After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (39 page)

By autumn 2011 the situation in Oman appeared to have stabilised, following scheduled elections in October for its Consultative Council and promises from the ruler that the Council would be granted more legislative power and that 50,000 new jobs would be created, mostly in the public sector. On this latter promise it became clear that Oman had sought assistance from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, as a GCC rescue package of about $10 billion—to be spread out over ten years—had earlier been allocated to Oman,
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in much the same way as Bahrain’s abovementioned financial assistance. But over the course of 2012 there have been several further arrests, with a round-up of several bloggers and internet activists in May 2012. Including a well-known Omani photographer and a female student who writes under the pen name ‘Rose of Dhofar’, they were accused of defaming the ruler and given prison sentences of between twelve and eighteen months.
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Saudi Arabia: the cracks appearing

Having intervened militarily in Bahrain and having now positioned itself as the de facto bank-roller of the Bahraini and Omani ruling families in
order to help them stave off riots and revolution, any political instability in Saudi Arabia itself will have major ramifications for all of the Gulf monarchies. Indeed, while it can be argued that a revolution or civil war within one of the smaller Gulf monarchies could be contained by its neighbours, any significant strife in Saudi Arabia would quickly spread across its borders. Although still in command of substantial resources, the kingdom is nevertheless under increasing strain, with several of the mounting pressures discussed in this book—including high youth unemployment, poverty, and a growing sectarian divide between its Sunni and Shia populations—reducing its ruling family’s room for manoeuvre. As with Bahrain and Oman there have been protests and numerous killings in the wake of the Arab Spring, but given the kingdom’s much more repressive police apparatus, its even stronger controls over the media, and its generally inhospitable atmosphere for foreign journalists and international non-government organisations, these have not yet received the attention they deserve.

Described as ‘Arabia’s silent protests’ and later as ‘the Middle East’s most under-reported conflict’,
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the Saudi protests began at about the same time as those in Bahrain and not long after crowds began congregating in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. In a direct rebuttal of the Grand Mufti’s position on the Arab Spring, in early February 2011 several senior Saudi scholars and religious leaders openly called on Mubarak to step down in order to ‘prevent further bloodshed’ and to respect ‘the thousands protesting for social and political reforms’.
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The same week a Facebook group was set up by Saudi activists focusing on their own country’s plight. Entitled ‘The People Want to Reform the Regime’ the group soon attracted several thousand followers, most of whom seemed to be Saudi nationals. In addition to demanding ‘the equal distribution of wealth’ and ‘seriously addressing the problem of unemployment’, the group also called for an independent judicial system, anti-corruption measures, and ‘respect for human and women’s rights’. More formally, after Mubarak’s ousting several petitions began circulating in Saudi Arabia. Signed by thousands of prominent Islamists and liberal figures ‘from across the political spectrum’,
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the documents included a ‘Declaration of National Reform’ and one entitled ‘Towards the State of Rights and Institutions’. As with the Facebook group the documents focused on the need for further political and social liberties and improved management of the economy.
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In mid-February a political party was even launched by opposition figures,
despite such organisations remaining illegal in the kingdom. Described as ‘an act of protest’, the new ‘Islamic Umma Party’ was made up of not only Islamists, but also many secular academics, human rights activists, and lawyers. In a letter sent to the king and posted on their website, the party wrote to the king that ‘You know well what big political developments and improvements of freedom and human rights are currently happening in the Islamic world’ and bluntly stated that ‘… it’s time to bring this development to the kingdom’. Meanwhile in an unprecedented public attack on the monarchy a party member and prominent Saudi lawyer
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told Reuters that ‘You cannot just have the royal party governing the country. We want to raise this issue with government officials and persuade them’.
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In parallel to these gestures of defiance a number of street protests have also taken place. Although these initially suffered from low turnouts, seemingly due to fear of reprisals by security forces, by April 2011 they had gathered pace and increasingly resembled those in Bahrain and Oman. Unsurprisingly, the largest protests were taking place in the kingdom’s Eastern Province. In some instances several hundred protestors were convening, especially in the Shia-dominated town of Qatif, with most calling for improved human rights and greater political reforms. A protest of more than 200 Saudi nationals also took place in the town of Awwamiya, despite a fatwa having been announced the day before by the government-backed Council of Senior Religious Scholars which stated that demonstrations were against
Sharia
law. Significantly, the Awwamiya protestors turned out to condemn the Saudi military’s role in Bahrain and in particular the alleged Saudi involvement in the destruction of Shia mosques there.
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The regime’s response to these challenges has thus far been multipronged, much like the responses in Bahrain and Oman, with a mixture of threats, violence, appeasement, and increased government largesse. Having had to imprison some 160 political prisoners in the first two months of the protests,
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the king moved quickly to announce the establishment of a new anti-corruption commission while at the same time promising thousands of new public sector jobs. However, the majority of these jobs were viewed as strengthening the kingdom’s security sector as 60,000 were earmarked for the Ministry for Interior—already one of Saudi Arabia’s biggest employers.
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In a massive ramping up of the wealth distribution strategy, a raft of new subsidies and public sector salary
increases was also announced. Estimated to have cost over $130 billion, which included some $14 billion worth of bonuses paid out to civil servants and a new $530 per month unemployment benefit, the package was clearly intended to provide the majority of Saudi nationals with a temporary panacea in order to insulate them from any further impact from the Arab Spring. To some extent this seemed to work, as by May 2011 a 58 per cent year-on-year increase in consumer spending was reported, as many Saudis began to enjoy their windfalls.
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As 2011 progressed and protests continued unabated, especially in Eastern Province, it became evident that these measures would be insufficient to quell all unrest in the kingdom. As with Bahrain, there were reports that the Saudi authorities were seeking foreign mercenaries to join their security forces. In June 2011 a noted Saudi scholar claimed that ‘the Saudis are doing the same [as Bahrain], trying to invite Indonesia and Malaysia to send military troops to protect the monarchy, and we see that from Jordan as well’.
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Similarly it was reported by Al-Jazeera that the chairman of the Saudi National Security Council
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had made ‘two quiet trips to Pakistan to seek their support in case protests erupted at home’. With the Pakistani media claiming that the Pakistani prime minister
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had told the Saudi visitor that ‘…his country supported the Saudi stance in the Gulf and the Middle East and would stand by Riyadh for regional peace’, one observer remarked that ‘the potential need for foreign troops in case protests spiral out of control has forced the Saudis to work with the current Pakistani civilian government for whom they have nothing but utter contempt’.
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By this time a number of hastily introduced new laws had also come into effect, most of which aimed to limit the kingdom’s increasingly vocal opponents’ use of the media and especially the internet. A decree was issued in late April 2011 that amended the kingdom’s existing press and publications law so as to prohibit all expression, including online comments, that ‘contradicted the rulings of Sharia law’ along with ‘anything that called for disturbing the country’s security, or its public order, or serves foreign interests that contradict national interests’. Moreover, seemingly fearing a backlash against the controversial fatwa, the new law also consolidated the position of the religious establishment by announcing a prohibition on ‘violating the reputation, dignity, or the slander of the Grand Mufti… and members of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars’. By also prohibiting the defamation of ‘any other government official
or government institution’, and preventing the ‘publishing without consent of proceedings from any investigations or court trials’, the law effectively elevated senior members of the ruling family above criticism and legitimised the already rampant practice of secret court proceedings. Described by Human Rights Watch as ‘eviscerating any gains in freedom of expression under [the king’s] reign’, the law was accused of ‘effectively throwing the kingdom back to a time when dissent of any sort resulted in arrest’.
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Although the financial penalties for infringing the law are very high—now approximately $130,000
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—a number of bloggers and journalists covering the ‘red line’ topics have also been imprisoned since its introduction. These include a writer
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who documented the various arrests that had taken place in the Eastern Province and the peaceful nature of a candle-lit march by female protestors in Qatif; and two young men
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who were seized after they blogged about the early protests in February and March 2011. Considered by Human Rights Watch as ‘having brought the climate for reform in Saudi Arabia to freezing point’ the arrests have also been viewed as clear evidence that ‘the Saudi ruling family shows no signs that it might ease its iron grip on the right to express political opinions’.
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Most dramatically, in early 2012 it became apparent that a young Saudi journalist
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who had been arrested in Malaysia, to where he had fled, was likely to face the death penalty upon his extradition to the kingdom. Having posted tweets that were deemed blasphemous by the Council of Senior Religious Scholars on the grounds that they revealed his uncertainties about the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings, he had also posted controversial tweets in defence of women’s rights in the country, including one that stated ‘No Saudi women will go to hell, because it’s impossible to go there twice’.
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Moves have also been made to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s anti-terror legislation even further in an effort to legitimise the arrests of opposition figures and other activists. Indeed, in July 2011 Amnesty International claimed that a secret new anti-terror decree was being drawn up by the Saudi authorities in order to ‘strangle peaceful protest’ and ‘pave the way for even the smallest acts of peaceful dissent to be branded terrorism’. Having seen a classified copy of the draft law, the BBC confirmed that the proposed changes would allow for even more lengthy detention of suspects without trial (for over 120 days at a time), would further restrict their legal access, and would likely increase the use of the death
penalty. Moreover, any questioning of the integrity of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family would become an offence automatically punishable by a minimum of ten years in prison. This has led Muhammad Fahad Al-Qahtani,
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the co-founder of Saudi Arabia’s Civil and Political Rights Association to claim that ‘[the law] will give an open hand for the minister of the interior to do whatever he wants to do. Basically he will be controlling the judiciary, controlling the public prosecutor, he’s in charge already of the prison system, and there is no way to get a fair trial’.
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Kuwait: ‘The People’s Spring’

As a wealthier Gulf monarchy with a relatively small population and a government that can continue distributing wealth to most of its citizens, Kuwait has mostly avoided violent demonstrations in the wake of the Arab Spring and, thus far, there have been few calls for outright regime change. Moreover, with a slightly more robust parliament than its neighbours the emirate has enjoyed something of a safety valve, as some degree of free expression has been tolerated. Nonetheless there were still intense periods of street protests in 2011 along with strong and very public opposition of the government and the ruling family—most especially the unelected prime minister, Nasser bin Muhammad Al-Sabah. And, as with the other Gulf monarchies, there has been a noticeable crackdown on dissenting intellectuals, journalists, and other activists. Most of the criticism has been centred on government corruption, the squandering of national resources, and the lack of meaningful political and economic reforms, which many Kuwaitis believe are long overdue.

In December 2010, only a week before the beginning of the Tunisian revolution, an outdoor rally was staged in a suburb of Kuwait City by a group of opposition members, including MPs and academics. Accusing the government of trying to amend the emirate’s 1962 constitution and thus limit the powers of Kuwait’s parliament, and protesting that fifteen of the Kuwaiti cabinet’s sixteen ministers remained unelected, the men were only dispersed following a baton charge by Kuwaiti special forces. Dozens of participants were reportedly beaten, with five Kuwaiti nationals being taken to hospital for treatment of their wounds and fractures.
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A month later, in January 2011, the opposition began making further claims, namely that the government was buying off MPs to ensure their loyalty in parliamentary votes. Calling themselves the ‘Anything but the
Constitution’ bloc, the fairly broad-based group then met to discuss and plan their agenda to ‘protect the constitution, basic freedoms, and national unity’ while also condemning the government for ‘putting pressure on media outlets that comment negatively on the government’. In particular, the government’s closures of
Al-Mustaqbal
daily newspaper and of the Mubasher satellite television channel earlier that month were strongly criticised. Warning the government that it was violating freedoms by suppressing the constitution, one member argued that the authorities ‘…should investigate the sources that fund corrupt media instead of targeting the brave youth of Twitter, who are honest and loyal to Kuwait’. Meanwhile several other members called for the outright removal of the prime minister on the basis that attempts by opposition MPs to pass non-co-operation motions against him should have pushed him to resign his post.
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In early February 2011, with the Egyptian revolution in full flow, the formal opposition’s demands were bolstered by the emergence of an informal coalition of younger Kuwaiti activists, most of whom were made up of students, young professionals, and other social media users. Calling themselves the ‘Fifth Fence’, the group began using Twitter to urge Kuwaiti nationals to stage a mass rally outside the parliamentary buildings in order to protest the government’s ‘undemocratic practices’ and ‘to press for the legitimate right of holding sessions and to declare our rejection of the continuity of this government’.
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