Bomber Command (73 page)

Beaverbrook, Lord
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Bell, George
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Bennett, Donald

appointed 8 Group
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raid on Kassel
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operation planning
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relations with Cochrane
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and bombing short
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insists on ‘no heroes’
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scorns low-level marking
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loses squadrons to Cochrane
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closeness to operational reality
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Berchtesgaden
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Berlin
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Berlin, Battle of
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Bernal, Professor
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Bethune
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Bf109G, specifications
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Bf110G, specifications
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Bielefeld Viaduct
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Biggin Hill Experiment
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Billancourt
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Birch
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Birdling
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Birmingham
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‘Black Mac’
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‘Black Thursday’
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Blackett, Pat
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Blair, Donald
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Blenheim Operational Training Unit
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Blenheims

accident rate
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ill-fitted as daylight bombers
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phased out
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specifications
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as stop-gap bomber
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Bochum
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Bodney
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Bomber Command

restriction to military targets
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knowledge of German radar capacity
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lack of preparedness before the war
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1936 reorganization
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daylight attacks
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bombing restrictions lifted
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operations against towns
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oil offensive
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support for the Navy
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influence of Churchill on
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results achieved by
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Butt Report
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4,000 bomber plan
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area bombing
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increasing casualties
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new range of equipment
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bombing constraints removed
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Harris takes over
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publicity and public relations
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moves into technological age
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against proscription
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aircraft
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Casablanca Conference
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lack of co-ordination with 8th Air Force
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and American dominance in the air
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Pointblank
Directive
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introduction of Mosquitoes
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German knowledge of
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Headquarters
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grasp of reality in bombed Germany
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Target intelligence
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morale
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SHAEF command of
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invasion support
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Transport Plan
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oil targets
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resumption of daylight attacks
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support for ground operations
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reverts from SHAEF
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raids on Dresden
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bomber production
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bombing

aircraft production plants
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area bombing
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ball-bearing factories
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Berlin Method
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bomb sights
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bomb-aiming
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constraints removed
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damage assessment
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daylight bombing resumed
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debriefing
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effectiveness of
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enemy morale
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escort fighters
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on ETA
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German counter-measures
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German defences
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‘Grand Slam’ bomb
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ground support sorties
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identification of targets
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lack of follow through
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last resort targets
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location of targets
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low level attacks
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Master Bomber technique
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moral questions of
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navigation
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new equipment
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off-set marking
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oil targets
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planning raids at HQ
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post-war assessment
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precision bombing
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