Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (101 page)

2
“UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello Begins Final Journey Home,” August 22, 2003, &Cr=xxxx&Cr1=#.

3
Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General Mourns Loss of ‘Dear Friend’ Sergio Vieira de Mello, Memorial Service in Rio de Janeiro,” August 23, 2003, online at Press/docs/2003/sgsm8829.doc.htm.Vieira de Mello’s “dying wish,” which quickly entered popular lore, was not mentioned in the press before Sevan’s tarmac speech on August 22. The following day the
Washington Post
published an article with the headline: “ ‘Don’t Let Them Pull the U.N. Out of Iraq’; Envoy’s Final Words Related by Army Sergeant Who Tried to Free Him.”

4
Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General’s Press Encounter with the Ambassadors of Malaysia, Cuba and South Africa Regarding the Attack on the United Nations in Baghdad,” August 22, 2003.

5
Liana Melo and Rita Moraes, “Energia e paixão Com a mesma intensidade que trabalhava, o diplomata reconstruía a vida afetiva” (Energy and Passion:With the Same Intensity with Which He Worked, the Diplomat Reconstructed His Personal Life),
Istoe,
August 27, 2003.

6
On August 21 the FBI also got a confession of sorts. A previously unknown group, the Armed Vanguards of the Second Mohammed Army, claimed responsibility. "We say it proudly that we did not hesitate for one moment to kill crusader blood,” said the group. In a typewritten statement in Arabic sent to the Dubai-based satellite TV channel al-Arabiya, they pledged “to continue fighting every foreigner [in Iraq] and to carry out similar operations.” Brian Whitaker, “Mystery Group Says It Planted Baghdad Bomb,”
Guardian,
August 22, 2003. Suspicion also fell upon Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, who on August 11 had told the Arab media that the “enemies of Islam” were not only the United States, the U.K., and Jews, but also “the UN and other international organizations.” Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 28, 2003. The Associated Press reported on the contents of the two-page message from Mullah Omar, written in Pashtu, which said: “Oh Muslims, know the enemies of your religion—the Jews and Christians. America, Britain, the UN and all Western aid groups are the greatest enemies of Islam and humanity.” Kathy Gannon, “Reclusive Taliban Leader Calls International Aid Groups ‘Enemy of Islam,’” Associated Press, August 12, 2003.

7
Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 22, 2003.

8
Ramiro Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 27, 2003. Among the 4,233 Iraqi staff, 2,830 worked in the northern governorates, 157 in central Iraq, 935 in Baghdad, and 311 in southern Iraq. Kevin Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 23, 2003.

9
Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 25, 2003.

10
Ibid.

11
Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 28, 2003.

12
Iraq Steering Group meeting, September 11, 2003.

13
Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 25, 2003. On August 24 UN security reviewed the ten hotels being used by UN staff and required staff to leave five of them. Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 25, 2003.

14
Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, September 1, 2003.

15
Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, September 2, 2003.

16
Kevin Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 10, 2003.

17
Iraq Steering Group meeting, September 8, 2003.

18
Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 3, 5, and 11, 2003.

19
Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 5, 2003.

20
Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 7 and 8, 2003.

21
Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 16, 2003.

22
Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, online at (hereinafter Ahtisaari report).

23
Kevin Kennedy was the rare UN official who agreed with Annan. Afraid of stranding Iraqi staff, he wrote to New York: “The UN should only leave if a direct, sustained threat, indicative of an organized campaign against United Nations personnel, premises or programmes, was established.” Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 11, 2003.

24
“Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Remarks to the Memorial Ceremony in Honour of Colleagues Killed in the Bombing of the United Nations Mission in Baghdad,” September 19, 2003.

25
Internal UN Discussion Draft, Planning Assumptions, September 19, 2003.

26
Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Anthony Shadid, “Gunmen Injure U.S. Appointed Iraqi Official,”
Washington Post,
September 21, 2003, p. A1.

27
David Filipov, “Rebuilding Iraq: New Strains after Iraq Blast; UN to Reconsider Staffing Levels,”
Boston Globe,
September 23, 2003, p. A1.

28
Kevin Kennedy,“Baghdad Update #3: SMT Recommendations,” September 22, 2003. On the suggestion of Kevin Kennedy, the SMT included a caveat that if the secretary-general deemed it necessary, a small voluntary presence of international staff could be maintained in Baghdad to provide leadership to national staff, to liaise with the CPA and the Governing Council, and to continue beefing up security at the Canal Hotel. SMT,“For Consideration of the Steering Group on Iraq, Concept of Operations for a Core Presence in Baghdad, 22 September 2003.” In a follow-up memo on September 24, Kennedy elaborated on the functions of this core presence. “A UN international presence, regardless of size, is more than mere symbolism; it indicates visible commitment and involvement. Ongoing discussions of a future role for the organization will be affected if the UN withdraws all international staff from Iraq and even a small presence can perform a critical role.” The abandonment of national staff weighed on him: “National Officers, regardless of experience and rank, will not get the same access or reaction from the Coalition, should assistance be required on an urgent basis.” In addition “a complete departure of international staff may have a direct impact on the continued deliverance of NGO programmes.” Kennedy also noted the UN’s experience with reconstruction and the assistance UN officials were giving civilian contractors and Coalition engineers. “If all internationals leave, that work, for the most part, will cease, making a larger re-entry more difficult.” The proposed core team included nineteen UN officials. “Concept of Operations for Core International Presence in Iraq,” September 25, 2003.

29
Kennedy, "Baghdad Update #3.”

30
In April 2004 Lopes da Silva was named country director of the World Food Program operation in Sudan.

31
Gil Loescher, online diary, .

32
Annan’s report to the Security Council in August 2004 said that the security of UN staff would be the “overarching guiding principle” for all UN activities in Iraq. In December 2004 Annan announced the creation at Headquarters of the UN Department of Safety and Security, for which the General Assembly added $53.6 million to the UN’s regular budget. The Department of Safety and Security would have 383 posts, 134 of them temporary. See .

33
Al-Kurdi said he had also been involved in the September 22 attack, dropping off the car used by the bomber. He was involved in a November 12, 2003, attack on the Italian police headquarters in Nasiriyah, killing nineteen Italians, the first Italian casualties in the Iraq war and the worst single loss of life for Italy since World War II. Twenty Italians were wounded. At least eight Iraqis were killed, and more than fifty wounded. He also owned up to the assassination of Izziden Salim, the former president of the Iraqi Governing Council. Al-Kurdi was arrested on January 15, 2005, and testified on March 30 before the Iraqi Central Criminal Court.

34
All quotes in the confession taken from Ashraf Jehengir Qazi to Ibrahim Gambari, “Meeting with Awraz Abd Al Aziz Mahmoud Sa’eed, aka Al Kurdi,” Code Cable CZX-251, July 3, 2006.

2
SVDM, “The World’s Conscience: The UN Facing the Irrational in History,” inaugural lecture at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, November 2, 2000, p. 11.

3
Ibid., p. 6.

4
SVDM, “Global Governance and the UN,” address to annual meeting of Trilateral Commission,Tokyo, 2000.

5
SVDM, “War and Politics: The Humanitarian Deceit,” written 1998, unpublished, p. 2.

6
Ibid., p. 4.

7
SVDM, “The World’s Conscience,” p. 11.

8
SVDM, “The Future of UN State-Building,” International Peace Academy conference, October 18-19, 2002, .

9
Ibid.

10
Ibid.

11
Ibid.

12
SVDM, “War and Politics,” p. 10.

13
SVDM, “Challenges in Peacekeeping: Past, Present and Future,” New York, October 29, 2002.

14
SVDM, “Philosophical History and Real History: The Relevance of Kant’s Political Thought in Current Times,” Geneva International Peace Research Institute, December 4, 1991.

15
SVDM, “The World’s Conscience,” p. 11.