Belisarius: The Last Roman General (5 page)

Still, given their earlier claims to the Achaemenid Empire, it would appear strange that they give the impression that they were content with their achievements and did not aspire to further accretions of territory. This is probably due to such claims being made for two reasons. Firstly, being a dynasty founded by Ardashir as recently as 226, the kings were likely to be eager to focus attention upon a common external enemy and away from internal affairs. There was no better way to achieve this than appeal to historical sentiment concerning the ancient Achaemenid dynasty. Secondly, an aggressive stance would help to strengthen their initial diplomatic activity with the Romans. An aggressive
attitude might cause anxiety in the Roman capital and so make them hesitate before invading Persia whilst the Sasanids secured their new kingdom.

These condsiderations highlight the fact that modern perceptions concerning Romano-Persian relations tend to be extremely simplistic, and lack an in-depth historical basis. Political relations between the Romans and the Persians were not always hostile. An example of this concerns the Hunnic attack of 375 already mentioned. The Darial Pass in the Caucasus Mountains had been the main route followed by the Huns, and the pass was in Persian-controlled territory. Therefore, the two powers agreed that the pass needed fortification and a permanent garrison to prevent a recurrence of the raid. The Persians built and manned the fortifications, but the Romans agreed to cover a large part of the ensuing costs. Although a rare occurrence, the example does give notice that relations between Rome and Persia were often more complex than appears at first glance.

The same is also to a great extent true of the Romans. Although some of their greatest generals, such as Trajan and Septimius Severus, had managed to capture the Persian capital and were in a position to enforce their will, on the whole they do not seem to have seriously contemplated the conquest of either the entire Persian Empire or any significant proportion of it, being content with smaller gains of easily-digested territory.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Persians had long frontiers in the east that were constantly under threat. For example, in 440 the White Huns had destroyed the Kushans and proceeded to terrorise eastern Parthia, their attacks culminating in the death of King Peroz in 484. Furthermore, they too were prone to civil wars, even after Varham V neutralised much of the internal strife by conceding many of his royal prerogatives in 421. Around the year 484, shortly before the reign of Justinian, there was a civil war between Peroz’s sons, Kavad and Zamasp.

With this in mind, it is easy to come to the conclusion that what Roman emperors desired from Persia was a relatively-strong buffer state that was easy to negotiate with, protecting Rome from barbarians further east. Most of the time Rome needed to focus upon the Rhine and Danube frontiers and would prefer it if Persia was similarly preoccupied with events on her other frontiers. Whenever Persia became too strong and posed a threat, the Romans gathered an army, invaded, and attempted to reduce the Persians to their acceptable role. What the Persian kings wanted was a Rome that would not be strong enough to dictate terms but which would always be there as an external threat to help unite their kingdom. There was also little chance that the Persians could conquer Rome, since Roman military might far outweighed their own.

It is not, therefore, unreasonable to conjecture that most of the large-scale Sasanid invasions of imperial territory, such as on the occasions that they reached Antioch, were either to deflect domestic criticisms and reduce internal
pressure for political change, or a counterattack to restore the balance in Persia’s favour after a damaging defeat. The need for equilibrium helps to explain the fact that conflict in the east was centred not upon large-scale battles and capturing territory, but upon sieges, small-scale victories and the establishing of spheres of interest and relatively minor territorial gains. When, in 395, this balance was seriously threatened, the two empires combined to neutralise the threat.

It is interesting to note that when the system broke down in 607, a full-scale invasion of Rome by Khusrow II quickly resulted in the capture of Mesopotamia and Syria, with Egypt falling in 616. A counter-invasion by Heraclius caused the deposition and murder of Khusrow by his own nobles, who then sued for peace in 628. The whole affair weakened both empires and the recently united Arabs, fired by Islam, wiped out the Persian Empire completely (637–19) and conquered all of the non-European Byzantine territories outside Asia Minor by 646.

Therefore, when Justinian came to the throne in 527 he inherited relatively stable frontiers in the east, where the only real threat was from the Persians, who appeared willing to play a game of small-scale warfare. However, this was liable to change at minimal notice, so there would always be a need to maintain a large military force in the East.

Chapter 2

The Byzantine Court and the Early Life of Belisarius

The Bureaucracy in Constantinople

A Roman emperor could not hope to run the empire alone. As a consequence, over time a large bureaucracy built up which increasingly gained a life of its own. From significantly earlier than Justinian’s reign, the various military and bureaucratic posts were much prized. For the higher echelons of the bureaucracy this was with a view to becoming one of the emperor’s closest advisors, or, for the most optimistic, perhaps even being raised to the throne in person – though it is unlikely that such lofty ambition was the norm.

In many instances the power behind the throne was likely to be a member of the imperial family, for example Justina the mother of Valentinian III or, on a lesser scale of influence, Euphemia wife of Justin – although Euphemia had to vie with Justinian for most influence with Justin. Even when such an influential individual existed, for most candidates the aim was to rise through the ranks and become a close advisor to the emperor – one of his intimate circle. In this way they would have a hand in controlling the destiny of the empire and, as a small dividend, become fabulously wealthy. For the heart of the imperial bureaucracy was, to all intents and purposes, corrupt.

There was a large number of important and influential imperial posts, with innumerable lesser posts below them. At the top of the pile were the prefects of the East (Thrace, Asia and Egypt), and the prefect of Illyricum (Dacia, Macedonia and Greece). There was also the prefect of Constantinople and the quaestor of the sacred palace (head of the Privy Council). Furthermore, the top jobs were merely the heads of sections. As a guide to the size of some of these departments, one major bureau of the government was under the
comes sacrarum largitionum
(Count of the Sacred Largesses). His department was divided into eighteen sub-groups, each of which was graded into seven classes in order of rank.

Over all of these was the
magister officiorum
(Master of Offices), who had authority over all of the civil service, especially secretarial departments in the palace, but also the
cursus publicus
(public post), the
agentes in rebus
(secret service) and the state arms factories. These state officers were served by huge numbers of clerks and assistants.

Yet these were only the civilian posts. There were also the military ranks, such as the
magister utriusque militae
(Master of all the Troops) previously mentioned and the
magister militum per Orientem
(Master of Troops in the East), plus a long series of ranks down to the commanders of pairs of units within the army.

On the civilian side, all of the preferred posts brought with them a measure of power and access to the higher positions in the hierarchy. But most of all, the uppermost ranks gained access to the emperor and some, such as the
magister officiorum,
gained control of who had an audience with the emperor. This was a very privileged position and was often abused. The bribes needed to secure an audience with the emperor would remain a source of disgust to petitioners in Constantinople until the end of the empire. Of course, if you offended an upper dignitary, it was unlikely that you would see the emperor at all.

On the military side, there was the prestige and fame of winning major battles, which in itself would bring wealth and power. There might also be the added temptation of rebellion – if your army was large enough and there were enough troops in your command loyal enough to challenge the emperor himself. As a result, the top army posts were only awarded to men the emperor thought he could trust, and even then not without restrictions – as we shall see later.

Apart from the power of the top assignments, there was much to be gained from a civil appointment. In the Later Empire society was very highly stratified, and in the uppermost echelons rank was graded according to position in the hierarchy. It is easy to understand why rank was important to the workforce; it let them know where they stood in relation to each other.

All senators now ranked as
clarissimus
(illustrious), yet this was now on only the third tier of the pecking order. The higher rank of
spectabile
(notable) was now only granted, for example, to some of the higher provincial governorships plus some eunuch officers of the imperial bedchamber. The top level,
illustris
(famous), was reserved for consuls, patricians and occupiers of the uppermost ministries within government. As a further bonus, alongside the rank and titles came extra privileges, such as protection from prosecution in the courts and
sportulae
(fees on the side); it was usually possible to recover the money spent on gaining a post in this manner.

As a result, to avoid being left on the third tier as a
clarissimus,
senators now needed jobs in the government in order to progress. In this they came into contention with upwardly-mobile members of the equestrian ‘middle classes’. This was especially the case in the army, where many of the latter coveted posts involving military rank so that they would be eligible for the
annona
(entitlement to provisions).

Accordingly, competition for jobs was fierce and usually revolved around a combination of family/personal influence, a patron’s personal recommendation
and, of course, bribery. Nor should it be thought that this was reserved for the comparatively lower echelons of the bureaucracy. The story goes that when the Emperor Anastasius died, his chief eunuch, Amantius, told the general of the palace guards, the
comes excubitorum,
of his plans to elevate one of his associates to be emperor. Consequently, he gave the general a large amount of gold with which to bribe the soldiers. Although the story may not be true, the fact that it could be told and be believed shows the level that such bribery could reach. Incidentally, the plan failed: the Excubitores guard unit proclaimed their general, Justin – who had been given the gold – as emperor on the following day. Not surprisingly, he kept the gold. He happened to be Justinian’s uncle and immediate predecessor.

To modern readers the whole system might be seen as corrupt beyond repair, yet some modern bureaucracies in western Europe still appear to function on patronage and recommendation – depending upon which schools and university the applicant attended. Nor should historians of the Republic and Early Empire condemn it. It was the natural extension of the Republican ‘patronage’ system taken to its logical extreme. Indeed, by the fifth century payment for office had become the norm and in 444 Theodosius II had even regularised and regulated it by law. Furthermore, it is likely that the level of bribery was usually kept within acceptable limits, even ignoring existing legislation. Anyone upsetting the balance by spending too much money may have been labelled an ‘upstart’ and been the victim of a backlash from higher ranks anxious to preserve their positions. Looked at from the outside the system may well have been corrupt, but this should not blind us to one salient point: it worked. It not only worked, but it lasted until Constantinople fell in 1453.

Alongside the scheming and plotting to ensure that the top posts were filled with ‘suitable appointees’ (ie your own men), there was another side to imperial politics. This was the ‘class’ struggle that was pursued at all levels between the established, cultured and highly-educated elite against the poorly-educated men that nevertheless achieved high rank, especially during the course of a military career. Indeed, this may have been a source of the resentment of Procopius in the
Anekdota,
since he portrays Justin as an ill-educated buffoon who needed a stencil in order to write the word
legi
(‘I have read this’) on documents for them to become legally valid.