(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
That is, on which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?
It is certainly for the interest of the service that a cordial interchange of civilities should subsist between superior and inferior officers, and therefore it is bad policy in superiors to behave toward their inferiors indiscriminately, as tho’ they were of a lower species, such a conduct will damp the spirits of any man. . . . Cheerful ardor and spirit . . . ought ever to be the characteristic of an officer . . . for to be well obeyed it is necessary to be esteemed.
John Paul Jones (1776)
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
Who does what, and how the activities are organized (in counterguerrilla or guerrilla warfare), is far less important than understanding the mission and being determined to accomplish it by means not inconsistent with the mission. So long as a sufficient number understand the mission and what it implies, seek to accomplish it with a dedication and an intelligence not substantially inferior to that of the enemy, and receive adequate political support, the counterguerrilla effort should not usually be difficult.
Lt. Col. Charles Bohannan and Col. Napoleon Valeriano,
Counterguerrilla Operations
(1962)
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu’s treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron, Ho Lü, king of the Wu State.
16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans.
Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish theoric.” He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; “for,” as Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.” On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said, “Who will attack first to-morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?”
18. All warfare is based on deception.
The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson [Lt. Col. G. F. R. Henderson, author of
Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
(1898) and
The Science of War
(1905)] tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by the “extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe.”
This is
the
great, famous line from
The Art of War
, quoted through the ages. DG
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
To what Federal soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that [General Robert E.] Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach the half of his own small force of 50,000 to attack his enemy in flank and rear? . . . [The Battle of Chancellorsville] took place in May 1863. Lee’s maneuvers, in conjunction with General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s devastating surprise attack, are still studied in military academies.
George Francis Robert Henderson and Sir Thomas Barclay, “War,”
Encyclopedia Britannica
, eleventh edition (1910)
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.