Beyond Belief (33 page)

The American press's treatment of this news was strangely cyclical. It had long thought of the story as unconfirmed rumor or the pleading of special interests. Therefore it reported the news but maintained a skeptical disinterest and treated the information in a circumspect fashion. One of the ways it did so was by relegating it to obscure corners of the paper. Then, once the news—all of it together—was confirmed, the press treated it as an old story, news it had, in the words of the
Atlanta Constitution
, “gotten used to” and “merely something to be expected from Nazidom.”

It is instructive once again to contrast the British reaction with the American one. The news of a Nazi program to annihilate the Jews had a profound impact in Britain, which was beset, according to the Archbishop of Canterbury, by a “burning indignation.” Religious and political leaders repeatedly spoke out during this period and refused to let the matter rest. This reaction was the result, in part, of the way the British press treated the topic. On December 4 the
London Times
, the flagship of the British press and a paper which eschewed fanfare, published an article with a direct and chilling headline:

N
AZI WAR ON JE
WS

DELIBERATE PLAN FOR EXTERMINATION

In it the paper cited “evidence from Berlin and from Poland itself” which gave the “bleakest possible picture.” It left “no doubt that
the German authorities are dealing with Polish Jews more drastically and more savagely than ever before.” According to the article, London had known for several weeks that “the worst of Hitler's threats was being literally applied.” There were no disclaimers or riders. The
London Times
article elicited a prompt call from the Archbishop of Canterbury for immediate action. He argued in a letter to the paper that at the very least Britain “might offer to receive here any Jews who are able to escape the clutches of the Nazis.”
⁷⁰
*

On the same day that the Archbishop's letter appeared in the
Times
, the
Manchester Guardian
urged the Allies to issue a joint statement “putting on record their knowledge, and the proofs, of this annihilation policy” and formally indicating that these were “war crimes for which retribution will most surely be exacted.” For the next few weeks the British press, led by these two prominent papers, kept a spotlight on the issue and demanded that something be done. The
Manchester Guardian
also called on Britain to “lend all aid to the rescue of such Jews as somehow get away.” On December 8 it argued that it was incumbent on the Allies to “find ways to do more than mourn.” The
Guardian
recommended that the BBC spread the facts and that a program to aid escaping refugees be established. Two days later the
Guardian
reiterated its call for “practical steps” to be taken in response to the “massacre of the Jews.” It urged that a United Nations conference be convened and that a policy to help Jews reach neutral countries be instituted. Other British papers repeated this demand for action. On December 7 the
Times
described the terror being inflicted on Jews as a “European pogrom” which had been “carefully prepared.” It had become apparent to the
London Times
that for many Jews “transportation means death.”
⁷²

British officials soon began to react to this public discussion of the tragedy occurring in Europe. On the following day the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, sent a draft resolution to American Ambassador John Winant and reminded him that
there was in England “growing public interest in this question and it is therefore desirable to make our attitude known at the earliest possible moment.” The
London Times
article was considered noteworthy enough by Winant to be included in a telegram he sent to the Secretary of State on December 7.
⁷³
On December 12 the
London Times
, even while acknowledging that a “prerequisite of real help is victory,” urged that concern be “not so much with retribution as with aid.” At the same time that the American press was still treating this news with faint skepticism and equanimity, if not lassitude, the British press had no doubts that it was true and that action was both necessary and possible.
⁷⁴

During December the British press “call for action” was echoed by religious and political leaders as well as members of Parliament from all parties. The Bishop of Chichester, one of the most influential Anglican Church leaders, urged that a rescue program be adopted and all steps be taken to grant Jews “temporary refuge.”
⁷⁵
The Archbishop of York spoke in the House of Lords on the “appalling outrages” against Jews in Poland and called for retribution against those who are “ordering these massacres” and against the “thousands of underlings who appear to be joyfully and gladly carrying out these crimes.” The
London Times
believed the Archbishop to have given expression to the “immediate feeling that must be uppermost in every heart.”
⁷⁶

While this sentiment may have been uppermost in the hearts of many—though certainly not every heart—in London, the same could not be said of the United States and particularly of its press. The American press may have been as horrified as the British press—though in view of its treatment of the news this does not seem likely—but unlike its counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic it accepted, almost without question, the official claim that rescue could only come with victory. During the month of December the same American editorials which unequivocally decried the Jews' fate unequivocally accepted the proposition that nothing could be done. The
New York Times
bemoaned the “world's helplessness to stop the horror while the war is going on” and believed that Jews' lives would only “be accounted for at the time of reckoning,” i.e., victory, and no sooner. In its editorial condemning Nazi “savagery,” the
Los Angeles Times
did not even raise the possibility that rescue action was possible. The most the
New York World Telegram
would support was the creation
of an Allied commission to identify the guilty so that
after
the war they could be punished.
⁷⁷
As has already been shown,
The Christian Century
believed that neither kinetic nor emotional energy should be expended on this issue.

Dorothy Thompson was one of the few journalists to strongly advocate action. In her column of December 22 she called what was being done to the Jews “complete extermination” and described the victims as 5 million “human beings who, after being removed from western and central Europe to the east are being poisoned, shot, gassed, and starved to death.” She tried to organize an appeal to the German people from Americans of German background and from American Protestants. She proposed that a group of German-Americans visit the White House and ask the President to broadcast a direct appeal to the German people. None of her plans, with the exception of a full-page ad in the form of a “Christmas Declaration” which appeared in ten major metropolitan dailies, ever came to fruition. The ad was signed by fifty prominent Americans of German ancestry, including Babe Ruth, William Shirer, and Reinhold Niebuhr. The declaration did garner attention and was broadcast by the Office of War Information to Europe and to U.S. armed forces. In order to be able to place the ad, Thompson not only had to tone down the references to Jews but had to appeal to the American Jewish Congress to help defray the expenses.
⁷⁸

A few American newspapers and journals pressed for immediate action. The
New York Post
declared it “good, but not good enough” for the Allies to denounce the extermination and promise to “deal out ‘retribution'” after the war. They needed to find a “serious plan” capable of stopping the killing and rescuing those in danger.
The Nation
and
The New Republic
both argued that the Jews of occupied Europe could do with “a little less pity and a little more help.” These lonely editorial voices asked America to respond to the moral imperative of action and not to watch with indifference while the “spiritual and physical crucifixion of the Jews” proceeds apace.
⁷⁹
Their requests proved as futile as their voices were few.

In analyzing the American press reaction, one cannot ignore the degree to which government officials, particularly those in the
State Department, were staunchly opposed to publicizing this issue. From late summer 1942, when reports regarding the Final Solution began to arrive from Switzerland, Department personnel debated not only whether the charges of a plan to exterminate the Jews were true, but, if they were, whether they should be publicized. The general sentiment was that in view of the “fantastic nature of the allegations” it was better not to do so. Department officials balked at transmitting the information to Jewish representatives, such as Rabbi Wise, who might release it to the press.
⁸⁰
During this time both the United States and Britain followed a policy of using horror propaganda sparingly.
⁸¹
Late in October 1942 Drew Pearson described in his syndicated column the debate among government officials regarding the release of the stories. Those who opposed publication argued

that the atrocity stories of the last war were largely invented, and . . . left the public disillusioned; thus the people might now react unfavorably and charge the Government with pulling the same tricks.
⁸²

Allied officials also opposed publicity because they feared, or so they claimed, that the non-Jewish population of Europe would, upon learning of Nazi brutality, become so paralyzed with fright that it would terminate all its resistance efforts. It does not seem to make much sense for officials to have argued that Americans would dismiss the stories as fabrications but Europeans would accept them without reservation. This may have simply been an excuse not to release the information.

There were Department bureaucrats who argued that the reports were the product of Jewish publicity tactics and the government should in no way provide its imprimatur. When the first reports of a mass murder program reached the State Department's Division of European Affairs, it opposed release of the information because of the “impossibility of our being of any assistance.” Division officials debated whether to “pass or suppress” it.
⁸³
But for pressure from external sources, both the British Foreign Office and the State Department would have probably suppressed the information long past December 1942. One of the most ardent opponents of confirmation was R. B. Reams, the specialist on Jewish issues for the State Department's Division of European Affairs, who repeatedly stated his “grave doubts in regard to the
desirability or advisability of issuing a statement.” In December 1942 he was still telling those who inquired that the reports of mass murder were “to the best of my knowledge . . . as yet unconfirmed.” On the day before Wise and the delegation of other representatives of the Jewish community were scheduled to visit the President in order to discuss the annihilation of the Jews, Reams argued that it was necessary for Wise “to call off, or at least to tone down, the present world-wide publicity campaign concerning ‘mass murders.'” When Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York called him to obtain details on Wise's press release, Reams informed him that the reports are still “unconfirmed.” On December 15, the eve of the Allied statement, he told an official from the Latin American Section that the reports about the murder of the Jews were still not confirmed. When it became clear that he would not be able to prevent the Allies from issuing a statement, Reams tried to weaken the proposed text and to add various disclaimers to it which would shed doubt upon the existence of the Final Solution.
⁸⁴

It had long been the State Department's policy to avoid public denunciation of massacres against Jews. In 1941 Franklin Mott Gunther, American Minister in Roumania, wrote to Washington regarding “oppressive and cruel measures employed against the Jews.” Jews were being “massacred,” “executed,” and treated with “indescribable horror.” Gunther suggested a variety of steps Washington could take, all of which were ignored by the State Department.
⁸⁵

There were other American officials who did not share their colleagues' reservations or spend their energies trying to keep their government from becoming involved in this issue. In October 1942 Paul C. Squire, the American Consul in Geneva, received a signed sworn affidavit from Paul Guggenheim, a professor of international law in Geneva, attesting to the existence of an order by Hitler “demanding the extermination of the Jews.” Squire expressed his faith in the professor's “integrity, reliability and sincerity” and leaned in favor of publicizing Guggenheim's information. Squire lamented the “futile search . . . in order to find somewhere the Good Samaritan” who might help “relieve the tragic situation.”
⁸⁶

John Winant, the American Ambassador to Britain, also was among those officials who supported publicizing the news. On the same day that Reams was urging the Department to distance
itself from Wise and the reports of mass murder, Winant urged Washington to join with the British and Russians “in protesting against German terrorism and to make clear that punishment will be meted out to those responsible for Jewish atrocities.”
⁸⁷

While most American State Department officials were trying to distance themselves from the news of the Final Solution, the British Foreign Office chose a different
modus operandi
After initially following a policy marked by great reserve and telling the BBC to “soft pedal” the news of atrocities, it decided that it was “particularly important . . . to continue telling the Poles that we know about the suffering of the Jews” and to seize the opportunity to publicize British anger. Among the reasons for this turnabout was combined pressure from Jewish organizations, the Polish government in exile, members of Parliament, and the press. Press attention stimulated other British religious and political leaders to speak out on the matter. Faced with articles and editorials in the
London Times
, the
Manchester Guardian
, and a myriad of other papers; the appeals from commanding personalities such as William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury; threats from members of Parliament to publicly confront the government on this matter by asking pointed questions regarding Allied behavior and the possibility that there would be even stronger demands for action, the British began to push the Americans to participate in a joint Allied statement.
⁸⁸
The British press alone could not have prompted the government to respond, but it clearly was a critical factor in arousing the interest and concern of both the public at large and opinion makers within the ranks of the public.