Call Sign Extortion 17 (21 page)

Chapter 33

Enemy “Squirters” on the Ground Prior to Shoot-­Down

There were enemy insurgents all over the ground prior to the shoot-­down, and those enemy insurgents posed a grave concern to the aircraft accompanying Extortion 17.

The word “squirters” appeared throughout Exhibit 1 (initial interview of Joint Task Force commander, operations officer, and others), Exhibit 40 (interview of AC-130 aircrew), Exhibit 54 (helicopter gun tape) and other exhibits.

Basically, a “squirter” in Afghan war parlance means an enemy combatant (Taliban) on the ground. In fact, at pages 97–98 of Exhibit 1, the J3 officer, the operations officer of the Joint Special Operations Task Force, defined squirters as “enemy combatants based on hostile intent that they assessed.”

Remember that this same officer, the J3, was the guy who started to provide an analysis of why seven unidentified Afghans were allowed to board Extortion 17, and then was abruptly cut off by his boss, the Joint Special Operations Task Force commander.

A good portion of the conversation on the Apache gun tape (Exhibit 54) leading up to the shoot-­down of Extortion 17 involved keeping track of squirters on the ground.

As Extortion 17 was attempting to fly into landing position, all three other aircraft with offensive capabilities, the two Apaches and the AC-130 Gunship, were talking constantly about the position of these enemy combatants, aka squirters, moving all over the ground.

At Exhibit 53, page 29, General Colt asked the Apache crews about their surveillance of the landing zone and whether they were actually watching Extortion 17 as it approached the Landing Zone. The co-­pilot of the Apache helicopter known as Gun 1 testified that he was watching squirters on the ground and, even up to the time Extortion 17 was attempting to land, was concerned about safety considerations on the ground right up to landing [author's emphasis].

 

General Colt:
And that point you had already made a definitive LZ (Landing Zone) reconnaissance. Just tell us about, in your eyes, what you felt you saw. We, obviously, have the gun tape, so we captured that. But in your own thoughts now, what do you think about the posture of in the surrounding area? What did you observe?

PB65FS (Apache Co-­Pilot):
From Gun 1—I will let Gun 2 speak. But Gun 1, my biggest threat was the squirters. So I never put eyes on [Extortion 17]. I was more worried about finding the squirters that would pose a threat to our guys when they were landing or when they were infilling the aircraft. Gun 2 had made COMMs, and had eyes on the LZ. But I was still trying to get eyes on the threat. I mean, that was up until they started giving 6, 3, and 1-minute calls.

 

The co-­pilot's concern continued at page 34 of exhibit 53:

 

PB65FS (Apache Co-­Pilot):
—because we were inside the valley, and we knew that they were outside the valley. Honestly, they were outside our area. And we were so worried about the squirters and lead that it wasn't that important for us to know exactly where they [Extortion 17] were holding.

 

Incredibly, despite the dangers that these enemy combatants on the ground posed to the approaching helicopter and despite the grave concern of the US pilots in aircraft accompanying Extortion 17 on its final mission, American military officials denied permission to the AC-130 gunship to attack them from the air and did not allow pre-­assault fire into
the landing zone, all of which might have saved the lives of the Extortion 17 crewmembers.

In the minutes leading up to the Extortion 17 shoot-­down, the AC-130
requested permission
to fire on enemy squirters on the ground. In this exchange from Exhibit 40, page 6 and 7, the question was being asked by the SME-­JSOAC, who is the Special Missions Expert—Joint Special Operations Air Command. This officer was interviewing both the navigator and the pilot (commander) of the AC-130 gunship,
who both testify that they were prohibited (by the rules of engagement) from firing at the enemy on the ground
[author's emphasis]:

 

SME-­JSOAC:
So just to be able to provide fire support if needed. Is this your standard TTP? [TTP stands for Tactics, Technique, and Procedures]

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER:
Really quick an important point I think at this juncture is,
we had requested to engage those two individuals and we were denied
—

 

Two pages later, at page 9 of Exhibit 40, the navigator of the AC-130 testified that the gunship was not allowed to fire on the enemy combatant squirters, but instead, was told to watch them on the ground and report their positions [author's emphasis]:

 

NAVIGATOR:
Basically like we said we were passing periodic updates to the first one we passed was when the squirters were 200 meters away. . . .
They said they didn't want us to engage; what he passed to us was that they wanted to follow those guys and figure out where they stopped.
And then find out exactly where they were and then basically use that as follow-­on after they were done clearing and securing the actual Lefty Grove site.

 

Further evidence of the rules of engagement preventing pre-­assault fire appeared at Exhibit 53 of the Colt Report. In this exhibit Colt and his team were interviewing five men, including the pilot and co-­pilot of each of the two Apaches that were in the air with Extortion 17, and also
the Helicopter Task Force commander, the immediate boss of the four pilots being interviewed.

Consider this testimony from the co-­pilot of one of the Apache helicopters (Gun 1), at pages 14–15, in response to a question from Brigadier General Colt about pre-­assault fires:

 

Apache Co-­Pilot:
“We have to take the 47s in on all the LZs . . . We are not cleared for pre-­assault fires or anything like that . . .”

 

The Ground Force Special Missions Expert then asked a follow-­up question at page 69 of the exhibit, which generated this response, first from the helicopter task force commander at page 70: “And to get back to your question about pre-­assault fires, the ROE and the tactical directorate are pretty specific about what we can and can't do.” To this comment, the Ground Force Special Missions expert immediately responds, “From my experience, pre-­assault fires are next to impossible.”

In other words, even though the AC-130 gunship specifically requested permission for pre-­assault fire, the rules of engagement prevented US military aircraft from clearing out the landing zone to ensure a safer landing for Extortion 17.

The purpose of this ludicrous rule, by the way, prohibiting pre-­assault fire, was to appease the Afghan government, which had launched protests to the Obama Administration about the practices. The Administration acquiesced to that demand and ordered the US military to refrain from pre-­assault fire, which was ultimately why the landing zone was not cleared of hostile RPG-­toting Taliban insurgents, and why Bryan Nichols, David Carter, and the SEAL team members lost their lives that day.

Chapter 34

Hypocrisies and Inconsistencies in the Rules of Engagement

To further illustrate the ludicrousness of the US rules of engagement as set down by US military planners in Washington, and the haphazard application of those rules, the record shows that on two occasions, within two hours after the shoot-­down, US helicopters were in fact firing rounds into the ground in the area of the attack. The first chopper provided post-­assault fire that came seconds after the shoot-­down (see below), and a second chopper poured pre-­suppression fire into the landing area before US Army Pathfinders, dispatched to secure the wreck scene, landed on the ground (see next chapter).

In the emotional and adrenaline-­charged seconds following the shoot-­down, one of the Apache helicopters broke protocol, broke the rules of engagement, and opened fire into the ground, attempting to fire in the area of the RPG attack. This burst of fire came at 0240:18, just thirty seconds after the shoot-­down at 0239:48 (Enclosure H, page 5).

In the exchange below, note what the pilot said, and note also, how in the aftermath, Brigadier General Colt seems to put the pilot on the defensive in his questioning of that decision to open fire.

At 22:11:43 Zulu time (2:41:43 a.m. local time), seconds after the shoot-­down, the gun-­tape (Exhibit 54) reveals the co-­pilot of the Apache helicopter closest to Extortion 17 making these comments.

 

Roger, we are circling overhead. I saw where the [EXPLETIVE] explosion came from, man. I'm searching the buildings. If I see [EXPLETIVE] anybody with a weapon, I'm firing.

 

These comments on the gun tape were made one minute and twenty-­five seconds after one of the Apaches first fired at 2:40:18 AM. The record isn't clear which of the Apaches fired first, and which fired second. All that is clear is that the Apaches did not fire until after the shoot-­down.

But with Extortion 17 in flames on the ground, that Apache helicopters, either on or both of them, did, in fact, almost immediately open fire in the aftermath of the shooting. For that, the pilot was treated to a thorough cross-­examination by Brigadier General Colt.

First off, note that Colt tried to frame his questions in a way that suggests that the squirters (enemy Taliban) who were spotted on the ground from overhead aircraft were not close enough to Extortion to pose a threat.

That supposition is rebuffed by the co-­pilot of Apache 1, who testified that the squirters could have been at the landing zone site for Extortion 17 (Exhibit 53, pages 73–74).

 

BG COLT:
For clarification, you said “that's where the threat was.” You are still referring to the Alpha and Bravo. But in your assessment from Alpha and Bravo, those forces at the time could not have applied effective fires against the aircraft on its approach to the LZ?

Apache Co-­Pilot:
Not the approach. But when they would have been at their LZ, they would have been within—from Bravo, I believe it was close to 600 meters . . . But those guys—the reason why we saw them as such a threat is because they had squirted from a place where [they] had just engaged six individuals that were heavily armed moving in a very military manner.

 

So we assessed that these guys were trained military. They weren't just five guys that picked up a weapon for a weekend of fun. These guys were legitimately, to me, the real thing, and that's where we saw the threat.

It's very clear that the Apache crews viewed the squirters as mortal danger to Extortion 17.

Two points: First, neither the Apaches nor the AC-130 were allowed to fire against Taliban insurgents on the ground considered to be a threat to Extortion 17. These insurgents, by the way, were all over the ground, posing a threat to Extortion 17. They were not in some building 220 meters away.

Second, when the Apache fired immediately after Extortion 17 was shot down, General Colt grilled the Apache pilot as if the pilot were under cross-­examination, asking the pilot if it was generally the pilot's procedure to engage a point of origin without positively identifying a target:

Consider this exchange, from page 40 of Exhibit 53:

 

BG COLT:
Is it a general TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] of yours to engage a POO—or suppress, I should say, a POO without PIDing the target?

PB65FS: (Apache Co-­Pilot):
Sir, I wouldn't say it's a TTP. I saw when they went down. And if there was any survivors, I wanted suppression fire to be placed where I thought the POO was.

 

The Apache co-­pilot's testimony went on to say that the Apache fired between seventy and one hundred rounds in the area near the downed chopper to prevent anyone from approaching it. The co-­pilot testified that they believed that the RPGs might have been fired from a qualat, which is a primitive Afghan compound made of a mud-­brick substance.

The implication from General Colt here was, “look, you shouldn't have fired unless you positively identified your targets as the enemy.” Also, it was in the military's best interests to suggest that the RPG was fired some 220 meters away from a building. In this way, they can argue that their failure to allow pre-­assault fire did not contribute to the SEAL team's deaths. In other words, “pre-­assault fire wouldn't have helped because the shot was fired from out yonder.” If the Apache pilot fired into the ground after the shoot-­down, that suggests the shot might have been fired from
somewhere other than the building 220 meters away. The military brass couldn't have that.

Again, there were contradictory reports from multiple witnesses about the true point of origin of the attack. The Combat Assessment Team at Bagram Air Base concluded that the “Point of origin was never positively identified or actioned” (Exhibit 60, page 42).

Regardless, the absurd point here is that the Apache was allowed to, or rather got away with, firing
after
the shoot-­down, i.e., post-­assault fire, but wasn't allowed to protect the SEALs by firing pre-­assault rounds before the shoot-­down.

Chapter 35

Indefensible Inconsistency: Pathfinders Get Pre-­Assault Fire but SEALs Don't

Adding insult to injury, the US Army's Pathfinder team, the team that goes in to help secure the area on the ground after a crash or shoot-­down of a US military aircraft, was, unlike the Navy SEAL team, protected with pre-­assault fire before it landed. This occurred less than two hours after the shoot-­down of the SEAL team, at 4:14 a.m. This was revealed in the interview of the Pathfinder commander, at Exhibit 65 of the Colt Report, and also at Enclosure H.

Remember that the shoot-­down takes place at 239:48 a.m. (Enclosure H to Colt Report).

At 4:14 a.m., with the US Army Pathfinders unit now in helicopters approaching the landing zone adjacent to the downed Extortion 17, the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters accompanying the Pathfinders poured pre-­assault fire into the landing zone prior to the Pathfinders setting down (Enclosure H, page 7).

Then, one minute later, at 4:15 a.m., after Black Hawk helicopters have strafed the landing zone with machine-­gun fire, the Pathfinders set down, approximately 600 meters southeast of the downed Extortion 17 (Enclosure H, page 7).

The Pathfinder commander reported that the Black Hawks put a few rounds in the ground to make people scatter prior to landing. Here's that testimony from Exhibit 65, page 6 of the Colt Report.

 

SME-­MH47:
And they did pre-­assault fires into that HLZ?

TF CDR:
Roger, this time they did. Again for what we talked about earlier put a few rounds down in the field to make people duck their heads and I spoke specifically to the crews that were doing it, one of them which was our company SIP, we told him look we are coming in here we are doing it fast, deliberately, controlled, and putting him down and getting them out.

 

This exchange demonstrates a radically inconsistent application in the rules of engagement, all within a matter of ninety minutes. The SEALs were denied pre-­assault fire, which led to their deaths but the Pathfinders were given pre-­assault fire prior to landing, allowing them to land safely to secure the Extortion 17 crash site.

Common sense prevailed and the Pathfinders received pre-­assault fire before their landing at 4:15 a.m. But if common sense had prevailed earlier, and pre-­assault fire had been allowed at 2:38 a.m., the SEALs could have landed safely, and there would have been no need to deploy the Pathfinders to the scene.

Remember, the math showed the shooter was between 119 feet and 178 feet from ground zero (the ground under the chopper when it was struck by the RPG). This is significant, because either one of the two Apache helicopters flying with Extortion 17 or the AC-130 gunship could have easily sprayed that area with gunfire to clear it out, which most likely would have saved American lives. But the rules of engagement for this mission foolishly prevented pre-­assault fire.

The US Navy SEAL team was not given the same protection as the US Army Pathfinder team, and the US military has given no cogent explanation for the foolish and inexcusable decision to deliberately deny pre-­assault fire for the SEAL team and the Americans aboard Extortion 17.

As long as the US military remains in Afghanistan, or in any area where known insurgents are on the ground with RPGs and other weapons
capable of shooting down US aircraft, as was clearly the case with the Tangi Valley on the morning of this shoot-­down, the rules of engagement should be changed to always allow pre-­assault fire into a landing zone to save American lives. Political correctness should not come into play when it comes to saving American lives.