Afghanistan (64 page)

18.
Gary Langer,
Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan
, ABC News, 11 February 2009.

19.
Ali Wardak,
Jirga—A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan
, University of Glamorgan, 2005;
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups//files/15/02/30/f150230/public/documents/apcity/unpan017434.pdf
.

20.
Talk given at CSIS, Washington, 28 May 2009.

21.
Richard A. Oppel and Sangar Rahim, “Afghan Lawmakers Accuse a Governor of Graft,”
The New York Times
, 15 April 2009.

22.
Talk given at CSIS, Washington, 26 February 2009.

23.
Interview following talk at Brookings Institution, Washington, 25 February 2009.

24.
For the emergence of Afghanistan as a
rentier
state: Barnett Rubin,
The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System
, 2 ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

25.
Talk given at CSIS, Washington, 26 February 2009.

26.
Nabi Misdaq, “Traditional Leadership in Afghan Society and the Issue of National Unity,”
Central Asian Survey
, v. 9, n. 4, 1990, pp. 98–115.

27.
C. J. Chivers, “Arms Sent by US May Be Falling into Taliban Hands,”
The New York Times
, 20 May 2008.

28.
Arthur Keller, “Propaganda and Peace Deals: The Taliban’s Information War,”
CTC Sentinel
, v. 1, n. 8, July 2008, pp. 15–18.

29.
The role of the qawm in Afghan life and warfare is set out in: Oliver Roy,
Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan
(second edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

30.
On Islamism in Afghanistan, see: Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in William Maley, ed.
Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban
. New York: New York University, 1999, pp. 199–211.

31.
Formally the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. In addition to JIA, it included the Shura-i-Nazr (council of the north, the cross-party organization Massoud had formed in 1985), Hizb-i-Wahdat (predominantly Hazara), and Junbish Milli-i-Islami (predominantly Uzbek). It also included two predominantly Pushtun parties, Dr. Abdul Rasoul Sayeff’s Ittehad-i-Islami (one of the Peshawar Seven) and the Nangarhar shura of Haji Qadir (previously part of HiK).

32.
Talk at American University, Kabul, 1 November 2008.

33.
Ibid.

34.
In 2009, polling results were that only four percent of Afghans preferred the Taliban rule, up from one percent in 2005. Gary Langer,
Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan
, ABC News, 11 February 2009.

35.
Again, the lack of anything like an Afghanistan census on a national basis, let alone by province or district, is one of the challenges faced by effective polling.

Chapter Two

36.
On the relationship between crime and insurgency: John Mueller,
Hatred, Violence and Warfare: Thugs as Residual Combatants
. Paper delivered at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

37.
The current international boundary differs from the 1893 line, especially in the
Chennai Hills area of Baluchistan, and has done so for decades. Afghan usage still terms it the Durand Line, Pakistani usage the international border.

38.
See generally: James W. Spain,
The Way of the Pathan, the Pathan Borderlands
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); James W. Spain,
The People of the Khyber, the Pathans of Pakistan
(New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 46–47).

39.
Sources on the Pushtuns and their world include: Akbar Ahmed,
Pakhtun Economy and Society
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Sir Olaf Caroe,
The Pathans
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); Bernt Glatzer, “Being Pushtun-Being Muslim: Concepts of Person and War in Afghanistan,” in Bernt Glatzer, ed.,
Essays on South Asian Society, Culture and Politics II
(Berlin: Zentrum Moderner Orient, 1998, pp. 83–94).

40.
The International Republican Institute,
Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey
, 3–16 May 2009, Lapis Communication Research,
www.iri.org
, p. 64.

41.
On the rise, fall, rise, and fall of Dostum: Antonio Giustozzi,
The Ethnicization of an Afghan Function: Junbesh-i-Milli from its Origins to the Presidential Elections
. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2005.

42.
For example, Alexander Klaits and Gulchin Gulmamdova-Klaits,
Love and War in Afghanistan
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005, pp. 276–78) described pro-Taliban Tadji Sunni mullahs operating against Uzbek militia forces in this time period.

43.
Talk at American University, by Massoud Kharokhail, Kabul, 2 November 2009.

44.
Hassan Abbas, “From FATA to the NWFP, the Taliban Spread Their Grip in Pakistan,”
CTC Sentinel
, v. 1, n. 10, 17 September 2008, pp. 3–5.

45.
Faisal Ali Khan, FIDA, interview, Washington, 3 February 2009.

46.
Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Ladin from the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001
. New York: Penguin, 2005, p. 67.

47.
Interview following talk at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 26 March 2008.

48.
Husain Haqqani,
Pakistan Between Mosque and Military
. Washington: CEIP, 2005, p. 3.

49.
Ten to fifteen percent of the estimated 20,000 madrassas in Pakistan are estimated to be radical (Stephen Cohen,
The Idea of Pakistan
. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p. 182). These are likely concentrated in the FATA.

50.
The author, visiting Shia Touray Pushtuns in the Kurram Agency in 1987, saw great resentment at what they saw as the use of Sunni Islamist Afghans of HiH against them as a tool of Zia policies that they saw as anti-Shia.

51.
Sources on Pakistani Islamic radical organizations include: Muhammed Amir Rana,
A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan
(Lahore: Mashal, 2004).

52.
Ahmed Rashid, “Musharraf, Stop Aiding the Taliban,”
Daily Telegraph
(London), 6 October 2006.

53.
David B. Edwards,
Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier
. Berkeley: University of California, 1996.

54.
Louis Dupree,
Afghanistan
, op. cit., details these changes.

55.
Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” in William Maley, ed.,
Fundamentalism Reborn
(London: Hurst & Co., 1998, pp. 43–44).

56.
On the rise of the Taliban, see: Ahmed Rashid,
The Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

57.
On the post-2001 organization and how the Taliban evolved as an effective insurgent force, see: Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan” (
China and Eurasia Forum,
Quarterly, v. 5, n. 2, 2007, pp. 93–129); Emma Sky, “Increasing ISAF’s Impact on Stability in Afghanistan” (
Defense & Security Analysis,
v. 23, n.1, March 2007, pp. 7–25); David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad” (
The New York Times
, 12 August 2007).

58.
Interviews, Afghanistan, September 2009.

59.
Interviews, Kabul, October—November 2008; Antonio Giustozzi, op. cit., pp. 43–46.

Chapter Three

60.
Philip Jones provided this approach to examining Pakistani strategy.

61.
“The Airlift of Evil.”
MSNBC News Report
, 29 November 2001.

62.
Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan is Playing a Cat and Mouse Game,”
Gulf News
(Dubai), 19 October 2005.

63.
Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Lets Taliban Train, Prisoner Says,”
The New York Times
, 4 August 2004, p. A1.

64.
Arnaud de Borchegrave, “The Talibanization of Pakistan” (
The Washington Times
, 7 April 2007, p. A11); Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, “Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say” (
The New York Times
, 15 January 2007, p. A1); Seth Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game” (
Survival
, v. 49, n. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 15–32).

65.
“ISI Protecting Obama” (
Dawn
[Karachi], 18 January 2007); “Musharraf Betting on Taliban” (
Daily Times
, 5 April 2007).

66.
Talk at the Johns Hopkins University Asymmetric Conflict Symposium, Washington, 11 March 2008.

67.
Gary Langer,
Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan
, ABC News, 11 February 2009.

68.
Interview, Washington, 6 June 2008.

69.
Interview, Bagram Air Base, 14 October 2008.

70.
Ben Rowswell, DCM Canadian embassy Kabul, Washington, 22 May 2009.

71.
Doyle McManus, “US Drone Attacks in Pakistan Backfiring,”
The Los Angeles Times
, 3 May 2009.

72.
On the divisions within the Pakistani military, see Ahmad Faruqui, “Failure in Command, Lessons from Pakistan’s Indian Wars, 1947–1999,”
Defense Analysis
, v. 17, n. 1, 2001, pp. 31–40.

73.
Interview following talk at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 26 March 2008.

74.
Interview,
60 Minutes
, 17 May 2009.

75.
Interview, Kabul, 21 October 2008.

Chapter Four

76.
Unclassified summary of the NIE. Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland
, Washington, DC, NIC, July 2007.

77.
Katya Leney-Hall,
The Evolution of Franchise Terrorism: Al-Qaeda
, September 2008, Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Working Paper No. 1.

78.
Kevin Johnson, “Weakened Al-Qaeda Is Still a Threat,”
USA Today
, 8 September 2009.

79.
Eli Lake, “Al Qaeda Bungles Arms Experiment. Biological or Chemical Weapons,”
The Washington Times
, 19 January 2009.

80.
Quoted in Alex Kingsbury, “Where the Terrorist Threat from Al Qaeda Is Headed,”
US News & World Report
, 12 January 2009.

81.
Rohan Gunaratna,
Inside Al Qaeda
. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 84.

82.
Imtiaz Ali, “Extremists in Tribal Areas Use Gory DVDs to Celebrate and Exaggerate their Exploits,”
The Washington Post
, 24 June 2008, p. A12.

83.
Interview, Kabul, 21 October 2008.

84.
On the shift to international vice Afghanistan-specific events as legitimation by the Taliban, see Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),”
Small Wars and Insurgencies
, v. 18, n. 3, September 2007.

85.
See generally Laura Mansfield, ed.,
His Own Word, A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri
. (No location given), TLG Publications, 2006. See generally Part 1, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner.”

86.
George Packer, “The Last Mission,”
The New Yorker
, 28 September 2009, pp. 28–55, p. 44.

87.
Interview,
NPR Fresh Air
radio program, 5 April 2007.

88.
James Brandon, “The Pakistan Connection to the United Kingdom’s Jihad Network,”
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor
, v. 6, n. 4, 22 February 2008.

89.
Tim Shipman, “CIA Warns Barack Obama that British Terrorists Are the Biggest Threat to the US,”
The Daily Telegraph
(London), 7 February 2009.

90.
Marc Sageman,
Understanding Terror Networks
. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

91.
Drawn from Farhad Khosrokhavar,
Inside Jihadism, Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide
. Herndon, VA: Paradigm, 2008.

92.
Nick Meo, “Disaffected Youth Seduced by the Notion of Holy War,”
San Francisco Chronicle
, 17 July 2005.

93.
“Leaked Plans Outline Government’s Agenda to Tackle Roots of UK-Islamic Terrorism,”
The Sunday Times
(London), 30 May 2004.

94.
“Former Metropolitan Police Chief Says Britons Probably Planned London Attacks” (
The Sunday Times
[London], 10 July 2005); Ben Leapmen, “4,000 in UK Trained in Terror Camps” (
The Daily Telegraph
, 15 July 2007); Patrick Basham, “Many British Muslims Put Islam First” (
NRO Online
, 14 August 2006).

95.
“Arrests Prevented Terrorist Bombing” (
The Copenhagen Post
, 4 September 2007); Nicholas Kulish, “New Terrorism Case Confirms that Denmark is a Target” (
The New York Times
, 17 September 2007).

96.
“Germany Foils Massive Bomb Plot” (
BBC News
, 5 September 2007); Dirk Labs and Sebastian Rotella, “European Militants Now Get Training in Pakistan” (
Los Angeles Times
, 15 October 2007).

97.
Mark Eeckhaut, “Extremists Trained in Afghanistan,”
De Standard Online
(Brussels), 17 April 2009.

98.
Cam Simpson and Evan Perez, “US Al Qaeda Cell Suspected,”
The Wall Street Journal
, 24 September 2009.

99.
“Home Grown Bombers,”
The Economist
, 3 October 2009, p. 36.

100.
Benjamin Haas and Daniel McGrory, “Al Qaida Seeking to Recruit African-American Muslims,”
CTC Sentinel
, v. 1, n. 8, July 2008, pp. 13–14.

101.
Current and Projected National Security Threats to The United States
, Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 February 2006.

102.
Daniel Markey,
Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt
, CSR no. 36, August 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, p. 16.