Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (47 page)

Lieutenant Donald J. Conway had pushed an observation post forward to a high water tower in the coal mine 50 yards from the enemy. This OP was maintained through four direct hits by enemy artillery, but the fifth made it untenable.
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“The artillery continued to be mighty rough,” Company L's Lieutenant Knox remembered later. “It wasn't safe. Two of our men were killed going up a road. Communication wires were always out. As soon as we could get them fixed, out they would go again. The situation kept the runners and myself busy.”
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It was around this time that the surrender ultimatum was delivered to the Aachen battle commander down in the city. Pressure to draw the noose with the linkup was foremost in the minds of both XIX Corps’ General Corlett and the 30th Division commander General Hobbs. Hobbs, for his part, maintained that he needed more troop strength in order to affect the juncture; this was understandable given nearly ten days of sustained combat operations and the resulting casualties that his forces had experienced.
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But there was only one reserve unit available to Hobbs—his own 3rd Battalion of the 120th Infantry—and Corps had no reserves it was ready to commit.

By midafternoon it was clear that Brown's 3rd Battalion troops would remain cut off at the mine in North Würselen. Even though the rest of Colonel Sutherland's forces were ringed around the village, probing attacks by the Germans necessitated defensive strategies that were sapping the necessary fighting stamina it would take to get through Würselen proper to make the linkup. Thus XIX Corps granted Hobbs's request that afternoon to “pummel the town with artillery, to pave the way for a more secure junction.”
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As General Hobbs would say in a call to Sutherland early the following morning, “This thing has to drive through.”
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When Supreme Command West received word that same night indicating that the situation near Bardenberg and Würselen had become critical, permission was granted to move a hastily organized and reinforced regimental group of the 116th Panzer Division into the area for its defense
on 11 October.
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XIX Corps’ intelligence unit had been anticipating the division's arrival at the front, and the commanders of the 116th Panzer Division had hoped that they would attack as a native fighting force, rather than being doled out piecemeal. But at 2030 hours on the night of 10 October, the chief of staff to 7th Army ended such thoughts when he informed LXXXI Corps that they would receive the reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment 60 and Combat Group Diefenthal for the next day's fight; the latter unit was “a hybrid collection of survivors of two defunct divisions in strength of about two battalions.”
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Other units were also committed. Three hours later,
Oberst
Johannes Bayer, commander of Panzer Regiment 16, arrived with his forces in an assembly area southwest of Jurlich.
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His regiment was attached to the 246th Division and out of this came the formation of Attack Group North, presumably to distinguish itself as not part of the Aachen inner-city defenses; this new group would be under Bayer's command. In turn, Bayer had two battalions of 650 men each from Panzer Grenadier Regiment 60 assigned to him, as well as nine “battle worthy” Panthers and four Hummels from Armored Artillery Regiment 146. Battalion Rink was also assigned to
Oberst
Bayer; at the time its strength was three Panzergrenadier companies and an antiaircraft platoon. Bayer also received eighteen additional guns when Assault Brigade 902 arrived. Attack Group North's mission was to relieve Panzer Brigade 108 in Bardenberg that very night; reports indicated that five Panthers and three Tigers of Panzer Battalion 506 were still in service here.

It was foggy again in the early hours of 11 October. The Germans in Bardenberg, after suffering from artillery strikes through the night, were pummeled once more with a terrific artillery preparation ahead of the new American offensive. Major Greer's 3rd Battalion of the 120th Infantry had moved from their reserve positions in Noppenberg and was assembled on the fringes of Bardenberg, ready to attack. Greer, in preparation for the fight, had used his photomap overlay to create quadrants in the village, and he had assigned sectors for each of his companies. At 0900, his men jumped off.

They encountered “virtually no opposition” when they stepped into town.
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Instead the men went from house to house, making careful searches, still finding no opponents. But when they reached the southern
half of Bardenberg in early afternoon the battalion met the grenadiers of Panzer Brigade 108, their tanks, and half-tracks. Here, and in the woods on the edge of the village, the Germans had arranged well-coordinated positions that were providing mutual cover for their companies. An account of the subsequent action said, “Major Greer personally did much to get the attack rolling. Grabbing a bazooka, he worked his way up to within range of one tank and knocked it out with one shot. Almost at once another tank fired, hitting the building he was in and knocking his helmet off. But a few minutes later, he reloaded and moved to a vantage point for a shot at the second tank. It worked.”
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Staff Sgt. Anthony A. Tempesta of Company A, 743rd Tank Battalion, was one of the first to spot an assault gun covering an intersection as he led his platoon southward along the main street near the building Greer was in. Another report provided this account of what he did next.

Tempesta boldly knocked it out with three shots, first swinging his tank cannon around toward the assault gun, then moving fast into an open firing position in the center of the intersection the assault gun was covering while a bazooka team also fired. Enemy snipers dropped grenades from upstairs windows but his tank moved ahead, knocking out another assault gun as he had the first, and eventually disabling six half-tracks. Tempesta assumed command of his company at 1400 after all of the officers had been wounded.
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Spurred on by actions of Greer and Tempesta, “similar crowbar tactics, here against a half-track sprouting 20mm shells, there against a machinegun or a tank, finally disassembled the matrix of German defenses.”
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By the end of the day, the battalion had destroyed 6 tanks and 16 half-tracks, killed at least 30 Germans, and taken 100 prisoners.

Captain McCullough's 1st Battalion men at the Birk crossroads had again kept the Germans from sending any help or supplies to their worn-down comrades in Bardenberg; four squadrons of XIX Tactical Air Command fighters had also aided in this effort during the late afternoon. Nevertheless, McCullough's forces were fired on for most of the day; between shell bursts and mortar fire the battalion took more than eight casualties. There were also enemy tank and infantry thrusts, but these
attacks proved to be just a small reconnaissance in force with approximately fifty men. Every attack was driven off, and the battalion after-action report stated that fourteen enemy tanks were disabled and nineteen prisoners of war were taken. By this time the 2nd Battalion had moved over to Schleibach to take up positions on the railroad line between this tiny hamlet and Euchen in order to also help protect the regiment's left from intruders.

After Major Greer's companies cleared out Bardenberg, he sent Capt. Charles R. Shaw's Company I down to make contact with Brown's 3rd Battalion of the 119th Infantry in Würselen. Shaw's men destroyed ten half-tracks while capturing over forty Germans, including three officers, from Panzer Brigade 108's Armored Engineering Company 2108. A diary entry by its commanding officer,
Hauptmann
Heinz Albert, evidenced that elements of
Oberst
Bayer's Attack Group North had arrived as planned that afternoon.

As of 1300 hours, sporadic infantry fire left rearward; mortar fire; the hits are almost in my positions. Towards 1700 hours, grenadiers arrive at our position; immense astonishment to find us here. Target of their attack: Pass west of the Würselen church and advance to Bardenberg.
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Panzer Grenadier Regiment 60's 1st Battalion, supported by tanks of Panzer Regiment 24, had reached the railroad station in North Würselen an hour earlier, and had engaged with some of Lieutenant Colonel Brown's men in houses just to the northwest of the station. Unknown to Brown, Battalion Rink had also occupied Kohlscheid just to the west of the mine he was using for his command post; the village was across the Wurm River. While the attack past the St. Sebastian Church into Bardenberg did not happen on 11 October, there was ample reason for concern.

General Hobbs had already received an updated report that day that confirmed the rest of the 116th Panzer Division was expected in the area; other reports verified the German buildup, “with the likelihood of a large scale thrust from the east or southeast.”
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This presented the 30th Division commander with a dilemma. Should he push his left flank outside of Alsdorf eastward, or even southward, into what appeared to be certain peril, or should he have Colonel Johnson's 117th Infantry and the two
battalions of the 120th Infantry hold in place? Ultimately Hobbs decided to wait it out on this flank and see what developed when German intentions became more evident; instead his focus would be on the fight in Würselen, which was in line with his very firm orders from XIX Corps’ General Corlett to finally draw the noose around Aachen by closing the gap.

General Hobbs did not have to wait long to see what the enemy's intentions were. At 0645 the next morning the S-3 of Lieutenant Colonel Franklin's 1st Battalion reported to division that tanks could be heard moving about in the fog out in front of their positions near Mariadorf. The 2nd Battalion of the 120th also sent word that their forward observers could see the ghostly outlines of enemy tanks to the south outside of Euchen. Then heavy artillery shelling began and did not let up for another half hour. Preparing to strike the American positions were a battalion of the 246th Division, a company of Panzer Brigade 108 with fourteen Mark VI Tiger tanks, two other companies with a mix of Mark IVs and Vs, as well as approximately four hundred men and ten more tanks attached to Panzer Grenadier Battalion 506. To their left, newly arrived Panzer Grenadier Regiment 156, accompanied by a half dozen more tanks under the command of
Oberleutnant
Willi Erdmann and belonging to the 2nd Battalion of Panzer Regiment 16, stood before Birk. At 0700 the Germans started attacking.

First hit were the 2nd Battalion positions near Schleibach, but the main assault quickly swung westward into Captain McCullough's companies after two battalions of grenadiers poured out of pillboxes around Euchen into well-deployed formation with sixteen armored vehicles and closed across the open fields toward Birk.
Oberleutnant
Erdmann's six tanks approached from the direction of Würselen. Two American 57mm gun crews near pillboxes in Company A's positions were among the first to see the enemy tanks, and they quickly reported that they were Tigers and Mark Vs. Draws made it difficult to spot the tanks lurking in front of Company B's location; at least three tanks were also spotted in front of Company C's defensive lines.

The 57mm antitank gun crews opened fire when the German tanks got inside 500 yards of Company A's positions; one crew fired three rounds and detracked a Tiger that was “silhouetted on the skyline,”
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and
another American tank put a shell through its turret. A Mark V immediately returned fire, destroyed the gun, and killed the American gunner and his assistant. The second 57mm gun emplacement was also hit, but the unwounded men of this crew stayed at their positions. A section of friendly heavy machine guns fired directly at the Germans who had their tank hatches open; the panzer crews quickly slammed them shut before their tanks burst into flames. One crew was not as fortunate; American machine gunners killed the men running from the burning wreckage. But another Mark V took aim at both Company A machine-gun positions, destroyed their guns, killed one, and wounded six others. Minutes later two TDs were found; the Germans took quick aim and also knocked them both out.

An artillery observation post on the exposed slope in front of Company A's positions now faced peril. An observer here was wounded after horrific enemy shelling found him; another who was rushing forward to take over the outpost was hit before he got there. Then, the tides of battle shifted. Capt. Michael S. Bouchlas, McCullough's liaison officer from the 230th Field Artillery, started up the hill to the OP alone. “We knew that he had made it when our own artillery, which up to this point was sporadic and was even throwing stuff at us, stopped and then began adjusting its fire,” nearby Company A rifleman shared later. “We all felt good about it.”
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Although Company A had sustained forty-eight casualties, including its captain, another account noted that “massed artillery was soon pounding the attackers and within a half hour the threat was over.”

Company B, at the crossroads in Birk, caught the wrath of ten other tanks attached to Tank Battalion 506 before it was all over, however. Later reports singled out Sgt. Melvin H. Bieber, a tank commander who forced the Germans to abandon a Tiger and knocked out a Mark V after twelve hits. Together with the friendly artillery fire that was saving Company A's men, the Shermans with Bieber's unit accounted for five more tank kills; others were still smoldering in front of the company's lines farther out, abandoned by their crews.
Oberleutnant
Erdmann later revealed that “under violent tank fire, since our infantry [was] not here but the enemy continually increases his fire, [2nd Battalion Panzer Regiment 16] finally pulled back to Weiden.”
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By 1030 Col. Branner P. Purdue, the 120th Infantry's commander for just six days, was finally able to report to a concerned General Hobbs that the situation was under control. “I have
no complaints,” Purdue added when Hobbs asked him how he was doing. “These are the bravest men you ever saw. That 1st Battalion fought them off with the outposts. I never did see men going like they have been going. We are as strong as strong can be.”
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