Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (14 page)

Even after Kazunomiya had given her consent, some nobles still opposed the marriage. A rumor circulated at the court that the emperor’s intimate Koga Takemichi (1815–1903) had accepted bribes from the shogunate to expedite the marriage and that the courtiers Chigusa Aribumi and Iwakura Tomomi were his underlings. K
ō
mei got wind of this rumor and directed the chancellor to squelch it, for once he had agreed to the marriage, he was in no mood to tolerate any opposition.
²⁹

Finally Prince Taruhito was persuaded to abandon his suit for Kazunomiya’s hand. A rumor was deliberately circulated that he had been unenthusiastic about the marriage because Kazunomiya had been born in
hinoeuma
(the year of the fiery horse), an ill-omened year for women. Then it was discovered that the young shogun had been born in the same year, whereupon it was decided that a marriage between two people born in an otherwise unlucky year was extremely lucky.
³⁰

At this period the education of Mutsuhito and the matter of Kazunomiya’s marriage seem to have fully absorbed the court’s attention. but we should not forget that 1860 was also the year of the first Japanese mission sent to America. Even as the shogunate was promising to expel the foreigners in return for the hand of Kazunomiya, it was taking the irrevocable step of sending officials abroad for the first time since the country was closed more than 200 years earlier.

Chapter 7

The year 1861 was one of the two “revolutionary” years in the cycle of sixty when the
neng
ō
was invariably changed. But even if it had not been a “revolutionary” year, the stormy events of 1860 provided ample reason to change the
neng
ō
, and the new year had begun inauspiciously. A fox was observed in the palace garden, and Emperor K
ō
mei commanded Nakayama Tadayasu to have it exorcised; but prayers and offerings had no effect. Night after night the fox yelped directly under the prince’s quarters, until finally (at the empress’s suggestion) he moved to her pavilion.
¹

The country was in the grip of severe inflation. Word of the hardships that high prices had inflicted on the common people reached the ears of the emperor, who gave the
shoshidai
fifty pieces of gold, instructing him to use the money to alleviate suffering in the province of Yamashiro, the area around the capital. The
shoshidai
refused the money, obeying the order of the shogunate, which had other plans for providing assistance.
²
The shogunate seems to have been reluctant to allow the emperor to become actively involved in relieving the distress of his subjects.

Japan’s relations with foreign countries were also strained. On March 13, 1861, the Russian corvette
Posadnik
under Captain Birilev cast anchor at the Tsushima Islands between Japan and Korea. Under pretext of making necessary repairs to the ship, Russian officers and men went ashore and soon erected barracks and other buildings, seemingly as a permanent encampment. The inhabitants of the islands and the Russians clashed, resulting in the deaths of several Japanese. The shogunate sent the magistrate for foreign affairs to Tsushima to demand that the Russians leave, but they refused.
³

Russia was not the only European power to realize the strategic importance of Tsushima. The British had asked the shogunate to open a port there, and a warship had made soundings in nearby waters. This action gave the Russians the excuse to “protect” Tsushima from the British. They warned the shogunate of the threat of British occupation of the islands and, urging the need for adequate defenses, offered to build gun batteries and lend cannons to the Japanese.
⁴
The shogunate rejected this proposal; but when the Russians had more or less occupied the islands, it had no choice but to turn for help in evicting them to Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister, following the principle of “using barbarians to fight barbarians.” Two British warships under Sir James Hope, commander of the East Indian Fleet, were sent to Tsushima. After receiving a severely phrased warning from Hope, the Russians withdrew from the islands.
⁵

News of these developments, which in the past would probably have been kept from the emperor, soon reached K
ō
mei, causing him extreme distress; but it was not until the following year (1862) that he commanded the daimyo of Tsushima to strengthen Japan’s sea defenses.
⁶
The emperor’s personal intervention in a matter that in the past would not have been brought to his attention suggests how greatly his authority had increased.

The change in the
neng
ō
from Mannen to Bunky
ū
took place on March 29, the day recommended by the yin-yang diviners. The change seemed at first beneficial. For a time, members of the court were again able to enjoy such traditional diversions as garden parties, performances of n
ō
, and other entertainments. There were also sad occasions: the death of K
ō
mei’s infant daughter Sumanomiya was another instance of an imperial child whose life was cut short.

The period of respite at the court was brief: antiforeign sentiments were rising to a frenzied intensity even as the shogunate was seeking to promote better relations with European countries.
⁷
On June 5 fourteen
r
ō
nin
from Mito attacked the British legation in Edo. The minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, escaped injury, but members of his staff were wounded. Although the Mito domain remained in the forefront of the
j
ō
i
movement, other domains were readier to reach an accommodation with the foreigners. M
ō
ri Takachika, the daimyo of Hagi, sent Nagai Uta (1819–1863) to Ky
ō
to and directed him to transmit his views on the necessity of opening the country and, in this way, achieving
k
ō
bu gattai
. Nagai met with
Ō
gimachisanj
ō
Sanenaru (1820–1909) and expressed his master’s strong conviction that a revision of the national policy was imperative.

Although Nagai delivered his long, rambling statement to
Ō
gimachisanj
ō
, it was clearly intended for Emperor K
ō
mei. It opened with the (by now familiar) description of the sorry state of the Japanese military caused by the centuries of peace. Surely, it continued, the emperor must be enraged when he sees that the shogunate is not only powerless to resist the intrusion of the barbarians but ready to sign treaties of friendship and commerce without even consulting him. No doubt he is also disturbed when he realizes that he can no longer depend on the military to protect him. The shogunate has no firm policy with respect to the barbarians but contents itself with temporizing expedients. The emperor has not been kept fully informed of developments, but hotheads have gathered around the throne to call for the abrogation of the treaties with the foreign powers. If the treaties are broken, the foreign powers will surely not accept this peaceably but will initiate military action against Japan. Nagai added that he would not oppose fighting the foreigners if there were any chance of success, but he believed that it would be folly to risk national survival in a war that the Japanese could not hope to win.

For 300 years, he continued, the court in Ky
ō
to has entrusted both internal political decisions and foreign policy to the shogunate. For this reason, the foreigners suppose that the shogunate is the government of Japan and, now that they have concluded treaties with the shogunate, imagine that Japan is their ally. If the treaties are abrogated, their wrath will lead immediately to war. The entire country will soon be in peril. For example, it would not take more than four or five foreign warships to blockade Ky
ū
sh
ū
, and the rest of the country would suffer the consequences. It is uncertain whether Ky
ō
to can be defended, and if the capital were defiled by the hooves of foreigners’ horses, the humiliation would affect all the other provinces, even those not directly under attack.

Nagai believed that this unhappy situation had arisen because of the policy of
sakoku
(closure of the country) adopted by the shogunate after the Shimabara rebellion. Earlier in Japanese history, not only foreigners had visited Japan freely but facilities had even been erected to accommodate them. Indeed, isolation from other countries was by no means true to ancient Japanese traditions. Had not the goddess of the Ise Shrine promised that imperial influence would extend everywhere the sun shone? The empress Jing
ū
’s conquest of the Three Han Kingdoms of Korea was in accord with the intentions of her divine ancestor, and if she had known about countries farther away than the Three Han Kingdoms, she probably would have continued her conquests. But now the government, far from extending Japanese territory abroad, passively allows barbarians to enter the country. Even supposing that
sakoku
were desirable, it could be successfully maintained only if the country possessed striking power; isolation that depended entirely on Japan’s island situation was bound to fail. At present the most urgent need is the power both to defend and to attack.

Nagai begged the emperor to change his views on
sakoku
and, returning to the policy of his ancestors, extend imperial authority abroad. He should establish a policy of insisting that all five continents offer tribute to the imperial land, in this way transforming a national calamity into a national blessing. There would be peace within the country, thanks to the union of the court and the military, and once Japan possessed an abundance of warships, imperial rule could be imposed throughout the world.
⁸

M
ō
ri Takachika (through his emissary Nagai Uta) was attempting to persuade Emperor K
ō
mei
ō
to abandon his support for
sakoku
, not by preaching the brotherhood of man, but by reminding him of the Sun Goddess’s promise of Japanese domination of the world once the court and the military had united. Several steps remained to be explained between the present, when the debilitated Japanese military are no match for the foreigners, and the future, when countries all over the world will pay tribute to Japan; but it was hoped that profits from trade with foreigners would enable the Japanese to strengthen their armaments.

As Takachika had expected,
Ō
gimachisanj
ō
passed on the contents of Nagai’s memorial to the emperor who was pleased to receive it. K
ō
mei did not approve of dismantling
sakoku
, but he favored strengthening Japanese military capacity, and he never wavered in his support of
k
ō
bu gattai
. He commanded Takachika to use his influence to promote understanding between the Court Council and the shogunate and bestowed on him this poem:

As the result of Nagai’s exertions, the shogunate ultimately agreed to ask Takachika to serve as its intermediary in negotiations aimed at achieving
k
ō
bu gattai
. Unfortunately for Nagai, however, the wording of the document he submitted to
Ō
gimachisanj
ō
was deemed to include disrespectful language, leading to a controversy that ended with Nagai’s dismissal.
⁹

During most of that year, 1861, the main matter occupying the court’s attention was Kazunomiya’s journey to Edo as the bride of the shogun. The date of her departure, the end of October 1861, was initially set in 1860. The shogunate hastily repaired the roads along which she would travel; but the emperor sought a delay on the grounds that the princess should be in the capital in the spring of the following year for the services on the seventeenth anniversary of the death of her father, Emperor Nink
ō
. This request was submitted to the
shoshidai
, Sakai Tadaaki, but he was opposed, citing the preparations that had already been completed. Nonetheless, the shogunate yielded to the extent of allowing Kazunomiya to leave as late as the middle of the November.