Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (63 page)

3.
Allende, Radio Magallanes, 11 September 1973, published as “Last Words,” in Cockcroft,
Allende Reader
, 240.

4.
For detailed examinations of the coup itself as opposed to these international dimensions, see Davis,
Last Two Years
; Soto,
El Ultimo Día
; and Verdugo,
Interferencia Secreta
.

5.
Telegram, Col. Gerald H. Sills to M. G. Aaron, 11 April 1974, CREST/NARA. For reference to an alleged Chilean purchase of Soviet arms in 1973 using a $100 million credit offered by Moscow, see also Ulianova, “La Unidad Popular y el Golpe Militar,” 108–10.

6.
The number 15,000 surfaced repeatedly before the coup among military plotters. CIA Information Report, 9 July 1973, CDP-CIA.

7.
On the figure of 120, most of whom were members of Cuba’s Tropas Especiales, see conversations with Oña, March–April 2010. The number also reflects the figure of 142 given by
Bohemia
for the Cubans, Prensa Latina staff, and selected Chilean colleagues including Beatriz Allende and her daughter, Maya, who landed in Havana on 13 September 1973.
Bohemia
, 21 September 1973, 46–49.

8.
Edict no. 1, 11 September 1973, as quoted in Fermandois,
Mundo y Fin de Mundo
, 405; and Airgram, Davis to DOS, “The Military Junta at One Month,” 12 October 1973, box 2198/RG59/NARA.

9.
Fermandois,
Mundo y Fin de Mundo
, 393.

10.
Telexes, Embachile Argel (Salum) to Gabinete del Ministro, 31 August and 7 September 1973; and Allende to Boumedienne, in Telex, MRE to Ministro Almeyda, 7 September 1973, Oficios et al./Argelia/1973/AMRE.

11.
Herrera, as quoted in Telegram, Belcher to SecState, 12 July 1973, DOS/CFP.

12.
Airgram, Davis to SecState, 16 May 1973, box 2194/RG59/NARA.

13.
Information Report, CIA, 2 May 1973, CDP-CIA.

14.
Cable, DCI to CIA Station, Santiago, 1 May 1973, CDP-CIA.

15.
Cables, DCI to CIA Station, Santiago, 2 and 9 May 1973; Cables, CIA Station, Santiago, to DCI, 2 and 7 May 1973; Cable, CIA Station, Santiago, to DCI, 26 May 1973; and Cable, CIA Station, Santiago, to DCI, 25 June 1973, CDP-CIA.

16.
Record of Meeting, ARA-CIA, 11 June 1973, Memorandum James Gardener (ARA) to William McAffee (INR), 11 June 1973, CDP-NARA.

17.
On the Tanquetazo, see Gustafson, “Double-Blind: Predicting the Pinochet Coup,” 80, and Davis,
Last Two Years
, 171–75.

18.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 95–96.

19.
Pérez, “Salvador Allende, Apuntes Sobre su Dispositivo de Seguridad,” 61–63.

20.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 97.

21.
Memorandum for Chief, WHD, “Chile—What Now?” 30 June 1973, CDP-CIA.

22.
DIA Intelligence Summary, 5 July 1973, CDP-DOD.

23.
Intelligence Telegram, 23 July 1973, CDP-CIA.

24.
Quotation from Memorandum, David Atlee Philips to Deputy Director of Operations, “Recent Visit of [redacted] to Santiago,” 13 August 1973, CDP-CIA.

25.
Covert Action in Chile
, 39. See also Intelligence Memorandum, “Consequences of a Military Coup in Chile,” 1 August 1973, CDP-CIA.

26.
Record of Conversation, Kubisch and Valdés, 24 July 1973, Telegram, SecState to Amembassy Santiago, 26 July 1973, DOS/CFP.

27.
Record of Conversation, Davis and Letelier, 4 July 1973, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 4 July 1973, DOS/CFP.

28.
Record of Conversation, Davis and Tomic, 24 August 1973, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 29 August 1973, box 2193/RG59/NARA.

29.
Telegram, SecState to Amembassy Wellington and Canberra, 6 August 1973, DOS/CFP.

30.
Telegram, Wood, Amembassy Wellington, to SecState, 13 August 1973, DOS/CFP.

31.
Telegram, Annenberg, Amembassy London, to SecState, 6 July 1973, DOS/CFP. See also Telegram, SecState to Amembassy Wellington and Canberra, 6 August 1973. On United Kingdom views of Chile’s “dismal” economic performance to this point, see Letter, G. J. MacGillivray, Bank of England, to Hunter, FCO, 26 July 1973, FCO7/2426/TNA.

32.
Sweden doubled its aid to Chile to $9.5 million in 1973. Telegram, Olsen, Amembassy Stockholm, to SecState, 5 September 1973, DOS/CFP.

33.
DIA Intelligence Summary, 2 August 1973, CDP-DOD.

34.
Memorandum, Philips to Deputy Director of Operations, “Recent Visit of [redacted] to Santiago,” 13 August 1973.

35.
See Otero,
Razón y Fuerza de Chile
, 16–24, and Davis,
Last Two Years
, 196–98.

36.
DIA Intelligence Summary, 24 August 1973, CDP-DOD.

37.
Memorandum for the 40 Committee, enclosure, Rob Roy Ratcliff to Kissinger, 10 August 1973, CDP-NSC.

38.
Ultima Hora
published a list of embassy staff supposedly working for the CIA on 15 August. See Telegram, Davis to SecState, 15 August 1973, DOS/CFP; Davis,
Last Two Years
, 190–91; Telegram, Davis to SecState, 10 August 1973, DOS/CFP.

39.
Kissinger as quoted in Memorandum, Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger, 15 August 1973, CDP-NSC, and Kubisch interview, FD.

40.
See Cable, Philips to CIA Station, 21 August 1973, CDP-CIA; Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger and Kubisch, 28 August 1973, CDP-NSC; and
Covert Action in Chile
, 30.

41.
Davis,
Last Two Years
, 152–54. On possible private Argentine sources of funding for Chilean paramilitary organization Fuerzas Nacionalistas de Ataque (FNA), see CIA Information Report, 28 August 1973, CDP-CIA.

42.
This was denied by Banzer. Telegram, Brewin, Amembassy La Paz, to SecState, 24 August 1973, DOS/CFP.

43.
Gaspari,
Ditadura Derrotada
, 348, and Davis,
Last Two Years
, 154.

44.
Prats,
Memorias
, 394–96, and Intelligence Telegram, 23 July 1973, CDP-CIA.

45.
Martínez Corbalá interview.

46.
Davis,
Last Two Years
, 331–32.

47.
“Chile Contingency Paper: Possible Military Action,” Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, enclosure, Memorandum, Pickering to Scowcroft, 8 September 1973, box 2196/RG59/NARA. On the DOS’s desire to be in a position to “influence the situation,” see Kornbluh,
Pinochet File
, 112.

48.
Leacock,
Requiem for Revolution
.

49.
Frei as recalled by Lincoln Gorden. Gordon interview, 2 May 2005.

50.
Davis,
Last Two Years
, 214, 221, 356–58.

51.
Memorandum to Pinochet, “Memorandum sobre la Situación Nacional,” 27 August 1973, as quoted in Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 124–25.

52.
Letter to Comandante en Jefe de la Armada Almirante José Toribio Merino Castro, Valparaiso, 5 September 1973, FJTM.

53.
Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 29 August 1973, CDP-NSC.

54.
Marambio,
Armas de Ayer
, 76.

55.
Report, Soviet Foreign Ministry, 16 July 1973, as quoted in Ulianova, “La Unidad Popular y el Golpe Militar,” 105.

56.
Ambassador Basov as quoted in Letter, East German embassy, Santiago (Friedel Trappen), to Berlin, 5 August 1973, V-33/MfAA. See also Haslam,
Assisted Suicide
, 210.

57.
Almeyda,
Reencuentro con mi Vida
, 184–85. On similar advice voiced in public, see “Chou-en-lai: En la entrevista al periódico mexicano,”
Excelsior
, 6 September 1972, in Pérez, “La Izquierda,” 385–86.

58.
Corvalán to Pajetta (Italian Communist Party) as quoted in Haslam,
Assisted Suicide
, 175.

59.
Letter, Castro to Allende, 30 June 1973, in Castro, “Salvador Allende: His Example Lives On.”

60.
Otero interview; Oña interview, 16 December 2004; and Vázquez and Cubillas interview, 11 September 2005.

61.
Oña interview, 16 December 2004.

62.
Letter, Castro to Allende, 29 July 1973, in Timossi,
Grandes Alamedas
, 187–88.

63.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 83.

64.
Oña interview, 9 December 2004.

65.
Ibid., and Estrada interview.

66.
Conversations with Oña, March–April 2010.

67.
Castro as quoted in Telegram, Schneider, Amembassy New Delhi, to SecState, 15 September 1973, DOS/CFP.

68.
Estrada interview. On Allende’s aversion to civil war, see Laura Allende as quoted in Davis,
Last Two Years
, 244.

69.
Estrada Testimony, CMSA.

70.
Pérez, “Salvador Allende, Apuntes Sobre su Dispositivo de Seguridad,” 34, n. 8.

71.
Estrada interview.

72.
Telegram, Davis to SecState, 30 July 1973, DOS/CFP.

73.
Estrada, “Allende’s Death in Combat,” 10, and Oña interview, 9 December 2004. See also, Timossi,
Grandes Alamedas
, 95.

74.
Vázquez and Cubillas interview, 11 September 2005.

75.
Otero,
Razón y Fuerza de Chile
, 58; Estrada interview; and Timossi,
Grandes Alamedas
, 96.

76.
Otero interview, and Oña interview, 9 December 2004. Oña later recalled that around 80 percent of those stationed at Cuba’s embassy in Santiago in the final month of Allende’s government were members of the Tropas Especiales. Conversations with Oña, March–April 2010.

77.
Oña interview, 16 December 2004, and Estrada interview. Carretero was due to leave Chile on 13 September.

78.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 251–52. According to these testimonies, they also had fifty Walther P-50 submachine guns that did not come from the Cubans.

79.
Estrada interview. Estrada says Havana trained and armed ten MAPU members before the coup.

80.
Castro to Honecker, 21 and 26 February 1974, as quoted in Gleijeses,
Conflicting Missions
, 222.

81.
Estrada interview.

82.
“Dictadura Popular: Unico Remedio Contra Los Golpes de Estado,”
Punto Final
, Extra Supplement, c. 3 July 1973, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 13 July 1973, box 2197/RG59/NARA.

83.
Dinges,
Condor Years
, 51.

84.
Estrada Testimony, CMSA.

85.
Letter, East German Embassy, Santiago (Friedel Trappen), to Berlin, 5 August 1973. See also Haslam,
Assisted Suicide
, 210–11.

86.
CIA Information Report, 25 June 1973, CDP-CIA.

87.
CIA Information Report, 3 August 1973, CDP-CIA. On general party directives to burn documents before the coup, see Silva interview, 31 March 2005.

88.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 147.

89.
Ibid., 101, 138.

90.
Davis,
Last Two Years
, 204.

91.
Oña interview, 16 December 2004.

92.
DIA Intelligence Summary, 14 August 1973, CDP-DOD; Telegram, Davis to SecState, 14 August 1973, DOS/CFP; and Altamirano, 9 September 1973, as quoted in Davis,
Last Two Years
, 220.

93.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 103, 136.

94.
Ibid, 52.

95.
Garcés,
Allende y la Experiencia Chilena
, 363.

96.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 130–31.

97.
Telegram, Davis to SecState, 17 August 1973, DOS/CFP.

98.
Letter, Allende to Houari Boumedienne, 10 August 1973, in Vera Castillo,
Política Exterior Chilena
, 501–2.

99.
Letter, Allende to Houari Boumedienne, 29 August 1973, in Vera Castillo,
Política Exterior Chilena
, 506–7.

100.
Memorandum of Conversation, Letelier and Chile’s Naval Council, 1 September 1973, FJTM.

101.
Otero interview.

102.
Isabel Allende interview,
South Bank Show
(ITV-UK), broadcast 22 April 2007.

103.
Huerta interview, 23 March 2010.

104.
Quiroga,
Compañeros
, 141.

105.
Oña interview, 16 December 2004.

106.
Soto,
El Ultimo Día
, 49.

107.
Timossi,
Grandes Alamedas
, 16.

108.
CIA Information Report, 8 September 1973, CDP-CIA.

109.
Quotation from Verdugo,
Interferencia Secreta
, 23–24.

110.
Telegram, Davis to SecState, 10 September 1973, DOS/CFP.

111.
Garcés,
Allende y la Experiencia Chilena
, 360–61.

112.
Ulianova, “La Unidad Popular y el Golpe Militar,” 106–7. The East Germans also appear to have been persuaded that, although a coup was likely, it was not yet immediately imminent. As late as 9 September, the East German embassy—informed as always by its close relationship with the PCCh—reported that the armed forces were loyal to the constitution, the Carabineros could be “entirely trusted” to reinstate order in Chile, and the UP still had available reserves to combat reactionary forces. See “Report on Main Political Developments in Chile from the Embassy in Santiago,” 9 September 1973, C/3320/BD/3/MfAA.

113.
Oña interview, 16 December 2004.

114.
Kornbluh,
Pinochet File
, 112.

115.
Allende as quoted in Garcés,
Allende y la Experiencia Chilena
, 368–74.

116.
DIA Intelligence Summary, “01.10 EDT,” 11 September 1973, CDP-DOD (emphasis added).

117.
Sigmund,
Overthrow of Allende
, 288–89.

118.
Estrada, Vázquez, and Cubillas interviews.