent attitude to German demands.
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On April 5 Goebbels interrupted his vacation on Rhodes to fly to
Egypt for two days. He had been planning a lengthy stay in Egypt since the end of 1938 but postponed it for reasons of personal security. On this short trip he explored, among other sites, Cairo and its National Museum, the pyramids at Saqqara, the pyramid of Cheops, and the Sphinx.
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Far from his homeland, Goebbels could enthuse about the exotic: “Late in the evening a camel-ride into the desert. Under a heavy full moon. […] Out in the desert colorful tents have been put up. There the Arabs perform a fantasia for us. Terrific, wild folk-plays that we find very fascinating.” On the way home he became “quite melancholy: what a country and what a wide world! For a long time I can’t sleep for excitement.”
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On Rhodes, to which he had now returned, on April 9 he caught up with further international developments: On April 7 Mussolini had occupied Albania, and on April 6 Great Britain and Poland had concluded a mutual assistance pact. Goebbels commented: “So, Beck has fallen into the Lords’ trap after all. Poland may have to pay a high price for this one day. That’s how the Czechs started, too.”
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It obviously never occurred to him that the British pledge of support for Poland might be deadly serious—or else he suppressed the thought.

On returning from his vacation Goebbels was heavily involved in preparations for Hitler’s fiftieth birthday. He was aware that in London war was being talked about “like you might mention supper,” but he took these threats no more seriously than he ever had; for him they were primarily meant to be “panic inducers.”
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Occasionally, though, he did have doubts: Was the “agitation” in the press not bound “to lead to war in the long run”?
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Hitler’s fiftieth birthday marked the ceremonial high point of 1939, a year in which the capital saw plenty of great occasions:
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This self-confident display of the dictator’s power was to set the scene for further aggression abroad.

On the day before the celebrations, in the Kroll Opera House, Goebbels gave his “Führer’s birthday address,” which, he proudly reported, was “broadcast practically throughout the world.” The Party leadership formally congratulated their leader, and Hitler then proceeded to open Speer’s east-west axis road, the first great artery to be
built under the plan for reshaping Berlin. Some two million people had turned out to line the brightly lit route, the Berlin population having been notified in no uncertain terms: “On the eve of the Führer’s birthday the whole of Berlin lines the east-west axis. […] Flags out, decorate houses and streets!”
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There followed a military tattoo and a “torchlight procession of the old guard from all over the Reich.” Goebbels was among the small group of confidants who were allowed to congratulate Hitler on his birthday at midnight.

The next day, declared a holiday on short notice,
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the celebrations proper began: In the morning, a parade of the Leibstandarte in front of the Reich Chancellery, followed by formal congratulations from the Reich government, and then—on the east-west axis road again—an almost five-hour parade by the Wehrmacht. The solemn induction of newly appointed political leaders of the Party rounded off the day’s events.

Goebbels learned from Hitler a few days later that the Führer, too, regarded the British and French threats as a bluff and was counting on Poland to give way. “Will there be war?” Goebbels asked himself: “I don’t think so. In any case, nobody really wants it at the moment. That’s our best ally.”
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Over the following few days he resumed his fierce anti-British polemic in the
Völkischer Beobachter
, which prepared the way for further aggressive moves by Hitler.
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On April 28 the Führer gave a speech to the Reichstag which he used to conduct a foreign affairs tour d’horizon. First in the line of fire was President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Two weeks earlier, Roosevelt had called on Hitler to swear that he would not commit any aggressive act against thirty specifically named states. Hitler’s answer, ridiculing Roosevelt, had his audience of parliamentary delegates—which included a completely spellbound Goebbels—roaring with laughter. Furthermore, Hitler canceled the naval agreement with Britain and the non-aggression pact with Poland.
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At the beginning of May German propaganda began to produce anti-Polish polemics, albeit kept low-key for the time being.
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The idea was to reinforce the message contained in Hitler’s speech about a break with Poland.
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At the heart of the campaign were two articles by Goebbels in the
Völkischer Beobachter
complaining about alleged anti-German tendencies in Poland: Elsewhere, in an explanation directed at the rest of the press, the Propaganda Ministry spoke of a
“trial shot.”
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The press was enjoined to publish a steady stream of reports about border incidents, although still in a restrained manner.
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The announcement of the military alliance between Germany and Italy on May 8 was what Goebbels called another “body blow”—a clear signal to the western powers, who were committing themselves more and more to the support of Poland.
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Two weeks later Galeazzo Ciano came to Berlin for the formal signing of the pact.
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Disappointment was mixed with triumph, however: Japan was not prepared to join the signatories.
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In May the regime received clear signals that the British intended to stand by their commitment to Poland.
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This prompted Goebbels to start another anti-British campaign, continuing into July, under the banner of “inciting hatred for England.”
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On May 20 he published an attack on the “encirclers”:
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“Take a good look at them as they squat together in their clubs, Freemasons’ lodges, and Jewish banks hatching new mischief to afflict Europe.”
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The key term
encirclers
, referring to the “encircling” of Germany by coalition forces led by a grasping Great Britain, was meant to recall the situation in 1914, when Germany alleged that the Entente Powers had hemmed the country in. Goebbels was trying to provoke new fears of a threat to the Reich and to shift the blame in advance for any possible outbreak of war. The shrill tone of his propaganda warned the German population unequivocally that war was inevitable to ensure the survival of the nation. But there was no mood of pro-war enthusiasm comparable with that of summer 1914.

The focus of Goebbels’s attacks varied. At some points he homed in on Britain’s interference in German-Polish negotiations, said to have handed the Poles a “blank check” allowing them to decide on war or peace;
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at other times he stressed that Germany did not want to number perennially among the “have-nots”;
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or he moved the Danzig question into the foreground in order to test “the international atmosphere” on this point.
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While Hitler remained convinced that the British were bluffing,
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Goebbels increasingly turned his attention to the demand for access
to resources and enlargement of
Lebensraum
(“living-space”). In his speech at the Solstice Festival in the Berlin Stadium, he declared that a “nation of 80 million could not be excluded from the riches of the earth”: As long as this remained the case, “any peace program was just empty words.”
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Two days later, in the
Völkischer Beobachter
, he ventured to predict that “in a war with Germany Great Britain would lose its empire.”
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In the
Völkischer Beobachter
in July Goebbels attacked the British politician and writer Stephen King-Hall, who had sent a leaflet addressed to Germans; however, the article did not appear until it had been thoroughly redacted by Hitler.
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On July 2 Goebbels went to Salzburg to check on preparations for the Festival. He had first visited the Festival the year before and had not been impressed by the building (“must be torn down”) or by the productions: “beneath contempt in terms of singing, scenery, and decor. […] This is real Viennese kitsch. But I’ll get rid of it all.”
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He used the journey to make a slight detour to meet up with his family in Bad Gastein, where Magda had been undergoing spa treatment since the end of June.
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It was in the Austrian resort that she confessed to him her affair with Hanke, who thus stood unmasked for Goebbels as a “first-class rogue”—but had a touch of respect crept in there?
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From Bad Gastein they traveled together to Bayreuth. In the intermissions between the opera performances, the usual social obligations, and the hours of conversation with Hitler, Goebbels tried to put an end to the relationship between Magda and Hanke. He had the head of personnel at the Propaganda Ministry working on Hanke in Berlin on his behalf, while he talked for hours with Magda, who was “very disturbed and upset,” frequently fainting; the confrontation placed him, too, under “the greatest nervous strain.”
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Eventually he discovered that Magda had changed the complexion of the matter by putting it to Hitler, as she always did when her marriage was at stake.
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Hitler followed the same line as he had in the Baarová case; the couple must remain together under all circumstances. There followed a headlong departure from the town of Richard Wagner.
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Back in Berlin, the first thing he did was to send Hanke off on vacation. With the beginning of war he would go into the army; there could be no question of letting him return to the Propaganda Ministry.
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Goebbels, the deceived husband, found himself in a “severe state of shock.” It was “terrible to lose all faith in your fellow man.” But perhaps this was “necessary and useful for the future”; you were then “free of illusions and can face life in a more open, freer and more mature way. You don’t have friends anymore, just acquaintances and colleagues.”
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After spending the first two weeks of August at the Salzburg Festival,
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he went with a delegation from the Propaganda Ministry and numerous representatives of the German press to the Biennale in Venice, where he had talks with his Italian counterpart, Dino Alfieri, about further cooperation in various areas of propaganda but also found time to simply lounge around on the beach or in cafés.
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On August 15 he flew back to Berlin, surely aware that with the “anti-Polish campaign” Hitler had signaled the beginning of the “final sprint.”
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Following Hitler’s lead, in the second half of August the press adopted an anti-Polish stance of almost unparalleled aggressiveness. The pressure on that country was to be stepped up, and at the same time the home population was to be attuned to the inevitability of a war.
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On August 19 Goebbels received a call from the Obersalzberg: In two days the propaganda effort was to reach a “full crescendo. After that, we’re off.”
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Goebbels had concluded that the war “was anticipated with a certain fatalism. It would almost take a miracle to stop it. If it has become necessary, then the sooner the better.”
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The propaganda was framed accordingly. In the last prewar phase it concentrated on blaming the war on the attitude of Poland and the western powers. There was still no mention of enthusiasm for war, either from Goebbels or in the pronouncements of his propaganda machine.