Farewell (47 page)

3
Peter Marwitz, e-mail message to Sergei Kostin, December 1, 1997.

4
Peter Wright,
Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer
(New York: Viking, 1987).

5
Peter Marwitz, e-mail message to Sergei Kostin, December 1, 1997.

6
The traveling distance authorized without advanced notice was forty kilometers (twenty-five miles), Mirabel airport being an exception (twenty-eight miles). (Peter Marwitz, e-mail message to Sergei Kostin, December 1, 1997.)

7
Ibid.

8
Ibid.

Chapter 8. A Puzzling Affair

1
Once again, the DST version of the reasons behind the Vetrovs’ departure seems to have been widely distorted or romanticized, probably intentionally. To start, Marcel Chalet claims that Vetrov had been posted to Ottawa, whereas he was staying in Montreal. Writing about Vetrov’s transfer back to Moscow, Chalet mentions “booze that helps him forget, and love affairs that break the monotony of his life” (
Les Visiteurs de l’ombre
, 162). Svetlana recognizes that in Canada Vladimir started drinking again, but she denies that he had affairs. Since she herself mentioned her husband’s escapades at other times in his life, we have no reason to doubt her. Lastly, Chalet alludes to a “vaguely suspicious business regarding a loan he would not have paid back entirely” (ibid.). On this point, it is worth noting that Soviet citizens living abroad were strictly prohibited from getting bank loans; “helping out funds,” a common practice of Soviet collectives, were also banned. One could hit up a friend for money, remaining quiet about it.

2
Peter Marwitz even faxed us a copy of an article published in the Canadian newspaper
Allô police
, dated February 23, 1975.

3
Different from Vetrov’s personal file, archived in the personnel department and classified “top secret”; also different from the crime investigation file which will be referred to later, the work file contained all the documents pertaining to an officer’s internal activities, annual activity reports, special operation reports, and so forth.

4
Peter Marwitz, e-mail message to Sergei Kostin, December 1, 1997.

5
Having worked as an interpreter in Algiers, Sergei Kostin is very familiar with Soviet security officers’ reactions and methods in case of repatriation within twenty-four hours, the
vingtquatreheurisation
as it was jokingly referred to in French. Many times he had to urgently complete departure formalities with the Algerian authorities, and he knew the security procedure to avoid incidents at the airport. Among the people forced to leave in a rush, there were persons likely to be taken in for questioning or arrested by the police. This was the case, for instance, of a female interpreter who had been approached by Algerian counterintelligence and had accepted collaboration in order to be released, and then she ran to the Soviet embassy to report the incident. Others had been part of trafficking deals, some rather innocuous, but nevertheless strictly forbidden to Soviet citizens.
Whatever the specific case, the same “out of sight, out of mind” principle applied to all. The person involved, and the entire family if need be, was accompanied to the airport by twenty men or so, and went up the airplane steps surrounded by this small crowd who dispersed only after the plane was airborne. It was never a question of diversion maneuvers toward the local authorities. The endangered individual, or the black sheep, along with his or her family, had to be boarded on a Soviet plane at all cost; after that, the security service washed its hands of it. This was in a country described as having a socialist bias, and with which official relations were overall cordial. In Canada, a NATO member and a close ally of the “main enemy,” orders to Soviet security officers must have been much more draconian.

6
To be thorough, here are two more plausible hypotheses. There is a possibility that Vetrov’s premature return to Moscow resulted from his conflict with Bolovinov, his direct superior. The latter may have reported the situation to the Center. Vladimir would have then been recalled by the KGB to answer their questions and clarify the situation. If so, Svetlana’s staying on in Canada was logical. Had the PGU been satisfied with Vetrov’s explanations and sided in his favor, he could have returned to his job, and his boss would have likely left Montreal. If after a month, however, Vetrov was not able to dissipate the doubts hanging over him, his recall would become permanent. Consequently, Svetlana also had to return to Moscow.
There is another plausible explanation. Perhaps the Center indirectly found out that Vetrov was approached by the RCMP. They were then tempted to launch a deception operation against Canadian counterintelligence. As a prerequisite, though, they needed to absolutely trust the officer playing the role of a double agent. In order to probe Vetrov, the PGU recalled him to Moscow without telling him anything. In Moscow, after a series of interviews, the KGB concluded he could not be trusted for the mission. The game plan was therefore abandoned, automatically putting an end to Svetlana’s forced waiting in Montreal.

7
Peter Marwitz, e-mail message to Sergei Kostin, December 1, 1997.

Chapter 9. Urban Worries and Pastoral Bliss

1
Oleg Kalugin gives a fascinating description of the place in chapter 7 of his book
Spymaster
(New York: Basic Books, 2009). This book was originally published in 1994 in the United States by St. Martin’s Press as
The First Directorate
.

2
A photocopy of the article is said to be archived in Vetrov’s file. Unfortunately, Vitaly Karavashkin could remember neither the name of the newspaper nor the year of its publication. Somehow, risky research in Moscow libraries did not yield results. Moreover, after reading
Bonjour Farewell
, Peter Marwitz also did some research at the Canadian National Library. Having found no trace of this article, he believes the whole story is a fabrication. He may be right. He is certainly right if Vetrov had, indeed, accepted collaboration with the RCMP.

3
Khinshtein, “The Lubyanka Werewolf.”

4
Upravlenie po obsluzhivaniu diplomaticheskogo korpusa
, Directorate for Service to the Diplomatic Corps, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was a government organization in charge of the construction and maintenance of diplomatic buildings, responsible for hiring Soviet personnel, providing common services, and organizing entertainment of foreigners residing in Moscow. Thus, the MID could not be bypassed by foreign missions either to establish relations with official organizations or to solve logistics issues.

5
Religious homes in Russia traditionally have icons hanging on the wall in the
krasny ugol
, the “beautiful corner.”

6
For privacy reasons, we modified his name.

Chapter 10. Crisis

1
See the shrewd analysis, apparently founded on Vetrov’s testimony, made by Marcel Chalet in his book. Talking about the prevailing climate at the PGU in the seventies, the head of DST mentions “the mutual suspicion between services, the fierce competition between executives, favoritism that brings to important posts individuals known to all for their mediocrity, the stifling red tape of a pettifogging bureaucracy, the absence of inspiration in the accomplishment of daily tasks, the weight of habits precluding any criticism, any innovation” (
Les Visiteurs de l’ombre
, 163).

2
Igor Prelin, interview by Sergei Kostin, March 30, 2007.

3
For privacy reasons, we modified her name.

Chapter 11. The Leap of Death

1
Igor Prelin, interview by Sergei Kostin, March 30, 2007.

2
Chalet,
Les Visiteurs de l’ombre
, 165.

3
Ibid., 166.

4
This great Western mole within the GRU surreptitiously handed off an envelope with his collaboration offer inside to two American students on the street. Since he never received any answer, Oleg Penkovsky made several additional attempts, as suicidal as the first one, with British and Canadian business executives. He had thus tried to contact three Western intelligence services, until one day the CIA eventually contacted him, eight months after he had handed off the letter to the students. For more, see in particular Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin,
The Spy Who Saved the World
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992).

5
Patrick Ferrant, interview by Eric Raynaud, January 24, 2003.

6
Raymond Nart, interview by Eric Raynaud, February 3, 2003.

7
Vladimir Kryuchkov (former PGU head, 1974–1988, and former KGB chairman, 1988–1991), interview by Sergei Kostin, March 29, 2007. This was one of Vladimir Kryuchkov’s last interviews, since he died on November 23, 2007. See also his brief account of the affair, told from memory, in his book
Lichnoe delo
[meaning both “Personal File” and “A Personal Matter”], tome 1, (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), 113–116, a biased oversimplification. For a more in-depth analysis of Vetrov’s motivations, refer to chapter 34: The Farewell Affair Under the Magnifying Glass of the KGB and DST.

8
In contradiction to what Chalet describes as “the excellent approaches” (
Les Visiteurs de l’ombre
, 102).

9
Igor Prelin, interview by Sergei Kostin, March 30, 2007.

10
Chalet,
Les Visiteurs de l’ombre
, 167.

11
Ibid., 169.

12
Raymond Nart, interview by Eric Raynaud, February 3, 2003.

Chapter 12. The Adventurous Knight

Source: Claude and Xavier Ameil’s memories.

1
Ameil, during this adventure, knew Vetrov only by his diminutive, “Volodia.” He learned about his family name much later, when the Farewell case started to be talked about in the press.

2
Igor Prelin, interview by Sergei Kostin, March 30, 2007.

3
There is another source of information regarding the Ameil episode in the Farewell operation. It is Vetrov’s investigation file in which his depositions to the KGB were given between September 1983 and April 1984. For the most part, both protagonists’ versions are consistent. Ameil’s memories, however, are more complete and more credible.
Vetrov’s accounts of the events as he presented them during questioning sessions have a major fault. As is natural, the defendant tried to minimize the importance of the damage he had done. To him, revealing the existence of each new person involved meant confessing a new criminal episode. Vetrov, therefore, talked about Ameil’s real role only on October 26, 1983, a month after having confessed his activities as a mole. Until then, he had pretended they had met by chance in front of the Beriozka store, and that he never gave him any documents. Explaining to the examining magistrate why he skipped that episode, Vetrov claimed it was to spare Ameil. There must have been some truth to it. Vetrov, at the time of the questioning, could not have known that the Frenchman had left the Soviet Union almost a year earlier.
The major discrepancy between the two versions is in the duration of Ameil’s involvement as Vetrov’s handler. According to Vetrov, the Thomson-CSF representative had been in contact with him only the two last weeks in April 1981. He pretended they had met four times in all. Ameil claims that they met for the first time in early March, and had at least six or seven rendezvous. He believes he stopped meeting with Vetrov in mid-May, which has been confirmed by Marcel Chalet, Raymond Nart, and Patrick and Madeleine Ferrant (interviews conducted by Eric Raynaud, 2003–2009).
This episode is also documented by a third source of information. Xavier Ameil’s KGB file contained the entry visas to the Soviet Union. These visas were on loose pieces of paper. During the period of interest, Ameil came back to Moscow after trips abroad on March 4 and April 10. The next entry visa is dated June 10. Yet Ameil remembers very well that the meeting he had with the DST in Paris regarding Ferrant’s takeover took place the day after Mitterrand’s election, therefore, on a Monday, May 11; he returned to Moscow in the following days (interview conducted by Eric Raynaud and Sergei Kostin on February 20, 2009). We tend to believe Ameil rather than his KGB file, which may very well be missing a loose-leaf visa.
Furthermore, during the operation, Ameil claims he had only two meetings with the DST men, one at the beginning and the other at the end of his adventure (without ever being briefed on the basics of clandestine contacts). Consequently, after careful study and comparison of all the information available to us, we believe that all of the Ameil-Vetrov rendezvous took place between early March and mid-May of 1981.