Cochrane (53 page)

The success of the two
brulots
was doubtful, one of them managed to drift alongside an Egyptian warship, which caught fire quickly and went up in flames. In terms of actual destruction it was a small recompense. But, as at the Basque Roads, the psychological effect of this was out of all proportion to the damage done. The other Egyptian ships began to head for the open sea and scatter in every direction, while the inhabitants of Alexandria, convinced that bombardment was about to follow, left their homes and fled to villages outside the city.

Unfortunately, the Greek ships assumed that the escaping Egyptian vessels were coming out against them in an organised attack, so Cochrane, in exasperation, saw most of his own squadron leading the flight. By the morning of
18
June,
they were scattered over some twenty miles of the Mediterranean. With the crews of the
Hellas
and the
Sauveur
in their present mood, it was hopeless to attempt the seizure of the port. At length, Cochrane put to sea in pursuit of twenty-five war
ships, from Alexandria and near
by, who were sailing at full speed to escape from the frigate and the corvette. After a chase of eighty miles, he had still not brought them to battle and, reluctantly, he turned to the task of rounding up his straggling navy. As a final gesture, he effected a brief landing on the Turkish coast of Asia Minor, near Phineka, seized supplies of food and water, and wrote a second contemptuous letter from conquered enemy soil to Mohammed Ali of Egypt. It was some consolation to injured pride. Despite the destruction of one Egyptian ship and the gratifying effect on enemy morale, the Alexandria expedition had been one more illustration of the apparent hopelessness of trying to win the freedom of Greece by naval warfare.
⁴⁹

It had long been evident that the outcome of the struggle between Greeks and Turks would probably be decided by the attitude of the major European powers. England, certainly, had a strong strategic interest in the area by virtue of possessing the Ionian islands. A Royal Navy squadron commanded by Sir Edward Codrington was detailed to see that neutral shipping was not exposed to Turkish interference or Greek pirac
y. Stratford Can
ning, as British ambassador at Constantinople, offered peace by negotiation. Its basis was that the Greeks should acknowledge the authority of the Sultan but that they should have internal self-government. The proposal was rejected by the Turks.

During Wellington's visit to St Petersburg, in
1826,
Britain and Russia had signed a protocol agreeing to the right of the Greeks to independence, in principle. While the Turks remained intransigent and Greek resistance began to disintegrate, the representatives of France, Russia, and Britain met in London. As Cochrane returned despondently from Alexandria, the three great powers signed a treaty which pledged them to enforce the St Petersburg protocol. Greece was to have internal self-government under Turkish sovereignty. If an armistice was not agreed within a month, the forces of the signatories would intervene. As might be expected, the Greeks agreed at once to the proposed settlement, and the Turks rejected it.

In the months which followed, both sides in the war fought to be in the best position when an armistice should be imposed. Independence would mean little to the Greeks if they held nothing but a few fortified positions in the Peloponnese. As for the Turks, they had everything to gain by pushing their military frontier as far south into Greece as they could.

Cochrane's part in this final struggle was to assist the remnants of the army, under Sir Richard Church, in holding as much territory as possible in Albania and western Greece. To facilitate this, he was also to do as much damage as possible to the Turkish and Egyptian fleets which had concentrated in Navarino Bay. Navarino, almost at the south-west extremity of the Peloponnese, was a natural choice as a naval base. Some five miles across and three miles deep, it was almost landlocked by virtue of the long island of Sphacteria lying like a huge breakwater across its mouth. A narrow channel at the northern end and the wider Megalo Thouro channel at the south were overlooked by fortifications and shore-batteries. On the southern shore was Navarino itself and at the northern end the ancient city of Pylos with the palace and cave of Nestor.

One of Cochrane's first duties was to transport Sir Richard Church's army from the Gulf of Patros to Albania, to fuel the rebellion against Turkey on the Adriatic coast. He had been cruising off Navarino, which he left on
11
September, and entered the Gulf of Patras six days later. While he was waiting there for Sir Richard Church's army, H.M.S.
Philomel
appeared and her commander, Lord Ingestre, hailed the
Hellas.
He had been instructed to bring a message from Sir Edward Codrington, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Codrington had enjoyed a distinguished naval career, as captain of the
Orion
at Trafalgar, at Cadiz, and in the Scheldt, as well as in the actions at Baltimore, Washington, and New Orleans in the war against the United States. It was now his duty to enforce the agreement of the great powers, ensuring that Ibrahim's fleet remained in Navarino Bay and that Cochrane's activities ceased. The menace of his warning to Cochrane was subdued but clearly present.

Whereas I am informed by Sir Frederick Adam that Lord Cochrane, with the Greek fleet, is about to embark the army of General Church in the neighbourhood of Cape Papas, for the purpose of conveying them to the coast of Albania, you are hereby directed to make known to the commander of that expedition that I consider it my duty, in the present state of affairs, to prevent such a measure being carried into execution, and that I shall shortly present myself in that neighbourhood for that purpose.
⁵⁰

Novel though it might have been for Cochrane to engage a Royal Navy squadron in battle, he obeyed the command. But Captain Hastings, with the
Karteria
and the
Sauveur,
was operating independently. He did not even know of the agreement between Ibrahim and the admirals of the English, French, and Russian squadrons patrolling the area, that there should be a cessation of naval hostilities under the terms of the London treaty. The Turks had reluctantly agreed to this maritime truce when the warships of the three powers appeared in Greek waters. Captain Hastings spent an unusually fruitful week in the Gulf of Lepanto attacking a few Turkish ships which were still anchored there. He attacked them with solid shot from the
Sauveur
and red-hot shells from the
Karteria.
He destroyed seven of the Turkish ships and captured three. Then he heard of the armistice.

At Navarino, Ibrahim received news of this outrage, which had occurred on
30
September. On
1
October thirty warships broke out of the anchorage to take vengeance on Captain Hastings. But Sir Edward Codrington overtook them and escorted them back to Navarino. On the evening of
3
October, Ibrahim sent off another squadron of ships but Admiral Codrington rounded up these as well, and drove them back to the anchorage. Infuriated by this, Ibrahim sent out a punitive expedition by land to burn the villages of the Peloponnese, destroying the olive groves and the crops.

In response to this wholesale repudiation, the combined fleet of the great powers sailed for Navarino. Whether their intention was to subdue Ibrahim by a mere parade of force alone is debatable. At the head of the fleet were ten British ships under Codrington's command, followed by seven French ships under Admiral de Rigny, and eight Russian under Count Heiden. At
2
p.m. on
20
October, Codrington in H.M.S.
Asia
led them into the wider Megalo Thouro channel at the southern end of Navarino Bay. Twenty thousand Turkish troops camped on the slope above watched the billowing armada sail past. Within the shelter of the bay, the eighty-two warships of Ibrahim's fleet were anchored in a horseshoe formation. One by one, Codrington's ships came to rest close by them, without any indication of what was intended.

In the crowded anchorage, it was a Turkish soldier or seaman who fired the first, unauthorised musket shot. Other ships of the Turco-Egyptian fleet, believing that they were being attacked, joined in. There was, in Codrington's words, "a fire of musketry" which soon turned to exchanges of cannon shot. The British admiral at once gave his orders, he and de Rigny taking on the battleships, while Count Heiden's squadron dealt with the frigates and sloops. Despite the
numerical superiority of Ibrahim
's fleet, it was no match for the gunnery and tactics of the allied force. Codrington at once laid H.M.S.
Asia
alongside the Turkish flagship, true to the traditions of the great sea battles of the past. At almost point-blank range the broadsides of his ships tore through the hulls of the Turks and Egypt
ians, until the whole of Ibrahi
m's fleet seemed to be ablaze. The Ottoman army on the cliffs above looked on helplessly.

Even by the standard of a full-scale sea fight, the scene at Navarino was awe-insp
iring. One after another, Ibrahim
's battleships burnt until they blew up, sending a fountain of fire into the smoke-laden sky before the shattered hulls, according to contemporary portrayals, seemed almost to crumple into the water. As night fell, the rocks of Sphacteria reflected the fire of the ships which still burnt. On board Codrington's vessels, the crews struggled throughout the hours of darkness to keep clear of the fiery wreckage. By daybreak on
21
October, only twenty-nine of
Ibrahim
's eighty-two ships were still afloat, though in no condition to eng
age an enemy. He had lost about
6000
men who were killed in action, or burnt or drowned in its aftermath. To all intents, the fleet of Turkey and Egypt had been annihilated and the means of maintaining an army to subdue Greece was gone. Navarino was a remarkable, if lurid, example of war as the extension of diplomacy.

Cochrane's employment had virtually been taken from him. Codrington informed the Greek government that only a few corvettes and brigs had escaped the destruction. Greece might now "easily obstruct the movements of any Turkish force by sea". However, lest he should be accused of partiality, he also warned the Greeks that they were to confine their naval activities to legitimate interests within the area allotted them by the great powers. "The maritime armistice is, in fact, observed on the side of the Turks, since their fleet no longer exists. Take care of yours, for we will destroy it also, if the case requires it."
⁵¹

The happy life of piracy to which some Greek captains turned, as soon as the menace of Ibrahim was removed, was partially checked by Codrington's warning and Cochrane's actions during the last weeks of
1827.
Moreover, Codrington's instructions were to prevent the Greeks from pursuing their ambitions eastward into Turkish-held islands, or into Albania. He ordered an end to the attack on the island of Chios, which Cochrane's ships were supporting. This policy was not dictated by mere sympathy for the Turks. Codrington knew well that when peace came, Chios and Albania would probably remain under Turkish rule. It was only five years since the brutal retaliation on the inhabitants of Chios, which inspired Delacroix's great painting. Whatever heroics the Greeks might accomplish, these inhabitants would afterwards be left, in Codrington's words, to "the cruel reprisals of the Turks".
⁵²

Under the circumstances, Cochrane judged it best to secure the position which the Greeks already held. He left at once for London, where he arrived on
19
February
1828,
hoping to persuade the government to amend the Foreign Enlistment Act so that British seamen would be permitted to man the Greek warships and ensure a sufficient protection against Turkey. He had no success in this. Worse still, many of the English Philhellenes were now disillusioned with the corruption of the factions in Greece, and the steamships were still not completed. Indeed, the money for them had run short and Cochrane now donated
£2000
of his own to aid the progress of the work.

After a fortnight in London, it was evident that the public mood was set against supplying further funds for Greece. Cochrane accordingly crossed to Paris to see what could be done there. On
22
March he wrote at last to Count John Capodistrias, President of Greece, reporting that no funds were to be had in either London or Paris. Soon after, he received a demand from the Greek deputies in London that he should repay all the money he had received from them for his service as First Admiral, on the grounds that by going to England and France to raise funds for Greece he had deserted his naval post. Cochrane had received a single payment of
£37
,000
which he invested at once in the Greek loan and used his own money to pay for such items as the completion of steamships and the costs of his foreign service. It had been agreed that he should receive a further
£20,000
at the conclusion of the war, but he returned the money and asked that it should be used to assist Greek seamen and others who had suffered during the struggle against Turkey.