Afghanistan (61 page)

Some Westerners focus their attention only on international terrorism, putting aside the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan because they do not directly affect their national security. However, the average American or European has an interest in preventing the reemergence of transnational terrorism that would potentially be fueled by an insurgent-controlled Afghanistan. Seeing the defeat of democracy in Afghanistan would encourage terrorism’s supporters, both in the regions surrounding Afghanistan and among the disaffected in the US and Europe. But while victory in Afghanistan will not prevent terrorism in the West, especially attacks that rely on recruits from the local population, as has been the case in the UK and throughout Europe, a Western defeat—which is how disengagement will be perceived—will likely embolden and encourage such terrorists to an even higher degree, providing an example of how a few hard men overcame great powers. The terrorist threat did not begin with the intervention in Afghanistan and is unlikely to end with it. Nor are the divisions between terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan likely to prevent cooperation. Both groups have, in recent years, demonstrated a willingness to cooperate toward a “common goal” as they are linked by ideology, shared networks, and through even the ties of blood and marriage. Al Qaeda, for all its limitations, may have shown the way to the next generation of networked and internationally aligned terrorists.

Success in the insurgencies means prevailing over or incorporating in
the political system the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans that are also deeply flawed yet strong contenders for power—political, social, and cultural—in Pushtun Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghan insurgents are even more deeply divided than those Afghans supporting the government, yet the Taliban’s apparent absence of corruption has been touted in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a way to contrast themselves with unpopular governments. This “lack” of corruption, however, is likely due to the fact that no one has been able to report on their inner workings and survive. The problem really lies with the future of one ethnolinguistic group—the Pushtuns—and they are superimposed on the future of the two countries. Effective Pushtun leaders need time to emerge in Afghanistan, where they have been limited by conflict, affiliation with the Taliban, and Pakistani influence, and Pakistan where they have been limited by military rule and feudal national politics. Such leaders would provide an alternative to the Pushtun insurgent leadership in both countries. Additionally, narcotics will continue to fund terror and insurgency alike so long as southern Afghanistan grows it in the absence of governance that eliminating the crop would require.

Currently, Kabul is still seen as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, but it is being slowly undercut by perceptions of corruption and its failure to improve the quality of life (power, roads) for the average Afghan. The lack of economic success throughout much of Afghanistan, the failure to create a viable national economy and the jobs that would go with it has proven as critical, if not more so, as the challenges posed by the insurgency, narcotics, and corruption. There is deep ambivalence toward cultural issues and the foreign presence, though attitudes on the whole remain favorable, especially as the perception remains widespread that the foreigners are preventing another round of Afghan civil war enabled by Pakistan and other regional powers. This means that any solution has to be seen as an Afghan solution; whether the foreigners are happy with it must be subordinated to what will work between Afghans. But the Afghans are going to have to rely on the foreigners to provide security until their own forces are ready and provide aid until they have achieved a national economy. In the longer term, any Afghan solution will have the potential to be disrupted by Pakistan or other neighbors. A US security
commitment will be required to mitigate this. In the final analysis, the US needs to help bring about a future where Pakistan is stable, democratic, and at peace with its neighbors and where its national security is not defined by the military. That is truly a long-term objective, but both the nuclear security issue and the security of Afghanistan mean it is one worth pursuing.

The Afghans had hoped for a better life in the wake of 2001 and bitterly resent it being available only to a few. There emerged few Afghan leaders or institutions that were willing to moderate these desires and convey the fact that it would not happen overnight, reminding elites and grassroots alike that while defeating the Al Qaeda and the Taliban militarily may have taken weeks, rebuilding Afghanistan would take decades. Fewer still Afghans were willing to take responsibility for the condition of their country, instead focusing on their own ethnolinguistic group or benefiting themselves and their kin. The over-centralized Kabul government created by the 2004 constitution has proven to be an unwieldy vehicle. Changes—through constitutional amendment or, once a consensus exists, a
Loya Jirga
—are needed to give the Afghan people more control over their government at the lowest possible level, in order to get them to take personal ownership and responsibility for their future. A more parliamentary and less centralized government in Kabul could possibly have something like a British-style war cabinet that meaningfully engages major opposition figures. This would prevent Karzai’s previous policies of aiming to sideline the opposition, denying them access to resources and so choke off their ability to provide patronage. There is a need to reduce the size of the Afghanistan cabinet, enlarged previously to provide patronage opportunities for Karzai. Decision making should be decentralized, increasing district and local authority and, through that, responsibility. There is a need to speed up reconstruction in stable provinces. Major drug traffickers and some senior corrupt officials need to receive high-profile trials and exemplary sentences. All the while, Afghanistan needs to give more power to the provinces, district, and villages. The Afghan people, above all, need to be made responsible for their own future, which must include empowering (and arming) them to defend it. Just as government cannot be limited to Kabul, security cannot be limited to the ANSF alone. In the short term, this policy will
require village-based militias with their own weapons. It has to involve the Afghan people, the same ones that defeated the Soviets and endured the 1992–2001 civil wars. They are tremendously tired and war-weary, but they can do it, if allowed to do it in their own way.

Enabling change in Afghanistan requires a form of policy “judo.” Rather than resisting with sheer force, pull with the strength of those parts of Afghanistan derived from its social structure and culture and then try and direct it in the desired direction. This works better than opposing what is strong and trying to build up what is weak. But change in Afghanistan will not result from top-down foreign-directed initiatives. It will require a generation to build Afghanistan’s institutions and create constituencies, and what foreigners can do best is help provide security and aid to see this needed generational change completely through.

Afghans, when they are not being polarized by foreign supporters, have been capable of working things out themselves, and this can be capitalized on today. In the past two years, the Afghan government’s best senior officials—a mixture of anti-Soviet guerillas, former Najibullah supporters, returning exiles, and educated Kabulis with roots in state service—together present a formidable group that cuts across ethnolinguistic lines and has real potential. Outside of Kabul, those Afghans willing to provide a bulwark against collapse, at least in the short term, may not have the qualifications and skills of those in Kabul, but they demonstrate that the strengths of the old Afghanistan still exist and they need to be on the “team” as well. The challenge will be to pull together these divided Afghans in both Kabul and the grassroots and cut out those that are there for their own power or enrichment.

Without any doubt, there is a substantial price tag on a sustainable Afghanistan, in terms of money, commitment, and troops. But not paying this price now will likely lead to failure, exacting an even higher price in the future, be it a renewed terrorist haven for new attacks on US soil, threats to shaky neighbors, or something else we dare not dream of. The insurgency in Afghanistan will not be won by foreign troops or aid, but they are needed to build up and reform Afghanistan’s governance and enable the ANSF to hold the line until there is a chance for a modicum of peace and economic growth.

As it currently stands, the security situation in Afghanistan will require additional outside troops to prevent further deterioration or even compensate for earlier actions not taken, be it actions to build an unitary security and development campaign, have an effective strategy for military operations, development and reconstruction; or help create legitimate Afghan governance for both the government and the grassroots. There was no alternative to increased reliance on foreign troops and money by the time of Obama’s December 2009 speech, but unless effective and legitimate Afghan governance can follow, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the population lives, these troops will provide only a temporary solution. Troops from additional coalition partners, especially from Muslim countries, are part of this requirement. While Turkey has been reluctant to commit additional ground forces,
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those countries that originally offered troops to ISAF, such as Jordan and Oman, may be willing to reconsider following the US withdrawal from the unpopular conflict in Iraq. An increased role for Islamic coalition members would be diplomatically difficult to achieve, but would also help with the cultural dimensions of the conflict.

The increased number of US and coalition ground troops will be able to defeat and clear insurgent forces from an increasingly large area. The weakness is the absence of a capability to fill this power vacuum in the wake of the troops and create governance that will negate the insurgents’ lingering threat that they will eventually return to kill all who collaborated. The Afghan government has, in the past, not been able to perform this vital, final act. When Musa Qala in Helmand province was reoccupied by coalition forces late in 2007, the Afghan government personnel that moved into the heavily fortified district headquarters reportedly spent most of their time in the basement waiting for a helicopter back to the provincial capital at Lashkar Gar, hardly confidence-inspiring. In 2009, the US was training the ANSF to follow up coalition forces as they move into areas such as the Helmand valley, where these Afghan forces can fill the power vacuum and provide security at the least. Building up the ANSF will be only part of increasing Afghan security responsibility. What is needed in places like Helmand are respected Afghans who will resolve land and water disputes and mullahs that will preach peace and not jihad in the mosques. These are
going to be harder to create than competent Afghan security forces, but are no less important, and the US needs to make sure that they, and the Afghan civil society they represent, are able to be reestablished where security permits. In the words of one veteran observer of Afghanistan, “More soldiers are not the solution without good governance to fill in behind them,” even when the soldiers are Afghans.

In addition to strengthening Afghan civil society, the coalition and Kabul need to de-legitimate—through the battle of ideas—what the insurgents have to offer: the suicide bombs, the rough justice of the Qazi courts applying a brand of Sharia unlikely to be recognized by genuine ulema, the maximalist practice of Islam, and the continued alliance with narcotics traffickers. All these things are unpopular with the Afghan people. What has been lacking is a way to leverage this unpopularity so that the population will resist the insurgents. The negative message against all these things is important, but it will lack credibility unless it is matched by a positive message, of demonstrating to the people that the Afghan government is competent, effective, and able to make their life better and not make them targets for insurgents or coalition collateral damage alike. Any insurgency is more a political than a military conflict, and in democracies people daily have evidence of the importance of effective communications to political success. Yet it remains that the coalition and Afghans alike have often been less successful in getting their message out to the Afghan people than the terrorists and insurgents.

“The Taliban is fighting for their ideology, even one not acceptable to Afghans. What is our ideology?” asked Engineer Mohammed Es’haq, comrade-in-arms of Ahmad Shah Massoud and a veteran of Afghanistan’s conflicts since the Panjshir Revolt of 1975.
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His question highlights the disturbing fact that Afghanistan and its allies have been losing the battle of ideas to their enemies since 2001. Just as those standing against the terrorists, insurgents, and narcotics traffickers in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan could become a strong world-class team, so too is there a potential to pull together an ideology to unify them. An Afghan national vision (embraced by Ahmad Shah Massoud), Afghan Islam, a willingness to embrace democracy down to its roots in the Afghan jirga and Islamic requirement for
majlis-e-shura
, and a commitment to better
the quality of life could, together, offer a future more appealing than any the insurgents could envision. It is here that the battle for hearts and minds can be won.

Afghans have earned the right to live as a nation, in peace and freedom, the same way Americans did, by fighting for it and voting for it. The Afghans remain independent in their thinking and committed to freedom. For all their many shortfalls, Afghans of all political allegiances remain proud of what they have successfully accomplished since 2001, from holding the
Loya Jirgas
, creating the constitution, and providing free elections, even if the most recent of these was tainted by corruption. The Afghans define nation, peace, and freedom differently from the Americans, seeing true freedom as only partly a secular concept. “Freedom” lacks meaning without also including submission to Islam and living life in accordance with Sharia law and the “Afghan way.”