France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (35 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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Page 161
if French interests were really served by forming a Franco-German têteà-tête that Germany might come to dominate. As the Foreign Ministry drew up plans to surrender French national control of the army in a bid to establish military equilibrium with Germany, support within the government began to weaken. In October, President Auriol revealed the depth of his anti-German sentiment and his complete opposition to Schuman's policies in a long conversation with
New York Times
owner Arthur Sulzberger. Auriol continually referred to the Nazi menace in Germany, claimed he had no confidence in Adenauer, thought Schumacher a fascist, believed that the "proud, militarist, and disciplined" Germans would cause trouble by reclaiming the Eastern territories, and would have preferred to see the "political and military neutralization of Germany," guaranteed by the United Nations. These sentiments revealed an alarming ignorance of the difficulties Schuman had already faced in maneuvering among American, British, and German diplomatic strategies. Auriol's hope for a "no-man's-land" in Germany recalled the long-abandoned and hopelessly Germanophobic Morgenthau Plan of 1945.
64
Even within the Executive Commission of the MRP, the party most openly identified with European integration and the EDC, serious criticism of Schuman's policy emerged in the fall of 1951 that had to be vigorously repulsed by Maurice Schumann, the deputy foreign minister, and Defense Minister Bidault. For Schumann, French influence had been immeasurably strengthened, especially among the Americans, by the nation's commitment to European integration. If this policy were abandoned, the United States would either turn to Germany for support of its European objectives, or withdraw from the continent altogether  both courses disastrous for French interests. "Do you see any other alternative," Schumann challenged his party colleagues, "to speeding up the pace of the construction of Europe?" He rejected out of hand their claims that a united and neutralized Germany would suit French interests: "Should all of Germany enjoy freedom of movement, that would be a mortal danger for peace," he said. "A control lasting five or ten years is worthless. There remains only integration, and it must be realized without delay." In a mid-November meeting of the Executive Commission, Bidault took up Schumann's position. His colleagues, increasingly nervous about the prospects of restoring to West Germany any military capacity whatsoever, and inclined to consider the Soviet proposals for a neutral reunification of Germany, earned a stern rebuke: "You want German unity? Do you really think that this unity will not lead to the restitution of a German Army?'' Bidault defended the European army as
 
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the only way to maintain West Germany within the alliance while depriving it of a national army: "Those who do not want the European Army will force the re-establishment of the
Wehrmacht."
Bidault argued forcefully that French influence over Germany would be secured by American-backed, integrated institutions, rather than by leaving the future of Germany unsettled, subject both to domestic unrest and Soviet subterfuge. This was not the last time French leaders would have to defend the thinking that lay behind the EDC from the criticisms of skeptical parliamentarians.
65
One weakness of the EDC that those French critical of the scheme frequently cited was the absence of Britain as a participant. The Conservative Party had returned to power in October 1951 and many in Europe could be excused for thinking that its leader, Winston Churchill, might be favorable to the EDC, or at least to some form of association with it. After all, Churchill had called for a much greater degree of unity of the European states during his period in the opposition. However, with regard to European policies, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden took much the same position as Bevin and Morrison had done. In late November, at the Rome meeting of the NAC, he repeated the position Britain had defined in Washington in September with regard to the European army: British units would not participate in the EDC, though perhaps some other form of association might be found. At a time when the EDC idea was attracting criticism in France, and also in the Benelux countries, British exceptionalism became a source of much agitation. As Eden pointed out in a note to Churchill, "now that the Pleven Plan is running into trouble in the countries that put it forward, we are being made the whipping boy."
66
Still, Eden feared that if the Paris conference on the EDC failed, this might be blamed on the British unwillingness to join. In mid-December, Churchill and Eden traveled to Paris to reassure the French of Britain's support for the concept. The visit may have had just the opposite effect. Churchill, rambling along in execrable French during a luncheon with the French government leaders, stated that Europe would never be strong unless French troops could march to the "Marseillaise" and Germans to the "Wacht am Rhein." Churchill seemed to think that if the United States, Britain, and France stood close together they could compel Germany to act responsibly. This did not satisfy his French interlocutors, and at the end of the meeting, President Auriol's private secretary told Eden that the French public would never support the EDC without British participation. Though the British could not offer such a commitment, they did agree to link British forces
 
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under NATO with those of the EDC for purposes of "training, supply, and operations," a concession designed to strengthen French resolve to go forward with the plan.
67
Despite the criticisms of the EDC within the French government, Schuman pressed forward with the Paris talks, and by early January, the French, Germans, and Italians agreed on many details of the plan. They overcame one great stumbling block by agreeing that the basic size of the army's divisions would be 12,500 men  much larger than initially proposed by Pleven  and that two such divisions drawn from different nations would be integrated into corps. It was recognized, moreover, that the German contribution would come to about a third of the EDC force, rather than the fifth that France had earlier insisted on. However, the French position against a German defense minister and general staff had been upheld; only recruiting would be done by a German national agency.
68
Yet though agreement had been reached on the military details of the plan, various political problems still lay in the path of the negotiations.
In mid-January 1952, the French complained to Washington about German obstinance in concluding the contractual agreements, which the French considered a prerequisite to the EDC treaty. The French had always claimed that their willingness to build a defense community with Germany on a basis of equality did not vitiate their rights to assure their economic and political security through the contractual agreements. Yet from the French perspective, Germany had become most unwilling to cooperate in drawing up those controls. "The Germans know," explained André François-Poncet of this stiffening in the German position, "that if the project for the European Army fails, the United States would help them build an army of their own, just like the British or even American armies, and would then bring it into NATO. . . . They cannot but win." Such an outcome would be a disaster for French strategy, for then "West Germany, rather than France, would become the fulcrum for United States [policy] in Europe." Yet if François-Poncet's report suggested that France must threaten to hold up the EDC until it received satisfaction on the contractual agreements, Ambassador Bonnet in Washington argued that "any step backward on our part would work in favor of those [American] partisans who urge the United States to break its links to Europe." The Pentagon had never favored the EDC idea, Bonnet went on, and there were many in the U.S. Congress who opposed sending troops to Europe at all. France must not weaken in its resolve and so lose the still strong American commitment to French security.
69
 
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Despite Bonnet's assessment, in late January Schuman directed a long and somber letter to Secretary Acheson about his concerns regarding German intransigence in the talks in Bonn. The EDC, Schuman wrote, had been conceived by France as the best and most equitable means to bring Germany into European defense, but because it was built on the premise of nondiscrimination, it could not contain "the precautions and barriers" that France believed must be put in place in the contractual agreements to ensure French security. Above all, France insisted that Germany not join NATO, despite the NATO membership of all the other EDC members. Further, France demanded restrictions on certain types of arms production in the Federal Republic, and had also sought a large German contribution to financing the cost of keeping Allied troops in Germany. Finally, on its own authority France had given the high commissioner for the Saar the rank of ambassador to underscore French intentions to support the autonomy of this disputed region. On all of these issues, Schuman sought satisfaction precisely because, in giving up sovereignty over its army, France required compensating assurances that Franco-German economic and political equilibrium would be maintained in the future, even if through these restrictive measures. Schuman summarized French thinking in a telling passage: "France's outside [i.e., colonial] obligations, the demographic superiority of Western Germany, the rapid recovery of the Ruhr industries and of the German economy as a whole are in different degrees elements of imbalance to which we must apply correcting factors." He had fought hard for a stable, balanced Franco-German relationship, one based on mutual guarantees and a pooling of sovereignties in crucial areas. If any one of the components of this package was rejected by Germany, the entire set of negotiations would be jeopardized,
70
In addition to informing the Americans about his growing frustration with Adenauer, Schuman worked on the British to try to associate them more closely with the EDC. Eden, who visited Paris on February 1, anticipated this, and had prepared a statement to the effect that Britain would work as closely as practicable with the EDC without joining it. Schuman, disappointed, wanted a formal British guarantee to protect EDC members from one another, in the event of "misbehavior," in Eden's understated phrase, by one of the EDC members. This evident French mistrust of German loyalty seemed to Eden a poor way to establish a new Franco-German military community, but Schuman was working under intense pressure from the cabinet to secure more guarantees against German freedom of movement in the future, particularly Ger-
 
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man efforts to retrieve the lost eastern territories. Without such assurances, it appeared that Schuman could not secure the assent of his government to the EDC.
71
Prospects for the EDC looked bleak indeed as the National Assembly, at the insistence of the Gaullist and Communist opposition, took up the issue in a debate that ran for six days, from February 11 to 17. The debate opened with an address from Robert Schuman, who did his best to place the EDC plan in its most positive light. He claimed that despite some modifications from the original idea made during the negotiations, the principles remained unaltered. The EDC would forestall German entry into NATO; it would have the backing of the broader Western Alliance of which it would be a part; and it would provide a common defense built on Franco-German and European solidarity. Furthermore, any reversal now would lead France's allies to propose solutions very much against French interests, such as a prompt resurrection of a German national army. The legislators, Schuman said, had a clear choice. They could decide "to build with others a common future" or they could push France into weakness and isolation and bring down the edifice of the Atlantic Alliance.
The deputies in the Assembly were not convinced. Among the critics, the Gaullists were harshest, denouncing the plan as an insult to the French soldier, full of military and institutional weaknesses, and provocative to the Russians. The Communists meanwhile claimed that the EDC would give cover to a new German army that would carry out a war of aggression against the Soviet Union. These positions could be expected. But centrists joined in as well. Leading Socialists Jules Moch and Daniel Mayer joined forces with the Radical Party veteran Edouard Daladier in criticizing the plan as militarily ineffective, far too accommodating to German demands, and inimical to any future détente with the Russians on the German question. In the face of this hostility, the best the MRP deputies could do was to point out that the EDC now represented the only way to contain German rearmament. It was either the EDC or the
Wehrmacht
.
72
The policy of the government was narrowly approved by a vote of 326 to 276, and only because the "order of the day" on which the Assembly voted contained the following demands: that the government redouble its efforts to secure British participation; that the pact be clearly understood as a defensive one; and that no German soldiers be recruited until the treaty had been ratified by the French parliament. Further, Premier Edgar Faure had made the issue into a vote of confidence on his government. Clearly, much work lay ahead of the
 
Page 166
French negotiators if they were to secure parliamentary approval of the EDC scheme in final form.
As this debate raged, Schuman shuttled on" to London to join Acheson, Adenauer, and Eden in a hastily arranged conference to try to resolve outstanding issues between the French and Germans. Schuman, at that very moment under fire in the Assembly, laid out his demands. He wanted definite restrictions on German arms production, including atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, gun barrels, and propellants. He demanded that the Germans abandon their campaign to gain entry into NATO, though he supported close relations between the EDC and NATO. He asked that the Germans give up their objections to French policy in the Saar, a point on which French public opinion was adamant. Finally, he requested a declaration from the United States and Britain guaranteeing their support for the EDC in the event of any threat to it, either from within or without: a means of ensuring that France would never be left alone in Europe, faceto-face with a hostile Germany. Aware of the grave state of Schuman's position in the French government, Acheson, Eden, and even Adenauer proved conciliatory, giving the Frenchman what he needed to stave off a rebellion against his policies within the government.
73
In an atmosphere of cautious optimism, the four ministers flew to Lisbon, there to be joined by representatives of all the NATO members for the ninth convocation of the North Atlantic Council. The agenda at Lisbon was enormous, as the ministers hoped to agree on the report of the TCC, or "wise men," for financing the NATO rearmament plans. They also sought to determine the size of the German contribution to this effort and planned to adopt a resolution in favor of the European army, a scheme that NATO as a body had not yet endorsed. All of these questions were settled, though not without some acrimony. The French in particular felt that the size of the defense burden they were obliged to undertake, and in particular their growing expenses in Indochina, required $ 600 million in American aid, which they received. Adenauer, after some hesitation, agreed to the TCC's figure of $ 2.6 billion for a German contribution to the cost of NATO rearmament and the occupation. The Council also approved the TCC force goals, which over the next two years proved totally unrealizable: fifty NATO divisions by the end of 1952, including twelve German divisions within the EDC. Finally, NATO proudly endorsed the EDC concept, knowing that at London the United States and Britain had agreed that they would issue a declaration upon the signing of the EDC treaty stating their support for

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