Carthage Must Be Destroyed (71 page)

41
Diodorus 23.1.4.

42
Walbank 1985, 90.

43
Broughton 1951–6, I: 229; Badian 1958, 36–43; Hoyos 1998, 122.

44
Polybius 3.28.1–2, 3.15.9–11.

45
Ibid. 7.4.1–2; Livy 24.6.4–8.

46
This can also be seen in the treaties that he later agreed with some Greek cities in Italy, which recognized their political freedoms (Hoyos 1998, 268).

47
De Angelis & Garstad 2006, 213–25; Malkin 2005.

48
Diodorus had extensively used Sicilian Greek authors such as Timaeus, and perhaps also Silenus (La Bua 1966, 249–52, 277–9; Vattoune 2002, 217–22; Pearson 1987, 11–12, 24–5).

49
Dionysius 1.41.1.

50
Fox 1993, 144–5; Rawlings 2005, 169–70.

51
Dionysius 1.41.1–2.

52
Ibid. 1.42.2–3.

53
Ibid. 1.42.4.

54
Twelve inscriptions have so far been found in the Oscan language spoken in these areas. In a recent essay, Guy Bradley (2005) has persuasively argued that many of the commonly assumed reasons for the popularity of Hercules in central Italy, such as Samnite bellicosity and local religious ‘beliefs’, are heavily influenced by later Roman and modern constructions of what these peoples were like.

55
Villaronga 1973, Series XI.

56
Onasander 10.26, tr. Daly 2002, 137.

57
Daly 2002, 135.

58
Athenaeus 6.246c–d. For Hannibal’s skills in motivating and controlling his Celtic warriors see Rawlings 1996, 88–9. For his use of Melqart, Heracles, Hercules and perhaps Gallic and Libyan deities to bring coherency to his ethnically diverse army see Brizzi 1984a, 150.

59
Dio 13.54.4.

60
Vegetius
Pref
. 3. Daly (2002, 88) must be correct in his assertion that there is no evidence of Sosylus fulfilling a military function for Hannibal.

61
Livy 21.21.9.

62
According to the later Greek geographer Strabo (2.145), who himself cited Polybius as the source of his information, the spring flowed inversely to the movement of the sea tide, falling with the flood and filling up at the ebb. Polybius had tried to furnish a scientific explanation for this strange phenomenon, developing a complex argument that revolved around the expulsion of air from the depth of the earth, but his ideas were not accepted by all. Silenus was reported as having his own theory about the workings of the spring, although Strabo fails to tell us what they were, preferring instead to dismiss Silenus as a layman who had no understanding of such complex matters. However, the fact that this spring was associated with Heracles–Melqart strongly suggests that this may have been the root of Silenus’ interest in it, and that his theory had some kind of association with the god/ hero (Briquel 2004). It is only in a much later fanciful Roman account, Silius Italicus’
Punica
, that we are furnished with any details of Hannibal’s visit. It is likely that Silius, with a little poetic licence, was describing what the temple looked like in his own day, over 250 years after Hannibal’s visit. Yet it is striking how the Semitic aspects of the cult had survived. Silius describes how the timber from which the temple was built had never decayed and how neither women nor swine were allowed to cross its threshold. Its shaven-headed, barefoot priests wore long robes and headbands and took a vow of celibacy. In the temple itself the fires by the altar were kept permanently alight, and no statues or images of the gods were allowed.

63
Cicero
Div
. 1.49 (Coelius Fr. 11).

64
Hannibal’s dream appears to have intrigued ancient Greek and Roman writers as much as it has modern scholars. There are three other surviving versions of the story: in Livy (21.22.5–9), in Silius Italicus (
Pun
. 3.163–213) and in Dio (13.56.9, copied in Zonaras 8.22). These other versions of the tale appear to have adapted the story to place it in a far more sinister and indeed more hostile light. Modern commentators have understandably focused on the differences between these versions in the context of the role that dreams played in Roman historiography. For Levene (1993, 45–6) the crucial transformation between the Ciceronian and Livian accounts is that, whereas in the former it is the dream that convinces Hannibal to undertake the invasion of Italy, Livy has it that he had already decided on this course of action, meaning that the Carthaginian general’s campaign may have been temporally supported by the gods, but was not divinely ordained. Pelling (1997, 202–4) sees the Livian account as clearly signposting divine ambivalence towards Hannibal and his cause (‘He must ask no more questions. He should allow destiny to remain in darkness’), with the reader, who already knows what fate has in store for Hannibal, being complicit in this. Stübler (1941, 95–6) takes this idea even further, describing Hannibal’s joy at what he is told as a form of blindness. See also Cipriani 1984.

65
Valerius Maximus, 1.7, ext. 1.

66
For the dream offering divine sanction to bolster the resolve of Hannibal’s troops see Seibert 1993, 186–7. For the identity of the guide see most recently the very persuasive arguments of Briquel (2004)
contra
the suggestion of Foulon (2003) that the divine messenger was in fact the god Mercury Aletes.

67
Rawlings 2005, 158–61.

68
D’Arco 2002, 160–1.

69
Polybius 3.47.7–9.

70
Livy 21.41.7.

71
More generally on the accusations of impiety levelled at Hannibal see Fucecchi 1990.

1
Polybius 3.34.3–6.

2
Ibid. 3.35; Livy 21.23.4–6.

3
Livy 21.24.2.

4
Ibid. 21.24.5.

5
Archaeological evidence for contemporary conflict and the destruction of native oppida (fortified hilltop settlements) in the region during this period may well be connected to the Carthaginian presence (Barruol 1976, 683). Seibert (1993, 110) has argued for the establishment of garrisons along the route, but Morel (1986, 43) has pointed out that the Carthaginian amphorae and other artefacts found at these sites by archaeologists probably owe more to the activities of Punic merchants in the region. Lancel (1999, 66) argues further that manning garrisons would have quickly depleted Hannibal’s troops.

6
I have taken Lancel’s excellent study as my guide for Hannibal’s route to Italy. For a detailed discussion of the multitude of different scholarly and unscholarly opinions on his itinerary see Lancel 1999, 57–80.

7
Polybius 3.42–3, 3.45–6; Livy 21.26.6–21.28.12.

8
Polybius 3.36.

9
Ibid. 3.48.

10
Polybius claims, by contrast, that it was a new generation of Gallic leaders who had not experienced their forebears’ bitter struggles with the Romans who provoked conflict in 225 BC. See Vishnia 1996, 17–18.

11
Polybius 2.13.6. See also Florus 1.19.2.

12
See Vishnia 1996, 13–25.

13
Indeed, it would not be until after the end of the Second Punic War that Rome managed partially to regain control of the region. For a full account of the Roman conquest of Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria see Toynbee 1965, 252–85.

14
For Graeco-Roman stereotyping of the Celtic peoples and other tribal peoples see Rawlings 1996, 84–5.

15
Rawlings 1996, 86–7 on Celtic warfare.

16
Polybius 2.19, 2.21. See Rawlings 1996, 82.

17
Dio 14.6b.

18
Polybius 25.16. For Hannibal’s disguises see ibid. 3.78; Zonaras 8.24; Livy 22.1.

19
Polybius 3.40.1–3.41.5; Livy 21.25.1–21.26.5.

20
Polybius 3.44.1–3.45.4; Livy 21.29.

21
Polybius 3.49.1–4; Livy 21.32.1–5.

22
Polybius 3.49.5–3.50.2; Livy 21.31.1–12.

23
Ammianus Marcellinus 15.10.4–6.

24
Polybius 3.50.3–3.53.8; Livy 21.32.6–21.35.3.

25
Livy 21.35.8–9.

26
Ibid. 21.36.7–8. Polybius (3.54.4–3.55.4) also gives an account of the terrible difficulties both men and beasts had with the icy conditions.

27
Livy 21.37.2–3. See Polybius 3.55.6–9 for a similar but far less exciting version of this story.

28
Ammianus Marcellinus 15.10.2.

29
I have once again followed Lancel’s sensible suggestions concerning Hannibal’s route over the Alps.

30
Ammianus Marcellinus 15.10.9–10.

31
Polybius 3.56.3–4; Livy 21.38.2–5.

32
Polybius 3.60.8–10; Livy 21.38.4.

33
Polybius 3.56.5–6; Livy 21.39.3.

34
Polybius 3.63. See also Livy 21.42.

35
Livy 21.43–4.

36
Ibid. 21.46.10; Polybius 3.65.1–8.

37
Polybius 3.66, 3.67.3; Livy 21.48.10.

38
For a detailed account of Hannibal’s tactics at the Trebia see Goldsworthy 2000, 173–81.

39
Polybius 3.68.11–3.75.3; Livy 21.52.1–21.56.8.

40
Polybius 3.77.4. For Hannibal’s other efforts, some unsuccessful, to persuade the Italians to desert the Romans see David 1996, 55–60.

41
Polybius 3.74.11. Livy’s (21.57–9) account of Hannibal campaigning in that winter is confused and nonsensical (Lancel 1999, 89; Goldsworthy 2000, 181).

42
Polybius 3.79; Livy 22.2.

43
Livy 22.4–6; Polybius 3.82.9–3.84.15. Goldsworthy 2000, 181–90.

44
Polybius 3.85.3–4; Livy 22.7.

45
Polybius 3.86.1–5; Livy 22.8.1–2.

46
Livy 22.1.10.

47
Ibid. 21.62. The celestial consort of Hercules, Juventas, was also invoked, and again a second time in 207 (Livy 36.36.5–6). See also Rawlings 2005, 162.

48
Polybius 3.86.8–3.87.5; Livy 22.9.1–6.

49
Livy 22.7.6–14 (quote = 22.7.9); Polybius 3.85.7–10.

50
Polybius 3.87.6–9; Livy 22.8.6–7.

51
Plutarch
Fab
. 5.1–2.

52
Polybius 3.88.1–3.92.7; Livy 22.11.1–22.13.11; Plutarch
Fab
. 5.3.

53
Polybius 3.90.6; Livy 22.14.

54
Livy 30.26.9.

55
Ibid. 22.23.2–8.

56
Plutarch
Fab
. 6.

57
Polybius 3.92.8–3.94.6; Livy 22.15.11–22.18.4.

58
Polybius 3.101.1–3.105.3; Livy 22.23.1–22.27.11.

59
ILLRP
118; Rawlings 2005, 161.

60
Livy 22.9.7–11.

61
Gruen 1992, 22–9; Galinsky 1969, 160–63.

62
Polybius 1.55.6.

63
Polybius 1.58.2, 1.58.7–8; Diodorus 24.8.

64
Schilling 1954, 243.

65
Ibid., 235–9.

66
The exploitation of Rome’s Trojan ‘heritage’ may also be seen in the priests’ injunction to construct a temple to
Mens
, a quality often associated with clear-headed calculation and composure–those qualities attributed by Greek authors to Aeneas himself. By constructing a temple to
Mens
, Fabius was thus perhaps attempting to convince the Roman public that his patient, unglamorous tactics were in fact deeply rooted in Roman tradition.

67
Plutarch
Fab
. 5.1.

68
Of particular significance in this regard was the goddess Juno, the consort of Jupiter, who was commonly associated with the Punic goddesses Astarte and Tanit, and to whom the Romans made a series of gifts to appease her with regard to both their own city and those in Latium during the terrible run of defeats of 218/217. See Livy 21.62.9, 22.1.

69
Ibid. 25.1.6–9.

70
Ibid. 25.1.10–11.

71
Ibid. 22.10.2–6.

72
Ibid. 22.36.1–5; Polybius 3.107.9–15.

73
Livy 22.38.6–22.41.3.

74
Polybius 3.110.1–3.112.9; Livy 22.41.1–22.45.4.

75
Livy 22.45.5–22.46.7; Polybius 3.113.1–3.114.8.

76
Livy 22.47.

77
Ibid. 22.47.1–22.49.18; Polybius 3.115.1–3.117.12. For detailed descriptions of the actual battle see Daly 2002; Lancel 1999, 103–8; Goldsworthy 2000, 198–214.

78
Livy 22.51.5–9.

79
Ibid. 22.49.16–17. For the escape of Varro see Polybius 3.116.13; Livy 22.49.14.

80
Livy 22.51.1–4.

81
Lancel 1999, 96–7; Lazenby 1978, 85–6. Lazenby (1996, 41) also points out that it would have taken Hannibal’s army much longer than the five days that Maharbal suggested to reach Rome.

82
Lazenby 1978, 41–6.

83
Livy 22.58.1–9.

84
Polybius 6.58.1–13; Livy 22.59.1–22.61.10.

85
Livy 22.58.3.

1
Livy 35.14.5–8.

2
Ibid. 35.14.9.

3
P. Green 1986, 231.

4
Livy 23.4.8.

5
Livy 23.6.1–3. Hannibal’s promise of freedom for the Italians is treated with scepticism by Erskine (1993), who argues that it was a Greek concept and probably therefore an invention of Polybius. For an analysis of the Capuans’ motivations for switching allegiance to Hannibal see Fronda 2007.

6
Livy 23.7.1–2.

7
Ibid. 23.7.3.

8
Ibid. 23.10.1–2.

9
Ibid. 23.8.1–23.9.13.

10
Ibid. 23.7.4–12, 23.10.3–10.