Closing the Ring (42 page)

  On October 29, I sent him the Cabinet view about the Italian Fleet.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

29 Oct. 43

… In principle we willingly admit the Russians’ right to a share in the Italian Fleet. We had however thought that this fleet would play its part against Japan, and we had been planning to tropicalise the
Littorios
and some other units for this later phase of the war. If Russia would like to have a squadron in being in the Pacific, that would be a very considerable event, and we should like to discuss this project when we meet. …

5. At present the only place where Italian ships could be handed over to the Russians would be Archangel and Murmansk. The Italian warships are quite unsuited for working in Arctic waters, and would need several months of dockyard work first. We should also have to be careful lest the immediate transfer to the Russians would have an ill-effect on Italian co-operation. It is important for Italy to have her flag on the sea against Germany. We do not want to provoke a refusal by the Italians to carry on the important work they are doing for us in Taranto dockyard. One cannot be absolutely sure that they would not scuttle some of the ships they brought out from the German clutches if they thought they were to be handed over to foreign crews. They are doing a good deal for us at the present time. Italian submarines are carrying supplies to Leros. Italian destroyers, of which there are only seven good ones, are escorting local convoys. Their cruisers are transporting troops and supplies. We should therefore in any case have to ensure against publicity until we could take steps to counter these ill-effects. Once distribution of the Italian Fleet begins, the French, the Yugoslavs, and the Greeks would put in their claims, which are pretty good.

6. For all these reasons it would be better to put off this question till “Eureka” [Teheran].

7. It is quite true that we have gained some Italian merchant tonnage, but the amount is actually less than what we have to provide for the minimum requirements of conquered and Italian territory, so that we are actually down on the balance, especially as most of these Italian ships are not fit for anything more than local traffic.

8. Has Mr. Hull referred this request to his Government? It would be essential that we should be agreed. I should like best of all to talk over all this at “Eureka,” if that ever comes off.

And later the same day:

  Provided the Americans agree, you may tell Molotov that in principle we agree that the Soviet Government shall have a share of the captured Italian ships and that the proportion for which they ask is reasonable. I am presuming the battleship for which they ask is not a
Littorio
. Details and dates of delivery must be settled with regard to operations and not losing Italian aid by precipitate publicity. This is very important. Of course, we a
looking forward to using the very newest vessels of this fleet in the war against Japan, and the Russians will surely understand that we ought not to prejudice that. We also feel we [the British] ought to have the two
Littorios
after the war, first, because of the overwhelming share we have had in the whole war against Italy, secondly, because of our heavy naval losses in capital units, and, thirdly, because we have suspended the long-term building of battleships already sanctioned by Parliament in order to concentrate on the current needs of the war.

2. Most especially secret and for your own thought and perhaps fly-throwing: If it were decided that on the defeat of Hitler Russia would play her part against Japan, a great design might come into being, as a part of which the fitting out under the Soviet flag and manning with Russian sailors of a substantial naval force at some Pacific base in our possession and the participation of this force of surface ships in the final phase of the war might come into view. However, I hope that the consent I have sent you in the first lines of this telegram will meet your difficulties.

*  *  * *  *

I had drafted a proposed declaration on German war criminals as a basis of discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of Governments.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin

12 Oct. 43

Would you very kindly consider whether something like the following might not be issued over our three signatures:

  Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union [in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last] have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass-executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers, and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties.

Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set up in Germany those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free Governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg. France, and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic, which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth, and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localisation.

R
OOSEVELT
S
TALIN
C
HURCHILL

If this, or something like this (and I am not particular about the wording), were put over our three signatures, it would, I believe, make some of these villains shy of being mixed up in
butcheries now that they know they are going to be beaten. We know, for instance, that our threats of reprisals about Poland have brought about a mitigation of the severities being inflicted on the people there. There is no doubt that the use of the terror-weapon by the enemy imposes an additional burden on our armies. Lots of Germans may develop moral scruples if they know they are going to be brought back and judged in the country, and perhaps the very place, where their cruel deeds were done. I strongly commend to you the principle of the localisation of judgment as likely to exert a deterrent effect on enemy terrorism. The British Cabinet endorses this principle and policy.

  This was accepted and endorsed, with a few verbal changes.

*  *  * *  *

The three Foreign Ministers had met regularly every day, and covered an immense amount of ground. Their agreements were recorded in a secret protocol, drawn up on November 3. The importance of these lay in the additional machinery of cooperation which was now to be set up. It was agreed to establish a European Advisory Committee in London to begin work on the problems which would arise in Germany and on the Continent when the Hitler régime neared collapse. It was this body which drew up the initial plans for dividing Germany into zones of occupation, an arrangement which caused grave problems later. Of this more in due course. For Italian affairs another Advisory Council was to be constituted, to include a Russian representative. There was to be an exchange of information on any peace feelers put out by the Axis satellites. The Americans were anxious that a Four-Power Declaration, to include China, pledging themselves to a united conduct of the war “against those Axis Powers with which they are respectively at war,” should be signed at this Moscow meeting. This was achieved on October 30. Finally, a protocol agreeing on joint action between Russia and Great Britain in regard to Turkey was drafted by Mr. Eden and signed on November 2.

We had every reason to be content with these results. There had been a smoothing of many points of friction, practical steps for further co-operation had been taken, the way had been prepared for an early meeting of the heads of the three major Allied Governments, and the mounting deadlock in our working with the Soviet Union had in part been removed.

Those who took part in the Conference sensed a far more friendly atmosphere, both on and off duty, than had ever existed before. One of the best-known Russian painters was commissioned by his Government to do a conversation piece of the Conference, and he had made preliminary sketches of various members of the British and American delegations. It is not known whether the picture was ever completed, but it has not yet seen the light of day.

¹
A Soviet division was equivalent to about a third or a quarter of a British, or United States Division.

²
Author’s subsequent italics.

³
See
Chapter 4
, page 114.

⁴
Author’s subsequent italics.

⁵
See
Chapter 14
, pages 243–47.

17
Advent of the Triple Meeting
The High Commands

Urgency of Choosing a Commander for “Overlord”___We Favour the Choice of Marshall___Speculation in the American Press___My Correspondence with President Roosevelt, October
1
and
5___
The President’s Delay in Deciding___His Desire For a Supreme Commander to Control Both Western Theatres___My Telegram to Field Marshal Dill of November
8___
Need to Arrange for a Meeting of the Three Powers___My Telegram to Stalin of September
25,
and His Reply, October
3___
Difficulties of Agreement upon a Suitable Place___Roosevelt’s Suggestions___Stalin Will Come Only to Teheran___Roosevelt’s Disappointment___Constitutional Difficulties Invoked___I Seek a Preliminary Anglo-American Discussion___My Telegram to the President of October
23___
His Proposal to Invite Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek___His Suggestion of Including the Russians in the Preliminary Meeting___I Argue Against This___Agreement for a Meeting___Proposals for a Rendezvous at Cairo___Or at Oran___The Russians Decline to Confer with the Chinese Government at This Stage___A Great Relief to Me___The President Agrees to Meet at Teheran after Cairo.

T
HE
SELECTION
OF
A
S
UPREME
C
OMMANDER
for “Overlord,” our cross-Channel entry into Europe in 1944, was urgent. This of course affected in the most direct manner the military conduct of the war, and raised a number of personal issues of importance and delicacy. At the Quebec Conference I had agreed with the President that “Overlord” should fall to an American officer, and had so informed General Brooke, to
whom I had previously offered the task. I understood from the President that he would choose General Marshall, and this was entirely satisfactory to us. However, in the interval between Quebec and our meeting in Cairo I became conscious that the President had not finally made up his mind about Marshall. None of the other arrangements could of course be made before the main decision had been taken. Meanwhile, rumour became rife in the American press and there was the prospect of Parliamentary reactions in London. Admiral Leahy in his book
¹
mentions some of the American cross-currents.

  The public [he writes] assumed that Roosevelt would name Marshall as Supreme Commander. There was vehement objection to such a move in the press. Opponents charged that Marshall was being given “Dutch promotion”; that Roosevelt planned to take him out of a big job and put him into a small job; that it was a plot against Marshall. At the other extreme there were reports that the American Joint Chiefs considered the post of Supreme Command promotion, and were jealous of Marshall.

  This question was discussed between us at some length. I was anxious to emphasise the status of General Marshall in every way, provided that the authority of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff was not impaired. I cabled Hopkins in this sense at the end of September.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins

26 Sept. 43

There is a lot of talk in the papers about Marshall becoming Supreme Commander-in-Chief over all the forces in the West. What I understood from our talks was that he would command the Operation “Overlord.” He would not however be only a theatre commander. He might have the same sort of general outlook with us on the whole war against Germany, in addition to his specific command, as Dill has on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington over the whole field. We should be very glad for him to sit with our Chiefs of Staff frequently, and to have the whole scene laid before him. But I made it clear that our Chiefs of Staff would more often have to sit together to consider our position
from the British point of view, just as your Chiefs of Staff sit together in Washington. It would not fall to him to give decisions outside the sphere of “Overlord.” The control of all our combined operations and world strategy must rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington under the final direction of the Heads of Governments. Please let me know whether there is anything wrong with this.