Closing the Ring (97 page)

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    25 Jan. 44

I have now read this paper about “British Strategic Needs in the Levant States.” The Chiefs of Staff seem to assume that partition [of Palestine] will arouse Jewish resentment. It is, on the contrary, the White Paper policy that arouses the Jewish resentment. The opposition to partition will come from the Arabs, and any violence by the Arabs will be countered by the Jews It must be remembered that Lord Wavell has stated that, left to themselves, the Jews would beat the Arabs. There cannot therefore be any great danger in our joining with the Jews to enforce the kind of proposals about partition which are set forth in the Ministerial paper. I therefore cannot accept in any way the requirements for internal security set out in the table, which proceeds upon the assumption that both the Jews and the Arabs would join together to fight us. Obviously we shall not proceed with any plan of partition which the Jews do not support.

Prime Minister to Dominions Secretary
    25 Jan. 44

It is to my mind very unwise to make plans on the basis of Hitler being defeated in 1944. The possibility of his gaining a victory in France cannot be excluded. The hazards of battle are very great. The reserves of the enemy are capable of being thrown from point to point with great facility. All my information from the interior of Germany goes to show that Hitler and his Government are still in the fullest control, and that there is no sign of revolt as a result of the bombings. In all our contacts with the German troops, such as we see in Italy, their quality, discipline, and skill are apparent.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.
    25 Jan. 44

I do not approve of the title “Allied Central Mediterranean Force,” and it should not have been made public without my having been previously consulted.

2. An army which will amount to upwards of twenty divisions should not be described as a “Force.” The activities of this army are not coextensive with the Central Mediterranean. For instance, Malta and Tunis are both in the Central Mediterranean; likewise Corsica and Sardinia. Furthermore, Yugoslavia, which is specially reserved to the Supreme Commander, is not—except possibly for purely operational purposes—placed under General Alexander. The title is therefore from every point of view a misnomer.

3. The appointment which I offered General Alexander and which he accepted was “Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy.” This follows the precedent of the last war, when “British Expeditionary Force” was changed as the armies grew to “British Armies in France and Flanders.” The change
should therefore be made, and a convenient moment to do so would be when the Battle of Rome has decided itself, assuming the decision is satisfactory.

Prime Minister to General Montgomery
    27 Jan. 44

Herewith is an interim answer from the Minister of Production about D.D. tanks. It does not look too bad.

2. I shall have a further report presently about waterproofing material. Two hundred thousand vehicles seem a vast outfit to attach to an army which, at thirty divisions of 20,000 men apiece, would only have 600,000 men, of whom less than three-quarters would actually fight. As each vehicle takes at least a man and a half to drive and look after, here are 300,000 men already absorbed. One hopes there will be enough infantry with rifles and bayonets to protect this great mass of vehicles from falling into the hands of the enemy.

Prime Minister to Major-General Hollis
    28 Jan. 44

It would not be a good thing for the main headquarters in the Mediterranean to be set up in Italy. General Wilson’s sphere comprises the entire North African front, and he should not be located in any one particular area. General Alexander should have the command in Italy without being overshadowed by the presence of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters. I do not feel enough effort has been made to overcome the difficulties of a move [of these Headquarters] to the Tunis area. Has Malta been investigated? If nothing else will serve, it would be better for him to remain at Algiers, after conducting a proper purge of the excessive officers who have accumulated there.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary
    30 Jan. 44

Your minute to me of January 24 about the employment of Communists on secret Government work.

I agree that the existence of the panel must be a secret. All members should be specially warned. Final decision whether action is to be taken against a Communist sympathiser must rest with the department employing him, whose Ministerial head is responsible to Parliament.

There are three degrees of responsibility in this business.

M.I.5 is responsible for the evidence produced before the panel. The panel is responsible for weighing that evidence and deciding whether to proceed with the department concerned. The department is responsible for deciding what action to take, if any.

I agree that the panel should include a senior representative of the Treasury experienced in handling staff questions, but am against compelling the panel to include a representative of the interested department. If the panel rejects a case it would be unfair that a member of the suspect’s department should know it had ever been brought up. The chairman of the panel should have discretion to co-opt a member of the interested department according to circumstances.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    30 Jan. 44

I think Sir Owen O’Malley should be asked very secretly to express his opinion on the Katyn Wood inquiry. How does the argument about the length of time the birch trees had grown over the graves fit in with this new tale? Did anybody look at the birch trees?

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord
    31 Jan. 44

I am willing that four of the fast improved carriers should be included in the forthcoming Admiralty programme; but I consider that the first two should have a considerable lead over the second two, in order that advantage may be taken of any possible improvements noticeable during construction. I also consider that the four battleships sanctioned by Parliament but not proceeded with during the war, namely,
Lion, Temeraire, Conqueror
, and
Thunderer
, should also remain in the naval programme, it being understood that no work is done upon them other than designing. Efforts should be made to finish
Vanguard
by the summer of ’45. Let me know what is involved in this.

2. I wonder whether you are not ordering far more warships than we can even lay down during the war. In 1943, 888,000 tons displacement were ordered, only 402,000 tons laid down, and 337,000 tons were completed. Thus, unless ships are laid down much faster than in 1943, it would take two and a quarter years even to lay down last year’s orders. Hitherto we have been having at least two programmes a year, with the result that you have an immense amount of sanctioned shipbuilding, far more than you can possibly carry out or digest. It is not in the interest of the Navy to present such an aspect to critical eyes. This should certainly govern the whole of the new programme, and I do not think any vessel should be included in it which either obstructs the completion of a similar vessel already ordered or cannot itself be laid down during the calendar year 1944—or, if you will, the financial year 1944–45.

3. We spoke of the War Fleet against Japan in 1945. I consider we should have the four
King George V’s
, the
Renown, Nelson, Queen Elizabeth
, and
Warspite
, in all eight battleships, together with as many armoured carriers and auxiliary carriers as have come to hand, the above being supported as necessary by cruiser squadrons and flotillas. A programme for developing the Fleet Train
³
stage by stage should be submitted. I hope the
Vanguard
will be able to join during the autumn. The question of fitting the
Littorios
for this service should also be considered. Let me know what it involves in time, labour, and money.

4. I agree that in June 1944 we should furnish the contingent you have already prepared, provided always that the United States desire it. Above all, we must be careful not to prejudice the operation “Culverin” [Sumatra], which is the only means of bringing the large military and air forces we have around the Bay of Bengal into effective action against the enemy in 1944–45. The disposition of the Fleet between the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific must provide for the
execution of “Culverin” if other difficulties are surmounted and unless unexpected developments occur.

5. We must ask the United States Chiefs of Staff to lend us a proper supply of landing-craft for November or December at “Culverin,” and in view of the help we are to give them with the Fleet they should not deny these to us. This matter however awaits the arrival of Admiral Mountbatten’s officers.

6. For the post-war Fleet we should aim at survivors of the four
King George V’s
, one modernised
Nelson, Vanguard
, four sixteen-inch battleships, which will be kept on our lists and proceeded with as may be possible, and we should claim the two
Littorios
, a potential total of twelve battleships. This of course depends upon whether the battleship is not rendered obsolete by new inventions. So far this has certainly not been the case. On the contrary, the U-boat danger to battleships has been largely mastered and the air menace to them is under much better control than ever before. I hold strongly that we have an overwhelming claim on the
Littorios
because of the preponderance of our efforts in the Mediterranean and the fact that we have sacrificed new construction of heavy ships to the immediate needs of the war. Perhaps you will let me have your sketch of a post-war Fleet—say, in 1947—balanced on this sort of scale, in order that I may consider the whole picture more maturely.

7. I approve the policy of using the
Warspite
, and I hope also the
Rodney
, as part of our bombarding fleet for “Overlord.” What other vessels have you available for this purpose? I presume measures are being taken to provide the proper gunnery complements, training of the latest kind, and the necessary spotters, and that there is no lack of ammunition, both anti-personnel and for destroying concrete defences. Under the air shield the bombarding squadrons should have great scope.

8. I will send you my comments on your man-power proposals later. I should think you now have at least one hundred thousand men in the training establishments, harbour services, and bases, men in transit, etc., on which you can draw during the next two years before trenching upon our limited pools. This will require a very sensible reduction of the training establishments and plants.

F
EBRUARY

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    2 Feb. 44

All experience shows that once a great offensive has been launched, quiescence and comparative unpreparedness prevail on other parts of the front not affected. The battle draws everything into itself, and there are moments when gains of priceless value in other quarters can be gathered cheaply or perhaps for nothing.

2. Pray have the following examined with the utmost secrecy: (
a
) During March, April, and May move the 1st and 6th British Armoured and the 6th South African Armoured Divisions into Morocco. Cover would be perhaps local unrest, or anyhow reinforcements for “Overlord.” (
b
) On D plus say
twenty or thirty, when everyone is all out, bring these divisions to Bordeaux with a minimum of landing-craft after seizing the place by
coup de main.
This should be possible, as the air would all have been drawn into the northward. A force of this character let loose in the south and centre of France would instantly arouse widespread revolt and would be of measureless assistance to the main battle.

3. Examine also the possibilities of the move overland quietly of these troops to Morocco, embarkation in great secrecy, and a [sea] move by a wide curve to the point of attack.

4. The above is without prejudice to “Anvil,” in which none of these forces would be involved.

5. Should the operation, which may be called “Caliph,” prosper, a follow-up by the United States with infantry divisions brought directly across the Atlantic to the new base could be arranged.

6. Arising from the above, how many ships would be wanted to convey the three armoured divisions? How many landing-craft would be required for, say, five thousand Commandos to make sure of the entries (it is of course intended to land the divisions at regular quays)? How could the shipping be found and brought to Casablanca without attracting undue notice? How long would the embarkation, the voyage, and, if all went well, the disembarkation take? A carrier force would have to be provided to cover the landing, but this should not be difficult if by then we have got shore bases established in the north. It is silly to go on as we are, butting at only one place, without trying to reap the immense opportunities which will be open almost everywhere else.

Prime Minister to Dominions Secretary
    2 Feb. 44

I could have a special Cabinet meeting on Friday, if desired, to consider the presence in Dublin of Axis diplomatic missions. Otherwise it can be brought up on Monday at the full meeting.

2. Much more dangerous even than the information betrayed about the movements of Anglo-American troop convoys is what will certainly be passing in a stream about our preparations for “Overlord.” If the German and Japanese Ministers remain at their posts in Dublin, it may be necessary on military grounds to sever all contacts between Ireland and the Continent in the near future for a period of months. At present anyone can get in an Irish ship to Spain and give the latest news he has picked up in England about British and American preparations. Even if complete severance by sea were instituted, it would not prevent the German Ambassador from sending a wireless warning of zero, even though that was the last he was able to send.