Closing the Ring (79 page)

On February 4, our advance was suddenly halted. The Japanese also had a plan. Since November they had increased their strength in Burma from five divisions to eight, and they proposed to invade Eastern India and raise the flag of rebellion against the British. Their first stroke was a counter-offensive in the Arakan to capture the port of Chittagong and draw our attention and our reserves to that front. Holding our 5th Division frontally on the coast, they passed the better part of a division through the jungle and round the flank of the 7th Division, which was farther inland. Within a few days it was surrounded, and the enemy had cut the coastal road behind the 5th Division. They fully expected both divisions to withdraw, but they had reckoned without one factor, supply by air. The 5th Division grouped themselves into perimeters, stood their ground, and fought it out. For a fortnight food, water, and ammunition were delivered to them, like manna, from above. The enemy had no such facilities; relying on the early capture of Chittagong, they had taken with them only ten days’ supply. Unable to overwhelm our forward troops, pressed from the north by our 26th Division, which had been brought from reserve, they broke up into small parties to fight their way back through the jungle, leaving five thousand dead behind.

The XVth Corps resumed their advance, proud of an achievement which put an end to the legend of Japanese invincibility in the jungle.

Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten
    1 Mar. 44

I sent you today my public congratulations on the Arakan fighting. I am so glad this measure of success has attended it. It is a sign of the new spirit in your forces, and will, I trust, urge everyone to keep closer to the enemy. Looking at the maps from here, I do not see why you should not continue your advance along the coast in the direction of Akyab

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In early March, there were sure signs that the enemy were also preparing an attack on the central front against Imphal, thereby forestalling our own projected advance to the Chindwin. The now famous Chindit
²
operation was a part of our offensive plan. Although it was clear that the Japanese would get their blow in first, it was decided that Wingate’s brigades should carry on with their task. This was principally to cut the enemy’s communications near Indaw, thereby dislocating their supply system, and notably that of the Japanese 18th Division, with whom Stilwell was at close grips. The enemy would moreover be forced to detach troops to deal with the menace behind his fighting front. One Chindit brigade, the 16th British, had already started on February 5 from Ledo. They marched across four hundred and fifty miles of mountain and jungle and were supplied solely from the air.

On March 5, sustained by an American “Air Commando” of two hundred and fifty machines, the fly-in of the 77th and 111th Brigades, British and Gurkha troops, began. After assembly at their rallying-points, they set out upon their task and cut the railway north of Indaw.

I sent a full account of all this to the President.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    14 Mar. 44

I feel you will be interested to hear about the flying-in of two of Wingate’s Long-Range Penetration Brigades. Landing-strips in two areas were selected from which the brigades could advance westward, primarily to interrupt the Japanese lines of communication, and so assist the American-Chinese operations taking place farther north. The strips were a hundred miles inside enemy territory and two hundred and sixty-six miles from the transport base.

The first landings were made by gliders, whose occupants then prepared the strips to receive transport aircraft. Between March 6 and March 11 seventy-five hundred men, with all their gear and with mules, were successfully landed. The only losses were a number of the gliders, and some of these should be repairable. The brigades have now started their advance, but a small holding party has been left at one of the strips to receive a flight of Spitfires and a
squadron of Hurricane fighter-bombers which were to fly in to protect the base and provide air support.

The only serious mishap occurred on the first night. One of the strips in the northern area was found to have been obstructed by the Japanese, and the surface of the remaining strip was much worse than was expected, causing crashes which blocked the strip and prevented further landings that night. A few of the gliders had to be turned back in the air, and failed to reach our territory. Another strip was immediately prepared in this area, and was ready for landing two days later. The total of killed, wounded, and missing is at most one hundred and forty-five.

The operation appears to have been a complete surprise for the Japanese. There has been no enemy air action against the strips in the northern area, and the one in the south was only bombed on March 10 after our men had left it. As it happened, the enemy were concentrating aircraft at airfields in the Mandalay area as part of their own plans. In consequence the strong air forces we had collected to protect the landings had a very good bag, and in two days destroyed sixty-one enemy aircraft for the loss of only three of our own.

We are all very well pleased that Wingate’s venture has started so well, and the success of this flying-in operation augurs well for the future. Your men have played an important part both in the transport squadrons and in the supporting air operations.

  “I am thrilled,” replied Roosevelt the next day, “by the news of our success under Wingate. If you wire him, please give him my hearty good wishes. May the good work go on. This marks an epic achievement for the airborne troops, not forgetting the mules.”

Wingate did not live long to enjoy this first success or to reap its fruits. On March 24, to my great distress, he was killed in the air. He insisted on starting. The facts are unknown. Probably the pilot lost his way in thick weather. The aircraft crashed into a hillside, and when a rescue party arrived none were alive. With him a bright flame was extinguished.

*  *  * *  *

On March 8, three Japanese divisions began their expected
attack on our central front. General Scoones withdrew his IVth Corps, also of three divisions, to the Imphal plateau, so as to fight concentrated on more open ground. If the enemy cut the road to the railhead at Dimapur, he would have to depend upon the air until the battle was won. The Japanese repeated the hazardous plan they had used with misfortune in the Arakan. They counted on capturing our stores at Imphal to feed themselves. They also intended to cut, not only the road to Dimapur, but also the railway, and thus sever the supply route maintaining Stilwell’s force and the United States air-lift to China. Important issues were therefore at stake.

The key lay again in transport aircraft. Mountbatten’s resources, though considerable, were not nearly enough. He sought to borrow a hundred United States aircraft from the “Hump” traffic to win the battle. This was a hard requirement to make or to procure. In the anxious weeks that followed, I gave him my strongest support. “Chiefs of Staff and I,” I told him, “are backing you up to the full. I have telegraphed to the President. In my view nothing matters but the battle. Be sure you win.”

By the end of March, the Japanese had cut the road to Dimapur and were pressing hard on the fringes of the Imphal plain from three sides. The fourth quadrant of the circle was barred by jungle-covered mountains. Two brigades of the 5th Indian Division were flown into Imphal from the Arakan, where operations were halted, and the 7th Indian Division was flown into Dimapur. Thither by rail came the headquarters of the XXXIIId Corps, under General Stopford, the 2d British Division, an independent Indian brigade, and also the last remaining brigade of Wingate’s force.

At Kohima, a roadside village among the hills, the Japanese northern attack was held. Here the garrison consisted of a battalion of the Royal West Kent, a Gurkha battalion, and a battalion of the Assam Regiment, with every man, and even convalescents from the hospital, who could bear arms. They were attacked on April 4 by the Japanese 31st Division, slowly forced back into diminishing area, and finally onto a single
hill. They had no supplies except what was dropped on them by parachutes. Attacked on every side, they held on steadfastly, supported by bombing and cannon-fire from the air, until they were relieved on the 20th by the leading brigade of the 2d Division which fought its way up from Dimapur. Four thousand Japanese were killed. The valiant defence of Kohima against enormous odds was a fine episode.

*  *  * *  *

We had the command of the air, but we depended upon having enough transport planes. The climax came in May. Sixty thousand British and Indian soldiers, with all their modern equipment, were confined in a circle on the Imphal plain. I could feel the stress amid all other business. On the principle, “Nothing matters but the battle,” I used my authority.

Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten
    4 May 44

Let nothing go from the battle that you need for victory. I will not accept denial of this from any quarter, and will back you to the full.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    9 May 44

The gap must be filled at all costs, either by delaying the departure of the seventy-nine transport aircraft to the Mediterranean, or by drawing twenty plus fifty-nine from the Hump, or by a combination of both. We cannot on any account throw away this battle. I am quite willing to telegraph to the President pointing out to him the disastrous consequences to his own plans for helping China which would follow the casting away of this battle.

Prime Minister to General Ismay and General Hollis, for C.O.S. Committee
    14 May 44

Whatever happens, Admiral Mountbatten is not to send away the seventy-nine aircraft to the Mediterranean except as they are replaced in his command by suitable American aircraft either from United States or the Hump. His argument seems to me unanswerable.

I have not been given any sufficient reasons to show that General Alexander’s battle will be hampered if the date of the arrival of these aircraft in the Mediterranean is postponed. General Wilson
has already an overwhelming superiority in the air, and these aircraft are not needed so much for the battle as for amphibious operations following its success, whereas they are vital to the operations proceeding in Burma.

General Hollis should therefore prepare me a short note which I will discuss with him at midnight tonight. Meanwhile, this minute should be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff. I am determined that Mountbatten’s battle shall not be ruined by the folly of flying a hundred and fifty aircraft five thousand miles in opposite directions, and I will appeal to the President tomorrow unless I am satisfied that the needs are met.

*  *  * *  *

Meanwhile, on the northern front Stilwell was making good progress towards the line Mogaung-Myitkyina, against the stubborn resistance of the Japanese 18th Division. He was anxious about his eastern flank, where their 56th Division, along the Chinese frontier, might turn upon him. President Roosevelt persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to send Stilwell another Chinese division, but it was not till April 21 that the Generalissimo agreed to order his troops in Yunnan to advance into Burma. On May 10, four Chinese divisions crossed the Salween at and above Kunlong, thus worrying the Japanese flank.

The Chindits, operating on the enemy communications, had been reinforced in early April by two more brigades, so that five were now in action. They worked northward up the railway, preventing the passage of reinforcements and destroying dumps as they went. But Wingate was no more. The Japanese withdrew nothing from the Imphal front and only one battalion from Stilwell’s. They brought their 53d Division from Malaya and tried, without success, to quell the nuisance.

On May 17, Stilwell sprung a surprise both on the Japanese and ourselves by capturing the airfield at Myitkyina by a swift advance of General Merrill’s United States brigade. Reinforcements were flown in to assault the town, but the Japanese held it obstinately till early August. At the end of May, Mogaung Stilwell’s other main objective, was invested by the leading Chindit brigade, the 77th, and finally fell to them on June 26 These successes were largely due to Stilwell’s leadership,
energy, and pertinacity; but his troops were exhausted by their efforts and many had to be withdrawn.

*  *  * *  *

Around Imphal the situation was still at full strain. Our Air Force was dominant, but the monsoon was hindering the air-supply, on which our success depended. All our four divisions were slowly pushing outward from their encirclement. Along the Kohima road the relieving force and the besieged were fighting their way towards each other. It was a race against time. We marked their progress with tense feelings.

Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten
    22 June 44

The Chiefs of Staff have expressed anxiety about the situation in Imphal, particularly in respect of reserves of supplies and ammunition. You are absolutely entitled to ask for all aircraft necessary to maintain the situation, whether they come from the Hump or any other source. The Hump must be considered the current reserve, and should be drawn upon whenever necessary. The Americans have by a brilliant feat of arms landed us in Myitkyina, but neither Myitkyina nor Imphal can be held without drawing on the Hump. If you fail to make your demands in good time, invoking me if necessary to help from here, it will be no good complaining afterwards if it is not a success. Keep your hand close on the job, which seems to me both serious and critical. Every good wish.

  The finale came while this message was on the way. I quote Admiral Mountbatten’s report:

In the third week in June, the situation was critical, and it seemed possible, after all the efforts of the previous two months, that early in July the IV Corps would finally run out of reserves. But on June 22, with a week and a half in hand, the 2d British and 5th Indian Divisions met at a point twenty-nine miles north of Imphal and the road to the plain was open. On the same day the convoys began to roll in.