Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (125 page)

While spending his winter “vacation” in Shanghai in 1988 and 1989, Deng had talked with Jiang Zemin and his replacement as Shanghai party secretary, Zhu Rongji. Deng had known Zhu in Beijing earlier, when Zhu had been deputy head of the State Economic Commission, and Deng recognized that he was a rare talent who combined bold political leadership skills, a strategic understanding of how to improve the economy, and an unusual confidence in pursuing reforms. In January–February 1990 Deng met with Zhu and other Shanghai party, government, and military leaders to discuss how to spark local growth.
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In February 1990, immediately after returning to Beijing, Deng told Premier Li Peng: “I have already retired, but there is one thing I must tell you about, that is the development of Shanghai's Pudong. You must give it more attention.”
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Two weeks later, on March 3, 1990, Deng called in Jiang Zemin,
Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng to lecture them on the international situation and the domestic economy: “Why do the people support us? Because over the last ten years our economy has been developing. . . . If the economy stagnated for five years or developed at only a slow rate—for example, at 4 or 5 percent, or even 2 or 3 percent a year—what effects would be produced? This would be not only an economic problem but also a political one.” Deng continued: “We must analyze problems from an overall, strategic point of view and work out concrete measures. . . . We should do some research to determine which localities have the most favorable conditions and promise the best economic returns. . . . It is of prime importance to develop Shanghai. That city is a trump card.”
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Alas, in 1990, Beijing leaders were not moved by teacher Deng's lecturing nor by the desires of Shanghai leaders to accelerate growth. They were then guided more by the master cautious planner Chen Yun who had grown up in Qingpu on the outskirts of Shanghai and had frequently returned to observe the situation there; he enjoyed special authority within the party on Shanghai-related issues. Chen Yun had opposed the establishment of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Shanghai, not only because of the risks to the nation's established heavy industry and tax bases, but also because as someone who had worked there in the 1920s and 1930s, he was acutely aware of the worst evils of capitalism and the “comprador mentality” of Shanghai businesspeople, who were all too willing, in Chen's view, to subordinate themselves to foreigners. Chen Yun thus feared a return of the foreign settlements. Deng, however, had no patience for Chen's hesitation. Although he did not attack Chen Yun by name, in February 1990 when he stated that Shanghai lagged behind Guangdong, insiders knew he was expressing frustration at Chen Yun's resistance to opening Shanghai.
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On December 24, 1990, on the eve of the Seventh Plenum (December 25–30), which was to review the drafts of the next five-year plan and the ten-year vision, Deng again called in Jiang Zemin, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng to give them some lessons about accelerating growth. Stressing the vital importance of doubling the economy by 2000, he told his successors not to be afraid of taking risks.
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Deng repeated that if China did not grow fast enough, its stagnant economy would become a political problem—and the austerity program, aggravated by foreign sanctions, was slowing economic growth. Deng passionately argued that China had to overcome the conservative policies to avoid the fate of the USSR and Eastern Europe.
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But Deng's lessons had little effect. Despite his entreaties, the Seventh Plenum was still dominated
by strict conservatives who were more afraid of an overheated economy than of slower growth.

On January 28, 1991, Deng took his special train to Shanghai where he remained until February 20, taking his winter rest while again trying to light the fire of economic growth. After being briefed by Zhu Rongji, he visited aeronautic and automobile factories and the construction site for the Nanpu Bridge, which would soon become the third longest suspension bridge in the world.
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Deng reiterated what he had said in 1990: that he had made a mistake in not opening up Shanghai in 1979, when he had opened the four SEZs, and that he should have taken advantage of the great intellectual resources of Shanghai. He emphasized the importance of developing Pudong not only for the city itself but for the entire Yangtze River basin. Finance, Deng explained—carefully avoiding using the charged word “capital”—is at the core of a modern economy; if China is to acquire an international status in finance, the entire nation would have to rely on Shanghai.
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In 1991 Deng's spark again failed to light a prairie fire. His picture was shown on national television as he, Yang Shangkun, and Li Xiannian greeted Shanghai leaders on New Year's Eve, but there was still no mention of Deng's efforts to speed up Shanghai's development.
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Deng's views did not even appear in the
People's Daily.
In 1991 Deng did, however, have two smaller successes. Deng garnered enough support to bring Zhu Rongji to Beijing to serve as vice premier. He also succeeded in getting several articles published in a Shanghai newspaper, albeit under a pseudonym. During March and April 1991 Shanghai officials allowed the Shanghai newspaper
Liberation Daily
to compile Deng's earlier comments in Shanghai into a four-part series. The articles did not reveal Deng's connection and simply appeared under the name “Huangfu Ping” (or “Shanghai Commentary,” “Huang” after the Huangpu River that flows through the city and “fu ping” which also can imply “fuzhu Deng Xiaoping,” or “to assist Deng Xiaoping”).
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The first Huangfu Ping article was published on March 3. The commentary criticized “some comrades” who said that markets were capitalist. The article stated that planning and markets are simply two different means of deploying available resources; neither one is the hallmark of either socialism or capitalism. Political insiders speculated who was behind the Huangfu Ping articles, but initially only a handful of people realized that it was Deng.

The Central Propaganda Department mobilized the
People's Daily
and
Guangming Daily
to refute the Huangfu Ping articles. At the opening ceremony of Shanghai's impressive Nanpu Bridge in November 1991, Premier Li
Peng, speaking on behalf of the conservative leadership in Beijing, publicly criticized the Huangfu Ping articles, saying that they provided the misleading impression that the political mood in Beijing had changed.
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In 1991, party officials began preparing for the 14th Party Congress, to be held in late 1992. Deng made it clear that if Jiang Zemin promoted faster growth and greater opening, he would support him; if not, he would back other party leaders. Yet the other leaders were also constrained by the prevailing atmosphere. After Zhu Rongji became vice premier in Beijing, for example, Premier Li Peng, who had dutifully followed the conservative policies of his seniors, felt pressure from Deng who wanted Zhu to take over responsibility for guiding the economy. But Li resisted this pressure, and in 1991 Zhu had no choice but to follow the current cautious policies.

Chen Yun and Deng avoided carrying out their struggle in public, but their respective supporters publicly expressed their views on their behalf. In October 1991, President Yang Shangkun used the occasion of the eightieth anniversary of the 1911 revolution to argue for bolder reform and wider opening.
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An article by Deng Liqun, arguing for the other side, in the
People's Daily
on October 23, 1991, warned that class struggle was acute and there was a danger of “peaceful evolution”—that is, the gradual replacement of communism by capitalism—which, he argued, was just what some liberals were hoping for.
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In late 1991, as officials prepared for the forthcoming congress, the battle lines were clearly drawn. When at the Eighth Plenum (November 25–29, 1991) the conservatives still had the upper hand, Deng took his usual approach: instead of wasting time arguing, he chose to act to build support.

Deng's Southern Tour, January–February 1992

When Deng's special train pulled out of the Beijing station on January 17, 1992, no other central party leaders, not even Jiang Zemin, were notified: the trip had been arranged entirely by the police forces within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As far as other leaders in Beijing knew, and as far as the local hosts in the south had been told, Deng, his wife, and four children—all except Deng Zhifang, the youngest—as well as their spouses and children, seventeen persons in all, were going on a “family vacation” with some leisurely sightseeing as they traveled south. And who would oppose a family vacation for the ancient patriarch?

The first stop on Deng's southern tour was Wuhan, a major rail junction
in central China where the 1911 revolution had started. Deng arrived at the Wuchang train station on the morning of January 18, 1992, where he was met by Hubei party secretary Guan Guangfu and Governor Guo Shuyan, as was fitting for Deng's eminence, even if on a family vacation. Deng remained on the platform only twenty minutes, but that proved ample time for him to vent his spleen: “When I turn on the television, all I see is meetings. There are too many meetings, the reports are too long, the speeches are too long, the content is too repetitious. . . . You should do more and talk less. . . . For the 4th National People's Congress [NPC] [1974], Zhou [Enlai] . . . ordered that there be no more than 5,000 characters in his speech. I got the speech down within those limits. . . . [now] there are more documents than there are hairs on a cow.” He told the story of the provincial secretary who returned from a week in the countryside only to find such a huge mountain of papers that he got a headache.
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Long opposed to empty talk, long reports, and meetings without careful preparation, Deng had once declared, “If you don't have something to say, keep your mouth shut . . . the purpose of meetings and talks is to solve problems.”
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After his opening blast, Deng got to his main point: “Whoever is against reform must leave office.” Although he was talking to a local audience in Wuhan and his words were not recorded in the public press, Deng's comments received quick attention from Jiang Zemin. Two days later, Jiang told fellow officials that China should quicken the pace of reform, revive the open-door policy, and reduce the number of meetings.
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That same afternoon, when Deng's train stopped at the station in Changsha, Hunan, Deng spent ten minutes greeting Xiong Qingquan, first party secretary of Hunan, and other provincial officials. At first, Deng seemed buoyant as he received reports of a good harvest despite the natural disaster in 1991, but teacher Deng still had some basic lessons to give: he instructed Secretary Xiong that Hunan “should be bolder in carrying out reform and opening. . . . Speed up economic development.”
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The morning of January 19, Deng stopped briefly in Guangzhou, where provincial officials joined him for an eleven-day inspection tour to the two most vibrant SEZs, Shenzhen and Zhuhai. Local officials had scarcely a week's notice to prepare for Deng's visit by walking through all the places Deng would visit to ensure their security and by arranging the necessary facilities, including spittoons. Officials had only been told that they should prepare to welcome Deng for a family vacation, but by the time he arrived, they had already received detailed reports from officials whom he had met in
Wuhan and Changsha; they understood that this was not an ordinary family outing.
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Guangdong party secretary Xie Fei, deputy provincial secretary general Chen Kaizhi, and a small number of other provincial officials joined local Shenzhen officials in guiding Deng through the city. Some of the local officials who welcomed him had also helped host him in 1984 when he came to affirm the success of the SEZs. After arriving at his guest house and taking a ten-minute rest, Deng, Xie Fei, and the others took a walk in the adjoining garden. Deng Nan, Deng's daughter, reminded her father that he had written some thoughts when they visited this same spot eight years earlier. Deng responded by reciting from memory his words at the time—“Shenzhen's development and experience prove that our policy of establishing the Special Economic Zones was correct”—which brought cheers from his delighted hosts who considered him their greatest booster, unlike other Beijing officials who were trying to restrain their investments.

Deng preserved his strength by touring only three hours each morning, then eating meals with his family, napping, and resting in the afternoon. On one tour of local areas, when the family saw a sign with the characters “Shenzhen” copied from Deng's own handwriting, Deng Nan remarked, “You should collect interest; you should have intellectual property rights.” Deng laughed.
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Later, when they saw bamboo trees brought from Chengdu at the Xinhua Botanical Gardens, Deng teased his local guides, saying that they should pay Sichuan province for intellectual property rights.
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The joke had a deep resonance for Deng: everyone knew that Deng had complained to Westerners about China having to pay large sums for intellectual property rights, and that Deng had reminded the Westerners that China had not charged other countries for borrowing Chinese inventions such as gunpowder and the printing press. But Deng also knew that China needed to adapt to the new international order. When visiting a Shenzhen factory making compact discs, Deng inquired whether they had bought the rights from the foreign countries and reminded the factory managers, “You must abide by international rules on intellectual property rights.”
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