Cochrane (57 page)

Public opinion in Britain and France turned towards war. A British ultimatum of
27
February
1854
demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied provinces of Turkey. There was no reply. On
28
March, Britain and France declared war on Russia. Their first military aim was to reinforce the Turks by way of the Dardanelles. From this there developed the strategy of invading the Crimea, seizing the port and arsenal of Sebastopol, and holding it as a hostage for Russian compliance with British and French demands. In the early spring of
1854,
as the Scots Guards and a host of other famous regiments marched through London, Portsmouth, and the dockyard towns, en route for the troopships that would carry them to Scutari or Varna, Cochrane turned his attention to the naval war against Russia.

By now, of course, he was one of the very few surviving commanders who had seen active service against the French in
1793-1815.
More to the point, his mind was sharp and his ideas as logically organised as they had ever been. Even before the declaration of war in
1854,
it was evident that the British military plan would involve equipping and maintaining an army of some
20,000
men in a location which, by the sailing time of most ships, would be six or eight weeks away. The Russians need only resume a defensive position in order to wear down the allies by a policy of attrition. Accordingly, Cochrane wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty, offering his secret plans as the means of devastating the Russian defences at Sebastopol or Cronstadt, in the Baltic, and winnin
g the war with less effort and in
finitely less loss of life than must otherwise be the case.

The First Lord in Aberdeen's cabinet was Sir James Graham, who had held the same post in
1834
and had been sympathetic towards Cochrane's plans for the development of steamships in the navy. But in
1853,
when war had not even been declared, he declined to consider the use of the secret weapons. By February
1854,
war was inevitable and the Aberdeen cabinet had to discuss the appointment of a commander-in-chief of the Baltic fleet. Britain and Russia recalled ambassadors on
7
February and the cabinet met the next day. The question was whether to appoint Cochrane to the important command and the discussion was reported by the First Lord to the Queen in his letter of the following day.

Lord Dundonald is seventy-nine years of age; and though his energies and faculties are unbroken, and though, with his accustomed courage, he volunteers for the Service, yet, on the whole, there is reason to apprehend that he might deeply commit the Force under his command in some desperate enterprise, where the chance of success would not countervail the risk of failure and of the fatal consequences, which might ensue. Age has not abated the adventurous spirit of this gallant officer, which no authority could restrain; and being uncontrollable it might lead to most unfortunate results. The Cabinet, on the most careful review of the entire question, decided that the appointment of Lord Dundonald was not expedient.
³⁸

There could hardly be a more splendid testimonial to Cochrane in old age than the fears which he inspired in Aberdeen and his ministers. His triumphs, in far more desperate enterprises, echoed through the history of half a dozen countries in the earlier nineteenth century: the
Gamo,
Fort Trinidad, the Basque Roads, Valdivia, the
Esmeralda,
and Maranham. Instead of the "risk of failure" in another such coup, thousands of men were condemned to misery and death by disease in the long siege of Sebastopol. By a quirk of the official mind, to lose
10,000
or
20,000
men in this way was a routine misfortune. To lose
5000
in action was both a defeat and a national humiliation.

Having missed the Baltic command, Cochrane pressed on with the campaign to have his secret weapons used in one form or another. He wrote to Sir James Graham on
22
July
1854,
pointing out that because the allies would not be able to invade the Crimea, let alone take Sebastopol, until they had secured the Danubian provinces, the seizure of Cronstadt in the Baltic was the one swift defeat which could be inflicted on the Czar. Under cover of the clouds of gas from his "stink vessels", the port and its armament would be seized, so that "the maritime defences of Cronstadt, however strong against ordinary means of attack, may be captured, and their red-hot shot and incendiary missiles, prepared for the destruction of our ships, turned on those they protect". In its audacity, and its impudent use of the Russians' own weapons to destroy them, the plan had the unmistakable cast of Cochrane's thinking. He could not, of course, be given command of the Baltic fleet, since that had now gone to Sir Charles Napier. But he asked "unreservedly" to be allowed to accompany the attack, under the command of Napier and his deputy. "Personal acquaintance with Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier and Rear-Admiral Chads warrants my conviction that no feeling of rivalry could exist, save in the zealous performance of the service."
³⁹

Graham replied cautiously that, "The Cabinet, unaided, can form no judgment in this matter." Would Cochrane allow his plans to be put before a secret committee under Admiral Sir Thomas Byam Martin, with Sir William Parker, Admiral Berkeley, and Sir John Burgoyne as its other members? He replied at once, agreeing to accept the committee and its decision, which was communicated to him by Graham on
15
August
1854.
The army was still disembarking in Turkey and the extent of the disasters which it was to experience in the following winter were, as yet, nowhere prefigured. Under the "present circumstances", therefore, the committee had decided that it would be "inexpedient" to use the secret weapons against Cronstadt. But the members did not absolutely rule out their use at any stage of the war, and the blow was judiciously softened for Cochrane himself, as the First Lord explained.

They do full justice to your lordship, and they expressly state that, if such an enterprise were to be undertaken, it could not be confided to fitter or abler hands than yours; for your professional career has been distinguished by remarkable instances of skill and courage, in all of which you have been the foremost to lead the way, and by your personal heroism you have gained an honourable celebrity in the naval history of this country.
⁴⁰

Cochrane noted merely that the secret committee had not expressed any doubt of the "practicability" of his plans. Sir Charles Napier was left to attack Cronstadt unsuccessfully with conventional weapons and to return to England in the autumn with the reputation of failure gathering about him. Cochrane came at once to his defence, intimating to the
Morning
Post
that the weapons allowed to Napier were no match for the Russian defences. "There is but one means to place these parties on an equal footing, and that I confidentially laid before the Government." In addition, he wrote again to the First Lord on
11
November, by which time the allied losses at the Al
ma, Balaclava, and Inkerman caus
ed a sober reassessment of the Crimean campaign. There was, Cochrane conceded, a popular prejudice against elderly admirals.

But, my dear Sir James, were it necessary - which it is not -that I should place myself in an arm-chair on the poop, with each leg on a cushion, I will undertake to subdue every insular fortification at Cronstadt within four hours from the commencement of the attack.
⁴¹

For good measure, he added that there would be no greater problem in capturing Sebastopol. To the men who endured the hunger and sickness of that winter, camped round the little port of Balaclava, such a prospect was beyond credence. Sir James Graham replied courteously that weather conditions would make further operations in the Baltic impossible until next year, while in the Crimea, "I still venture to hope that at Sebastopol our arms will be triumphant."
⁴²

Cochrane not only doubted the triumph but foresaw that the position of the British army in the Crimea might be in danger. He wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, offering his secret weapons as the means of rescuing Lord Raglan's expeditionary force. The reply came from Sir James Graham once more, reminding Cochrane of the opinion of the secret committee. "Neither Lord Aberdeen nor I can venture to place our individual opinions in opposition to a recorded judgment of the highest authority."
⁴³

But in January
1855,
Sir Charles Napier's command of the Baltic fleet ended. Cochrane, now approaching his eightieth birthday, at once volunteered to succeed him. He was not chosen, but as a consolation he had now been promoted to Admiral of the Fleet, though without a fleet to command. In any case, there was nothing that Aberdeen could do for him, since the government was forced to resign over the Crimean affair. Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister of a new Liberal government, with Sir Charles Wood as First Lord of the Admiralty. Cochrane swiftly offered his plans to the new administration, writing directly to Palmerston and also announcing in
The
Times
on
10
March that, given eight or ten days of fine weather, the use of his plans in the Crimea "would spare thousands of lives, millions of money, great havoc and uncertainty of results". Given a free hand, he would also effect "the emancipation of Poland" and liberate "the usurped territories of Sweden".

He petitioned the House of Commons to oblige the government to use his new weapons as the means of ending the war. His reputation and popularity were now so widespread that there was a lively response from the middle-class Victorian public. One of the most forthright suggestions was that a public subscription should be raised to equip an independent force under Cochrane's command. This would be despatched to Sebastopol or Cronstadt, complete with the secret weapons, to do the job which the regular army or navy seemed unable to dispose of unaided. Cochrane refused to act in anything but an official role, yet the popular demand for a swift and successful conclusion to the war persuaded Palmerston to grant him an interview. When it had taken place, Lord Panmure wrote from the War Office to General Simpson in the Crimea, "What would you say to try Dundonald's scheme on the Malakoff ? It might answer."
⁴⁴

The subject was further discussed
between Panmure and Palmerston himself during July and August
1855.
Cochrane's plans were now somewhat more elaborate than they had been in
1812,
though in his memorandum to the Prime Minister on
7
August he still favoured a gas in which "five parts of coke effectually vaporise one part of sulphur". To take Sebastopol by this means, "Four or five hundred tons of sulphur and two thousand tons of coke would be sufficient." He also suggested that "a couple of thousand barrels of gas or other tar" should be used to "mask" the fortifications on either side of the area to be attacked.
⁴⁵

His more advanced researches involved floating naphtha on the sea, close to Sebastopol, and "igniting it by means of a ball of potassium". But whereas the authorities were prepared to consider the more modest scientific weaponry offered by coke and sulphur, there was alarm at the dangerous possibilities of the naphtha if the wind should change at a critical moment. Cochrane was prepared to settle for whatever was permitted and had not the least doubt that Sebastopol would be overwhelmed in a matter of hours, after twelve months of misery which the besieging army had endured. "There is no doubt," he informed Palmerston, "but that the fumes will envelop all the defences from the Malakoff to the Barracks, and even to the line-of-battleship,
The
Twelve
Apostles,
at anchor in the harbour."
⁴⁶

Among all the self-congratulation of the Victorians at the way in which the political corruption and blindness of their predecessors had been routed, it was easy to forget that some of those predecessors were still alive and held high office. Palmerston, though now a Liberal Prime Minister, had once been a Lord of the Admiralty in the very government whose corruption and cynicism Cochrane had attacked. It might be argued that the Palmerston of
1855
was a different man from the young Tory lord of
1807.
But he had had cause to dislike Cochrane then, and his letter to Panmure on
7
August
1855
shows a cynicism, which would have done credit to the Duke of Portland's ministry, in which he had served almost half a century before.

I agree with you that if Dundonald will go out himself to superintend and direct the execution of his scheme, we ought to accept his offer and try his plan. If it succeeds, it will, as you say, save a great number of English and French fives; if it fails
in
his
hands,
we shall be exempt from blame, and if we come in for a small share of the ridicule, we can bear it, and the greater part will fall on him.
⁴⁷