Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (50 page)

Things went wrong quickly. In the woods closest to the railroad line the Germans were dug in on an elongated slag pile and on a high embankment that overlooked the tracks. They opened up with machine-gun fire while several grenadiers raced down to the thick underbrush that covered their final protective lines and started shooting. This devastating fire drove back one of Captain Sibbald's platoons, but the other struggled forward and got almost to the railway embankment. Here, more Germans emerged from tunnels and a mine shaft. The platoon was surrounded. Six Americans eventually made it back; the others were either killed, wounded, or captured.

Sergeant Fortune's squads had done everything possible to avert this disaster. His men had moved forward “on the double” through the woods to the left of Company E, proceeding quickly enough for most of his soldiers to get ahead of the German mortar and artillery fire. Fortune had ordered them to dig in on a little knoll about 30 yards from the edge of the woods where they could observe the enemy. As he later explained:

Each squad dug in standing foxholes and we placed BAR's covering both flanks. We got a good deal of small arms fire across the open fields to our front and left. After we had been at it about an hour, the Jerries started throwing artillery at the edge of the trees to our immediate rear. Suddenly Company E started withdrawing through my lines. I could hear, just barely, the voice of the company commander, but for a long time couldn't understand what he was saying over the 536. Finally, I got the information that we should withdraw if we could. I tried to send out men between barrages, but it was rough going. My platoon guide, Staff Sergeant Robert Schwartz was killed by a tree burst. Thinking he was alive, I dragged his body back to my foxhole.
⁷²

Tall, mustached Captain Sibbald had been using his 536 radio to request permission to use his reserve platoon in an attempt to rescue his
surrounded men. For more than an hour they “fought doggedly through a hail of small arms and shellfire.”
⁷³
But his regimental commander, Colonel Johnson, eventually ordered him to withdraw. Sibbald obeyed, but “he refused to report to the Regimental CP or leave the woods until he personally saw that all wounded that it was possible to reach had been evacuated to safety.”
⁷⁴
Johnson later “characterized this action as the finest example of leadership by a company commander in [his] regiment.”
⁷⁵
Company E's morning reports eventually showed that twenty-one men were missing, all likely captured; Lt. John F. Doyle, one of the platoon leaders, was among them.

Sergeant Fortune was no less earnest in his efforts to evacuate the men of his squads. After locating what he thought was most of them, he “looked around and hollered twice; nobody answered,” so he went back and reported to Captain Sibbald. “Then I began to think,” he recalled later.

Where were Masters and Evans? Are they still out there wounded? Did I leave them there to be killed? I don't remember anything else until I woke up two days later in a hospital in Holland. They had me down for “Combat Fatigue–Serious.” The major said I had hollered all night like I was crazy; “I killed my own men, I let them die, it's all my fault.”
⁷⁶

Sergeant Fortune was eventually released and sent back to his company. But he spoke for many when he later said, “It's funny how you can be cool as a cucumber when there's all hell breaking loose, and then go to pieces when the danger is over.”

Lieutenant Colonel Cox's 2nd Battalion forces had still been clinging to the downward slope of the hill just 500 yards from the highway that led into Aachen during the 117th Infantry's feint. The Germans were arrayed to either of their flanks; SS Battalion Bucher of
Kampfgruppe
Diefenthal attached to the 246th Division was to Cox's right. To his left was the 6Co of Militia Training Battalion II from the 116th Panzer Division. Theses combined forces had created a critical situation; the Americans were being clobbered with hostile artillery fire and the pillboxes
with German machine gunners in their trenches were proving to be difficult to overrun. Rain was coming down; the hillside was full of mud; the American tanks were stuck in it, and Cox's infantry dared not move to either flank without them.

The German Mark VIs had more maneuverability because their tracks were much wider than the American armor; their commanders took full advantage of this and sent six of their Tigers, accompanied by about forty grenadiers, onto the hill. But Sergeant Holycross, who had so aptly demonstrated how pillboxes should be taken a week earlier, again rallied his men. He “pinned the defenders next to their shelters with fire and worked his men in, successfully reducing seven pillboxes and capturing 50 of his opposite numbers.”
⁷⁷
And as the Mark VI Tigers and grenadiers got closer, they were driven off by the combined fires of American bazookas, artillery, and small arms. Then, as the 116th Panzer Division historian later noted:

When the German artillery had to move its fire over toward the American attacks [northeast of Würselen] the 2nd Battalion 119th Infantry broke through the boundary between the 116th Panzer Division and the 246th Volks-Grenadier Division, which had detoured from Kohlscheid to Richterich…the road to Hill 194 was therefore open to the enemy. Only the bunkers southwest of the Kaisersruh station now formed a barrier.
⁷⁸

At 1544 hours, General Huebner's 1st Infantry Division chief of staff phoned General Hobbs's command post and told them “his observers reported friendly troops [in sight] and that a patrol was being sent out.”
⁷⁹

Lieutenant Arn of Company F received immediate orders to send his forces across the now darkening and rain-swept valley; a ten-man patrol under the command of Staff Sgt. Frank A. Karwell was hastily assembled with two scouts—Pvt. Evan F. Whitis and Pfc. Edward Krauss. It did not start well; when the patrol jumped off they were greeted by strong machine-gun fire from both of their flanks and even frontally. Karwell got hit before the patrol could cross the Aachen-Würselen roadway. His last words to Krauss and Whitis were to “keep going and make the contact.”
⁸⁰

Through continued interlocking German machine-gun fire they did, and according to their own narratives they “eventually stumbled into the 1st Division's positions.” “We're from Company K,” shouted Staff Sergeant Chastin from Ravelsberg Hill. “Come on up!”
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Together, Krauss and Whitis yelled back, “We're from Company F; come on down.” Chastin proved more persuasive; the two scouts came up, they all shook hands, and closing of the Aachen Gap was finally accomplished.

Night found the American flag waving over the first captured German city in World War II.

26TH INFANTRY AAR, 21 OCTOBER 1944

A
t 0530 on 17 October, German planes started dropping both heavy and antipersonnel bombs into Aachen, but amazingly few landed in the 26th Infantry Regiment battalion areas. Three of these bombers continued flying back and forth over the city; then at 0630 the first friendly American aircraft screamed into the German airspace and their planes peeled away and disappeared. Little activity had initially been planned after more daylight enveloped Aachen; Lieutenant Colonel Corley's 3rd Battalion companies were to sit in place, rest, receive replacements, and prepare for their new offensive in Farwick Park the following morning. But with the situation on the hills northeast of the city now under control, General Huebner permitted Lieutenant Colonel Daniel's 2nd Battalion to go back on the attack. “Our zone widened considerably to both the north and the south as soon as Wilhelm Strasse was crossed,” Daniel later recalled while also adding, “Enemy resistance became more fanatical.”
¹

It was Captain Smoot's Company E and Walker's Company G that first ran into this renewed German vigor. Wilhelmstrasse was one of the city's main streets; the buildings on nearby streets were in such ruin from shelling and bombing by this time that the Germans were using their fragile façades as offensive targets for their
Panzerfausts
. Inauspiciously, Americans started receiving injuries from falling brickwork as soon as
they started making their way to Wilhelmstrasse where it intersects with Hinderburgstrasse.

The enemy forces had even better fields of fire here; according to Lieutenant Bays, leader of the TD platoon operating with the companies, this was where they really “caught hell.”
²
A panzer-supported attack by enemy infantry quickly developed. Direct antitank fire roared in from the rubble around the once-proud Aachen state theater, where famed maestro Herbert von Karajan had conducted Beethoven symphonies before the war came to the city. Now a pillbox in front of the theater was being used to lull the Americans into a trap; direct antitank fire was set up around it, and Bays's only operational TD could not get into an effective location to return fire due to the claustrophobic layout of the streets. “The Germans were running tanks back and forth across Hindenburg right in front of our eyes,” Lieutenant Colonel Daniel explained later. “All we could do was chase them with artillery and mortar fire and this was not a satisfying procedure.”
³

Daniel quickly thought through a plan to rectify the problem and he wasted little time putting it in place. Like Corley's 3rd Battalion, General Andrus had also entrusted Daniel's forces with a 155 SP gun. It had been kept out of harm's way up to this point. Now, in preparation for its opening performance, Daniel first had Lieutenant Bays move his TD into a courtyard behind one of the houses on Hinderburgstrasse and then he directed him to blast a hole straight through one of its brick walls. The battalion's attached tanks then worked their way into positions on the other side of the street; they were accompanied by a platoon of Walker's Company G men whose job was to prevent any
Panzerfaust
teams from firing on the American armor.

After blowing the hole through the house, Bays repositioned the TD so its crew could join the Shermans and start firing down the cross streets along Hinderburgstrasse. The purpose was to discourage German tanks from emerging and being able to shoot any rounds toward the house with the clearly visible hole now in it. About a half hour later, satisfied that the enemy forces were occupied and well distracted by his armor feint, Daniel played his hand and ordered the SP gun into position. It was moved up to the brick house and its muzzle was soon seen poking through the blown opening. A dozen rounds of 1,400-feet-per-second velocity shells were fired directly into the pillbox, at the
Panzerfaust
positions around
the state theater, and toward the cross streets between them. The pillbox turned out to be a camouflaged tank; it was completely destroyed. One of the SP gun's shells hit another German tank just as it was nosing around a building and starting to aim its gun at the Americans. “The firing of our gun was spectacular and satisfying,” a contented Lieutenant Colonel Daniel told everyone later.
⁴

By the time all offensive operations were suspended at 1700 hours, both Companies E and G had closed into positions near the central railroad station. But Lieutenant Webb's Company F was stuck back on Adalbertstein Weg; an enemy antitank gun firing from the corner of Lutherstrasse and Kaiser Platz denied any advancement. It had also been a rough afternoon for Walker's men; one platoon faced intense enemy machine-gun fire while crossing one of the open areas leveled by the earlier bombing. The enemy gunner teams were well hidden among the rubble and ruins around other houses. Still, the Americans attacked; two German tanks joined the fight, laying 88mm fire into Company G's advancing skirmish lines. Heavy casualties resulted, but the rifle platoon pressed on; a friendly machine-gun section carried the fight directly toward the enemy tanks while the remaining U.S. soldiers charged the hostile machine-gun nests. More walls crumpled; bricks flew. Then the German tankers buttoned up their vehicles and withdrew. The rest of the enemy forces withered; their positions were finally cleared out. Survivors surrendered.

While the 3rd Battalion companies saw no combat during the day, Lieutenant Colonel Corley and his staff kept very busy. Visitors first arrived at 1000 hours; General Rose was in company with Lieutenant Colonel Hogan. Along with Colonel Seitz, the command group was there to review plans and coordinate their forces for the attack the next day.

Corley's mission was broadly defined as taking back every enemy position in Farwick Park, but his primary objectives were the Kurhaus and the Hotel Quellenhof. Once these were back in Corley's possession, a portion of his forces were to move on to Salvatorberg in order to protect the flank of Task Force Hogan as his armored forces drove toward Lousberg; Hogan was to then wheel north up to Laurensberg about 2 miles north of Aachen, an ancient Roman sanctuary site before it was occupied by Napoleon during the French Revolution. Remnants of the
49th Infantry Division still held Laurensberg. The briefing ended before noon, but Lieutenant Colonel Corley's staff was only getting started; typewriters were now being dusted off because Seitz had warned everyone that another important visitor would be by to review the plan later in the day. “This was the only time in 13 months of combat in which a written order was put out while engaged in battle,” a startling, later memo to the 26th Infantry Regiment's S-3, Major Clisson, revealed.
⁵

Somewhat derisively entitled Field Order Number 1, Corley nevertheless presented it to General Huebner when he arrived with Colonel Seitz in the CP at 1500 hours; the order detailed attachments and objectives for each company.
⁶
Captain Botts's Company I would have five tanks and three TDs for his men's attack; it would be preceded by fires from the 155 SP gun before they moved along Rowlandstrasse and came into Farwick Park from the north. Corwell's Company K would attack along Manheim Allee, which fronted his objective—the Hotel Quellenhof; a squad of engineers would perform necessary demolition work and two bazooka teams would provide added firepower. Lieutenant Shepard's Company L was tasked with retaking the Kurhaus; he was expected to then send a platoon over to hold the hotel. Two tanks, two TDs, and a section of heavy machine guns would support this platoon; Shepard's other two platoons would stay back as the battalion reserve, to be used as needed.

Corley then turned General Huebner's attention to the planned support for Task Force Hogan's thrust up to Laurensberg. First, the Antitank Company would be used to defend the north flank of his battalion by going into positions on Krefelderstrasse and Passstrasse; this would also afford flank protection for Hogan's armored vehicles as they passed by the area. Lieutenant Nechey's Company M, less the section of heavy machine gunners that would be with Shepard's men, would also help protect Hogan's forces; the 81mm mortar platoon, with 4.2-inch chemical mortars joining, would escort Task Force Hogan as they continued their drive by pouring blinding concentrations of smoke and fire on the Lousberg. To satisfy Huebner's penchant for timing, Corley told him he expected to have the objectives in Farwick Park taken by noon, allowing for mopping up through the afternoon. General Huebner was undoubtedly even more pleased to hear that the 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar teams had warmed up for their assignment by thoroughly working over
the area south of the tennis courts that very afternoon just before his arrival in the CP.

Lieutenant Colonel Corley's opponents were also planning their defensive strategies, undoubtedly spurred on by messages of encouragement from their higher ups.
⁷
Oberst
Wilck exclaimed in a written memo to his forces that “All of Germany is watching our battle with pride and admiration.” Himmler reinforced this sentiment by radio, announcing to Wilck's men, “The eyes of all Germany are on the defense of the ancient city by Battle Group Aachen.” Brandenberg of 7th Army added to the pitch by writing, “Your fight for the imperial city is being followed with admiration and breathless expectancy; you are fighting for the honor of the National Socialist German Army.”
General der Infanterie
Köchling even joined in with his own inspirational message, stating “The 81 Corps renders the highest tribute to the Aachen defender's valor in the fight to the end for Führer and Nation.” These words of encouragement were later found neatly folded in the pockets of captured Germans.

About 150 men from the 1st SS Panzer (Hitler) Division found their way into Aachen during the night of 17–18 October. Lieutenant Lafley, the 26th Infantry's S-2 noted, “The gap was thought closed, but this group got through.”
⁸

They brought in an anti-tank platoon of 75's; one infantry howitzer platoon of two 75's, another AT platoon of three 20mm [antiaircraft guns], and the rest infantry. They were probably sent in to bolster morale. An estimated 125 Aachen police were also given rifles and put in the line in their police uniforms. They were broken down into squads of eight, with each squad being given a machinegun. The chief of police, Major [Paul] Zimmermann, was in charge. The previous night, about 80 police also arrived from the Cologne area.

Total enemy strength remaining in Aachen was uncertain. Lafley estimated that there were 3,350 men still under
Oberst
Wilck's command in the city on the night of 15–16 October. The U.S. Army historian claimed Wilck had a total of 4,392 “combat effectives,” plus eleven surgeons and thirty-four medics on 17 October. The difference in their estimates may
have been rooted in the actual disposition of the 246th Division's forces; Wilck still had units outside of the city under his direction.

The mission of Denkert's 3rd Panzer Division on 18 October was again to reestablish contact with
Oberst
Wilck's forces inside of Aachen; plans included assistance from the 116th Panzer Division.
⁹
The first task was the seizure of the Ravelsberg and a group of bunkers south of the hill mass in a surprise attack. Then all available forces were to push farther west and reopen access to the city. But judging by the sentiments of the 116th Panzer Division's commander,
Oberst
Siegfried von Waldenberg, despite his Prussian sense of duty, he confessed this in his pocket calendar on the night before the attack:

It is very, very tough fighting and casualties are high accordingly. Contrary to expectations, the American fights very well. The Americans succeeded in the encirclement of Aachen; they broke the 246th Division. My front held its own…but nothing helps anymore; enemy fire is too strong.
¹⁰

For Colonel Smith's 18th Infantry, this same day was confidently devoted to making adjustments in expectation of their opposite numbers’ last attempts to take back their hard-fought-for positions outside of Aachen; they were prepared for any so-called surprise attacks. Captain Folk's Company L men were even engaged in bitter fighting for the pillboxes fronting the Ravelsberg; two TDs had been ordered up from Haaren to provide assistance. They cruised through the area west to northwest of the hill all morning, blasting the pillboxes from 300 to 500 yards out; Folk's soldiers eventually took one hundred prisoners attached to
Oberst
Wilck's 246th Division. Later, at about 1700, the TD crews set up a roadblock on the northern slope of the hill, but upon spotting three German tanks approaching from Würselen, their commander, Lt. Ira W. Blackwell, ordered them back to Haaren
¹¹
; two squads of Captain Russell's Company K 3rd Platoon assumed responsibility for guarding the roadblock.

The weather was suddenly a big factor; the skies became pitch black that night, the wind started blowing harder, and rain began falling in sheets. It was a cold, wet night at the roadblock. Then, at 0530 on 18
October, the two American squads were leaving this position and returning to Ravelsberg Hill where the roadblock could be observed from an outpost; Germans suddenly came in behind them and overran the roadblock before they could make it back up the hill. In a very short time, Russell's opposite numbers grew in strength and captured all of the pillboxes that belonged to the 3rd Platoon—numbers 2, 3, 4, and 6 on the north slope of the hill. Two Mark Vs eventually started firing directly into Company K's positions farther back, knocking out Lieutenant Heinrich's machine-gun emplacements. Approximately twenty-two more German tanks were forming up; enemy SP guns were now starting to throw fire into the hill mass. The Americans had been surprised; from one German who was taken prisoner, Captain Russell learned that the attackers were the vanguard of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division.