Cold Blooded Murders (4 page)

Justice Buttrose said the prosecution had to
prove three things. First, that the death of a human being had taken place.
Second, that such death was caused by or in consequence of the act of the
accused. Third, that such act was done with the intention of causing death.

On the first point, the judge went on, “If
no death, then of course no murder. You will observe that I have deliberately
and intentionally said, ‘If no death, then no murder’, not ‘If no dead body,
then no murder’. The difference in phraseology is vital because the distinction
is very real. It seems to have become a popular fallacy that there can be no
conviction for murder unless the body of the victim is found and produced.
Nothing could be more fallacious or more untrue. I direct you, as a matter of
law, that a person may be convicted of murder without the body of the victim
being found or produced.” Justice Buttrose said that what the prosecution must
do was to prove the death of a human being, not to produce a dead body. The
production of the dead body, of course, made the proof of death very easy. The
absence of a dead body, of course, made the proof of death more difficult, and
the onus on the prosecution of proving it, heavier. But that was all.

The judge warned the jury they must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenny was murdered by Ang, in that he
caused her death with the intention of causing her death. “There is no actual
eye-witness as to how she died. There is no one who can tell us what happened,
down on the sea bed some 30–40 feet below the surface, to this young girl of 22
years of age on this fateful afternoon, the 27 of August 1963. Only Jenny
herself could have told us, but, according to the prosecution, her lips have
been sealed forever.”

The prosecution case was that Jenny was
dead, and that Ang deliberately and intentionally caused her death. They relied
entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove it. “Now,” said the judge, “in
case there should be any idea in your minds that circumstantial evidence is
intrinsically or necessarily of any less value than the direct testimony of
eye-witnesses, let me at once disabuse you on it.” Justice Buttrose said that
the fact of death may be proved, and proved quite adequately, by circumstantial
evidence, as may the fact that murder had been committed be proved, and proved
quite adequately, by circumstantial evidence.

“But,” added the judge, “there are two
things I must tell you about circumstantial evidence. The first is that it is
the cumulative effect of all the evidence that is important, not one isolated
link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. It would be quite wrong for you
to consider the case link by link, and looking at one link in the chain, say to
yourselves, ‘Well, that is certainly very suspicious, but not enough’, and
discard it: and so on through each separate link doing the same thing until
nothing is left. That would be an utterly erroneous approach to this question,
and you must consider circumstantial evidence in its totality. The cumulative
effect of every one of those links must be considered together, not
individually. The second thing I must draw your attention to is that the
question in this case, depending as it does on circumstantial evidence, is
whether the cumulative of all the evidence leads to the irresistible conclusion
that it was the accused who committed this crime. Or is there some reasonably
possible explanation such as, for example: was it an accident?”

The
trial lasted 13 days.
The foreman of the seven-man jury
was a Dane, Nielsen Jorgan Neinholdt. Court documents showed that the case had
been marked No. 13 of 1965. Mr Francis Seow, prosecuting on behalf of the
State, was assisted by Mr Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree.

The charge was: “That you, Sunny Ang, alias Sunny
Ang Soo Suan, alias Anthony Ang, on or about the 27 day of August 1963 at or
about 5:00
pm
at sea off Pulau
Dua, also known as the Sisters Islands, Singapore, committed murder by causing
the death of one Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid and thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code Chapter 119.”

“I claim trial,” said Sunny Ang.

Mr Francis Seow’s opening speech was not
unduly lengthy. “The case for the prosecution,” he began briskly, “is that
Sunny Ang on 27 August, 1963, at about 5:00
pm
murdered Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid by causing her to be drowned whilst she was
scuba-diving in the Straits between Pulau Dua ... the prosecution suggests that
her body was carried by the currents probably out to the open sea. At any rate,
it was never found, despite intensive search for several days by divers from
the Royal Navy and from the RAF Changi Sub-aqua Club.”

At once Mr Seow sought to establish the
legal fact that murder can be determined through circumstantial evidence even
though the body of the victim is missing. He said, “This is the first case of
its kind to be tried in our Courts. There is no body here. There is a general
belief that you cannot charge a person with, let alone convict him of, the
offence of murder where the victim’s body has not or could not be found. This
is, of course, quite fallacious. If a person who kills another person is crafty
enough to dispose of the body of the victim successfully, say by dissolving it
in an acid bath or where he intentionally causes his victim to drown at sea,
using his knowledge of the tides and currents, calculates that his victim’s
body would be carried by tidal streams out to the open sea (which makes it
difficult if not impossible to recover the body), it does not mean that he
cannot be prosecuted for murder, and if prosecuted, cannot be convicted of it.
It only means that the onus of proof on the prosecution becomes heavier than
usual. In such cases, there are two main questions which the prosecution will
have to prove to your satisfaction. The first is: is the person named in the
charge dead? Is Jenny dead? If so, the second question will be, at the end of
this trial: has it been proved that the prisoner, Sunny Ang, murdered her? In
the context of this case, members of the jury, and subject to what my Lord may
say, murder is the intentional killing of one human being by another human
being.”

“Jenny,” continued counsel, “at the time of
her disappearance was 22 years of age. She received her formal education in
English up to Standard Three. She was married according to Chinese rites at an
early age to Yui Chin Chuan, with whom she had two children. A few years later
she separated from him and continued to remain separated up to the date of her
disappearance. Her father had died and her mother married Toh Kim Seng. They
had a daughter, Eileen Toh, with whom Jenny grew up and with whom she later
lived.”

Jenny worked as a waitress at the Odeon Bar,
North Bridge Road, where she earned a modest wage of $90 a month, in addition
to which she would receive tips from customers whose generosity, no doubt,
depended upon the quality of service she had rendered to them. In any event,
Jenny’s average daily income by way of tips was about $10. In all, she earned
approximately $350 a month.

Sunny Ang was 27. He came from a middle
class family of not inadequate means. Since leaving school in 1955 with a Grade
One pass, he had a varied career. He included part-time studies in law,
canvassing for insurance, and poultry-farming, among his many activities. In
1962 he was made a bankrupt, which meant that his affairs were, ‘and still are’
being managed by the Official Assignee.*

(*The Official Assignee had
given evidence at the inquiry that Ang had been made a bankrupt on the petition
of Madam Goh Ah Eng who obtained judgment for $2,091. Ang in his statement of
affairs admitted that he also owed a total of $3,187 to two other creditors.)

Jenny met Sunny Ang sometime about May 1963.
He proceeded to cultivate Jenny’s acquaintanceship. “You may think, in the
course of this trial,” remarked counsel, “that Jenny was a simple and naïve
girl, who, flattered by Sunny Ang’s attentions, fell completely under his
spell. He came from a world so very much different from hers. He was far
superior in intellect and in education to this unhappy waitress. The stage was
soon reached when Jenny began to entertain notions of matrimony and the
probability that Ang encouraged her in that belief cannot be excluded. Indeed,
members of the jury, you will hear evidence that he intended to marry her. At
any rate, within two months or so after they had first met. Sunny Ang had so
completely won Jenny’s confidence that at his suggestion, and without so much
as a murmur of protest, she was to leave everything she possessed to Yeo Bee
Neo, a woman whom she hardly knew.”

Mr Seow then dealt with the insurances which
Sunny Ang hurriedly look out on Jenny’s life. On 18 June 1963 Jenny applied to
the Great Eastern Life Assurance Company, through Sunny Ang, for a $10,000
endowment insurance policy for 20 years with accident benefits of $200,000, the
premium for which was $453 per year, and the premium for the $200,000
additional accident benefits was $250 per year. Thus the total premium payable
was $703 per year, or $61.60 per month. Sunny Ang filled in the application
form, and Jenny’s occupation was given as, ‘I serve food and drink to customers
at a bar and restaurant’. The beneficiary was named as Madam Yeo Bee Neo. She
was described as a close friend.

The Great Eastern Life Assurance wrote to
Jenny asking her why she wanted accident benefits of $200,000 and why Madam Yeo
was named as beneficiary. “You may agree with the company,” Mr Seow told the
jury, “that it was most unusual that Jenny should want to leave the benefits to
a relative stranger when she had other relations living, among whom was her
half-sister, Eileen, for whom she had real affection.”

On 29 June, the Great Eastern Life Assurance
received a letter from Jenny in which she attempted to answer the queries, but
the company was not satisfied. A few days later, the company received another
letter dated 2 July. This was also signed by Jenny. It was a further attempt to
answer the queries. Jenny said she intended to make flights in commercial
aircraft to the Borneo territories. This was completely untrue, and was
obviously said in the hope that the company would be influenced to grant the
policy. There was a marked difference in the English language between the two
letters. Although signed by Jenny it was in fact written by Sunny Ang. Neither
of the letters satisfied the company, which remained suspicious; and they
decided to grant only $20,000 accident benefits, and not $200,000. This brought
the total premium down to $41.90 per month.

On 9 July, the company received another
application signed by Jenny. This was for a 1-2-4 policy for $40,000. This was
a policy which ensured that at the end of the assurance term Jenny would
receive $40,000. In the event of death by natural causes the beneficiary would
receive twice that amount, but in the event of death by accident the
beneficiary would get four times the sum assured, in this case $160,000. In her
letter, Jenny again described herself as ‘I serve food and drink to customers
at a bar and restaurant’. Again, Madam Yeo Bee Neo was named as the beneficiary.
Mr Seow raised his eyes from his notes and directly addressed the jury. “Who,”
he asked, “is this Madam Yeo Bee Neo? She is none other than Sunny Ang’s
mother. She did not know Jenny. Why should she be named beneficiary? Why?”

Counsel pointed out that the premium for
this 1-2-4 policy would have come to $212.65 per month. Where would a waitress,
whom her sister said was always ‘broke’, get the money to buy and maintain such
a large policy? If she did not have that kind of money who then would pay? “If
it was Sunny Ang, as we say it was, why was he doing it? These are some of the
questions (and there are many more), which I ask you to bear in mind …
questions the answers to which, I submit, will irresistibly and inexorably
bring the charge of murder home to the prisoner.”

Mr Seow went on to say that when the
application for the 1-2-4 policy was received by the company, the managing
director, Allen Geddes, instructed a member of his staff, Lo Ku Him, to find
out why Jenny wanted such a large policy. Consequently, Lo called on Jenny at
33 Lim Liak Street, where Jenny rented a room. Lo asked Jenny why she wanted
such a large policy, and why the beneficiary was not even a close relative.
Jenny replied that she knew nothing about the policy application. The letter she
said had not been written by her. Her friend wrote it. “All the insurance
forms, with one exception,” observed counsel, “were in fact filled in by Sunny
Ang and signed by Jenny.”

Lo was not satisfied, and made arrangements
for Jenny to meet Geddes the next day, but she failed to keep the appointment.
Counsel suggested that Ang had advised her against it. “Ang knew,” argued Mr
Seow, “that if Jenny had kept the appointment with Geddes, Jenny’s gullibility
would have been revealed and Ang’s own complicity in the affair would have been
prematurely exposed.”

When Lo reported to Geddes after his
interview with Jenny, Geddes sent for the agent, Sidney Kong, and told him that
he did not like the application, and instructed Kong to cancel both policies.

Sidney Kong was a friend of Sunny Ang. Later
it was to be revealed that it was Sidney Kong’s car which Sunny Ang borrowed to
take Jenny to Kuala Lumpur. This was the car which Sunny Ang used in what was
believed to be his first attempt to murder Jenny, in a carefully contrived road
accident which severely damaged the car, but only slightly injured the
unsuspecting Jenny. Sidney Kong never appeared in Court during the trial. Mr
Seow told the jury that he understood that Sidney Kong had left the country.