Empires and Barbarians (110 page)

29
I suspect, but am unable to prove, that this would have been particularly true of indigenous groups who merely paid some tribute to the Goths and were otherwise left substantially alone. For a similar range of relationships between the Huns and their different subjects, see
Chapter 5
.

30
For full references, see
PLRE
2, 934.

31
For Vandals in Raetia, see Claudian,
Gothic War
278–81, 363–5, 400–4, 414–29. On the identity of the Sueves, see most recently Goffart (2006), 82–3, who adopts the most plausible Marcomanni/Quadi approach. The Rhine crossing is generally dated 31 December 406 on the basis of Prosper,
Chronicle
AP 379; for the argument that the chronicler might have meant 31 December 405, see Kulikowski (2000a), 328–9. Following the counterargument of Birley (2005), 455–60, however, Kulikowski (2007), 217 n. 37 appears less sure.

32
For Uldin, see Sozomen,
Historia Ecclesiastica
9.25.1–7;
Codex Theodosianus
5.6.3. On Burgundians, see Demougeot (1979), 432; 491–3.

33
On Olympiodorus, see, above all, Matthews (1970), with the further thoughts of Blockley (1981), (1983).

34
For Vandal losses, see Gregory of Tours 2.29. The 1:5 ratio was customarily
employed, e.g. by Schmidt (1933), 286, 293. For Vandal/Alanic numbers, see Procopius,
Wars
3.5.18–19; Victor of Vita,
History of the Persecution
1.2. For Burgundian numbers, see Orosius 7.32.11. On Radagaisus’ following, see note 30 above.

35
Jerome,
Chronicle
2389 (= 371
AD
).

36
On the ‘
distributio
’ and its significance, see Jones (1964), Appendix III. Jones’s argument is unaffected by Kulikowski (2000b) since it works from the comparison of two well-dated sections of the
Notitia
: the eastern field army of c.395, and its western counterpart of c.420. For the thirty ‘
numeri
’, see Zosimus 5.26.4. For the 12,000 followers of Radagaisus, see Olympiodorus fr. 9.

37
Victor of Vita,
History of the Persecution
1.2. I therefore take a more optimistic view of Victor than does Goffart (1980), Appendix A.

38
Halsall (2007), 206, for example, has Radagaisus leading ‘a large force’, characterizing the Rhine crossers as a ‘huge force’ (p. 211). It is really only Drinkwater (2007), especially 323–4, who thinks that warbands will adequately explain the action.

39
Zosimus 5.26.3 has Radagaisus engaged in widespread recruitment prior to attacking Italy (although I remain slightly worried that he is here confusing Radagaisus and the Rhine crossing).
Codex Theodosianus
5.6.3 makes clear that Uldin’s following was a mixture of Huns and Sciri, and therefore a new, post-376 alliance.

40
On Radagaisus’ followers: Zosimus 5.35.5–6. On Alans in Gaul: Paulinus of Pella,
Eucharisticon
377–9. On Vandals and Alans in North Africa: Victor of Vita,
History of the Persecution
1.2. For Burgundians, see notes 34 and 35 above, together, of course, with the fact that this group were able to preserve their east German dialect throughout these moves: see
Chapter 3
above. No one doubts Ammianus’ report that the Goths of 376 also came with women and children in tow (31.3–4), so the basic principle that Germanic and Alanic armed forces might have moved with their dependants seems well enough established. Against this, the assertions of Drinkwater (1998), especially 273, that it is commonsense that only warriors took part in the action are underwhelming. Cf. Drinkwater (2007), 323–4.

41
Both points – i.e. the Middle Danubian origins of the crisis, and the subsequent appearance there of the Huns – were first argued by Heather (1995a), and are now been generally accepted: see for example Goffart (2006),
chapter 5
; Halsall (2007), 206ff. The crucial passage of Claudian which has been misunderstood to refer to Huns on the Danube is
Against Rufinus
ii.26ff. (especially 36ff.)

42
Heather (1995a).

43
Goffart (2006),
chapter 5
, especially 75–8 (Huns appear in Middle Danube shortly after the crisis); 78–80 (Radagaisus); 94–5 (summarizing the knock-on effect among the expectations of other groups of the fact that the Goths had survived their arrival on Roman soil with their coherence more or less intact).

44
Halsall (2007), 195–212; cf. Halsall (2005), particularly on the disruptive effects of ending subsidies.

45
On Tribigild, see Heather (1988); Synesius,
De Regno
19–21.

46
The first practical help from the east consisted of 4,000 soldiers who arrived in Ravenna in 409/10: Zosimus 6.8.

47
For slaves, see Orosius 7.37.13ff.

48
Either Constantine III or Flavius Constantius has usually been considered responsible for the transfer: see Chastagnol (1973); cf. Kulikowski (2000a). Halsall (2007), 209 raises doubts, but offers no specific evidence in their support.

49
On Constantine III, see Zosimus 6.1, which specifically identifies British, Gallic and Spanish military forces as sufficiently united behind him to drive the Vandals, Alans and Suevi into Spain, and to take the usurper to the brink of Empire: see Matthews (1975), 312ff. On the general role of subsidies in Roman diplomacy, see Heather (2001).

50
The relevant sources are, above all, Ammianus 17.12–13;
Anonymous Valesianus
6.31–2. For a recent discussion of the Vandals in the fourth century, see Goffart (2006), 82–7, who convincingly concludes that the evidence places them in Silesia and on the Upper Tisza.

51
For Vandals in Raetia, see note 31 above. For their fourth-century placement, see previous note.

52
For fourth-century Goths, see for example Heather (1991),
chapter 3
. For Alans, see Goffart (2006), 89–90, with Ammianus 31.3.1, who records that the western-most group of Alans in c.375 were called ‘The Don People’ (Tanaites).

53
For the Alans in 377, see Ammianus 31.8.4ff., with Heather (1991), 144–5 and Appendix B; and in 378, see Ammianus 31.11.16. For their drafting into the Roman army, see Zosimus 4.35.2.

54
The identity of Uldin’s followers emerges from Sozomen,
Historia Ecclesiastica
9.25.1–7 and
Codex Theodosianus
5.6.3.

55
Ammianus 17.12–13 (Constantius’ arrangements in 358); 19.11.1–3 (the return of the Limigantes in 359).

56
On the differences between the cyclical movements inherent in a nomad economy and ‘real’ migration, see pp. 208–12).

57
Ammianus 31.4.13; I take it these are the Sarmatians defeated by Theodosius prior to his elevation: Theodoret,
Historia Ecclesiastica
5.5;
Panegyrici Latini
12(2).12.9–10.

58
The nomadic character of the Alans’ economy makes one expect a priori that they had a different social structure from agricultural Germani such as the Vandals or Goths, and this is strongly implied, if in a rather general way, by Ammianus 31.2.25.

59
On the Sciri, see
Codex Theodosianus
5.6.3. The contrasting fates of the ‘better’ among Radagaisus’ following who were drafted into the Roman army, versus the many others sold into slavery, might suggest that the latter had had little choice over whether to participate in the action.

60
On Uldin’s force, see Sozomen,
Historia Ecclesiastica
9.25.1–7; and
Codex Theodosianus
5.6.3. Radagaisus: Olympiodorus fr. 9 for the ‘best’, as against Orosius 7.37.13ff., who records the miserable fate of the mass of the rank and file sold into slavery. ‘Best’ translates Olympiodorus’
optimates
, which has sometimes been translated as ‘nobles’, but to reckon so many nobles is absurd, so the word can only make sense as a reference to the higher-grade caste of warriors: see
Chapter 2
above. The elites of both the Rhine crossers and the Burgundians, neither of whom of course were faced with as powerful and immediate a
Roman counterattack as Radagaisus or Uldin, showed no obviously similar propensity to abandon the migrant mass.

61
The only group for whom any case can be made for an invitation is the Tervingi, by Valens, in 376, but in my view even here Valens had no real choice: see p. 169 above.

62
Cf. Heather (1991),
chapter 5
, and Appendix B. I don’t believe that the Emperor Gratian made a separate peace agreement with the Greuthungi in the summer of 380. That this adjustment in traditional Roman policy affected only these particular Goths is well understood: see Stallknecht (1969). Kulikowski (2002) and Halsall (2007), 180ff. have recently tried to argue that nothing out of the ordinary was granted in 382, but the case does not stand up to scrutiny: see Heather (forthcoming).

63
It may well be, then, that local Roman landowners cut a deal with the invaders to prevent less organized and hence inherently more damaging assaults upon their property. Cf. Hydatius,
Chronicle
41[49]: the settlement saw particular groups of invaders settle in particular provinces, so it is possible that the Spanish provincial councils were responsible for the Roman provincial side of the negotiations.

64
See for example Kulikowski (2002); Halsall (2007),
chapters 7
–
8
.

65
Claudian,
De Bell. Get
. 166ff., 610ff. (dating to 402); Synesius,
De Regno
19–21 (dating to 399), with Heather (1988). Neither Kulikowski (2002) nor Halsall (2007), 189–94 offers any explanation of the fundamental distortion they suppose these authors to be incorporating.

66
Zosimus 5.5.4. Privileging the short, non-contemporary and confused Zosimus over the more contemporary sources is the basic approach adopted (even if leading to slightly different interpretations of Alaric’s career) in Liebeschuetz (1992); Kulikowski (2002); Halsall (2007), 191–4. Amongst other problems, Zosimus conflates Stilicho’s two campaigns against Alaric (in 395 and 397) and wipes out ten years of the history of Alaric’s Goths in making the join between his two main sources here: Eunapius and Olympiodorus (at Zosimus 5.26.1: see Heather (1991), 210). To say that Zosimus had no real grasp of Alaric’s career, therefore, is an understatement.

67
The activities of Gainas are well covered, if certainly with hostility, in Synesius,
De Providentia
; cf. Cameron and Long (1993).

68
To my mind, this is why Liebeschuetz (1992) cannot be correct in viewing Alaric as leading no more than a regiment or two of Gothic auxiliaries in 395. Halsall (2007), 192–3 tries to wriggle round this problem by continuing to deny the overlap with the Goths of 382 while accepting that Alaric’s armed following must have been large, mostly Gothic and from the Balkans. Having accepted these points, he is in fact most of the way to the conclusion that Alaric led the 382 Goths in revolt. He resists this conclusion because he doesn’t believe there was a peace deal in 382 which licensed Gothic autonomy, but see the next note.

69
Themistius,
Orations
16.211. Continuing Gothic autonomy up to and beyond c.390 is signalled, beyond Themistius, in sources both sympathetic to Theodosius and his treaty such as Pacatus,
Panegryici Latini
12.(2).22.3–5 (where the Goths are one of a series of foreign peoples serving Theodosius), and hostile to them:
Synesius,
De Regno
19–21, with the commentary of Heather (1988). Halsall (2007), 180–4 oddly argues that there is no evidence that any continued Gothic autonomy was licensed in 382; he appears not to have read the closing words of Themistius’ speech closely enough. Cf. Kulikowski (2002).

70
For Roman policies towards leaders, see Heather (2001). Neither the original leaderships (Athanaric, the dynasty of Ermenaric) nor their immediate successors (Fritigern, Alatheus and Saphrax) survived the struggles of 376–82: for more detail, see Heather (1991), 188–92.

71
Fritigern: Ammianus 31.12.8–9, with Heather (1991), 175–6, 179–80. The best example of the post-382 jockeying is provided by the quarrel between Fravitta and Eriulph. Both led factions and both held different views over the proper ordering of Gotho-Roman relations: see Eunapius fr. 59, dated by the summary of it at Zosimus 4.56. For further discussion, see Heather (1991), 190–1. That Theodosius should have held such a banquet undermines the contention of Halsall (2007), 188–9 that Alaric couldn’t have been the leader of the Goths of 382 in revolt, because there is no evidence that their sociopolitical hierarchies had continued in place after that date (Halsall does not discuss the incident). For Sarus and Sergeric in more detail, see Heather (1991), 197–8. Neither Kulikowski (2002) nor Halsall (2007) bothers to discuss its potential significance. In my view, extracting Roman recognition of his leadership was also precisely the significance of the generalship that Alaric periodically demanded of compliant Roman regimes – probably along with the financial package for his followers that came with it. But note that the generalship was an optional extra that he was willing to drop to make a deal: see Heather (1991),
chapter 6
.

72
Kulikowski (2002) – largely followed by Halsall (2007), 187–9 – denies large-scale Gothic military service in the years between the 382 treaty and Alaric’s revolt in 395, but this involves too much special pleading to be convincing.
Panegryrici Latini
12.(2)32.3–5 strongly implies that the main Gothic contingent was recruited only for the campaign against Maximus (especially Pacatus’ explicit comment that it would have been dangerous to leave the Goths behind), while Eunapius fr. 55 and Zosimus 4.45.3 note Maximus’ attempts to undermine the recruited Goths’ loyalties, which again implies that this was something unusual. A range of sources note the participation of large numbers of Goths in the campaign against Eugenius (Zosimus 4.58; John of Antioch fr. 187; Orosius 7.37.19), and Theodosius’ banquet for the Gothic leaders (see note 71 above) was held precisely when Theodosius was mulling over his answer to Eugenius’ envoys (Zosimus 4.56). In my view, the banquet was probably a first move towards securing Gothic participation.