After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (30 page)

Criticism of these many problems and issues is, as would be expected, becoming increasingly loud. A few years ago, for example, a prominent UAE national claimed to a major US newspaper that the city he lives in—Dubai—is now unrecognisable and is not even Arab anymore. Moreover, he complained that when he visits one of the many malls, the vast majority of patrons are foreigners, and that he rarely hears Arabic. Most damningly the article recorded the man’s concern that despite religious prohibitions ‘…drinking is unabashed, and [he fears] public wine-tasting parties are on the way, with the beaches of his youth having been taken over by hotels and their occasionally topless sunbathers and other westerners whose dress is deemed inappropriate… he grimaces at women jogging in the streets, sometimes with their dogs, considered unclean under Islamic law, and the celebration of Islamic holidays and the country’s national day pale before the more commercialised commemoration of Christmas’. He concluded his interview by stating that he and his family felt they were in ‘internal exile’ and in an effort to maintain their Arab and Muslim identities they had had to move away from the central area of Dubai to an outlying suburb.
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This is far from being an isolated case, with there being many other examples of UAE national families relocating from Dubai completely, or at least building a new family home in another emirate so that their children could still feel they were growing up in an Arab city. Most recently, in 2012 there has been an extensive, grass roots social media campaign to uphold modest dress codes. Launched by two women and now centred on a Twitter subject entitled #UAE-DressCode, the campaign has seen large numbers of UAE nationals criticise the inaction of their government to enforce basic standards.
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Famously outspoken, even Dubai’s chief of police
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has publicly discussed the situation, arguing that expatriates and tourists pose a serious threat to national identity and societal norms in the Gulf monarchies. Speaking on a popular call-in show on Qatar Television, he was debating ‘Whether the rising numbers of foreign workers posed a serious threat to the Gulf’s identity and culture, and if so, what steps the governments in the region could take to reduce the danger?’ Among other statements, he argued that ‘…if the Gulf governments do not take bold steps to check the inflow of foreign workforce, a day could come when locals would be marginalised in their own countries and become like Red Indians [sic]
in the US’.
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Interestingly, since the credit crunch and the slowdown of Dubai’s economy, there have been some small signs that the government has begun to take the matter more seriously—perhaps because it has been concerned that many UAE nationals were becoming increasingly frustrated with the authorities due to poor-performing investments or substantial losses. Notably, in 2009 fresh ‘decency regulations’ were introduced in Dubai, leading to posters appearing in shopping malls and other public places that instructed what women could and could not wear, and warned about public displays of affection. Moreover, in summer 2011 standalone bars and restaurants that were not connected to hotels were banned from displaying alcohol in full view, while bars inside hotels were ordered to tint the glass on display cases. To some extent these mirrored similar regulations introduced in neighbouring Sharjah in 2001.
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Perhaps most dramatically, especially given their aforementioned attempts to build up a tourist industry and host international sporting events, in 2009 alcohol was completely banned in Bahrain’s three star hotels, following criticism from pressure groups, and in early 2012 Qatar announced that alcohol would be banned on the Pearl—one of its major tourism and real estate developments.
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Most vulnerable to criticism with regard to these trends in the region has been Saudi Arabia, given the ruling family’s closeness to the religious establishment and its greater reliance on religious legitimacy. While most nationals are aware of the quantities of alcohol, drugs, and prostitutes in their country, the authorities have nonetheless managed to keep these vices out of the immediate public gaze. Nevertheless several recent developments have sparked anger and outrage amongst Saudi nationals, especially the various construction projects in the two holy cities and the sense that the regime is trying to ‘cash in’ on the pilgrimage industry. In late 2010 it was reported by the
New York Times
that several new buildings were nearing completion in Mecca. Among these was the Royal Mecca Clock Tower, also known as the Abraj al-Bait Tower, which in 2011 became the second tallest building in the world.
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Covered in neon lights and topped with a crescent-shaped spire, it has been described as a ‘kitsch rendition of London’s Big Ben’ while being a ‘cynical nod to Islam’s architectural past’. In order to make way for it, the authorities had to demolish an eighteenth-century Ottoman castle—a practice which is usually justified on the grounds that buildings prior to the founding of the Saudi state were built during a ‘corrupt era’. Unsurprisingly, many have been
appalled by the clock tower and the slew of new luxury hotels and high rises that have sprung up in Mecca in recent years. One Saudi architect explained that it as ‘the commercialisation of the house of God’ and that ‘the closer [one gets] to the Grand Mosque, the more expensive the apartments… in the most expensive towers, you can pay millions…. If you can see the mosque, you pay triple’. On this point, it has been claimed that the new buildings will effectively divide Mecca along ‘highly visible class lines, with the rich sealed inside exclusive air-conditioned high-rises encircling the Grand Mosque and the poor pushed increasingly to the periphery… like the luxury boxes that encircle most sports stadiums, the apartments will allow the wealthy to peer directly down at the main event from the comfort of their suites without having to mix with the ordinary rabble below’. According to another Saudi critic ‘…The irony is that developers argue that the more towers you build the more views you have… but only rich people go inside these towers. They have the views… We don’t want to bring New York to Mecca’.
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Western bases and armaments

Still viewed as a necessity by the governments of the Gulf monarchies—most of which remain fearful of foreign aggression or in some cases even each other—the Western security guarantees they have sought and maintained are nevertheless becoming increasingly problematic, not least because of the significant expansion of the physical Western military footprint in their territories, often described as ‘boots on the ground’. Despite receiving encouragement from the ruling families that serve as their hosts, the existence of substantial non-Arab, non-Muslim bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been controversial and potentially delegitimising for the Gulf monarchies. And as more details emerge of their size and scope it is likely the bases will draw further criticism, perhaps serving as another flashpoint for opposition movements while of course undermining the ability of these states to keep positioning themselves as peaceful neutrals.

Among the most entrenched Western bases in the Gulf monarchies is Qatar’s Al-Udeid Airbase. In 1999 Qatar’s ruler told the US that he would like to see ‘up to 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emirate’ and over the next few years the US duly began shifting personnel from a camp at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Airbase.
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Although Al-Udeid has only ever housed a few thousand American servicemen at a time, it has nevertheless been used as a forward headquarters of the US Central Command—CENTCOM—along with housing a US Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an array of US Special Forces living in compounds. Similarly, nearby Bahrain continues to host a US Naval Support Activity Base that houses the US Naval Forces Central Command and the entire US Fifth Fleet. Although the American role in Kuwait has recently been downsized, there still exist at least four infantry bases, including Camp Patriot, which is believed to house about 3000 American soldiers, and two air bases: Camp Ali Salem and Camp Al-Jabar.

Although there are no US infantry bases in the UAE, the country’s ports are heavily used by the US. Dubai’s Jebel Ali is now the US Navy’s most highly visited ‘liberty port’, with warships such as the
USS John Kennedy
regularly being refuelled or serviced in Dubai’s dry docks,
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which remains one of only two ship repair yards in the Persian Gulf.
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It was recently estimated that around 4,000 American sailors come ashore at Jebel Ali each year, with many claiming in anonymous US Navy surveys that Dubai is their favourite stop-off location due to the availability of alcohol and nightclubs.
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Moreover, Jebel Ali together with Port Rashid also serve as major transit hubs for US military goods, with most such freight being delivered by three inconspicuous European shipping companies.
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Meanwhile Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed is the US Navy’s second most used port in the Persian Gulf
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and, on a lesser but still significant scale, Fujairah’s deep water port is also used by the US Navy, with the emirate’s major hotels having a longstanding arrangement to bloclet many of their rooms for Navy personnel. Similarly, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq some of Abu Dhabi’s hotels began to billet US soldiers on leave from Iraq. In mid-2006 the US president stated that ‘…the UAE is a key partner for our navy in a critical region, and outside of our own country Dubai services more of our own ships than any other country in the world’. Moreover, commenting on the aforementioned Dubai Ports scandal in the US, a US rear admiral declared that ‘…in a sense Dubai Ports has already been responsible for American security because we dock here in Dubai, and from personal experience I can confirm they are wonderfully efficient’.
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The use of UAE air infrastructure has also proved to be a key area of cooperation with the US military, as after 9/11 Dubai International Airport’s
Terminal 2 became one of the busiest airports involved in invasion of Afghanistan. For some years since it was one of the few airports in the world that had regular flights to Baghdad and Kabul, with a high proportion of seats being reserved for American military personnel or for employees of big US contractors such as Halliburton. Also important have been the airport’s military freight facilities, with many commercial companies using it to ship US military goods and even armoured vehicles. Shrouded in secrecy for many years Abu Dhabi has also been making available its airbase in Al-Dhafrah to the US Air Force and to the CIA, with RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft being stationed there and with KC-10 tanker aircraft having used the base to support operations in Afghanistan. Most embarrassingly for the UAE authorities, in the summer of 2005 it was revealed that US drones and U2 aircraft were also being serviced in Al-Dhafrah, following the crash landing of an unmanned spy plane on its return to Abu Dhabi from a mission in Afghanistan. The incident prompted the US Air Force to confirm that its 380
^th
Air Expeditionary Wing had been based there since 2002
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and at the time it was thought that there were over 100 US military personnel stationed in Al-Dhafrah.
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The UAE has also been secretly making available an airbase in Pakistan to the US military. Following a leaked US diplomatic cable and a Reuters report describing the base as a ‘mystery wrapped in a riddle’, it emerged that the Al-Shamsi base in Baluchistan had been leased by the Pakistani government to the UAE since 1992, but had then been sub-leased more recently by the UAE to the US, presumably to facilitate the latter’s operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the cable ‘the UAE government desired to keep details of the UAE cooperation with the US military in Afghanistan and Pakistan confidential, because the government is concerned that public acknowledgement of this assistance could pose risks to the UAE security within the UAE and in Pakistan’.
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Despite pleas and offers of financial aid from certain Gulf rulers to keep British servicemen based in the region after their independence,
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Britain’s military role in the Gulf monarchies has been greatly reduced since 1971. Nonetheless the Royal Air Force continues to deploy an expeditionary air wing at Qatar’s Al-Udeid base, and has its own desert air base at Thumrait in Oman.
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Moreover, other Western powers have recently been establishing bases in the region—sometimes openly, and sometimes covertly. Most prominent has been the aforementioned French
base in Abu Dhabi, opened at Dhafrah in 2009. Although Abu Dhabi’s former ruler, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, had long forbidden the overt presence of Western servicemen in Abu Dhabi, sensing the risk it would carry, it seems that his successors have been much less cautious. If anything, the French base—dubbed the ‘Peace Camp’—was inaugurated with considerable fanfare, with even the French president being in attendance.
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It was followed up by announcements that the French Navy would begin using facilities at Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed, and that UAE diplomats could begin using French embassies in countries where there was no UAE presence.
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Moreover, writing in a high profile opinion editorial for one of the UAE’s state-backed newspapers, the French president openly stated his case, claiming that ‘We have been strategic partners for fifteen years, linked by the defence accord we signed in 1995. With this permanent base, our commitment alongside you becomes even stronger. This base proves that our country is prepared to commit itself fully, together with you, to the security of the region’. Later in his article he also claimed that the base ‘…proves that France is prepared to take every risk for its friends. The message is clear: we will stand by you under all circumstances, even the most difficult’ before concluding that ‘…it is in adversity that one recognises one’s friends. You should know that you can always count on us if the security of the region were ever to be threatened’.
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